Nikolay Starikov

# 1917

# KEY TO THE "RUSSIAN" REVOLUTION

It wasn't by chance that the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917, and nor was it the case with the Soviet Union. In both cases a powerful external force initiated Russia's falling apart using villains and fools, who completely destroyed their own country for money and attractive promises.

The history of this great catastrophe still holds many mysteries, and there are much more questions than answers here. Germany, which is still blamed for it, was not more than a tool and fell a victim to its own revolution afterwards. February 1917 – this is when the Russian catastrophe of the 20 century started, and we paid too high a price to overcome the damage. However, as soon as we forgot how Russia's geopolitical enemies had destroyed our country, disintegration and chaos came back. In both cases, this force hid behind the smokescreen of an "alliance" and "universal values." And now their conceptual descendants, sufficiently sponsored from abroad, are ready to provoke a new revolution in Russia.

**Read this book and learn**

- **why Nicholas II and his brother abdicated so easily;**
- **who and how arranged Lenin's return to Russia in a "sealed" railway car;**
- **why the British agent Oswald Rayner put a security round into Grigori Rasputin's forehead;**
- **why the German General Staff never knew they had a spy by the name of Ulyanov;**
- **why the Provision Government paid for the passage of revolutionaries, who were going to overthrow them;**
- **why Alexander Kerensky didn't fight Bolsheviks but played a giveaway game with them and tried to hand the power to Lenin.**

**Kerensky = Gorbachev = Yeltsin = …?**

**Enough of this! There should be no more revolutions in Russia!**

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КАРТА
РОССИЙСКОЙ
ИМПЕРІИ

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**16+** (In accordance with the Federal Law of December 29, 2010 № 436-FZ.)

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# Author's Note

February and October 1917.

Two parts of the same whole.

The bullets shot from one gun.

Steps of one stairway leading to Russia's collapse.

A lot of questions haven't been answered yet.

It is still unclear how this thing, which should never have happened, came to pass.

To this day Russia hasn't completely recovered from the mayhem of those days.

After all, the USSR falling apart in 1991 is the direct consequence of what happened in 1917.

We've never learnt the truth about those days.

We haven't acknowledged how and why our state, the Russian Empire, collapsed.

We haven't learnt the lessons of the February and the October days.

And the catastrophe recurred, albeit not as bloody, not as crucial.

And today we hear new calls for resolution of Russia's problems through revolution.

The tragedies have been forgotten, the lessons haven't been learnt, the real number of victims is shrouded in secrecy.

Revolution is not about happy protesters and the collapsed state regime.

Revolution is about millions of victims, hunger, and illnesses, it is about the civil war, the fronts, where the "freed" Russians were sent to shortly after.

No revolution should ever happen again in our lands.

And that is why we need to understand how it happened before. Who is the orchestrator of our revolution?

Can a revolution have an orchestrator?

That is the main mystery of the Russian Revolution…

# CHAPTER 1

# Dark Spot in the History of the Russian Revolution

> The revolutionary October and February are inseparable on the calendar of the Russian Revolution just as they are on the calendar of nature. These are two links of one chain, fever and ulcers of the same plague.
>
> *Anton Kersnovsky*

> It's bad enough to be enemies with Anglo-Saxons, but it's even worse to be friends with them.
>
> *General Alexei Vandam*

Almost 90 years have passed after the February and the October Revolutions, but it is still not clear why and how the powerful Russian Empire fell into oblivion. Whenever you study the history of the Russian Revolution, you will find dark spots here and there. Historians have come up with lots of explanations about those events. And lo and behold, as the social and political structure changes, these explanations change, too. They are as substantial and convincing as before, but their essence becomes directly opposite. It is much like whenever a judge changed, the person on trial and the proof system would change, too. These explanations are like rings on the water — they remain atop, and it is all mud, murky water, and silence in the deep.

A bright example is how Lenin traveled in a "sealed" railway car. Some of the historians say the German spy Ulyanov came home bringing German money. The others say the proletarian leader returned to orchestrate a revolution. However, neither can explain why Lenin ***freely*** entered Russia or why he didn't have to use any counterfeit documents. Right at the railway station, he called people to overthrow the existing government and just got away with that.

We need the simplest tool to study the history of our revolutions — the common sense. If a healthy, powerful, and very rich person suddenly died, the investigation process would be the same in any country. Competent agencies would consider all the versions, look for motives, vestiges, and proofs of the crime. No variants would be neglected only because "this can't be true." Detectives shall not act from emotions in their job, they have to deal with *the facts*. And when a whole empire has been destroyed, documents and deeds of people are the facts.

If we start to study the revolution period in our country, our main feeling will be astonishment. That incredibly many acts of states, politicians, governments, and parties within such a short time segment cause contradictory feelings. However, let's not see politicians and statesmen as fools and simpletons. They aren't any witless than we are. If their actions seem odd to us, then we just fail to see their real motives and objectives. If a variety of serious political events miraculously coincide in such a short period, it can't be a game of chance. Let's see who profited from it...

Let's conduct our own investigation. We'll stick to the facts and put away all the emotions and stereotypes. Just then the one to be truly blamed for the catastrophe unprecedented in the Russian history will come out of the shadow...

Convenient bowels of the conspiracy theory are regularly used to hide the truth about the reasons, orchestrators, and sponsors of the Russian Revolution. Indeed, how can the colossus of a revolution be planned in advance? How can all the kaleidoscope of occasions, human characters, and acts of nature be taken into account? What brain or association is capable of that?

This is what we hear from those who either strive to withhold the truth or are just unaware of how the global politics works, and therefore believe that revolutions are always spontaneous like fires in warehouses happen to be. They believe that neither misuse of funds nor revisions can cause fires, that competitors never set fires on their opponents' and enviers never commit acts of arson — they are sure that the only reasons for fires are short circuits and cigarette ends unextinguished without any fraudulent intent...

***So, can a revolution be calculated and planned?***

***Definitely not!*** No one has ever planned a revolution as an accurate sequence of mathematically precise acts of different people and groups. However, it doesn't mean that there were no intents to shatter Russia from the inside and remove this strong geopolitical competitor.

Do you plan your life from one certificate to another? When I am 18, I will enter University A on Street B, and I will get A in Math and B in Physics. When I am 23, I will be an ordinary manager with 2 years' experience, and then I'll be appointed deputy director, and in 5 years I'll become a director. When I am 26, I'll get married to a blonde by the name of Irene, and we'll have two daughters. We'll have Karina this year, and Olga the next year. When I turn 29, I'll buy a country house...

No one plans their lives that way, that's ridiculous. Life has so many factors that simply can't be predicted. No one is capable of such scheduling, but does it mean that you DON'T MAKE ANY PLANS IN YOUR LIFE? Does it mean you don't construct your life in some way? This is as much nonsense. But this is exactly what our "denouncers' say — because a revolution is as unpredictable as nature, no one can do anything to explode opposing states.

Still, you plan your life — not in every detail, but in general, topically. I need to get a degree, I need to get married, now it's time to have kids. You choose the trends of your life and affect its course. Thus, your life is 50% governed by circumstances and 50% created by yourself.

Likewise, the orchestrators of the Russian Revolution never planned it end-to-end, but they always tried to direct the events according to their needs. They watched the circumstances developing, adjusted, changed and modified their plans, they made their mistakes, had their wins and sustained their defeats. A revolution is like life, and in life, you always plan your objectives depending on sine waves of the reality.

We use different people to our benefit, whether it is good or bad. We just do it. National security agencies do the same — they spent dozens of years to weaken and destroy their opponents. And doing so, they use a lot of people that for various reasons and circumstances are eager to cooperate and help. Sometimes these "helpers" simply don't understand what they are doing, as no one explains to them the essence of their tasks.

States contest each other, and this is indisputable. If the opponent has become weaker, wow. If he hasn't, proceed. Complete destruction of the opponent is an inaccessible objective and is really rare. It requires exclusive good luck and a combination of circumstances, as well as long-term painstaking work, every day and every hour.

This is what the Russian Revolution was about. THAT Tsar in the lead of the country, THOSE allies of the Tsar, that small bunch of extremely talented cynics and riff-raffs from revolutionary parties, that good luck for one party, and that fatal bad luck for the other. Criminal stupidity, foul treachery, impermissible faith, and a gift of oratory — all of it made our revolution happen. There were dozens of thousands of factors that combined for Russia's bad luck.

All those *ifs*...

However, we can't fail to see that all of it was prepared by the scouts of the foreign nation, who took every effort to get all of it ready...

...Our revolution had two stages that are mistakenly considered to be independent full-weight coups. Whether you admit it or not, it all started in February.[1] We've always been told that the events of the February Revolution were plain and simple:

---

[1] According to the Gregorian calendar, the revolution happened in March, and the October Revolution took place in November.

hungry people took to the streets to cry out for some bread and then turned to political slogans. They say it was how autocracy was toppled in Russia. However, the simplicity of this scheme is so very misleading. For instance, Pavel Milyukov, one of the leaders of the February Revolution, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic (KDs) Party, didn't agree with this simplicity. Having participated in those events in person, he didn't delay to write down his reminiscences of them, where he confided that the mechanisms of the February Revolution remained unclear to him.

"This is *the darkest spot* in the history of the Russian Revolution," Milyukov wrote about the events that had put a start to the February Revolution.[1] The name of the chapter where this quotation comes from is also informative, as it is "Secret Sources of Labor Movement."[2] The matter of how and why this revolution started is "the darkest spot" in regard to the February Revolution. This is so odd — you start to read memoirs of the central figures of those events and see blind spots here and there. You had it all clear, bread — demonstration — revolution, but as soon as you open the memoirs of one of the main "Februarists," the puzzle gets scattered.

"One of the omens for this overthrow was the suppressed unrest within labor masses, *its source unclear,* though this source could hardly have been the leaders of Socialist Parties within the State Duma."[3]

The coup started with labor demonstrations, but Milyukov was absolutely unaware of who organized them and why they began.

It is only obvious that KDs didn't initiate them, and nor did their allies from the Progressive Party in the Duma. Social Revolutionaries (SRs) didn't take people to the streets, either. This becomes evident as we flip through a book by Victor Chernov, a well-known leader of this party. After the chapter on how the World War proceeded and how revolutionaries from different countries were trying to come to some mutual understanding, he tells us how he returned to Russia after the February Revolution.[1] If SRs had made something this important, they would have been trumpeting about it all over the world: we've started a process that ended in the damned tsarism overthrowing!

---

[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 33.

[2] Ib.

[3] Ib. P. 34.

Bolsheviks didn't organize the labor demonstrations, either, though later the Soviet historians crept them with the merit of the manifestation arrangement. However, it happened much later, when many of those involved in these events were already dead, and the rest of them were writing their memoirs abroad. At that moment, the matter of who took people to the streets in February 1917 was interesting only to a small coterie, and no one was going to argue with the Red historians. It was so convenient and profitable for the true orchestrators of Russia's collapse. Lenin and his party gave them a 100% good alibi. However, contradicting this lie is so easy — we only need to ask who of the Bolshevist leaders arranged the labor demonstrations that ended in the tsarism overthrowing. It will instantly become clear that all of them were either abroad or in prison, and Vladimir Lenin learnt about the revolution "orchestrated by his party" from the fresh Swiss newspapers. And oh, he was surprised.

And yet, the start of the February Revolution is the key moment for us. We need to know for sure when the Russian Empire started to collapse, and then we will arm ourselves with patience and immense into the subject. And here there are some new discoveries. To be more specific, the logics of these events should be like this: bread — the labor demonstration — the clashes with the police — the revolt of the city garrison soldiers — the revolution. And again, there are mysteries at every turn here:

- it is unknown why the working people came to protest;
- it is also unknown who orchestrated these demonstrations.

---

[1] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 308–309.

"Neither Bolsheviks nor Mensheviks, or the Working Party, or the SRs on their own or all together could have brought the workers of Petrograd to the streets," Viktor Chernov, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionary party, wrote in his memoirs.[1]

So, the workers just stopped working, drew some posters and banners as they must have been bored and for no reason moved forward to overthrow autocracy. If we dig further into the Chronicles of the February Revolution, it doesn't become any clearer. Nobody can give a reasonable answer to the second key question — who took the soldiers to the streets?

"Just the day before it (appearance of soldiers — *N. S.*), the representatives of the left-wing parties met, and most of them were sure that the turmoil was fading away and that the Government had won," Milyukov quoted his Duma colleague Vladimir Stankevich and added, "However, *behind-the-scenes revolution preparation remained behind the scenes*."[2]

Hey, that is interesting. A revolution took place, and no one can clearly explain how its primary events, which caused the shift in power in Russia, happened. No one got soldiers or workers ready, but as if commanded they took to the streets when it was needed, and the outcome of the case was in favor of the overthrow. "There must have been a directing force, but it obviously had nothing to do with organized left-wing parties," Milyukov tells us.[3] And there are some incertitude and confusion in the words of the KD leader. The revolution happened, but neither the Rights (i.e., KDs and Octobrists) nor the Lefts (i.e., SRs and Social Democrats) had organized it. It's hard not to get confused: they had been waiting for freedom decades-long, and when it came, no one knew whom to bless for it.

And old time-proven clichés — whatever is wrong, the Germans did it — didn't work here. It was so convenient, and no evidence was needed. The key proof is really simple: who else can profit from it? Whom did we fight with? Germany. Then, whatever was wrong, the Germans did it. However, if we check the facts closer, this simple logic doesn't work. It wasn't for the first time when in February 1917 our dear Russian workers went on a strike. They had already done that before, for instance, during the Russian Revolution in 1905–1907. Still, never in historiography has anyone written that the first Revolution in 1905 with all its strikes was orchestrated by the Kaiser's intelligence service. That was because it was so ridiculous and absurd to blame the Germans for heating up the Russian liberation movement in that historic period. And indeed, Berlin had no motive for subversion in 1905. It was Japan who had the motive, so historians love to say that during the Russo-Japanese war revolutionaries were paid with Mikado's money. Yet, as World War 1 began, the Japanese lost their motive for subversion (as they were with the Entente), and now the Germans had it, as Russia became their opponent.

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[1] Chernov V. The Great Russian Revolution. M.: Tsentrpoligraph, 2007. P. 100.

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 36.

[3] Ib. P. 37.

Just one problem here — all the questionable events of the Russian Revolutions seem to be written with one hand. One hand held the pen and simply copied the same scenario.[1]

*And if we know the Germans didn't orchestrate our first revolt, why should we put the February and even the October in their book?*

"Great changes came in the east. In March, the revolution supported by the Entente overthrew the Tsar... It is a mystery to me why the Entente walked hand in hand with the revolution... But there is no doubt the Entente hoped to accrue some benefits from the revolution to make war...," said General Erich Ludendorff, the actual leader of the German Army.[2]

---

[1] Geopolitical opponents have always been sabotaging Russia. For more details of this Hundred Years War see: Starikov N. Who is Financing Russia's Collapse? From Decembrists to Mujahideen. St. Pb.: Piter, 2011.

[2] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 411.

Why did they need the revolution? In fact, it was the revolutionary explosion that destroyed both the Russian and the German Empires...

It wasn't Germany that orchestrated the February Revolution. Why am I so sure? Because by now NONE OF THE HISTORIANS has ever blamed the Germans. The German agents took advantage of the revolt, indeed. If a crowd of drunken soldiers is passing by, why not aim it at counter-intelligence? Why not direct them to kill — not only officers, like in Kronshtadt, but certain people from a special list? And still, it is a smart use of the circumstances shaped up by somebody else...

Everybody blames the German General Staff for orchestrating the October, but no one blames it for the February. And this is weird. The first part of the revolutionary demolition of Russia in 1917 is kind of "ownerless." It happened on its own. Whereas the Germans are believed to have prepared the October. The problem is that both the February and the October Revolutions are links of the same chain, steps of the same stairs. These are two parts of one plan. And if you, dear reader, think this matter is disputable now, when you've just started to read this book, you will have no doubts in that regard after we're done.

*And if the orchestrator is the same, and the February Revolution wasn't prepared by the Germans, then who is responsible for our revolution?*

...February 1917 brought strange and mysterious events. There were no orchestrators, no reasons, but there were consequences disastrous for Russia. No one knew about them then, they weren't that obvious. Who of the happy protesters flushed with the wind of changes in February 1917 could have imagined that in six months the powerful Russian Army would become a herd of looters and deserters, that soldiers would be killing their officers, and that in eight months a group of fanatics would seize the power? Not even in their nightmares they imagined the Civil War, typhus, famine, their native country absolutely ruined, and millions of people dead.

And yet, "unexplainable" events in the Russian Empire began long before February 1917 and haven't stopped by now. Like a venomous snake, they crawled since the first Russian Revolution over the body of World War 1. They impregnated the February and the October Revolutions to the core. After that, weird and curious coincidences faded away and came back only in 1985 to add plentiful decoration to the quiet and dull life in the Soviet Union. And right after that, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

So, who orchestrated it all? Who does Russia owe for incomprehensible sufferings of its sons and daughters? To answer this question we have to go back in time that passes by so fast. We need to get back to the start of the Russo-Japanese War. And we'll clearly see that the chaos and anarchy that were to start in Russia had been accurately planned. Those who truly believe that the first and the next Russian revolutions happened on their own should pay attention to one little-known fact. On January 27, 1904, some Philipp Voronov came to the State Bank of St. Petersburg, where he had an account, and explained that he had received a note with a hysterical warning, "Save your money!" Such letters (both handwritten and hectographed) suddenly appeared all over the Russian Empire and filled the country promptly. The authors of the note threatened, "The ministers need money to fight Japan. They take our money from the banks and give us our revenue."

This economic diversion was started in advance. And mind you that those notes appeared in Russian cities **right on the first day** (!) of the Russo-Japanese War. It means that whoever intended to undermine the financial stability of Russia needed to know when the Japanese were going to "suddenly" attack our fleet in Port Arthur. And the letters had to be printed and sent out all over the country, it was necessary to plan how they were going to be distributed and passed to the paper boys. In short, a serious and extensive work had to be done...

The notes weren't published in vain — in many places the situation quickly became critical, and funds started to outflow from the banks. The panic was especially strong in the provinces of Warsaw, Baltics, Minsk, Vilnius, and Grodno. However, calm and balanced state politics helped to overcome the challenge.

Whoever wished it were returned their deposits, and all top Russian newspapers published announcements that the banks undertook to further observe their obligations to their depositors. Similar announcements were posted in the banks and in public places. And the panic settled down. Today the story of the panic among the depositors in 1904 is told in Sberbank of Russia to draw attention to the challenging and hard times this grand company has faced through its 160 years of existence. The matter of who orchestrated these difficulties is not raised or studied anymore. No one draws parallels between the similar actions and further feeding of the revolution machine.

So, who was trying to cause economic collapse in Russia? At first, one would think of blaming Japan. And there is no doubt that the Japanese secret services had their hand in it. Yet, they were definitely unable to cause havoc that major, not least because they didn't have that distributed agent network in Russia. At that time the Japanese secret services only started to communicate with the Russian revolutionaries. Moreover, a sudden activity of the Japanese in searching contacts with the subversives could have alerted the Russian counter-intelligence and warned the tsarist government about the upcoming war. If one such note had got to the wrong hands, the entire Russo-Japan War could have gone differently.

It means someone helped the Japanese. Only someone with the distributed network of agents all over the country could have planned and made it all. And they weren't the revolutionaries because all radical parties swarmed with police spies, and thus, the date of the attack by Japan would have instantly been reported to the tsarist secret police that would have passed it to the army and fleet executives. Such data leak shouldn't have been afforded. Thus, whoever sent notices all over the Russian cities had to have iron discipline and remain in Russia.

Who was it that so accurately and consistently orchestrated the attempt to destabilize the inside life of our country? Who helped the Japanese to find paper boys to distribute the anonymous notes, who started to stir the pot by these yet pacific means?

And there is one more really newsworthy event behind the rapid development of World War 1. It seemed so minor and humble against the catastrophe that no one seemed to pay attention to that, albeit someone should have! Like a small fragment of a large mirror, this event reflected the coming Russian Revolution. Its scenario and driving force showed their worth right before the global conflict, in June 1914. Literally a week before the global conflict there had been a series of strikes in the capital of the Russian Empire. The country, tortured with the first Russian coup, wasn't likely to be surprised with industrial strikes. The police and the tsarist secret police were accustomed to subversive activities of the revolutionaries. However, these strikes were unusual. They were even described in a lot of memoirs. The main specialty of these mayhems and strikes were weirdness and mysteriousness. They started for no apparent cause, kind of "incidentally," and they stopped as suddenly.

Tatiana Botkina, the daughter of the Tsar's doctor who was shot with his crown-bearing patients in Yekaterinburg, recalls those odd strikes, "The workers withheld their labor, thronged the streets, broke trams and lampposts, killed policemen. *No one saw the reason for that turmoil.* Whoever got caught was thoroughly interrogated about why they had started it all.

'We don't know, they gave us *tryoshnitsy* (three ruble notes) and told us to give a good working over trams and policemen, and so we did,' they would say."[1]

Mikhail Rodzianko, the chairman of the State Duma, in his writing "State Duma and the February Revolution in 1917," paid much attention to these events, too. "In 1914, right before the war, Petrograd was full of revolutionary incidents. Happening among the working people of Petrograd, these incidents were often quelled by the armed forces. There were demonstrations, meetings, tramway cars were keeled over, telegraph and telephone poles were kicked down, and barricades were built."[2]

---

[1] Melnik-Botkina T. Memories of the Tsar Family. M.: Zakharov, 2004. P. 27.

[2] Rodzianko M. State Duma and the February Revolution in 1917; http://lib.web-malina.com/getbook.php?bid=3939&page=6

Rodzianko also indicated the time when the mayhem started, "It started when Russia was paid a visit by Poincare, the president of the French Republic."[1]

For your reference, President Raymond Poincare came to Russia on 20 (7) July, 1914. It was right when the upcoming global conflict was getting started. It was eleven days before the war!

"Last sounds of street fighting accompanied the French president as he put a wreath on the tomb of Alexander III," Leon Trotsky wrote in his "History of the Russian Revolution."[2] Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador, who met his president in the Russian capital, recalls, "When I returned to Petersburg by railway at a quarter to one, I was told that in the afternoon *with no reason and by a signal made from a location unknown major plants of the city stopped their work,* and clashes with the police started here and there."[3]

None of the cabinet members had time to analyze the sudden flash of labor demonstrations. Right after that the country was shaken in a way that made a couple of damaged tramways a golden age. However, at the end of July 1914 the Russian government was rather anxious about this mayhem. Yet, as the war began, the Russian special service had no time to determine the reasons and orchestrators of the mysterious strikes. Then they had more important issues to deal with, and later they were quickly and efficiently destroyed by the revolution. And the reason for those strikes has never been discovered. Or rather it hasn't been proved, as the authors of the above-mentioned memoirs readily named the guilty parties and orchestrators without much hesitation.

"There is no doubt that the turmoil among the workers was caused by the activities of the German General Staff," Rodzianko wrote.[1] Tatiana Botkina shared his position and wrote that "*tryoshnitsy*" given to unconscientious workers by anonymous agitators had come from Germany.[2] Here is the guilty party, the Germans. And once again, there is this plain evidence like "But who else?" Who could have agitated the strikes in Russia right on the edge of the war with it? Naturally, it had to be someone who was going to attack it — the Germans. And everything is consistent and true here if we miss the simple fact that *Germany wasn't going to attack Russia!*

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[1] Rodzianko M. State Duma and the February Revolution in 1917; http://lib.web-malina.com/getbook.php?bid=3939&page=6

[2] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1–3.html

[3] Paleologue M. The Tsarist Russia in the World War. M.: International Relations. 1991. P. 28.

The only war plan that existed, the Schlieffen Plan, didn't provide for that.[3] And why would Germany need demonstrations and beating up the policemen in Petersburg? It was the war with France that Germany was actually getting ready for. It would be much more logical to cause some turmoil in Paris to destabilize its industry and environment. Could it have been the Japanese again? Hardly so — during World War 1 Japan joined the Entente and forced the Chinese Qingdao out of it. It no longer had contradictions with Russia. Japan was peacefully building its empire in Asia. Why would it destabilize the Russian political landscape?

Yet, there was a nation that had a motive. The one that was tediously preparing the encounter of its two geopolitical opponents, Germany and Russia. Germany wouldn't dare to fight the entire world (meaning the British Empire and its allies). Thus, Britain through the mouth of Sir Gray, the foreign secretary, evoked in the Germans the sense that the moment was unique — only at that moment, Britain would remain neutral and thereat Germany could be rough and determined. The issue with Serbia could have been solved, and Russia and France could have been put in their proper places. The "allies" were ready to do anything to evolve this false sensation with the German and Austrian governments. In particular, they were ready to simulate Russia's weakness by means of the fabricated strike movement...

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[1] Rodzianko M. State Duma and the February Revolution in 1917; http://lib.web-malina.com/getbook.php?bid=3939&page=6

[2] Melnik-Botkina T. Memories of the Tsar Family. M.: Zakharov, 2004. P. 28.

[3] According to the Schlieffen Plan, France was to be invaded along with defense on the Eastern Front in case France and Russia were fought. The latest version of this plan was provided in the memorable note Schlieffen wrote in December 1905 that was called "Krieg gegen Frankreich" ("War Against France"). (Strokov A. History of the Military Art. St. Pb.: Omega Polygon, 1994. P. 259.) (We will come back to the details of the German military plan and the mechanism for starting World War 1 later. After all the weirdness of our revolution this information will be compelling not in the beginning, but at the end of this book).

*The British took every effort to set Germany on Russia.* It was them who provoked mysterious riots and the turmoil. All of it was just a part of the large-scale campaign for misleading the German government, which would be later joined even by the British monarch. The objective was to trigger a world war.

"Strikes started for no apparent reason," Rodzianko wrote. "Yet, several days before the war was announced, when the international political stature turned threatening, when the powerful Austria issued its notorious and unacceptable ultimatum for small Serbia, brotherly to us, *all the revolutionary turmoil had stopped in the capital as if by magic*."[1]

"The announcement of war caused a surge of patriotic enthusiasm. All the broken trams and German *tryoshnitsy* were forgotten...," Tatiana Botkina wrote about the early stage of the war.[2]

Curiously enough, we see that the striking rampage *"as if by magic"* stopped right after the battle actions had begun. Yet, that's impossible. If the turmoil had been prepared by the German special service, they should have reinforced their effort when Russia and Germany rushed into the war. And here the operations were folded in a couple of days.

Barbara Tuchman, a writer, won the Pulitzer Prize for her book "The Guns of August" ("August 1914"). Such awards are hardly given for nothing. If we open the book, we'll read, "Count Pourtales, an elderly ambassador, who had lived in Russia for seven years, concluded and repeatedly assured his government that *this country would not fight for fear of revolution.*"[1]

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[1] Rodzianko M. State Duma and the February Revolution in 1917; http://lib.web-malina.com/getbook.php?bid=3939&page=6

[2] Melnik-Botkina T. Memories of the Tsar Family. M.: Zakharov, 2004. P. 28.

Count Friedrich von Pourtales was the German ambassador to Russia. Having seen the broken trams, he sent a letter to Berlin in July 1914 assuring his government that this country, i. e. Russia, would not fight. Having read enough of such letters, the Germans and the Austrians took a rough attitude, which finally led to the World War. Yet, was it the German intelligence service that performed some spectacular strikes and meetings for their own ambassador? No, they were neither the Germans nor the Japanese. Then who took the Russian workers to the streets and paid them with "*tryoshnitsy*" to demonstrate Russia's weakness?

If this isn't absolutely clear to you yet, let's consider one more mysterious event. It was described in the memoirs of Viktor Chernov, the head of the Russian Social Revolutionary Party. SRs had close relations with the Polish Socialist Party (PSP), their friendship long and time-proven. They tried to destroy the Russian state during the first revolution, together they killed policemen and soldiers. And when the year 1914 came, the situation changed.

"...We felt somewhat odd and alarming during the speech of Jozef Pilsudski in 1914," the head of SRs wrote.[2] What happened? What caused the sudden coolness between the revolutionary parties? It was nothing, the head of PSP and the future leader of the independent Polish state just delivered a lecture at the Geographical Society of Paris. And it was all about its plot...

"Pilsudski was absolutely sure that in the nearest future Russia and Austria were going to enter a war for the Balkans," Chernov wrote giving the words of this Polish Socialist, who *had given an accurate forecast of how World War 1 was going to start.*[3] Confidently and accurately Pilsudski explained which nations would support each other, and who and why would rush into the armed conflict. Yet, this still was not the main thing!

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[1] Tuchman B. The Guns of August (August 1914). M.: AST, 2004; http://militera.lib.ru/h/tuchman/06.html

[2] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 293.

[3] Ib.

"...Pilsudski put the question squarely: what would happen and who would win the war? This was his answer — Austria and Germany would defeat Russia, but would be defeated themselves by the Anglo-French (or the Anglo-American-French)."[1]

The Polish dictator's insights into the future were incredible. Neither Nicholas II nor Wilhelm II or Franz Josef suspected that the war was coming. Archduke Franz Ferdinand quietly played with his children in Belvedere Castle, Gavrilo Princip attended his university classes. Mlada Bosna group didn't consider killing the heir to the Austrian throne yet, and the general staffs of the future opponents didn't even have any plans for the upcoming war. However, *Jozef Pilsudski didn't just know the war scenario, but was even aware of how it was going to end!*

Even the Head of the SR Fraction Chernov, who detested the tsarist autocracy, hardly understood Pilsudski's reasoning. How can Russia be the only one to be defeated if Britain, France, and the USA were on its side, and, according to the orator, were going to win?! In the 21 century, we easily agree with this Polish leader, as we know what happened next. Yet, in 1914 his prediction, as Chernov put it, looked like "a house of cards, a dream of a manipulator in politics."[2] However, Pilsudski didn't just hesitate to predict the coming war and precisely announce its results but also dropped a hint about the winning tactics for those fighting for free Poland in that war. He only suggested that there were outsiders listening. He sent his comrade by the name of Jodko, the future ambassador of Rzeczpospolita in Constantinople, to discuss the details.

"This discussion is one of the best ones that I've ever had," said the head of the Russian SRs.[3] Of course, having a chance to talk to people who know the future in-and-out is a rare thing. Yet, the more Pilsudski's messenger talked, the more Chernov wondered and the less he understood. Jodko told him that in case of war the Polish were going to help the Germans "to clear the provinces of the Kingdom of Poland" from the Russian Army.

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[1] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 293.

[2] Ib. P. 294.

[3] Ib. P. 295.

"Let me put it straight... Right now we are thoroughly getting ready for a possible Europe-wide war... We prefer the Austrian Army to the Germans. The Polish military resources are already being trained in our Galicia... We prefer Austria to Germany because the former is weaker and can be imposed our terms," Pilsudski's envoy pulled back the shroud of secrecy.[1]

As the discussion progressed, Viktor Chernov started to groan inwardly. Having seen the first Russian Revolution, he understood that something grand and large-scale was about to start, and he, the head of the SR Party, knew nothing about it. Wheelmen and people directing the flows of the global behind-the-stage politics had steered clear of him this time. The problem was that giving "crazy" lectures was one thing, and following them and training the military resources for the Austrian Army was an absolutely different thing. Independence of Poland, Pilsudski's homeland, was at stake. If his prediction, which sounded like a madman's raving, had turned out wrong, consequences for Poland would have been absolutely unpredictable. That meant that Pilsudski knew something that Viktor Chernov didn't.

And Jodko went on. It turned out that the Polish Socialists had taken everything into account. At the right moment, they were going to betray the Germans and side with the Anglo-French.

"...It isn't a secret for either Paris or London. During the early stage of the war, we are going to cooperate with the Germans to oppose Russia. During the second and the final stage of the war we are going to side with the Anglo-French to oppose Germany."[2]

After these words there was silence. Chernov was definitely impressed. All that we can do is wonder with our eyes wide open. However, as we know what objectives the British and the French had in the coming war, why should we be surprised? They were tediously preparing World War 1 to destroy Russia and Germany. Whoever had hatred for these two nations could help. Yet, "the allies' planned a combination so complicated and brilliant that the Polish could have failed to understand all the political narrow curve. That was why Pilsudski was given this information — for Poland to get ready and act as needed. They weren't afraid of the data leak. Should some Jodko share the knowledge with the Russian gendarme, no one would have taken him seriously. Just like in January 1991, no one would believe a story about the August Putsch in the USSR, about the future collapse of the Soviet Union, and the start of the first Chechen War. Such things seem absolutely impossible until they actually happen...

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[1] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 296.

[2] Ib.

There were so many other incredible and fantastic stories in the Chronicles of World War 1 and the Russian Revolution that rose from it. These stories appear many-colored in reputed memoirs and absolutely free sources, one just needs to pay attention. For instance, the future hero of Finland, at that time — a Russian Cavalry General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim spent three years in battles of World War 1. In February 1917, he came to his native Suomi for a stay. There were joyful meetings, visits, and dates. And in Mannerheim's memoirs we read, "When I visited an old friend of mine from the Cadet Corps for lunch, I met some ex-officers and old friends. Over lunch, no one said a word about 2,000 volunteers that had moved to Germany to receive military education there within the recent two years. And by the way, those were the people that should have joined the army to free Finland in case the long-expected revolution happened in Russia."[1]

Stop. It is 1917. If the Finns had been leaving for Germany for already two years, they should have started in 1915. At that time the revolution was nowhere near Russia. Then how did "the hot-tempered Finnish blokes" (Translator's note: This phrase was popularized by the 1995 Russian comedy 'Peculiarities of the National Hunt' due to the Russian stereotype of Finns being slow in speech, thinking, and action) know that it was to happen? Moreover, for them it was "long-expected," and they were training the anti-Russian Army in advance to make their country independent. Was it a coincidence, a chance, or a twinge of intuition?

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[1] C. Mannerheim. Memoirs. M.: Vagrius, 1999. P. 70.

No, it wasn't. It was exact knowledge, just like with Pilsudski. The British were planning to destroy Russia and Germany through setting them on one another. They needed allies to fulfil their plan. Russia was very large, and the Poles alone can't have done the trick. Albeit Poland had the top-priority part in crushing of our country, Finland due to its size could have joined the process as late as in 1915. It had a much more humble task, and it received information later, in strict compliance with the scenario...

Thus, using facts and logic, we can find who orchestrated the collapse of the Russian Empire...

Still, logic alone isn't enough for history, so let's turn to facts. The generally accepted version of how the February Revolution started is simple and plain. Russia entered the war, sustained tremendous losses, its economy was exhausted, and naturally, its people were annoyed and overthrew the corrupted autocracy. Was everything so? If we look into the facts in greater detail and consistently interpret them, this simple explanation will fall to pieces like a house of cards.

Let's start with some obvious things that can't be argued. A successful attempt to change the existing regime is called a revolution, and an unsuccessful one — an uprisal, a coup, or an anti-government plot. Whenever the people are dissatisfied with their government, there is *a reason* that will either lead to a victorious revolution or will be ingloriously suppressed. World War 1 involved 38 countries, including the largest European monarchies. By 1917, after three years of fighting, all members of the global fight incurred tremendous human and economic losses. Surely, the extents of their losses varied, but the participants were different in size, too, and their economic and mobilization potentials were diverse.

Reasons for dissatisfaction, i. e., for dumping the regime during the war, can be some military defeats or incredible deterioration of living conditions. At the end of World War 1, revolutions happened in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Regime changes there were in many respects caused by the military defeats of these empires and the dismal state of their economies. *However, in 1917 Russia was the only country where the revolution had already happened.* Following this logic, Russia either lost the war a year and a half earlier than all of its opponents, or sufferings and hardships of its citizens were beyond all expectations. This is what the Soviet historiography kept telling us, and today all pro-liberal historians repeat it. *Yet, in February 1917 the Russians had neither strategic military nor economic reasons for revolting!*

The potential of our country development in the early 20 century was so great that the situation in the country, at the front, and in the army didn't get any worse but even improved. The front was stable, and it was all calm in the country. Of course, in the third year of the war Russia wasn't as full with bread and wine as it used to be. And yet, don't forget that whenever a war happened, it always brought along hunger, deprivation, and military draft. The unprecedentedly colossal encounter caused problems in all spheres of life. The living conditions naturally lowered, the food economy changed for the worse if compared with peaceful times. However, this happened everywhere — at our opponents' and our allies', too. Almost everywhere it came to regulated consumption and food coupons. When the German government discovered the lack of food caused by the British naval blockade, they quickly started to confiscate food and redistribute it directly. Austria-Hungary in early 1915 introduced coupons for bread, which was followed with coupons for other consumer goods. The British were starving, as their ships loaded with foreign provisions were sent to the bottom by the German submarines, and "various agencies confiscated all delivered provisions for military units and supply workers; potatoes and flour were unavailable to the poor." [1] David Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, wrote, "By the autumn of 1916 the food position was becoming increasingly alarming and grave."[1] France had serious issues with food, too, as half of its territories were occupied by the Germans, and many industrial enterprises were within the warfare zone. Trotsky, who passed Sweden when returning to Russia in 1917, wrote that the only thing he recalls from this neutral Scandinavian country was "bread coupons."[2]

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[1] Czernin O. In the World War. M.; Pg.: Giz, 1923. P. 159.

In other words, Russians weren't starving any more than people in other countries at war and were much better than in the "free" Russia soon after the second and the third revolutions. And the deprivation experienced by the Petrograd citizens in 1917 definitely couldn't match the dreadful hunger people suffered during the Blockade of Leningrad. And it wasn't just the same city, *many of the people were the same.* Yet, starving to death in 1942, people didn't take to the streets to demand bread. Was it because people perceived the opponent differently? Was it because they were ideologically brain-washed? Yes, indeed. Yet, the main thing was that everyone knew that the government wouldn't tolerate any tricks and would suppress any the demonstrations definitely playing in the opponent's favor. And there were no instigators or leaders, no one to fire up and manipulate the crowd to direct it in accordance with their own needs. I mean, it was so easier for the foreign spies to work in Petrograd of 1917 than in Leningrad of 1942…

The economy of the Russian Empire groaned, rattled, but stood up even to the enormous expenses for the war. If in 1914 the war expenses of Russia came to 1,655 mln rubles, in 1915 they were 8,818 mln rubles, and in 1916 they were 14,573 mln rubles.[3] Deliveries of military equipment were to a certain extent covered with the loans provided by Britain and the USA. The military draft sucked out up to 15 mln adult males from Russia. When this figure is announced out of context, it does astound. If compared with other belligerent countries, though, things look much different. Russian peasants draught to the army made up about 9% of the Russian population, whereas German and France sent about 20% of their adult males to fight. Even in Britain, which always used someone else to do the dirty work, it was about 13%.[1]

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[1] D. Lloyd George. War Memoirs. V. 2. P. 597.

[2] Trotsky L. My Life; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/My_Life/My_Life-00–02–01.html

[3] Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision… St. Pb.: Satis, 2002. P. 234.

The situation in Russia was not worse but better than in other countries at war! In Germany they had to draft 17-year-olds, some voted for general mobilization of all males from 15 to 60.[2] The high command demanded that this military service obligation "should be extended to women, at least, to a certain extent." In January 1916, the Emperor of Austria issued a decree declaring males of 50 to 55 liable for military service; in Turkey, it was up to 50.[3] As we see, toils of war affected Russia not more than the other countries at war.

Why did the revolution happen in our country, then?

This is the question we need to ask again and again. Might it be because of the country's lands occupied by the opponent? But then the revolution definitely should have happened in Paris, not in Petrograd, as half of the French lands were under the German heel. A great scene for disturbance formed in Romania. Their army was completely defeated, most of the country and even the capital were occupied by the Germans. And we just lost Poland, which wasn't too important to us, and some Baltic provinces. These lands didn't matter for food supply to the country. All the primordially Russian lands were safe and sound. The production sector was okay, and the population didn't suffer the horrors of war made beyond the stabilized front line. The primary blooming part of Russia was going to be destroyed much later, during the Civil War that was started with this objective, with the direct instigation and strong contribution of the Entente.

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[1] Yakovlev N. August 1, 1914. M.: Algoritm, 2002. P. 291.

[2] Zaichonkovsky A. World War I. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 628.

[3] Ib.

Thus, there were no typical prerequisites that normally lead to riots and then to revolutions in war times. But for one, though — the wish of the British government to destroy their dangerous geopolitical opponents and the ability of the British intelligence to provoke unrest, turmoil, and regime changes in the undesirable states.

To make the next move towards correct understanding of what happened in February, we should talk not about reasons of the revolution in general, but about why it actually started:

- exactly in 1917;
- exactly in February of that year.

There were several reasons for that, and their coincidence caused that month of that year to put a start to the Russian tragedy...

The Russian industry was taking every effort to rearm its army as fast as possible. Our military experience obviously demonstrated that we could only rely on ourselves. Deliveries of weapons from the "allies" were accurately measured and pursued a two-fold task — not to let Russia be resoundingly defeated and leave the war and to prevent decisive victories in the Eastern Front. Weakened yet resisting, Russia was needed to fulfil certain scenarios, and the completion time for those plans was drawing close...

At the same time, the Russian government faced the future with confidence. Next year they planned to significantly improve the military situation in the country: the dreadful scourge of the Russian Army, the missile shortage, was coming to its end. It was impossible to measure how many lives we've paid for that persistent silence of the Russian arms. At early stages of the war the field artillery had a reserve of 1,000 missiles per a piece of ordnance, and by 1917 it was 4,000 missiles.[1] This empowered the Russians to plan any heavy attacks with a due preparatory bombardment of the opponent's defense posture. It clearly made the breakthrough and the victory much more possible. If the Russian soldiers managed to carry the war on without missiles and ammo, they were going to become simply unbeatable once they had them.

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[1] Barsukov E. Russian Ordnance in World War I. M.: Voenizdat, 1938. V. 1. P. 70.

Armed with only rifles, our soldiers mowed out the best of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the battlefields of Galicia and the Carpathian ravines. The Germans got their share, too — according to statistics, the German regiments fighting in the East Front suffered twice as many losses than the Germans battling in the west. The Turks, who had defeated the British and the French, suffered a catastrophic defeat from the Russian Army, and the Russian soldiers were at the approaches to Iraq already. And this heroic army entered the year 1917 as strong as ever.

Both Russia and its "allies" planned their offensive blows in spring and summer. The German Army, by contrast, planned its strategic defense. "Our position was really challenging and almost desperate. We couldn't think of any offence, and we had to keep our reserves ready for defense. Any of the Entente members would hardly be put out of action. *Our defeat seemed inevitable…,*" Erich Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs.[1]

The German Army was pessimistic as they were reported not only by the German ministers but by their Austro-Hungarian colleagues, too. And the latter were full of some goner's "optimism."

"It is quite obvious that our military strength is coming to an end. To enter into lengthy details in this connection would be to take up your Majesty's time needlessly. I allude only to the decrease in raw materials for the production of munitions, to the thoroughly exhausted human materials, and, above all, to the dull despair that pervades all classes owning to undernourishment and renders impossible any further endurance of the sufferings from the war.

Though I hope we succeed in holding out during the next few months and carry out a successful defense, I am nevertheless quite convinced that another winter campaign would be absolutely out of question; in other words, that in the later summer or in the autumn an end must be put to the war at all costs. Without a doubt, it will be most important to begin peace negotiations."[1]

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[1] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 379.

This is how Count von Czernin, the internal minister in Austria, grimly described the situation in the report for his Emperor. After the Russian Army had significantly increased its combat might, the German Army wouldn't withstand the onslaught from the east and west for long. Germany would be definitely followed by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, whose armies stayed up only with the German support. The German submarines were the only hope for Germany — if they didn't help to win the war, they would at least help them to stay up. "Without our submarine warfare, the Quadruple Alliance would have been inevitably defeated in 1917,"[2] Ludendorff indicated. Therefore, no one relied on the overland army anymore.

***The military catastrophe of Germany and all of its satellites was inevitably coming in 1917.*** "If in 1917 Russia had remained an "organized state," all the Danube countries would be just Russian provinces today," said Count Istvan Bethlen, the Hungarian chancellor. "Not only Prague but Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Sofia would follow the will of the Russian rulers. The Russian military flags would wave in the breeze in Constantinople on the Bosphorus and in Kotor on the Adriatic Coast. Yet, due to the revolution, Russia lost this war and many of its lands..."[3]

The victory was very close, which meant Russia was going to win. However, our joint victory with all of its signs clear wasn't what the "allies" wanted, as in that case they would have to share the trophies. They would have to give Russia the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles and to let Russia out from the blocked Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Thus, Russia might have left the crucible of the dreadful war not ruined but reinforced. And it would have been impossible not to give it the straits if it had won. On December 1, 1916, Nicholas II addressed the army and the navy and explained that he was going to fight for the recovery of our primordial boundaries and for the ownership of Constantinople. Thus, he announced the agreements made, and after Russia had victoriously ended the war, they couldn't have been failed. If Russia hadn't been on the list of the winning nations, though, there wouldn't be any need for sharing!

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[1] Czernin O. In the World War. M.; Pg.: Giz, 1923. P. 161.

[2] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of the War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 384.

[3] Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision... M.: Forum, 2007. P. 242.

Our partners from the Entente didn't need the world slaughter to end in the coming year, it was too early. The "allies" didn't need a victory. They wanted to have Russia and Germany, these large states, destroyed, and their economies absolutely ruined. It would be great to have chaos and civil wars to weaken them finally. Early in 1917, the Russians and the Germans weren't yet ready to kill their fellows. It was necessary to make their sufferings even worse for the scenario to work. The "allies" took every effort to prevent the war from ending this year and to prolong it for a year and a half. Millions of soldiers were going to fall on battlefields in accordance with the plan of our "allies," who didn't just need a victory. What they needed were total destruction and the revolution. Russia should have been the first to burst into flames — to get rid of the tsarist regime and detonate the rest of the monarchial Europe. That's why the war took over a year longer, and Germany fell only in November 1918, not in summer 1917. How can a war be "prolonged" when one of the opponents is ready to loose? Only through weakening the other opponent. The February Revolution despite its obvious progressiveness quickly destroyed the Russian Army, which revived the spirits of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The war went on. That's why "the bourgeois democratic revolution" should have happened in Russia exactly in 1917.

There are other rather compelling facts explaining why the revolution was needed in February, not in August or July. ***As the Russian General Headquarters planned to land in the Bosphorus in March or April 1917, February was the deadline for***

***a revolution in Russia.*** After this push in March the revolution would be impossible, and thus, it was due by February. If the Russian Army had entered Constantinople, it would have come into Russia's possession without any prior agreements. So, February was the deadline for the revolution.

Summarized, *no matter how weird it sounds, it was an improvement of the military situation, not its worsening, that lead to the February overthrow!* It was exactly when the revolution should have happened. Light had already appeared at the end of the tunnel — for Russian patriots. It was the last call for the orchestrators of the global slaughter and the authors to the scenario of our overthrow. They had to hurry, as after the war there wouldn't be a chance to destroy Russia. Before they had blinked, the war would have been over, and there wouldn't have even been a reason for revolution. If you are still in doubt, recall what happened next. As if on an order, monarchy fell, putting an end to all the plans of getting Constantinople and the straits. The Provisional Government discussed it a lot but could do nothing, as they had no army, no navy, and soldiers and sailors weren't eager to fight.

All the above-mentioned were the exterior reasons why the Russian Revolution had to happen before spring 1917. Yet, there was another strictly interior reason why the Russian Emperor had to be quickly overthrown. Historians that tell us about these events lose sight of an important fact. ***In November 1917, the powers of the Fourth State Duma were to expire.*** In the end of June 1916, Nicholas II received a report on the meeting held at Boris Shturmer's, the Russian prime minister. "Forming a hardworking and patriotic majority in the State Duma is especially important under the grave situation caused by the war,"[1] which was the government's strategy for the future election, absolutely correctly formed by the attendants of the meeting. The previous election gave Russia many anti-state thinking deputies that used the Duma tribune to accuse the state and its leaders. In careerists ready to risk the well-being of their nation for personal prominence.

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[1] Diaries and documents from the personal archives of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 320.

Moreover, the government wasn't going to tolerate the Duma vespiary even by fall 1917. An order about the Duma dissolution was being prepared, and the new election was to be held after the victory. On February 22 (9), 1917, Nikolay Maklakov, ex-minister of internal affairs, received the Emperor's order to draft this manifest. Maklakov had been in his retirement for about 2 years after his Duma companions made him chased by the mass media and in the Duma circles. The deputies didn't like him, and he felt the same way about them. Being a minister, he regularly reported to the monarch about the attitude of the parliament leaders that was, to say the least of it, weird and adverse for the country. And it was him who Nicholas II entrusted to compile the manifest draft.

"...It is urgent that we thoroughly consider the entire plan of further actions by the executive powers to be ready for all the temporary difficulties that the Duma and the unions will definitely tangle up some of our people in after the State Duma dissolution..."[1], Maklakov wrote.

The authorities were getting ready for a resolute struggle with the exterior enemy in 1917. To that effect, it was intended to disarm the interior enemy first. None of the authorities thought or believed that "its true allies" were the real enemy of the Russian Empire...

The truth about the Russian chaos in 1917 has been lost under so many speculations and counterfeiting that it is hard to dig it out. However, we need to do it, because the scenario for ruining Russia used in 1917 was slightly changed and repeated in 1991 for the Soviet Union. And if our geopolitical opponents and orchestrators of our country's double trouble remain our "allies," the integrity and even existence of the modern Russia remains at risk. If we know the previous scenarios, we might prevent the future catastrophe...

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[1] Diaries and documents from the personal archives of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 192.

Thousands or even dozens of thousands of scenarios for state cataclysms and revolutions have been made up during the history of the humanity. However, only several dozens of these "projects" have been a success. Revolutions as destructive as in Russia, bringing as many victims and so totally ruining the country's power have never happened afterwards. And we need to understand some things here:

- Ruination of the Russian Empire wasn't predetermined.
- The revolution wasn't inevitable.
- The operation of the British intelligence for the destruction of their opponent, Russia, wasn't a perfectly designed ingenious plan.

A great number of invisible facts, details, and contingencies had to match each other as in a puzzle. They had to coincide for our REVOLUTION to happen. In such a large-scale project many facts developed favorably for those wishing to destroy Russia and unfavorably for its people and government, Yet, don't get depressed. Every spectacular success of the Anglo-Saxons is always followed by a failure as spectacular. Russia, which seemed destroyed in 1917–1924, managed to retrieve it power. When with a sore heart we think of the year 1917, so fatal for our country, let's remember that in 1945 our tanks entered Berlin.

*The main culprits behind the tragic events in Russia were Great Britain and the USA, and to a smaller extent, France.* These were the countries that allied the Russian Army to fight their common enemy. An enemy can't be blamed for inciting chaos in the opponent's country to try and win the war. An enemy is an enemy, and any claims in that regard are ridiculous and absurd. However, there is no forgiveness for pseudo-friends that hug you with one hand and stab you with the other.

*The next person guilty is the Russian Emperor.* His particular government "genius" allowed the Russian enemies to implement their plans. It was he who had given key jobs to the people that betrayed him. It was he who made his immediate surrounding permanently allergic to himself. It was he who let his country be dragged into the World War and who sacrificed hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers' lives for mythical "allied" ideals. It was he who abdicated all of a sudden, unexpectedly for both his army and his country, turning the unrest of the workers and the revolt of the Petersburg garrison into the February Revolution. However, Nicholas II paid an ultimate price for his mistakes — he paid with the lives of his innocent children. Only God can judge him…

Other culprits behind the country's destruction should be named, too. Or, let's say, one culprit. This is not an organization or person, this is a social stratum. *This is the Russian social elite.* The revolution and everything that followed it was accurately orchestrated and supported by the intelligence services of the "allies." They were the main culprits behind what happened, but we need to understand that it was the treacherous behavior of the Russian elite that helped the "allies" to turn their ominous plans into reality. Today, when top leaders of our country call for unity, for rallying of the elite, we have to understand that it was the absence of such consolidation that had brought the Russian Empire to ruination. As the proverb goes, the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. It was the attempt to make the country more prosperous and to improve the Russian realities that lead to millions of victims and destruction of the country.

The policy of Nicholas II was leading monarchy to its end — this was what the other members of the ruling dynasty thought. The Tsar was steering the country to a catastrophe, leaders of most Duma parties believed. Mediocre war running ended in outrageous losses and defeats, this was what the Russian top military leaders said. Everyone saw the only way out — Nicholas Romanov had to be dismissed. No one expected that their attempts to save the country would trigger its ruination. If all these groups hadn't started "to save" the Russian Empire, it might have withstood the test of time till today!

The interior plot against the Russian monarchy started long before. Those looking for changes construed the war as a favorable opportunity they were afraid to lose. If Russia had won the war, it would have only reinforced the accursed autocracy, so they needed to seize power right at that moment and to bring this war "to a victorious end together with the allies." This was the stance of the main Duma parties, the KDs and the Octobrists, members of the so-called "Progressive Block." The plot was led by the leaders of these parties, Pavel Milyukov and Alexander Guchkov, as well as the Chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Rodzianko. High-ranking military officials also took their part in the plot — Generals Mikhail Alexeyev, Vasily Gurko, and Nikolay Ruzsky.

In 1915, the SR Alexander Kerensky decides to take some care of his health, sapped in the Duma battles. Later he became the most famous member of the Provisional Government. The future "Father of Russian Democracy" goes to a holiday resort in Finland. Let's pledge him the honor, "Soon after my return, I attended a secret meeting of the Progressive Block's leaders where it was decided to overthrow the Tsar by a palace revolution and to replace him with his 12-year-old heir Alexei, appointing Grand Prince Michael Alexandrovich of Russia as his regent."[1] The military men had their part in the coup d'état. I mean the high general officers that were dissatisfied with the Tsar's personality and his attitude in the World War. Many members of the Romanov family also craved for Nicholas to abdicate as they hoped to get better positions with the new monarch. Some members of the ruling dynasty and fans of the Republican regime didn't understand how abnormal their ideas were for those of royal descent. Just like some vegetarian lions, they dreamt of the times when everyone would be vegetarian and missed the fact that in that case they would inevitably starve themselves to death.

Freedom fighters in their white gloves during a dreadful war conspired to depose the leader of the state. Naturally, they believed there would be no blood. Imagine if the City Committee of Moscow decided to dismiss Stalin "without violence" in December 1941. None of the plotters expected that with the war going on, the country, exhausted by overwhelming efforts, might fail to stand the race for power. And it never occurred to them that they might be unable to retain that long-awaited power. Most of the Romanovs who simple-heartedly had taken delight of the February overthrow were killed by Bolsheviks, and the rest had a narrow escape from the country in turmoil.

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt09.htm

The Russian elite perceived the fever for changes in the ruling circles, and it became the basis for the country destruction plan of the "allies." "Soft" monarchists like Rodzianko, Milyukov, and Guchkov hoped there would be a constitutional monarchy led by Tsarevich Alexei or Grand Prince Michael Alexandrovich, the brother to Nicholas II. The political Lefts, who used Kerensky as a megaphone, wanted a republic. The military men wanted to have a steady hand and to stop treachery from the pro-German party in the Tsar's circle. No one was confused about the absence of real evidence for that treachery — as the Tsarina was German, she was considered to be the culprit behind our defeats. And it was she and Rasputin who were supposed to seek a separate peace agreement with Germany. These were the rumors spread in high society salons, blight barracks, and the Duma corridors.

To turn their plans into reality the plotters initially planned to arrest the Tsar and the Tsarina and make him abdicate in writing. This was the main scenario, approved by the Duma and military plotters. As the "allies" had a bigger plan, their intelligence services decided to correct the plot scenario to make it more natural, to provide a motive and to make the revolt look like popular discontent, not a plot.

Indeed, at that time many people knew about the plot against Nicholas. It was definitely known in London and in Paris. General Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich knew many plotters in person, "The idea that sacrificing the Tsar might save the dynasty called into existence a lot of plotting groups and societies that were considering a palace revolt... Paleologue and George Buchanan, the French and the British ambassadors, were also aware of it."[1]

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[1] Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision... M.: Forum, 2007. P. 248.

In May 1916, Europe was attended by the Russian parliamentary delegation led by Milyukov. "Allied" governments had a liking for this "parliamentary social" group. The Russian intelligence reported that during informal meetings of the parliamentarians they often discussed matters that normally lead to execution in wartime. Nicholas II was receiving more and more reports about that, and he was also aware that the Duma opposition members were supported by Britain and France. Anna Vyrubova, the Empress's maid, wrote, "The Tsar told me that he knows from reliable sources that the British Ambassador Sir Buchanan is actively engaged into intrigues against Their Majesties and that he is as near as holding meetings with grand princes in that regard." [1]

Such evidence is in plenty. Major General of the Cortege, Palace Superintendent Voeykov recalled his impressions from meeting the British and the French Ambassadors during the New Year's levee in 1917 in Tsarskoye Selo,

"At the levee Ambassadors Buchanan and Paleologue were inseparable. When they asked me when the war was likely to end, I replied that from my perspective the state of the army had drastically improved and that if nothing happened, we should expect a fast and favorable outcome of the campaign. They didn't answer to that, but exchanged looks that left a bad taste in my mouth." [2]

The "allies" were not just aware of the brewing plot — they orchestrated and coordinated it. To direct the events according to their need, they used the secret agents of the western intelligence services. As if by magic, strikes, meetings, and demonstrations, which *no one had organized*, started again, and only after that the blinded elite captained the destructive forces. Most of the people who had their hands in destroying Russia sincerely wanted to do their homeland good and were used by the "allies" without seeing their cards. Like *Matryoshka* dolls stacked one into another, every plotter knew his own accurately proportioned piece of truth regarding the original idea. In fact, the true Master of puppets always keeps a low profile and sends his puppets to act in the spotlight. Such secret agents had back seats for the time being, but after the overthrow they made their leap for power to destroy the very foundation of the Russian state as soon as possible and to throw it into chaos. To destroy Russia, a puppet government had to be placed at the steering wheel, a government obeying the will of somebody else. Later, when all those puppets were in the Provisional Government, they acted weirdly and at first thought incomprehensibly, they literally dug their own graves and drew the Bolshevist revolution nearer. Further acts of the Februarists can't be reasonably explained unless we suppose they obeyed the orders of their masters and worked off the money spent to compile their "perfect biographies."

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[1] Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision... M.: Forum, 2007. P. 234.

[2] Ib. P. 238.

However, we will come back to the "odd" and "strange" actions of the Provisional Government later. Now let's recall how the February Revolution progressed...

# CHAPTER 2

# Driving Forces of the February Revolution: Lies and Delusions

> The history will curse the proletarians but it will also curse us, the ones who evoked the storm.
>
> *Pavel Milyukov*

> The British and French funds assisted Guchkovs and Milyukovs in overthrowing Nicholas II so that they could be of help in conquering Germany.
>
> *Vladimir Lenin, Letters From Afar*

February 1917 was the point when interests of the British and the local plotters came together. (Usually all the dates of the February Revolution appear in history books according to the Julian Calendar; let us also follow this rule. However, according to the Gregorian Calendar it would be the March Revolution.)

It was time for immediate action; any delay might result in loosing grip of the situation. Therefore, the tops of the western intelligence agencies gave the green light to their agents. Luckily, right before the coup they got a legal way to be in the center of future events and adjust their plans. Petrograd hosted the regular Inter-Allied Conference. Its official goal was coordination of the tactics of the "allies" in future offensive actions. The non-official one was to complete the last-minute preparations for the coup. The coincidence was certainly of purely *accidental* nature: earlier all coordination meetings had taken place *solely* *in France*. However, on the eve of elimination of the Russian monarchy, financed and encouraged by the allied secret services, the Supreme War Council was for the first time moved to the Russian capital. While the generals and diplomats talked war, plotters checked the coup alert, gave last-minute instructions and money. Delegates arrived in the Russian capital on February 3 (16), 1917, and left on February 6 (20). In two and a half weeks, on February 23 (March 8), 1917, Petrograd saw the first riots.

Thoroughly preparing the overthrow of the Russian monarch, the "allies" lavished Nicholas with praises and simply smothered with embraces. Their hypocrisy had no limits. By 1916, Tsar Nicholas II had been honored with the highest awards of France, Britain, Belgium, and Serbia. He was even honored with the rank of Field Marshal of Great Britain, though even the British king was not in this rank.

This book is not particularly about the revolution processes in Russia, so we will only slightly address the chronicles of the February and the October of 1917. Revolutionaries and their actions are mostly interesting to us with regard to their relations with the "allies" from the Triple Entente. I should mention right away, there is no direct evidence that the British and the French financed the February Revolution, just as there is no direct evidence of the plot against the Russian Tsar. There is a great number of hints, references in various books, observations, and logical conclusions. In particular, the logic of events, deeds, and actions confirm that they were the ones who helped to organize and fund the destruction of the Russian state. If we analyze the conduct of the Triple Entente, the conclusion will be forced upon us. The sequence of the world massacre and its outcome (where Russia turned to be among the defeated, though it had been fighting on the winners' side for three years) give direct hints to that. Another evidence that the "allies" had a hand in destroying the Russian monarchy are the dates of the revolution: well-chosen as much as unexpected...

"Behind-the-scenes revolution preparation remained behind the scenes," Milyukov wrote in his memoirs. And then the *workers* *with no one behind them, simply the workers on their own took into the streets of the Russian capital.* In the end, nobody was prepared for such a scenario: neither the plotters from the Duma conceiving the palace coup, nor the generals who assisted them. Social Revolutionaries (SRs) and Bolsheviks, enjoying cozy Swiss coffee shops and beer houses, had no clue about the revolution. Vladimir Lenin didn't count on it spending his time in Zurich, Lev Trotsky could not believe the lines in New-York newspapers, Joseph Stalin had no idea his exile would end in a few days. Russian Emperor calmly boarded his train to the General Headquarters in Mogilev, and his spouse saw him off with an easy mind.

Everything was supposed to look as if the situation was unfolding on its own, and the waves of people's indignation caused the overthrow of the odious monarchy. Therefore, there had to be not a regular riot but some massive turmoil that could pass for a people's revolution. The displeased part of the Russian elite was ready to act but was short of a cause. Trotsky gave an excellent description of their mood in his memoirs, "The stage for the last act had long been prepared but, as usual, nobody expected that the time for action had already come."

The cause for people's discontent was chosen perfectly — bread. Provisions in Russia were in abundance — in 1916 the surplus of bread minus internal consumption and supplies from allies made up around 197 mln poods (Translator's note: Russian pood is a unit of mass equal to about 16 kg).[1] Yet, in February it was the first time when interruptions in supply began. The scenario of 1905 was repeating: demonstrations, troops, and victims. The only difference was that in 1917 the capital stationed not the selective guards' regiments but reserve units. At the same time, a new draft of recruits born in 1898 had been completed. The barracks were filled with 18 and 19-year-olds, who had been drafted in earlier to replenish the heavy casualties at the front. In case of clashes with "people's" demonstrations, it could be easily predicted that these troops would not be effective in subduing the coup.

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[1] Kitanina T. War, Bread, Revolution (Provisions Issues in Russia. 1914 — October 1917). L.: Nauka, 1985

The first alarm of the Russian tragedy rang on February 18: just the same as on the eve of the Bloody Sunday, the strike outburst at the Putilovksy Factory. The enterprise was not an ordinary one, it was the defensive plant that manufactured products on which life and death of our soldiers depended. In the democratic France, colonial forces would seal off the defensive plant on a strike at wartime, while all the troublemakers would be arrested, tried and shot. In the "Prison of Nations," as the imperial Russia is presented to us, not a single police officer moved towards the plant.

The authorities did so many weird things that February, and all of it started with this forbearance for the strikers. The coup was not subdued in the inception. Even nature seemed to act against Russia. It was extremely cold in Central Russia, as cold as minus 43°C. Over 1,200 steam trains were out of order, which resulted in provision supplies' interruptions. Problems with food started in the capital on February 18, so the authorities had to announce introduction of bread coupons in the city. Apart from that, groundless rumors about upcoming hunger were insistently spread in Petrograd. Obviously, citizens started purchasing more bread, which resulted in even bigger food shortage. There was no brown bread in the stores while white bread, which was more expensive, was still available. Large queues formed in front of the stores, and people railed against the government. The only thing left was to explain "correctly" the annoyed citizens who was responsible for the difficulties. It was this very drawback so typical for monarchies: when stores have no bread, it is the autocracy responsible.

After consulting with the "allied" delegations that had arrived for the conference, Nicholas II peacefully departed for the General Headquarters in Mogilev. He left his capital on February 22, 1917. The Tsar is often blamed for leaving Petrograd at the most critical moment. Yet, there were solid grounds for leaving the capital: he was at the head of the army and had to be at the General Headquarters. There were no particular reasons for concern. In spite of the fact that on the day that the State Duma was opened for sessions, workers' demonstrations were planned, all the riots were prevented thanks to the accurate actions of the secret police service, certain people were arrested. The last arrests in the history of the Russian secret police service[1]...

The planned marches did not take place. Only about 20,000 people went on strike. At two factories workers marched off with revolutionary songs crying, "Down with the war," but were scattered by the police. On Nevsky Prospect, male and female students converged in crowds but were also cleared away. The capital seemed to return to its peaceful state, and Nicholas II could return to manage the battle operations without any anxiety. However, leaving Petrograd and sensing uneasy situation in the capital, the Tsar ordered to send the reliable troops forth from the front to Tsarskoye Selo. Just in case. Could he have predicted the betrayal by the top military commanders?!

Protopopov, the minister of internal affairs, wrote, "In mid-February, the Tsar informed me with a distaste that he had ordered General Gurko to send the lancer regiment and Cossacks forth to Petrograd but Gurko did not send those. Instead, he assigned other regiments including navy (who were considered pro-revolutionary)."[2] The researcher of the February events Ivan Solonevich writes, "Among other things it certainly can be explained by foolishness, however, this explanation faces the fact that everything has limits in our world, even human foolishness. It was a treason, a well-thought and well-planned one."[3]

Apart from the non-performed military preparations, before departure the Tsar received Prince Golitsyn and signed a decree on the Duma dismissal, leaving it at his disposal. If required, Golitsyn was authorized to date the decree and notify the Duma members on their dismissal. After that, the monarch's train left for the General Headquarters in Mogilev.

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[1] The last ones were not these particular arrested "fighters for liberty" but the involvement of the Police was the last before the liquidation of the law enforcement authorities. Actually, arrests of the revolutionaries continued until February 27, when anarchy completely swallowed the city (Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914–1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 525, 533).

[2] Multatuli P. God Bless My Decision... M: Forum, 2007. P. 285

[3] Solonevich I. Great February Forgery; http://www.hrono.ru/ libris/lib_s/solonev08.html

The next day after the monarch's departure, as if by command, serious riots *spontaneously* started in the city. "February 23 was International Women's Day. The plan was to celebrate it in social and democratic circles in the usual order: meetings, speeches, news sheets," Lev Trotsky wrote later in his "History of the Russian Revolution." "The day before nobody had the slightest idea that Women's Day would be the first day of the revolution. There was not a single organization invoking strikes on that day."[1]

Nobody called out to start the strikes but they started. *Randomly, on their own, out of nowhere.* However, the fact that tension started *right after* Nicholas's departure, makes us ponder on the "spontaneity" of people's anger. The Empress, who remained in Tsarskoye Selo, sent a letter to her husband the next day, "Yesterday there were disturbances on Vasilievsky Island and on Nevsky Prospect, because the poor tried to storm bakeries. They broke the Philippov's shop into shatters, and the Cossacks were forwarded against that. I received this information *non-officially* (the italics are mine. — *N. S.*)."[2]

This is extremely important. Information blackout of the royal family is an obligatory condition for the coup to succeed. The blackout was in the final stage — the city was already overwhelmed by the revolution, but the Empress discovered it not from the people whose job it was to inform her. The same about the people close to Nicholas II — they did not report anything to him, and from his wife's letter he could only understand that nothing critical was going on. The Tsar did not know that the destiny of the dynasty was being resolved at that moment in

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[1] Trotsky L. The History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.magister. msk.ru/library/trotsky/trotl007.htm

[2] Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914-1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 507.

Petrograd, the issue of life or death for his country and his family. Yet, to understand what was in store for him he should have only read the records of the Duma sessions.

Later on, the members of the Provisional Government would shift the blame for assassinated Romanovs' family onto Bolsheviks. There is just as much truth in those accusations as bluff. On February 14, 1917, the plan was to prevent demonstrations and uprising, when Kerensky said in his speech to the Parliament, "Today the historic task for the Russian people is to abolish the medieval regime immediately at any cost... What legitimate instruments can be used for fighting those who turned the law into a tool for torturing people? There is only one way of fighting lawbreakers — their physical removal."[1]

Rodzianko, the chairman, interrupted Kerensky's speech asking what he meant by those words. The response followed immediately, "I mean what Brutus did in the times of Ancient Rome."[2] This was a direct instigation for an uprisal. Never before had anyone the guts to speak about monarchy in that manner. He sounded suicidal: death sentence is the outcome for such statements — appealing for a state revolution and assassination of the Tsar — even at the time of peace. Not to mention the wartime. But there was no reason to worry about Alexander Kerensky — it cost nothing to him. He was one of the few who had deeper outlook into the plans of "the allies." Kerensky was so daring because he knew Nicholas II was to stay on the throne for only a few days. No success today only meant success a week later. Memoirs of the future head of the Russian Republic are full of Freudian slips. The actions that he would conduct on that post were even more informative.

Unfortunately, the Tsar wasn't in the habit of reading the Parliament's records; he was Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army and had no time for such trifles. Reports from the capital read almost complete peace and calmness. In the letter dated February 25, his wife again wrote about the events in Petrograd as of something not quite important, "It is a campaign of hooliganism — little boys and girls running about shouting they have no bread, simply in order to cause a stir; workers stopping others from doing their work."[1]

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[1] http://hronos.km.ru/biograf/kerensky.html

[2] Ib.

Let us be honest. If you received such a letter from your wife, would you drop everything and leave for the capital immediately? Many historians who blame the Tsar of inaction should better read this correspondence first. Yet, Nicholas understood the necessity of putting things right in the capital, only on his agenda this issue was not the most critical one. The situation at the front was issue number one. On the evening of February 25, he sent a telegram to the Commander of the Petrogradsky garrison General Khabalov, "I rule it to suppress the unrest in the capital city, as it is unacceptable at this difficult time of war with Germany and Austria. Nicholas."[2]

After sending to Petrograd the rough telegram, so often cited by historians, he wrote in his diary, "February 26. Sunday. I went to a mass at 10. The report was over on time. There were many people having breakfast, including all the foreigners. I wrote a letter to Alix and went along the Bobruisk road to a chapel where I had a walk… In the evening I played domino."[3]

Not a word about the unrest. The plotters' plan went on smoothly — the breaking point was close, while the Tsar entertained himself having walks and playing domino, obviously unaware of the upcoming disaster. He gave an order but did not understand that there was only a slight chance of that order being performed.

Unfolding according to a written scenario, civil unrest was growing like a snowball. On February 23, over 88 thousand workers went out into the streets of Petrograd shouting, "Down with the war!" and "Bread!" Primarily these were females. The reason is simple — according to the Gregorian Calendar, it was March 8, International Women's Day. Thousands of factors, accidental and prepared ones, came together in those days against the Russian Empire. Military commanders could have saved the country and had the chance. Yet, instead of resolute actions, which, as we know now, could have saved millions of lives, Commander Khabalov forbade to use weapons. Meanwhile, "hungry" strikers for some reason withheld work only of the defense enterprises.

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[1] Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914-1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 523.

[2] The telegram containing the direct order to stop disturbances was sent by the Tsar right after he had received the FIRST report from Minister of Internal Affairs Protopopov about what really was going on in the city. His reaction was immediate.

[3] Diaries and Documents from the Personal Archive of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 22

"Nobody paid attention to the cries 'Down with the War', to the destruction of factories that manufactured military supplies. Nineteen agitators arrested at the factory were not subjected to field court martial. Their immediate execution would have a cooling effect better than any troops."[1]

People incited by agitators crowd together, while soldiers and Cossacks take no action. The police tries to deal with the unrest but they are also banned from using weapons. Seeing no punishment on February 24, people's movement expanded and yet again experienced no counteraction. On that day, already 197 thousand workers were on strike. Red flags appeared. The turning point was close — the order had to be re-established then or never.

Simple bread rebellion in the streets of Petrograd? *No, there are no simple rebellions of such extent!* We, who had the chance to observe various velvet, pink, and orange revolutions on the territory of the former USSR, would more easily believe that back in 1917 there were the western intelligence services involved. People on strike remain people, and they need food, and somebody had to pay for their work interruptions. The one who gets something of it is the one who pays. This fair thought is the border behind which historians and politicians make wrong conclusions out of the correct message. Neither World War 1 nor the pre-war period should be subjected to analysis. We should go much deeper into the history and remember who was constantly muddying the waters in the world's politics and claimed global supremacy. We should think carefully and remember who had been repeatedly trying to weaken and destroy Russia during the 19 century — first by Napoleon's sword, and later by Turkish yataghans.

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[1] Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914-1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 504.

***Answer the question, "Who was the historical and geopolitical enemy of the Russian Empire?" to learn who secretly orchestrated our revolution.***

According to official sources, on February 25, as much as 240 thousand people were on strike. This day saw the first blood: on Znamenskaya Square, a police officer who was trying to snatch a flag from a marcher was killed. Later on, another trouble: the Cossacks refused to clear away the rebellious crowd.[1] Somewhere, yet humbly, there were slogans "Down with the monarchy!" At the same time there started massacres, shop looting, and police officers' assault. Capital's military garrison was quite large: it consisted of almost 200 thousand soldiers, but they were not experienced soldiers, they were *recruits*; and only 3,300 police officers in the city with a million of citizens.[2] Beaten up police officers started using weapons for self-protection but the army remained passive and only observed.

Orders coming from the War Minister General Belyaev only made the crowd more self-assured in avoiding the punishment,

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[1] A peculiar moment of our revolution: the Cossacks were on the side of the rebellious people, this is what we hear from liberal historians, and that is why they did not clear the crowd away. Possibly, some people really sympathized the Petrograd citizens and workers. Among the Cossacks, there also was at least one rascal outlaw who killed the police officer, Cavalry Captain Krylov. However, the principal reason why Cossacks took no actions was that they did not have the whips! They were not eager to slash civilians with sabers, while they had not been supplied with their major and the most effective tool that turned out to be very useful during 1905-1907. General Khabalov had ordered to purchase whips and they had even provided money for that but there was not time to do it.

[2] Kersnovsky A. History of the Russian Army. M: Golos, 1994. V. 4. P. 356.

"Aim but do not get the target," "Fire so that bullets fall before the crowd not injuring anyone..."[1] Such orders at the time of revolution could come from the minister of environment protection but certainly not from the top military commander in Russia. Explanation to such strange behavior at the most critical point is no less surprising, "How would our allies react if they saw corpses on the streets of Petrograd!" What actions would be taken in the democratic Britain in a similar situation? History gives us a very accurate answer — they would fire in volleys until complete liquidation of the riot. If small arms fire hadn't been enough, the British would have no doubts in calling for artillery.

This is exactly what they did almost a year before in Dublin. Let me remind you that at some historical point Ireland became a part of Great Britain nowhere near voluntarily, and the war gave Irishmen a chance for freedom. The coup occurred on the Easter Monday on April 24, 1916. Two hundred members of the trade-union militia and the Irish Civil Army supported about fifteen hundred thousand volunteers. They seized several buildings in the downtown Dublin and issued the Proclamation of the Irish Republic. The British authorities displayed quick reaction and did not allow the coup to embrace the whole country. It took only several hours to bring strong reinforcement to Dublin and if on Monday the correlation of forces was approximately 3:1, by Wednesday it was already 10:1, naturally not in favor of the rebels. 20 thousand British soldiers surrounded the city. The poorly armed rebels displayed surprisingly powerful strength. Then, without thinking twice, on April 28 the British brought artillery and navy to the city. The British command chose the post office as the main target because it hosted major forces of the rebels. The bombardment resulted in the destruction of the entire neighboring quarter of Sackville Street and deaths of thousands of civilians. The "allies" were not particularly bothered. They did not care about the public opinion and the impression — they were consistently suppressing the riot. In addition, they had achieved their goal — on Sunday, April 30, the last of the rebels gave up. This is how similar issues were solved in the democratic countries, as Bismarck would say — "by iron and blood."

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[1] Kersnovsky A. History of the Russian Army M: Golos, 1994. V. 4. P. 356.

Our autocratic generals were "democrats" indeed, not to be compared with the British ones — which resulted in the destruction of the entire country. Incitement and money distributed by "allied" intelligence service brought the riot a new lease of life. On the day when Nicholas II ruled to halt the civil unrest, they, on the contrary, moved to the new level: there was shooting in the city, more people killed and injured. The crowds were behaving as provocative as in 1905. They did not go away on good terms, somebody from the crowd and behind the corner fired at soldiers, and soldiers responded with a volley. Weapons were repeatedly used during February 26. Crowds started to scatter.

On the night of February 27, the earlier drafted Tsar's decree on the Duma's dismissal was declared therein. Afterwards, it seemed the unrest was over. But military plotters using the situation did all they could to prevent the coup from being suppressed. Prince Alexander Mikhailovich had a telephone talk with his brother who stayed in Petrograd. He knew that Nicholas II had ordered to forward the guards' regiments from the front to the capital, and that was why he was so astounded to hear his brother's response about the state of affairs,

"The situation in Petrograd is getting worse and worse," he told nervously, "street clashes continue, and any minute I expect the troops to side with the rebellions."

"But what about the guards' cavalry troops? Could they be relied on or not?"

*"For some strange and mysterious reason,* the decree about their relocation to St. Petersburg was abolished. The guards' cavalry never left the front."[1]

So strange and mysterious. Always like that when we discuss the Russian Revolution.

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[1] Romanov A. Memoires. M: Zakharov, 2001. P. 174.

On the morning of February 27, the worst happened: the military coup. Timofey Kirpichnikov, the sergeant of leib-guards of the Volynsky regiment, killed his Commander Captain Lashkevich. A Russian soldier at the time of war shot an unarmed Russian officer in the back.[1] It was the very first shot in the long struggle of the Russian civil discords. It was the first death in the ocean of fraternal bloodshed in the Civil War and World War 1. Later the Provisional Government honored Kirpichnikov as "the first soldier to bear arms against monarchy." Yet, the real award found "the hero" later...

Lives of the participants of the February events closely intertwined. Everything mixed up and the country kicked over the traces. Right after the February Revolution General Kornilov, the icon-to-be of the White Movement, awarded Kirpichnikov with St. George's Cross and promoted him to the officer. A year after that, during the Civil War, Officer Kirpichnikov addressed with a request another hero of the White Movement, Colonel Kutepov. Noticing that his surname was not making the anticipated impression, he took a press clipping telling about his "heroic deed" out of his pocket and put it on the table. Kutepov, who had been trying to subdue the roaring Petrograd that February, glanced with interest at the coup initiator, "So, you killed your unarmed commander, didn't you?" and ordered to shoot Kirpichnikov...

After the murder of the first officers, the most horrible things started happening. The armory was destroyed, the police finished off, the district court burnt down, and the prisoners set free. Crowds of rebels crumpled up the troops that remained loyal to the Crown. There was no authoritative body left in Petrograd. Plotters from the Duma who had not expected such course of events were trying to find a way to steer the "spontaneous" coup in the right direction.

Having issued a decree to suppress the unrest, Nicholas II was receiving reassuring information. The head of the state was not informed about the affairs of topmost importance. Those military and Duma circles that were planning to overthrow the monarch by arresting him adjusted their old plans. The goal was the same: to overthrow the monarch by concealing information initially and exaggerating the scale of the coup later on.

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[1] Just a day before Kirpichnikov was an exemplary soldier and turned down a student arrested with a bomb to the police.

All the more unexpected for Nicholas II was a telegram from the Chairman of the State Duma Rodzianko, "The situation is grave. Anarchy overcame the capital. The Government is paralyzed. Transport is in complete disorder. Public discontent is growing. There is random shooting in the streets. Military units fire at each other. It is necessary to immediately summon a person whom the whole country trusts and charge him with forming a government. No time for delay..."[1]

The unrest reached the required intensity. It was time to use the unrest to blackmail the Tsar. There was no way to arrest the monarch at the General Headquarters, so he had to leave the Headquarters. The events were presented to him with that goal in mind. The monarch was supposed to arrive at the capital to deal with the matters right on the spot and simply establish the new government liable to the Duma. Before his departure from the General Headquarters, he did not have a single thought of abdication. It is obvious, Nicholas II had the multi-million army at his disposal, while the coup only had the drunk recruits and looters. One or two divisions would have brought the capital to order in several hours. Successful resistance to rebels in Petrograd by the unit of Colonel Kutepov was the bright example to that. There were only 500 soldiers under his command but he managed to succeed with this little bunch of people who remained true to their oath. However, he was defeated without receiving support.

Due to disinformation, Nicholas II did not fully realize the scale of events. He wrote in his diary, "February 27. Monday. Riots broke out several days ago in Petrograd; regrettably, soldiers have begun taking part in them. A vile feeling to be so far away and to receive scraps of bad news. In the afternoon, I had a walk along the road to Orsha. The sun was up. Later I decided to go to Tsarskoye Selo as soon as possible, and at 1 at night I was on the train."[1]

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[1] http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/rodza1917.html

He made the decision to go, full of worries about his family that was staying in Tsarskoye Selo, only dozens of kilometers from the military coup. Rebels could have easily attacked his dear children and beloved wife. Before the departure, he made the decision to forward General Ivanov to suppress the coup. On February 28, Nicholas wrote in his diary, "...I went to bed at 3 in the morning after a long talk with N. Ivanov, whom I am sending to Petrograd with the troops to put everything back into order. I slept until 10. The train left Mogilev at 5 in the morning. It was sunny and frosty. During the day we passed Vyazma, Rzhev..."[2]

Soviet historians were always trying to picture the February Revolution as some kind of half-revolution counterpoising it to the fully featured October Revolution. They had the difficult task of describing how hard it was to overthrow the monarchy and at the same time of giving Bolsheviks all the credit for overthrowing the autocracy. Events related to General Ivanov were never mentioned because Leninists had not been involved in that matter.

Now the historians have an opposite task. They claim that the October Revolution was a betrayal and a mistake while the February could have given Russia the chance for prosperity and freedom. It is impossible to prove those claims with documents and it is most uncomfortable to display the February Revolution as a plot. Hence, come the weird words of complaints among the writers and publishers for broken hopes that contain the tiniest historical inaccuracies. That is the story of General Ivanov whose father's name was Judah, so rare nowadays.

A bright example of historical falsification in favor of the situation is the book by V. Strongin "Kerensky." If we open and read it, we'll see, "It came to knowledge that the Tsar and the General

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[1] Diaries and Documents from the Personal Archive of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 23.

[2] Ib.

Headquarters forwarded the troops from the front to Petrograd headed by General Ivanov, who was vested with dictatorship authorities."[1]

No wonder there is not a single figure in such books. They count on emotions and lack of knowledge. Just think how many troops Nicholas II could have forwarded to suppress the revolution, if the Petrograd population was about two million people and the rebellious military garrison amounted to almost 200 thousand people? Ten, twenty, fifty thousand?

Let us not guess but simply tell the truth. The truth so disliked by those defending the plotters, who had first pushed Russia to the edge of the cliff and later had simply got it over with. ***General Ivanov was going to master Petrograd with a troop of 800 St. George Cross holders!***[2] Still, even those soldiers could have yet solved the situation but for the Tsar who withheld their approach to the capital. He did this being completely misinformed, bewildered, and betrayed by his immediate environment, his relatives, and his Parliament. He did that thinking of what was best for Russia and trying to prevent the violence but thus missing the last chance to save the country and avoid further turmoil.

*The February Revolution was successful because the authorities had not suppressed it and certainly not because the people had been so eager to get freedom.* The February Revolution cannot be described in classical terms when despite the resistance of the authorities, the rebels still blaze through. It is a plot, moreover, a plot of losers who do not orchestrate the events but simply follow them. And the betrayal of all those who should have suppressed the coup leads to the victory.

Destiny of the country was balancing on the scales of history. On February 27, the situation was still mostly unclear, the Tsar didn't even consider the possibility of abdication. Armed rebels crushed state authorities and almost seized the capital. And that was it. There are old lawful political bodies and there are raving crowds who will eventually be cleared away. For the coup to turn into revolution a new authoritative body should be established. It looks like the Duma members received a signal at that point.

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[1] Strongin V. Kerensky M: AST, 2004. P. 115.

[2] General Ivanov had one battalion of St. George's Cross holders consisting of three squadrons. Earlier they guarded the General Headquarters (Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914-1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 579.)

Confused members "spontaneously" resolve to establish a new political body.

Not one but two (!) centers of power at once (the "confrontation" of those two bodies would later constitute the drama of the Russian Revolution).

It was done before the Tsar's abdication. Two days before it!

**By pure accident, it happened on the same day, in the same building — in the Tauride Palace!**

Just think about such unanimous opinion! Why? The coup could have been suppressed. Establishment of the new government in such a situation was an obvious treason. Tricky thing: under the flag of fighting the anarchy the Provisional Committee of the Duma was established not to liquidate the anarchy but to wreck the existing regime. The Duma members established the Provisional Committee of the Duma — practically a new revolutionary government. Its chairman was Rodzianko. All principal plotters were on the board: Milyukov, Guchkov, Lvov, Kerensky. Leaders of the left-wing parties were also in a hurry and on the same day established the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and elected its Provisional Executive Committee. The leader of the Menshevik faction of the State Duma, Chkheidze, became the chairman of the Executive Committee, and his deputies were the Duma members — Menshevik Skobelev, Steklov (Nakhamkes) and... an "independent deputy" Mr. Kerensky. Thus, Alexander Kerensky became the principal link between the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and the Provisional Committee of the Duma that obtained the supreme power. He was resolute and bold. Those days he became extremely popular and started his the tremendous career. Such absolute love for this person by representatives of the two emerging political centers is quite justified. Kerensky had personal involvement in establishing both of them. Simply because Kerensky knew what would have to follow, and the rest had no access to the source of knowledge coming from the "allied" intelligence services.

It's only due to the inertia of capital authorities that members of the Duma assembled at the Tauride Palace again. Nobody took measures to prevent the dismissed members from appearing at the building of the Duma. Three dozens of soldiers and a couple of decisive officers would have been enough to use the gun butts and to accurately complete the monarch's decree within ten minutes. Yet, there were no guards, and the former Duma members freely entered the building. As soon as they were in, they decided to comply with the decree to dismiss the Duma and to further consider it as a non-functioning political body. Here came Kerensky, active and full of energy. He was the author of the idea to comply with the decree only in half. The Duma could have been considered dismissed but former members were supposed not to leave but to immediately assemble... simply for a private meeting. Just as Kerensky was not afraid to call for regicide, he was not afraid to violate the monarch's decree. Alexander Kerensky rang the bell for the former members to assemble in the Great Meeting Hall. It was the toll of the Russian monarchy. Kerensky had the advance knowledge of all the events-to-be and led his colleagues along the earlier drafted plan — they needed to establish a new political body immediately. It was the time to form new authorities, and nothing apart from glory and honors promised to follow that initiative.

Just a little later the Petrograd Soviet also started its functioning. In the same building, in the room next door. There was no coincidence that the second political body was located at the same place as the first one. Kerensky told us about it, "Another important advantage of the Petrograd Soviet was the psychological effect of its dislocation in the Tauride Palace. In the eyes of politically inexperienced people, due to the proximity of the Petrograd Soviet to the new government, this institution seemed to be in a certain degree equal to the government and therefore held the power on the territory of its state."[1]

The founders of the Petrograd Soviet were quite smart. But who were they? Many "miracles" did we see in the history of the Russian Revolution, and there are more ahead. We can find the names right in Alexander Kerensky's memoirs,

"I have a lively recollection of our meeting with Mikhail Rodzianko in one of the corridors of the Tauride Palace approximately at 3 p.m. on the same day (February 27. — *N. S.*). He informed me that a member of the Duma from the Menshevik faction had approached him with a request to provide premises for establishment of the Soviet of Workers as to maintain order at the factories.

"What do you think, isn't it dangerous?" asked Rodzianko.

"What can be dangerous about it?" I replied. "In the end, somebody has to deal with the workers."

"I guess, you are right," Rodzianko noted, "God knows what is happening in the city, nobody is working while, as a matter of fact, we are at the time of war."[2]

The circle was closed. Kerensky is rather modest because he was the one to initiate the Petrograd Soviet establishment, it was also he who assisted the Soviet to be under the wing of the government in order to project its authority at him personally. *That is how one person managed to build a foundation for future diarchy.*

New authorities had already been established but to launch their functioning into Russia's destruction monarchy had to disappear. That is why the silver-haired General Alexeyev together with other military participants of the plot that now aimed at performing changes on the throne, was getting ready to persuade the Tsar to abdicate. Military officials set big hopes on regency of Grand Prince Michael Romanov, the Tsar's brother (in the presence of the young Tsarevich Alexei). The Monarch was travelling inside the country with the minimum number of guards. We remember that he had set 800 soldiers to suppress the coup, while his personal escort guards were very few. It would be easy to arrest and isolate Nicholas.

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at the Historical Turn; http://stepanov01. narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt14.htm

[2] Ib.

We will have to study further events in more detail. In fact, the chronology hides the answer to the question of who had designed all of that. So, Nicholas was on the train approaching the capital. To make sure he was travelling without worrying about safety, nobody notified him about the two political centers that had emerged in the capital. On the contrary, on the same day — February 27 — Rodzianko sent a telegram to the Tsar that gave an idea that monarch's decisions could change the situation.

"Affairs of the State Duma were suspended until April in accordance with the resolution of Your Majesty. The last pillar of order has been removed. The troops of the garrison cannot be relied upon. The reserve battalions of the Guard regiments are in the grips of the rebellion. Their officers are being killed. Having joined the mobs and the revolt of the people, they are marching on the offices of the Ministry of the Interior and the Imperial Duma. The Civil War has started and is spreading. Order to immediately summon a new authority on the terms I reported to Your Majesty in the yesterday's telegram. Order the revocation of Your Majesty's resolution again to convene legislative chambers. Inform immediately by means of an Imperial Manifest. Your Majesty, do not hesitate. Should the agitation reach the Army, Germany will triumph and destruction of Russia along with the dynasty will be inevitable. On behalf of Russia, I address Your Majesty to perform the above mentioned. The future of the country and the dynasty is being at stake now. Tomorrow may be too late. Chairman of the State Duma Rodzianko."[1]

In reality, the fall of the dynasty will result in Russia's destruction. That is why it was important to get the Tsar to abdicate the throne. It was not only the Tsar whom Chairman of the State

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[1] Spiridovich A. The Great War and February Revolution (1914-1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 576.

Duma Rodzianko was cabling to. On March 1, he sent messages to the plotting generals, to Alexeyev at the General Headquarters and to Ruzsky in Pskov, about uptaking of the authorities by the Provisional Government chaired by Prince Lvov and asked them to withdraw the troops forwarded by the Tsar to Petrograd. Ruzsky immediately informed Nicholas II about the message and in the evening of March 1 followed the Tsar's fateful resolution to General Ivanov not to take any actions. For actual arrest and detention of the Monarch, the Provisional Government had already issued an order to railway workers:

"Block the Tsar's train, it must not pass." Nicholas wrote with surprise in his diary, "March 1. Wednesday. At night we turned from Malaya Vishera back as Luban and Tosno were occupied, rebellious... Gatchina and Luga were also occupied. Shame and disgrace! I was unable to reach Tsarskoye Selo. My thoughts and feelings are always there! It must be hard for poor Alix to live through these days alone! God help us!"[1]

"...The Provisional Committee took up its major task — liquidation of the monarchy. Nobody had doubts that Nicholas II could no longer be on the throne," Milyukov recollects.[2] Goal number one for all the plotters, "well-informed" and less informed ones, was one and the same on the evening of March 1 — abdication. But such agreement of opinion among the Duma members was only a vision. They were approaching the point when the first part of the plotters suddenly realized that events weren't developing the way they had expected. When reading the memoirs and recollections of the participants of those events, it is hard to escape the feeling that agreements that had been in force before the February started to be violated later on.

Among the first people who felt awkward was Milyukov, the KD leader. Early on March 2, addressing the crowd on the composition of the Provisional Government he announced that Grand Prince Michael Romanov would be the regent and that constitutional monarchy would be established in Russia. It is quite clear why he said that. Those were actually the goals of the palace coup conceived at the Duma and in the army. Yet, what the destructive forces needed was not the substitution of a person on the throne but rolling down the country into chaos and anarchy.

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[1] Diaries and Documents from the Personal Archive of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 23.

[2] Milyukov P. The History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 40.

Kerensky, who was better informed than his Duma partners, absolutely openly wrote in his memoirs about Milyukov's speech, "With persistence so typical for him he started to defend his opinion, according to which the discussion came down to the fact that Russia needed a tsar on the throne no matter who that new tsar would be. The Duma was not aiming at establishment of a republic but simply wanted to see a new personality on the throne. In close cooperation with the new tsar, Milyukov continued, the Duma will have to pacify the storm. At this critical moment in its history, Russia can't do without its monarch. He insisted on immediate approval of all required measures for acknowledging the new tsar."[1]

Milyukov expressed the protest, his opinion was that Russia needed a tsar, otherwise the state would be ruined. Forces that stood behind Kerensky and required extraordinary oratory skills from him, needed something different. That is why Alexander Kerensky made instant conclusions, "Milyukov's speech did not appeal to the soldiers and workers that gathered at the Tauride Palace. However, in the early hours of March 2, it was almost unanimously decided that the future structure of the state would be determined by the Constituent Assembly. *Thus, the monarchy was forever abolished and passed to the historical archives.*"[2]

It is very simple to tell who of the plotters was naive and who was consciously ruining their motherland. We need to see their logic. Let us try to do it. What options of crisis recovery did Russia have in that February?

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at the Historical Turn; http://stepanov01. narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt13.htm

[2] Ib.

The first one was for Nicholas II to remain on the throne. Nobody agreed to that. The second one — abdication in favor of the heir, Alexei, provided the brother of the former monarch, Michael Romanov, would become the regent. Only those two options were completely legal. That's exactly the reason why they tried to avoid them. The third option, which Nicholas was eventually persuaded into — abdication in favor of his brother Michael. The fourth option — establishment of a republic in Russia, Kerensky firmly stood for that one. The last two options suit one another like *Matryoshka* dolls and are both illegal.

If options one or two had been fulfilled, the Russian Empire could have remained on the map. Events developing according to the other two scenarios left no hope for its survival. Let us see into it. The law on the succession to the throne generally did not envisage abdication by the Lord's Anointed. However, in such case, in accordance with the order of the throne succession, Tsarevich Alexei, the son of Nicholas II, was to become the tsar. Due to his young age, he would not be able to reign on his own and would need a regent guardian. The moderate plotters saw Grand Prince Michael Romanov in that place. It would have been the best outcome for Russia. The fact of abdication would calm down the crowds, the coup would be over, and the country would be able to continue the war until the victory. Of course, there would be some changes related to reduction of monarch's rights and changes in top government echelons, but in general, the structure of the state would be subject to minimum alterations.

A minimum price if compared with the disturbances presupposed by options three and four. The "allies" could not permit the throne succession to young Alexei. *Because his young age would become a major obstacle on the way to the destruction of the country.* To be confident in success one should not simply vector and forecast country's journey to decay but should be at the head of this journey. For that reason, Russia's destroyers had to hold the full powers: the dynasty would have to give up all the powers to the new political centers — the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet. In case of power succession to the young Tsarevich, nothing like that would happen. The dynasty would still hold the powers. Manageability of Michael Romanov and the rest of the family had limits. Guardians of the crown prince could agree to the Duma government but they would never agree to destroy the entire political mechanism of the country. There would be no more reasons to put pressure on the authorities while bringing the country to order. Just as there would be no more reason for a coup: because of a boy on the throne who could be blamed for nothing. And no legal way to remove him from the throne.

Persuasions and threats made his father transfer the power. Michael Romanov could also abdicate from the throne. They were grown up people and were free to decide whether they wanted to be on the throne or not. The young heir, in his turn, could not abdicate — his abdication would have had no legal force due to his age of incapacity. Another important point was that the guardian of the heir could substitute the government; dismiss it in case he would see the path multiple Kerenskies and Milyukovs followed. The guardian would have such authority. How would you destroy the country and adopt insane decrees (which we will discuss in the next chapter)? There is no such way.

Meanwhile, the Provisional Government had *nobody* to report to and *nobody* to dismiss it. *Because nobody elected or appointed it!* It was self-appointed.[1] Its illicit activities couldn't be interrupted other than by the coup, and that would be the chaos and anarchy that "allies" were striving for. It was some kind of a vicious circle: at the head of the country was the government that ruined it, but in case of its overthrow the result would be the same — destruction of the state.

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[1] Historical paradox — nobody elected the "democratic" Provisional Government. Additionally, as soon as it had been established, the Duma that had really been elected by the whole people did not assemble even once! Why? Because all its leaders were already at ministers' posts. They did not need any disguise because they received what they had been striving for — power. Not all those KDs, Octobrists, SRs, and "other shallow assholes", as accurately defined by Lenin, gave a damn about the rest, like Russia, for instance. If the Tsar had dismissed the Duma, he would be

Only one obstacle was in the way: the monarch, although underage, his powers transferred to a guardian for a certain time. This obstacle could be overcome by adopting the constitution that would envisage only representative functions of the Russian monarch. Once again, take away the power and steer the state ship of Russia directly to the rocks. Yet, again there is no possibility to fulfil it because of… the age of Tsarevich Alexei.

*The mature Tsar Michael could swear an oath to the newly amended constitution. The young Tsarevich Alexei could not.* That meant that constitution could not be amended with Alexei on the throne. The heir's age completely blocked any changes to the state structure. If Alexei had been declared the successor, the process of destroying Russia would have been interrupted right at the start. It was a way to avoid Civil War, diseases, and collapse. Therefore, the only way out for the enemies of Russia was to transfer powers not to Tsarevich Alexei but to Grand Prince Michael Romanov. He could be made to abdicate or to adopt a new constitution. Consequently, the idea was to persuade the Tsar to abdicate particularly in favor of his brother. It was against the law. But what is the law when a revolution is on the streets?

"If it is legally incorrect… If the Tsar does not abdicate in favor of his brother… Let it be illegal!.. Maybe, it is a way to gain some time… Michael Romanov will rule the country for some time, and later, when events calm down, it will be revealed that he shall not rule and the throne will be passed to Alexei…," pondered V. Shulgin,[1] the well-known monarchist who obtained the abdication from Nicholas II. These were the thoughts of the moderate

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a suppressor of freedom and an autocrat, but let the Duma be dismissed by its members, and they are democrats and protectors of freedom.

[1] Shulgin V. Days. 1920: Notes. M: Sovremennik, 1989. P. 235.

plotters, who stood for maintaining the royal power. Military men had the same opinion. It seemed that their goal was close. Nicholas II whom they thought an improper person on the throne, was removed from power. With the regent, Michael, everything would be different.

This is exactly where they got "caught" by the "allied" intelligence services. That is why when the KD leader made an announcement about the regent, those who knew more than Milyukov pretended to agree with him. In reality, everything was going according to the plan where there was no place for monarchy in Russia. Kerensky actually blurred it out in his memoirs writing *"monarchy was forever abolished and passed to the historical archives."* Pay attention to the dates — it is of crucial importance! *Nicholas II abdicated in the middle of the day on March 2. While Kerensky resolved the destiny of the monarchy on the morning of March 2, which is technically before the official abdication of the crowned head!* Let's presume that abdication of the monarch was an obvious fact even before the document was officially signed by Nicholas, but why then the supporter of regency Milyukov, who was present at the same meeting, interpreted the event differently? For Kerensky, it was clear as daylight that the Tsar was gone forever, while his colleague did not see that as clear. It is possible only in case Kerensky knew way more than Milyukov. That is the reason why he was the person who with no hesitation led our country into its disastrous future. Please note that the future principal "democrat" of Russia matter-of-factly had buried the monarchy *even before Michael Romanov abdicated from the throne!* The Tsar's brother did that on the following day, on March 3, while on March 2, Grand Prince Michael Romanov was still unaware even of the fact that the Tsar was going to abdicate in his favor. He found out about the burden to his shoulders from the telegram received in the middle of the day on March 2. He was only going to start pondering on the situation, while Kerensky already knew how it was going to end.

As we all very well know, the February Revolution came down to the establishment of the Provisional Government that formed the Constituent Assembly and only that agency was entitled to decide whether our country was to be monarchical or republican. Meanwhile, Kerensky knew everything in advance, he had made all the decisions for the people without asking the opinion of ordinary Russian citizens. All further democratic games were just a play, a performance to hide unattractive activities on ruining Russia launched by the Provisional Government and Alexander Kerensky who was at the head of power *from the very first day*.[1]

Now we know what the destructive forces were striving for and what turn of events would have satisfied them. They started with the fulfillment of their plan. The first stage — abdication in favor of Michael Romanov.

March 2, 1917, was fatal for the Russian monarchy. Nicholas II wrote in his diary on that day, "...Ruzsky came in the morning and read for me his long telephone conversation with Rodzianko. In his words, the situation in Petrograd is such that at present the Ministry without the Duma is powerless to do anything, because they are opposed by the Social Democratic Party in the guise of the workers' committee. I need to abdicate. Ruzsky communicated his conversation to the Headquarters, and Alexeyev — to all the commanders-in-chief. By two in the afternoon answers had arrived from all. The crux of the matter is that it is necessary to take this step, for the sake of Russia's salvation and of maintaining calm in the army at the front. I agreed. A draft manifest was sent out from the Headquarters. In the evening, Guchkov and Shulgin arrived from Petrograd, and after talking to them, I handed over the signed and recopied manifest. I left Pskov at one o'clock at night, with a heavy heart. All around is betrayal, cowardice, and deceit!"[2]

These last words of the monarch are being cited so often. But it is the truth, and being aware of the fact how the situation was unfolding, it is hard to disagree with Nicholas Romanov. This is what he was called after abdication. Practically this was the demand from the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front General Ruzsky, who blocked the Tsar's train on his way to the capital. The pressure from one commander was not enough — Nicholas had doubts. General Alexeyev sent telegrams to all commanders-in-chief in which he described demands from the Duma on the Tsar's abdication and requested to express their choice. However, General Alexeyev needed to put commanders-in-chief into the required frame of mind and deceived those who were asked advice by the monarch. At the beginning of the telegram he added the words, "obstinacy of the Tsar can only result in more blood" — those are the words after which all higher military men of Russia supported the demand on abdication of Nicholas II. Naturally, they did not realize that abdication would very quickly bring the country to disaster!

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[1] Kerensky had not been in power for a long time; however, he managed to live a long life. He died in *London* on June 11, 1970, being 89 years old.

[2] Diaries and Documents from the Personal Archive of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 23–24.

Responses from commanders-in-chief were put on the monarch's table. Amazingly how much lie and deceptions built up the February Revolution. When thin telegrams fell on the table in front of the Monarch, he was deceived again, he was only shown the telegrams that supported his abdication. The telegram from Cavalry General Khan Nakhichevanski, who informed of his commitment to die for the monarch, was not shown to Nicholas II. Just as Nicholas II did not see the response from Cavalry Commander Prince Keller, the best cavalier soldier of the Empire. The rest of the military heads also did not insist but recommended abdication in order to pacify the country. They asked the Tsar to abdicate in favor of his son — nobody had a thought about eliminating or overthrowing the monarchy.

Taking advantage of "spontaneous" riots, military plotters simply fulfilled their old plan. They had no clue that "spontaneous" and "mysterious" actions by workers and soldiers were arranged specifically to turn the events into a different direction. The military circle was used to make Nicholas believe that the country wanted his abdication. Military commanders — people whom he fully trusted, believed that it would be better for the country.

The plotters used the royal family to threaten the Monarch in case of his obstinacy and appeal to his patriotic feelings. They insisted that only his abdication could prevent the chaos. He received no messages from his wife and could not know for sure that there was no real danger to his loved ones. If so — he did not see the point to persist. Deceived, the Monarch agreed to transfer power.

Just see how adroitly, in stages, power was transferred from Nicholas II to the Provisional Government. First, the Tsar abdicated in favor of Michael, and only afterwards the latter, in his turn, did transfer power to the members of the Provisional Government. It was done in such an order because even under penalty of death Nicholas II would not give away his powers to anybody but a representative of the royal dynasty. While abdication in favor of Michael, *already a violation of law*, gave an opportunity to continue with another violation — by Michael, who could transfer the rights not to the next Romanov in order of precedence but to the Provisional Government.

In order to launch the machine of the new Russian time of troubles, Nicholas had first to abdicate in favor of his brother and not the son. He naturally signed the manifest in favor of his son — Tsarevich Alexei. Grand Prince Michael Romanov became the Regent, Prince Nikolay Nikolayevich — the Commander-in-Chief, Prince Lvov — the Chairman of the Ministry, General Kornilov — the Commander of the Petrograd military district. The Tsar did what moderate plotters wanted him to. For the ones who wanted Russia to be destroyed and some of the Duma members, who were blindly used, such results were not enough. In order to prevent the publication of the monarch's manifest, after which it would be almost impossible to take a step back, they sent to him a delegation to discuss the conditions of abdication. Their real goal was to persuade the Tsar to abdicate in favor of Michael.

In expectation of the delegates, Nicholas Romanov ordered to detain the manifest on abdication in favor of the crown prince. They arrived in Pskov in the evening of March 2 and after having short doubts, Nicholas abdicated in his own name and in the name of the heir in favor of his brother. It is hard to say for sure why he violated the law on succession to the throne. Historians say that the state of health of Tsarevich Alexei, who suffered hemophilia, was the reason. It is hard to believe, though: whatever the state of health of the heir was, nobody could move him aside from the throne. Even his own father. It is more likely that the plotting generals — the plotters who kept the Tsar under arrest — explained to him that if he abdicated in favor of his son, the rebels in Tsarskoye Selo would kill him and the rest of the family. The Tsar was aware of the fact that his son, daughters, and wife were in danger. At the same time, he was not sure where his brother was. If the Tsar transferred power to him, he might have been able to save the country and bring it to order. And Nicholas II could save his family from suffering…

Thus, the first stage of the plotters' plan had been perfectly fulfilled. The powers went to Michael Romanov but that was also just a step and not the goal. It was already the time to hoax those who had been helping at the first stage but could interfere with the next ones. The Chairman of the Duma Rodzianko and Kerensky pushed the members and ministers of the newly established Provisional Government to liquidate monarchy and form a republic. Military men never wanted such an outcome so they had to be deceived. General Ruzsky was present at the abdication and was going to send out the manifest on accession to the throne of Michael Romanov across the country. Early in the morning on March 3, Rodzianko cabled General Ruzsky and requested not to announce the document to the public and the army. The chairman of the Duma informed the surprised general that a most serious riot burst out in Petrograd on the night of March 2 after the message on possible maintaining of monarchy had been announced. Supposedly, the rebellious troops demanded deposition of the dynasty, otherwise threatening to rip through everything in their path. Rodzianko repeated the same lie to Alexeyev requesting the General Headquarters to detain the manifest, as well. Generals were surprised, some of them bewildered, but they were executing an order, though the manifest had been already sent to some places. It was necessary to telegraph there and ask to detain its announcement. In the end, it all resulted in a huge mess. The confusion was so great that the Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral Kolchak begged in his telegram asking to explain who actually got the supreme power in the country.

Obviously, there was no new coup in Petrograd. The plotters simply needed some time to "prepare" Michael Romanov. The grey-haired head of the Russian Parliament shamelessly lied just like a cardsharp. Generals could not have imagined that. The final stage of the seizure of power was coming.

"Last night Alexander Kerensky had already declared himself a republican at the meeting of Soviet Workers," Milyukov, the KD head, recollected.[1] Again it was Kerensky who practically "by the head and ears" pulled Russia forward, boosting the events, and like an engine moving to the final goal — destruction of the monarchy. He was ahead of the resolutions of his own party: *on March 2,* at the Conference of the Petrograd SRs, a resolution "On Preparing the Constituent Assembly as Advocacy of the Republican Form of Government" was passed. But on the morning of *March 3*, Kerensky persuaded the delegates to attain abdication of Michael.[2] His argumentation was simple — supposedly, people would never accept any other option. By people, he presumed the crowds of looters and morally destroyed soldiers. The rest of Russia kept silent just as the multi-million army. Kerensky's oratory skills led delegates to their personal hidden ambitions. *In case of the monarchy liquidation, the members of the Provisional Government would automatically become the supreme power in Russia.* Certainly, most of them did not wish for the future disaster to happen, but Kerensky was obviously not the only one who was consciously pushing Russia to the cliff. Still, he was definitely the major character during those important historical days. Milyukov was the one supporting maintenance of the constitutional monarchy.

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[1] Milyukov P. The History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 45.

[2] Ib. P. 48.

It may seem that the driving force of the coup were ambitions and lack of principles of the politicians. No. It was only possible to be so calm and cool-headed about the complete alteration of the political structure of Russia during the World War on condition of having guarantees of support from the "allies." A coup in a country-member of the Entente was not only about its internal affairs — it affected the war in general and consequently affected the other members of the Entente. Kerensky knew that he had support from the British and the French. In case of defeat, he would be safely taken away from Russia. That is exactly what happened: not in February but after the October Revolution. Kerensky's loyalty to British "allies" provided for his escape from Bolsheviks' punishment on a British destroyer, that is what historians say. Yet, Nicholas Romanov was even more loyal to London, but he was not evacuated even though there had been plenty of opportunities. Interesting parallels can be observed...

Kerensky telephoned Grand Prince Michael Romanov and arranged an immediate meeting with the members of the Provisional Government and the Provisional Committee of the Duma. After a hot discussion, the delegation went to the apartment of Princess Putiatina in 12 Millionaya Street, where Romanov was staying. Members of all the parties except for Milyukov insisted on abdication. To be more precise — on transfer of powers to the Provisional Government until the Constituent Assembly.[1] The main character of the play, Kerensky, spoke plainly in his memoirs while he said something rather different to Grand Prince Michael Alexandrovich, "Prince Michael Alexandrovich announced that he would succeed to the throne only at the request of the Constituent Assembly which the Provisional Government had undertaken to establish. The issue was solved: the monarchy and the dynasty became the attributes of the past. From this moment on, Russia, in fact, became a republic, and all the supreme powers — executive and legislative — were in the hands of the Provisional Government until the Constituent Assembly."[1]

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[1] Milyukov P. The History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 49-50.

Blackmail, double talk, threats — these were the tools used to deceive Michael along by telling him that people should elect the political structure of the country. The spineless Michael Romanov gladly agreed to use this gap to avoid responsibility and the risk of massacre. Meanwhile, his brother was following the events with close attention but still was far from understanding that he had been deceived. He had been deceived twice: first, when he was persuaded to abdicate in favor of his brother, and second, when they managed to get abdication from Michael. On March 3, Nicholas made another note in his diary, "...I received Alexeyev with the latest news from Rodzianko. It appears Misha has abdicated. His manifest finishes with something about elections for a Constituent Assembly. God knows who advised him to sign something that vile! In Petrograd the disturbances have ceased — may it continue that way."[2]

In a few days, Nicholas Romanov met with his mother, Empress Maria Feodorovna, and his uncle, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich. The latter described the hard scene, "... I found Maria Feodorovna weeping uncontrollably on her chair; he, meanwhile, was on his feet, stock-still, his gaze fixed on the floor, a cigarette (naturally) in hand. We embraced. I did not know what service I could render him. His calmness testified to the fact that he was firmly convinced of the rectitude of his decision, although he did reproach his brother Michael Romanov for leaving Russia without an emperor when he refused the throne.

"Misha shouldn't have done that," he concluded sententiously. "I wonder who could possibly give him such an odd piece of advice."[3]

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at the Historical Turn; http://stepanov01. narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt13.htm

[2] Diaries and Documents from the Personal Archive of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 24.

[3] Prince Alexander Mikhailovich. Memoires. M: Zakharov, 2001. P. 154.

The former Tsar had not yet realized that the chain of fateful events was far from accidental and that his brother had been deceived just the way he had been tricked. Yet, there was Kerensky who knew that all decisions had been made and that events were developing according to a planned scenario. He disclosed these facts in his memoirs again. Kerensky demonstrates "the gift of providence": by agreement with the Duma Michael Romanov could have accepted the power of monarch later, provided the Constituent Assembly approached him with such a request. The issue was just delayed, and that was what they kept repeating in order to persuade Michael; Alexander Kerensky was already describing "monarchy and dynasty" as "attributes of the past." Again, he was the one who knew more than anyone else, again, he understood the events in their only true sense. He was yet another clairvoyant like Pilsudski and Finnish Social Democrats...

The abdication of Michael Romanov ultimately cleared the way to the disaster. Behind the "bloodless" and "democratic" February history was already drawing the powerful silhouette of the bloody and tragic October. The history of our country was inevitably facing the period of which none of the February activists had dreamed.

To many it brought death, to many others — exile. The "heroes" of the October Revolution were to receive their awards in the NKVD torture chambers (Translator's note: NKVD — People's Commissary of Internal Affairs, the Soviet secret police) when Stalin gave death sentences to "enemies of the people." Many "heroes" of the February Revolution had it coming even earlier. Almost all the Duma members left in exile and instead of power had to enjoy a complete lack of it, instead of the free democratic Russia, for the sake of which everything had been supposedly started, — the Red Soviet Union. They devoted the rest of their lives to writing their memoirs, which in fact were lengthy excuses written for their successors. Were they bothered by regrets? Nobody knows...

Was General Gurko feeling remorse? After the February Revolution, he was arrested by the Provisional Government and thrown into the Peter and Paul Fortress by those for the sake of whom he had betrayed his monarch. What was General Alexeyev feeling? After the revolution, he became the commander-in-chief, taking the former post of Nicholas, who had trusted General Alexeyev in so many respects. Did he regret betraying the Tsar right after he had been dismissed by the Provisional Government? What was he thinking in his last minutes dying from typhoid fever in Yekaterinoslavl at the very beginning of the Civil War? What were the feelings of the Commander of the Baltic Fleet Admiral Nepenin, who had supported abdication of the monarch in his telegram and two days later was killed in Kronshtadt by "an unknown civilian"? Was Michael Romanov, deported by Bolsheviks to Perm, recollecting his poor-spirited rejection of the supreme power? What were the last thoughts in his crowned head when, despite all affirmations from Lenin that there were no claims against him, he was kidnapped and shot by the Cheka? Did General Ruzsky consider his treason when he was literally digging a tomb for himself listening to the jokes cracked by drunk Red Army soldiers? Did he have regrets standing on the edge of that tomb when chekists tried to cut his head off making him crane his neck? We do not know that. there is one fact we know for sure — Russian history was entering one of its most dreadful stages.

And this stage was not beginning on its own — it had been thoroughly prepared by those who had taken over power — the Provisional Government…

# CHAPTER 3

# How Provisional Government Managed to Ruin Russia in Eight Months

A person is not what he tells or thinks of himself, but what he does.

*Vladimir Lenin*

I assure you that no one has harmed Russia more than Alexander Kerensky.

*Michael Rodzianko*

Every Soviet schoolchild knew this date — October 25, 1917; it quickly entered the global history. It put a start to a new countdown. History books divided life into two uneven periods — before the October Revolution and after it. Whoever read these books didn't have any questions; everything was so plain, simple, and actually made sense. Today the explanation has changed to an exactly opposite one. And yet, none of the reasons provided the answer to the key question —

***what did the Provisional Government do to its people during its 8-month rule that hardly any of the two million citizens came to protect it?***

Pro-communist historians focused on fighting and the many victims of those days; modern researchers have totally switched to the German origin of Bolsheviks' money. However, this is not the key matter. Today, it is known for sure that occupation of the Winter Palace was practically unopposed. There was no assault. This version is also supported by the fact that during this "operation" only six junkers died. Women, some public-spirited though disabled guys, and young boys — these were all whom the Russian Democracy managed to summon on that dark October night in 1917. Last defenders of the Provisional Government were the shock women's battalion, forty St. George members led by a one-legged staff captain and some junkers...

It was the time when, according to the Soviet scientists, the history made a new turn, the most critical moment, where Russia's fate was to be determined for the next seven decades, the moment when the future of almost the entire world was about to be resolved!

How was that possible? It was only *eight* months since the February Revolution, which overthrew "the accursed tsarist regime"! According to its orchestrators that revolution was "bloodless and nationwide." And in that February only 1,433 people died! They were mainly policemen, gendarmes, and officers that remained true to their oath and didn't leave their posts right to the end. They tried to protect "the antipopular tsarist regime" and died. Then why nobody came to protect the first Russian democratic government that had been awaited by many generations of progressive Russian minds, that according to its orchestrators was welcomed by the entire country? How did it come that when Bolsheviks came to power, Kerensky and Co were protected as devotedly that only *six* junker boys were killed? Isn't that unbelievable?

Why did the ministers of the Provisional Government surrender to the violent Bolsheviks without any fuss? Could they have wanted to avoid bloodshed? Not at all, their "mercy" opened way to millions of victims, rivers of blood, and endless miseries in Russia. Naturally, it wasn't the reason — the capitalist ministers humbly agreed to be convoyed to the Peter and Paul Fortress because they had no forces to resist. Nobody wanted to die for them.

Yet, the questions keep arising. Germany gave Lenin money, modern historians tell us, and that was why he organized the revolution. Let me note, though, that subverters have been financed hundreds or even thousands of times in the human history, but there were dozens of times fewer riots and rebellions. And one can count successful revolutions on fingers. How come the German "spies," Bolsheviks, were at such ease in the capital of Russia that they plainly prepared and accomplished a coup? What was the Provisional Government, the legitimate power authority, doing? Why when it came to it, Alexander Kerensky wasn't in the Winter Palace? What happened to his obsessive popularity if he left his ministers in a dim hall at that crucial moment and fled from the Winter Palace in the American ambassador's car?

Where were our reliable "allies" that greeted the tsarist regime falling with such fervor, why didn't they indicate the Bolshevik danger to their democratic protégé? Why didn't they save their Russian ally from the seizure of power by the German agents? Wasn't it obvious that Lenin would have to work off the German millions? And Lenin only had one option here. He had to deactivate Russia in the war with Germany, isn't that obvious? Actually, this is what the Germans gave him their Douche marks for. Didn't the British, the French, the American, and other "allied" intelligence services understand that, weren't they aware of it? Didn't they expect such a course of events? Didn't they believe that Russia, their ally, would sign a separate peace agreement with the opponent and immerse into chaos and anarchy after losing its combat value?

So many questions, and only one answer. Everyone knew. It was exactly what they expected. They were preparing for it, or, actually, they were preparing ... it.

*"The allies" of Russia in the Entente were the main orchestrators, sponsors, and inspirers of the Russian Revolution, its first stage in February, and the second — in October.*

At first, this claim seems proofless, but let's consider it. If we assume that both our revolutions were, in fact, one, then they should have had the same orchestrator. We are used to the thought that the reason for the third Russian Revolution was either in "revolutionary forces" or in the evil will of the German General Headquarters. Yet, so much weird things happened in eight months from February until October that one can't help but wonder if everything was as plain and clear as we believe. Today, no one argues that the October originated from the February, that one revolution consistently followed another. "Democrats," who seized power in February, failed to keep it, and other forces, which almost had no part in the monarchy overthrow, came to the top of the Russian history.

The first "February" stage of ruining Russia was followed by the second one. The puppets of "the allies" came to power and had to destroy the Russian state in eight months. Or rather, to destroy it from the inside insomuch that its people would lose all the will for resistance, become apathetic and indifferent. Let us put it straight — the Provisional Government successfully managed this difficult task. However, it was the only task that these people managed to succeed with. Whatever else they did was a fiasco. Yet, no success was, in fact, the major success of the Provisional Government. Not for Russia, naturally, but for those who planned its destruction and for that end pushed a group of risk-takers, spies, and third-rates to the top leaders of Russia.

That was why the Russian "allies" welcomed the February Revolution. The United States of America were the first to officially recognize the Provisional Government on March 9 (22), 1917. One day later, on March 11 (24), it was recognized by France, Britain, and Italy. Soon they were followed by Belgium, Serbia, Japan, Romania, and Portugal. And they, indeed, had a great reason for joy — London and Paris could breathe a sigh of relief. No one ever hoped that in such a short period the operation of "the allied" special services for the political regime change in Russia would be such a grand success. Whatever had been planned happened; it wasn't just the minimum program, it was a most complete scenario…

The new "independent" government undertook all the liabilities of the reign, both financial and political. They recognized all the debts and announced that they were going to fight in the war until the final victory. And if the tsarist government sometimes was able to deny requests of "the allies," the new Russian leaders depended on them completely. They didn't even consider how the British and the French treated the overthrown Russian monarch — at first, they made him spill rivers of his soldiers' blood in the name of the Utopian ideals of "the allies," and then they just threw Nicholas Romanov down the sewer of history. After he abdicated, not a single word was said to support or protect him. And shortly after that, the Provisional Government followed him into the nothing. Well, no wonder. They were used material, and in politics no one takes scum to the future.

Yet, for that moment the Entente noted in their reports the rising star of the political Olympus, Alexander Kerensky. Kerensky was worshiped in Russia, and there was a reason for that. A bold and passionate speaker, "a great orchestrator," he really stood out against the other members of the Provisional Government. And that was why he pushed aside all of his February comrades incredibly fast. The Provisional Government soon started to be associated with Kerensky personally. And it was his merit that it catastrophically dropped in rating for the Russian citizens. It was Kerensky who bitterly mentioned in his book, "In fact, however, three quarters of the officers of the Petrograd military district ... sabotaged all the efforts the Government was taking to put down the revolt that was quickly growing in strength."[1]

This was said about the October, and the said officers weren't Bolsheviks. The February reformers had been violently acting for already half a year, so, the Russian citizens had enough time to change their attitude towards Kerensky. General Alexeyev thought it was Kerensky who should have been given the disgraceful laurels for destroying his homeland. General Pyotr Krasnov simply despised Kerensky, "I've never seen him and read little of his speeches, but everything in him disgusted me."[2] General Mikhail Bonch-Bruevich didn't like Kerensky, either, "Kerensky's

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt24.htm

[2] Krasnov P. The Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 417.

Alexander Kerensky. His input to destruction of Russia was really great, albeit its true value hasn't been recognized yet.

regime with all his riotous talk and no action seemed somehow *fake* to me," he writes.[1]

You know what it feels like when you meet a person who says one thing and does the opposite. Kerensky's regime promised unprecedented freedoms and rights, carried out some reforms and transformations, but to the accompaniment of this phrase-mongering, it was steadily leading Russia to its end. Leading the Government and making use of the power in his hands, he sure-handedly blocked and talked round any attempt to right the ship. What was Kerensky to be loved for?

"He destroyed the army, outraged the science of warfare, and I despised and loathed him for that," Pyotr Krasnov explained the feelings overwhelming him.[2] Mr. Krasnov was mistaken, oh yes, he was. It wasn't the army that Kerensky and his accomplices from the Provisional Government destroyed, it was the whole country. And they did it consciously and intentionally.

A person is as a person does. Let's follow this smart rule and try to see into the business of the new Russian Government. We began this chapter with the story of one October night, and now let's switch to an early morning in March when soldiers of the Petrograd garrison changed epaulettes on their overcoats to red bows, which symbolized the victory of the "great and bloodless" Russian Revolution — the February. It was in that month of the Russian Revolutionary calendar that the country, the army, and the Russian spirits started to ruin, finally opening the way to Bolsheviks. They couldn't have come to power without that.

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[1] Bonch-Bruevich M. All Power to the Soviets! M.: Voenizdat, 1958. P. 3.

[2] Krasnov P. The Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 417.

The February wasn't a color revolution, and most of the victims were killed by raving people in military garments. Apart from the victims killed in street fights in Petrograd, many were killed in Kronshtadt. As a matter of fact, the crowd of outraged sailors tore Admiral Commanding Viren to pieces and killed many other officers. "...They covered people with hay, sprayed them with kerosene, and set on fire, and the alive were put into coffins with the dead..,"[1] wrote Tatiana Botkina about the horrors of the "great and bloodless" revolution. Dozens of officers were killed, hundreds were imprisoned. Policemen and gendarmes were torn to pieces. Many passers-by and citizens were murdered. According to the official data, there were 1,433 victims. Isn't that quite a lot for a "bloodless" revolution? And the new government that called itself "provisional" came to power over the blood of all these people. What had been these worthy men busy with since the February to the October before almost all of them were taken to the Peter and Paul Fortress?

Let us imagine ourselves in the place of Guchkov, Milyukov, Kerensky, and Co. Let's forget about loads of deceit and lies they used to prepare their way to power. Let's not recall how they used their own comrades not showing their cards, about the military men that naively trusted them. Let's disregard Nicholas II, who was misinformed twice, and Michael Romanov, who reposed power in their hands so easily. Let's not suspect anyone in orchestrating the mayhem and the artificial lack of bread in the capital. Let's imagine for a moment that the loathed tsarist regime was indeed swept away because of the popular discontent. Let it be so. Let's suppose the Provisional Government was a group of idealists who wished to save the country from chaos in a tricky historic situation. Okay. Let's reckon all of them were vehement patriots of Russia, no objection. And yet, all these worthy people got what they had never wanted — the power. And the whole point of our transformation is in this word. If you were Kerensky, Guchkov or Milyukov, how would you use that power?

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[1] Melnik-Botkina T. Memories of the Tsar Family. M.: Zakharov, 2004. P. 62.

Let's see. The country is at the most difficult war. It is on the verge of exhaustion and fatigue, but in 1917 the balance could have been turned to our favor. And in that most important moment a revolution "suddenly" happens, and all the political Duma leaders appear at the helm. The first thing they should do is calm the country down. To explain everyone what happened and to call for the steady performance of everybody's duty. It was primarily important to address their officers and soldiers, to publish something like Stalin's "Brothers and Sisters" in the mass media for people to understand that they were fighting not just for their country, but for their freedom, as well.

Having calmed and conciliated everyone, they could have considered the ways of winning the war. Yet, they didn't even have to think about that. All the military men are ready, let them think. Together with the British and the French they have designed campaigns for spring and summer 1917. It is time to turn it all into reality and be patient, as the German were already at the end of their tether. If some of the commanders don't seem trustworthy, they should be replaced. It can be done with a plain order, in accordance with a regular military procedure, by an order of Minister Guchkov. It was Nicholas II who did everything wrong. He had his hands tied down with promises, interests of the dynasty, and aristocratic prejudices. The regular Duma patriots had none of that. They had love for their homeland and insights about solving the old challenges. Just start solving them — roll up the sleeves of your dress coats and go ahead. Tighten your belts, bring discipline wherever the dough-face Tsar couldn't. The victory and the Dardanelles promised by "the allies" are near. To collapse in the immediate vicinity of the long-awaited peace would be an unpardonable luxury. All defeatist and pacifistic moods should be nipped in the bud, helping the enemy after the revolution is double treachery, both of the country and the recently acquired freedom. In sum, what we need is discipline. This is what the program of the Provisional Government should have been like. Well, hypothetically. In fact, it was absolutely the opposite, and that was why General Bonch-Bruevich called Kerensky's regime "fake"...

Almost instantly the new government expropriated the Winter Palace for its departments. The Provisional Government established their headquarters there, and the Prime Minister occupied the historic room of Alexander III. These humble and worthy people used museum pieces as kitchen utensils, and about a thousand guards were accommodated in great halls of the Palace. Yet, that's not a big deal, though it didn't make the government more popular among the citizens. Let's see what they did, not where they stayed! Indeed, who cares where the new government lived. None of the ministers was poor, they were used to luxury, let them serve their homeland in the way they are used to, with silver forks and golden plates, as long as they know their business.

Let's try to get it right. The "provisional" ministers started to serve their cause long before they moved to the Winter Palace. On the first day of its existence, on March 2, the Provisional Government signed its declaration that was published a day later. This was its program where all of its future steps were determined. Let's read it thoughtfully (*comments in brackets by N. S.*).

**"Declaration of the Provisional Government on its Composition and Objectives."**[1]

"The Cabinet will use the following grounds as a guide for their activities:

1. Full and immediate amnesty on all issues, political and religious, including terrorist acts, military uprisings, and agrarian crimes, etc.

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[1] Mind the date, March 3, 1917. The document has the date when Mikhail Romanov abdicated, but it was sent for printing *at night on March 2*, when only Kerensky the Clairvoyant knew that monarchy wasn't going to ever revive in Russia. This means that even the talk with the Tsar's brother was a mere ceremony. Someone had decided that Mikhail Romanov needed to abdicate no matter what...

(*All the murderers, rebels, instigators, and deserters, revolutionary terrorists, peasant arsonists are immediately amnestied and go to the Russian Army and defense enterprises.)*

2. Freedom of speech, the press, unions, assemblies, and strikes with spread of political freedoms to military servicemen within the restrictions allowed by military technical conditions.

*(During the war it is allowed to strike in defense enterprises, to down tools at the railway and to have meetings in the bakeries. Naturally, it will help to solve the bread deficiency problem. Political discussions will definitely double or even triple the military power, as well as the amount of the weaponry produced.)*

3. Abolition of all hereditary, religious, and national class restrictions.

*(In fact, it means the abolition of the Pale of Settlement and restrictions for Jews.)*

4. Immediate preparation for the convocation on the basis of universal, equal, secret, and direct vote for the Constituent Assembly, which will determine the form of government and the constitution of the country.

*(It is preparation of the universal, equal, secret and direct vote that naturally is the key problem and objective for Russia being in the global war, where millions are being killed or mutilated. This is exactly what the Government should concentrate on.)*

5. Replacement of the police with a Public militia and its elected chairmanship subordinated to the local authorities.

(*It goes without saying that during the war criminal activities recede. All murderers, rapists, and robbers stop wrongdoing in a single patriotic urge. This is exactly the time to replace the police with a Public militia.)*

6. Elections to the authorities of local self-government on the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret vote. (*See clause 4.*)

7. Non-disarmament and non-withdrawal out of Petrograd the military units participating in the revolution movement.

*(These respectworthy soldiers, who refused submission to their commanders, killed their officers and rampaged in shops, really*

*don't want to go to the battlefield, and the Government is ready to guarantee they won't.)*

8. Under preservation of strict discipline in ranks and performing a military service — elimination of all restrictions for soldiers in the use of public rights granted to all other citizens.

*(It's long known that the main things for soldiers are not good food and warm underwear, not state-of-the-art arms and enlightened commanders, but "the use of public rights granted to all other citizens." No objection here. Leave the weapon pit, go to a meeting!)*[1]

This was how the Provisional Government calmed its citizens down. Only the smartest reacted instantly. Having read this program, General Alexeyev immediately shared his concerns about the future of Russia with Rodzianko. The former chairman of the State Duma replied,

"...But my attitude is as vigorous and resolute as everybody else's here."[2] He used to be an optimist then. It was after he had emigrated that he changed his mind.

Along with the Provisional Government, another spot of power appeared in the capital, the Petrograd Soviet. It was founded by Mensheviks and SRs. Thus, after the monarchy was overthrown in Russia, there appeared diarchy, which gave outside forces a great opportunity for blackmailing and bribing the Russian politicians, and a room for maneuver. Right policies could be driven through the Soviets or through "Provisional" ministers. By October, Bolsheviks will recapture this initiative, but on the early stage, the main activity is with the Provisional Government. And it didn't linger and instantly embarked on its plan for ruining the country and its preparation for further degradation. Alexander Kerensky was in the center of this ominous process. He was the only person that at the same time was on the Petrograd

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[1] Declaration from the book by Milyukov P. "History of the Second Russian Revolution." Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 42.

[2] Solzhenitzin A. The Red Wheel. March 1917. Military Publishing House. Moscow, 1993; http://koleso.by.ru/3/3_03/3_404.htm

Soviet and on the Provisional Government of capitalist ministers. So much for the diarchy! We are on the same track, comrades!

The further story of revolution is about the struggle between two different powers. If their conflict is bad for Russia, then Kerensky should be the first to try and settle some civil peace in the country, especially since he is a lawyer. Didn't he know how things should be explained and positions drawn closer, or how to move towards the civil peace and the victory in the dreadful war? We already know that such consensus searching resulted in the October and imprisoning of the entire Provisional Government. Except for Kerensky, all capitalist ministers were sent to the dungeons. Well, Mr. Kerensky knew his ways out of tricky situations. He knew how to shift the blame or just to lie.

"A person or a group of persons, who still remain unknown, in bad faith have distributed this order intended just for the Petrograd garrison to all the fronts. And though this action caused much trouble, contrary to some absurd statements of many representatives within the Russian and foreign military networks, it wasn't the reason for "the Russian Army's collapse." Their statement that the order was written and published by the Provisional Government or at least under its silent approval is also unfair. The matter is that the order had been published two days before the Provisional Government was established." Moreover, the first thing that the government did was explaining to the soldiers at the front that this order was not intended for them, but for the Petrograd garrison only. However, distribution of this order at the front had its negative effect and sped up the establishment of military committees..."[1]

What is Kerensky talking about? Why is he explaining himself away that much? It's rather plain: this is all about the famous Order Number One that destroyed the Russian Army in mere weeks, which is a fact. That is why Kerensky equivocates and tries to look oblivious — "a person or a group of persons," since the issue of this order alone is the heaviest charge. The historians are still looking for the person in charge for that, though it looks more like the case for a Public Procurator.

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt13.htm

Order Number One caused horrible results. The future president of Finland, at that time the Russian Cavalry General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, commented on its consequences as follows, "As soon as I returned to the front, I understood that over the several weeks of my absence significant changes had occurred. Revolution was spreading like forest fire. The first announced order of the Soviets, which at first was only aimed at the Petrograd garrison, came into force here, so the discipline was breached. Anarchic moods bloomed, especially after the Provisional Government announced the freedom of speech, mass media, and meetings, as well as the right to strike, which since then became appropriate even in military units. There were no more court-martial or death penalty. The eternal military discipline where soldiers had to obey orders was almost neglected, and lives of the commanders who tried to save their units were in danger. According to the new rules, a soldier was allowed to take leave any moment, which in fact was to get away. By the end of February, there were over one million deserters. And the military leaders did nothing to fight with the revolutionary welter."[1]

The most reliable Cossack units started to decay. General Pyotr Krasnov commanded a division, but then everything changed, "Before the revolution and famous Order Number One everyone knew what he had to do in times of peace and in times of war... There was no time to shell the seeds. After the revolution things changed. The committees started to interfere with directions of the commanders, battle and non-battle orders were distinguished. The former were followed at first, and the latter were fulfilled "to a certain extent," as it became popular to call it. A barefaced ensign, who graduated a four-months course, or a plain soldier could discourse if a certain practice was needed or not. And it was enough to call it "leading to the old regime" during a meeting for the whole unit not to come for studying, and some incidents, what they were called then, to start. Those incidents were of different kinds, starting with a rude answer and ending with murdering the commander, and all of them were got away with."[1]

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[1] Mannerheim C.G. Memoirs. M.: Vagrius, 1999, P. 76

"I was sure that the army established under that order won't be able to fight and even to exist in some organized manner," General Bonch-Bruevich agreed with Mannerheim and Krasnov in his memoirs.[2] After the October Revolution, he was employed by Bolsheviks, whereas Krasnov led the anti-Bolshevik Cossack movement, and Mannerheim made Finland independent from Russia. And yet, the generals were consentient in their assessment of the consequences of Order Number One regardless their so different views and future destinies.

Ominous metastases of the decaying discipline quickly spread within the Russian Army. In a couple of days, every unit knew the contents of the order. Later the government tried to explain that it was only for the Petrograd garrison, not for the army in general, but it was too late. The imp couldn't be corked back inside the bottle!

Now when we know the Order's consequences, it is time to read through its text (*comments in brackets by N. S.*).

**"Order Number One. March 1, 1917**

To be immediately and fully executed by all men in the Guards, army, artillery, and navy and to be made known to the Petrograd workers.

The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies has resolved:

1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, batteries, squadrons and separate services of various military departments and on board naval ships, committees shall be immediately elected from among representatives of the rankers of the foregoing units. *(These committees were to replace the army command.)*

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[1] Krasnov P. The Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 366–367.

[2] Bonch-Bruevich M. All Power to the Soviets! M.: Voenizdat, 1958. P. 144.

2. In all units which have not yet elected their representatives to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies, one representative from each company shall be elected. All representatives, carrying appropriate identity cards, are to arrive at the building of the State Duma by 10 a. m., March 2, 1917.

*(The Provisional Government that "had nothing to do" with this document sat in the room next to the Petrograd Soviet. Kerensky just walked from one room to another.)*

3. In all their political actions, units are subordinated to the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and their own committees.

4. All orders issued by the Military Commission of the State Duma shall be carried out, except those which run counter to the orders and decrees issued by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

*(Two clauses with the same implication — the Government can't give orders to its own army. According to Clause 1, the Army command can't do it, either.)*

5. All kinds of weapons, namely rifles, machine-guns, armored cars, and so forth, shall be placed at the disposal and under the control of the company and battalion committees and shall by no means be issued to the officers, not even at their insistence.

*(You only imagine, officers shall not be issued weapons! In wartime!)*

6. Soldiers in formation and on duty shall strictly observe military discipline; however, off duty and formation, in their political, civic, and private life, soldiers shall fully enjoy the rights granted to all citizens. In particular, standing to attention and obligatory saluting off duty shall be cancelled.

*(It was prohibited to limit soldiers in their civic and private lives. Soldiers were given all the rights and were implied almost no liabilities. This is how riots start — at first you don't have to salute the commanders and stand still, then you don't have to fight. You'd just rather not do it, that's it.)*

7. Likewise, officers shall be addressed as Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, etc. instead of Your Excellency, Your Honor, etc.

8. Rudeness towards soldiers of all ranks and, in particular, addressing them as `you' shall be prohibited. Any violation of this rule and all cases of misunderstanding between officers and soldiers shall be reported by the latter to the company committees.

This order shall be read out in all companies, battalions, regiments, ship crews, batteries and other combat and non-combat detachments."[1]

Let's once again note the date when Order Number One was published — March 1, 1917. Nicholas II abdicated only in the afternoon on March 2. Was it an insight? No, it was haste. It isn't yet clear what the end will be, so let's plant a quiet paper bomb in the Russian Army while we can. That means that whoever issued this order committed the worst act of treachery. They consciously tried to decay and destroy the army of the Russian Empire and thus, the country itself. Were they the German spies? Alas, there were no Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet in its early days. Not a single Bolshevik, only SRs and Mensheviks. And no one but Lenin's allies has ever been blamed for cooperating with the Germans.

*That's weird — supporters of the allies and of fighting till victory*[2] *in incredible haste try to destroy the army, the only tool that can be used to defeat Germany together with Britain and France!*

And the historians aren't willing to solve the mystery of their conduct that is against any logics…

There are some more manifest facts here. To issue a newspaper with the printed order in the morning on March 1 it should have been put into print on February 28. But every textbook would tell you that the Soviet was established only on February 27, and Kerensky had the favor of "registering" in the State Duma building. He held the first meeting and selected the Executive Committee. The meeting started in the afternoon, — a little of this, a little of that — and it was night already. This means that the texts of Order Number One and the rest of the newspaper were composed during the night or in the morning of February 28. And it was also necessary to find a printing office and to solve all organizational issues related to the run. Naturally, all of it could be done if there was a wish strong enough, and if someone moved on. But if we open the Izvestiya Newspaper today, we'll see that it was first published not on March 1, but on February 28 (March 13) 1917. Thus, the authors of the newspaper didn't have a day and a half in stock, but only a couple of hours in the evening. The Guinness Book of World Records is missing the most interesting fact — never ever in the human history has anyone solved all the printing issues in a mayhem-struck city that fast.

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[1] Spiridovich A. The Great War and the February Revolution (1914–1917). Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 610.

[2] This means all the left-wing parties but Bolsheviks who alone suggested that Russia should have been defeated in this war.

However, it was not about the printing office and the texts. The time was lacking, and where could they find money to issue the Izvestiya Newspaper (News of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies)? Since 1905, this printed media hadn't been issued, and even in that year, it was issued several times and then prohibited and closed down. Who could have given money to bring it back in one day, so fast and simple? Who would have paid for printing the newspaper of yet illegal power authority when Nicholas II hadn't abdicated yet? Who wanted to stand trial for treason felony together with a couple of SRs and Mensheviks?

It is amazing how hastily and quickly all the printing matters in regard to the newspaper with Order Number One were solved. And the Izvestiya wasn't just printed once. Order Number One was published in its second issue. Yet, who had the pleasure of paying for the first, the second, and all the next issues? Was it the Germans? Or their agents? But even the Entente had never accused Germany of orchestrating the February.

We can have a long discussion about how the history of Russia could have been different. And yet, it is obvious that this order could have been published that fast only if it had been written in advance, even if the money and the publishing house in operation were ready. It means that the "occasional" rebellion of soldiers that turned the demonstrations in Petrograd into the revolution, was prepared in advance. And as soon as the occasion recurred, they planted the paper bomb in the Russian Army!

Who was the author of this dirty trick? Who is responsible for the destruction of the Russian Army and Russia itself? Opinions vary. Some blame the Petrograd Soviet, some accuse the Provisional Government. The main excuse for the "Provisionalists" is that on March 1, 1917, when the Order was published, the Government hadn't been established yet. However, we remember that both centers of the new Russian power were established on the same day, on February 27. It had a different name — the Provisional Committee of the State Duma — but it was all the same.

All this dark story is shed light on in the memoirs of Vladimir Lvov, a member of the Provisional Government. On March 2, the lawyer Sokolov, the author of the Order, came to the room where the Provisional Committee of the State Duma was having a meeting. In his hand, he was holding the text that had already been published in the morning issue of the Izvestiya — the News of the Petrograd Soviet. The bomb has already been planted under the Russian Army, and the newspaper is being distributed in the streets. Sokolov made his name during the first Russian Revolution when he defended those who destroyed Russia. And now he is in the Soviet. By the way, it is Sokolov whom Russia should thank for Kerensky. It was he who put a start to Mr. Kerensky's political career and invited him in 1906 to the landmark case of the Baltic terrorists. After the trials were successfully over, Kerensky started his ascent to power.

"...Nikolay Sokolov quickly approaches our desk and asks us to read the paper he has brought," wrote Vladimir Lvov, the chief procurator of the Synod. "It was the notorious Order Number One... Having read it, Guchkov instantly announced that the order was... outrageous and left the room. Milyukov tried to persuade Sokolov that this order mustn't be published... Finally, Milyukov withdrew, blue in the face... I bounced out of my chair and cried in hot temper that this paper was a crime against our homeland... Kerensky ran up to me and cried, "Vladimir

Nikolayevich, say no more!," grabbed Sokolov by the arm, dragged him into the next room, and locked the door..."[1]

Those responsible for the decay of the Russian Army can be mentioned by names. They are the members of the Petrograd Soviet, who wrote the Order: Yuri Steklov (Ovshey Nakhamkes) and Nikolay Sokolov. Plus Alexander Kerensky who took a really all-out effort to ruin Russia. He was a member of the Soviet that wrote and issued this Order, he was a member of the Government that could have nipped in the bud the catalyst that triggered decay of the Russian Army. Kerensky could have prevented all of it *twice*. However, he didn't. On the contrary, he helped to publish the Order, even though its consequences were quite obvious. No army can follow such rules and stay put. Even Bolsheviks that were most enthusiastic about Order Number One used it as a tool to seize power and to destroy the existing army. As soon as they came to power, they started a new Red Army with a new discipline, which, in fact, was a blast from the past — insubordinate conduct was immediately followed by death penalty. Army has always been about subordination, strict hierarchy and full obedience in order execution. Misconduct is good for a discussion club, not the armed forces. This is rather obvious, but there is some inexplicable thing. It was neither Lenin nor Trotsky who published and distributed Order Number One. Bolsheviks didn't initiate any of it. It was done by somebody else. Didn't the Provisional Government understand that the war couldn't be won with such an army? Did these idealistic patriots know even less about the warfare than us?

Other members of the Provisional Government can't be exculpated, either. How were they to react to Order Number One? They were all patriots and the Entente's friends. And all of a sudden someone from the room next door tries to ruin their state with a media publication. How were they going to look into the eyes of the British and the French ambassadors? How were they going to explain why the villains hadn't been arrested and immediately committed to court? *They were in the next room, and there was no Red Guard yet!* No one was there to protect the self-constituted Petrograd Soviet. This problem could have been so easily solved if a dozen officers had been summoned and given to read Order Number One. Then just point them to the room next door and order to arrest the authors. What's next? Then, whoever had signed this death penalty to the Russian Army should have been simply whacked right there. It might be illegal and even violent, but there were two dozens of apparent traitors on one pan of the scale and the destiny of the entire country or even the world on the other!

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[1] Kozhinov V. Black Hundreders and the Revolution. M., 2004. P. 133.

And then the Provisional Government should have appealed to the people and explain that a group of renegades attempted to destroy the army and to usurp power — and was shot in compliance with the martial rule. And that would be the destiny of any who dared down the front and devaluate lives of millions of soldiers already sacrificed on the altar of victory. And that would be the destiny of all deserters, the German spies, and whoever disobeyed their commanders. The new power won't allow Russia to lose that war. Signed and stamped. This is the document the patriots taking care of their country should have issued.

As you will appreciate, our misters "Provisionalists" didn't do anything like that. The Izvestiya wasn't banned. No one attempted to arrest the Soviet, and why was that? *Because they were friends.* Both the misters and the comrades served the same holy cause of ruining the Russian Empire! Whenever it came to the outsiders, they had consensus. None of the "democratic" doubts could break it. For instance, right after the February "The Union of the Russian People" and other Black Hundreders' organizations were banned. On March 5, not the Government but the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet banned the Russkoye Znamya Newspaper of the Black Hundreders. And the "Provisionalists" didn't call it illegal. Yet, it also was non-democratic. Why were the anarchists allowed to keep a newspaper, and the Black Hundreders were not? Because the former were "friends," and the latter were "outsiders"...



The Provisional Government destroyed Russia quickly and efficiently.
That's what it had been established for.

***To proceed with the destruction of the country it was necessary to destroy the army. In case it remained willful and disciplined, it would be able to instantly suppress any hotbeds of anti-state activities.***

And yet, Order Number One wasn't alone. The Russian Army was too powerful to be destroyed in one move. And the first order was followed by Order Number Two explaining that its predecessor didn't provide for electivity of officers, but only permitted the committees to protest against appointments. After this order was published, none in the army could understand how the Russian armed forces are managed. The Germans had been fighting with our army for almost three years, and they failed to disorganize it. Yet, a couple of Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries led by the Provisional Government managed to do it in three days. And still, they couldn't have enough of it. On March 6, Minister of War Guchkov called a meeting with the Soviet of People's Deputies at his place. There it was decided to cancel both Orders Number One and Two. Finally, anyone in the army was allowed to choose the order he liked better and serve in accordance with its spirit.

***The action logic of the Provisional Government is comprehensible once you believe that its only objective was to dismantle all the statehood and cause incredible chaos.*** If all allegations are dismissed about naive democrats that incidentally ruined the country, we see the takeaway, the accurate and steady steps for ruining Russia. To destroy a state one has to break the hoops holding it together, which are always the same:

- the army;
- the police and other law enforcement agencies;
- the government machine.

These were the key targets the Provisional Government hit right after it had come to power.

The army was aimed several times, and the first time this target was hit with the ominous Order Number One. Since then soldiers discuss making attacks in meetings, and strict officers could be given the finger... oh sorry, the suspension order. Well, if it is about the freedom of speech, welcome to the military units, dear agitators. Tell the soldiers how the Left SRs are different from the Rights, explain all the niceties of anarchism to them. Isn't that exciting? And if the commander yaps anything about discipline, we'll instantly suspend him, the tsarist satrap.

Try to command a hoard of yelling and bold soldiers, each of them having sympathies in a different party. Officers aren't killed often yet, but soldiers are suspicious about them, and as Bolsheviks came to power, the slaughter of the army commanders began.

The next target to hit was the government machine. They started to destroy the executive power vertical. Hardly had Nicholas abdicated, changes started *in two days* one by one. As we are always told, they started with themselves: the Soviet of Ministers was renamed and became the Provisional Government. The Ministry of the Imperial Court and Domains was replaced with the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). Yet, if you think the latter dealt with thieves and murderers, you are sadly mistaken, as the new MIA took care of the palaces, too. In March, our tireless readjusters established the Committee on Legal Affairs. It was entrusted to provide "preliminary legal conclusions" in regard to the actions of the Government. The State Board of Printing in April was replaced with the All-Russian Chamber of Bibliography and the Bureau for Press Reviews. In late March, the Department for Local Government Affairs was established at the MIA to control activities of the Provisional Government commissaries. On March 25, 1917, the Special Committee for local reforms was established, it was to draft laws on commissaries, the militia, the country councils, etc. This is where all these commissaries, special committees, and other Bolshevik pleasures belong!

For you to better understand how much Russia was in chaos, let me tell you *that on March 5 the Provisional Government with a single ink stroke abolished all Russian administration and suspended all the governors and vice-governors.* The head of the government Prince Lvov simply sent a circular order to all of the governors saying, "The Provisional Government has decided it is necessary to suspend the Governor and the Vice-Governor and dismiss them from their posts. Management of the counties shall be entrusted to Presidents of County Councils that shall be assigned to the posts of County Commissaries of the Provisional Government... The Presidents of the District County Councils shall act as District Commissaries..."[1]

All of it was abolished in a moment. All of a sudden. Without any explanation or preparation. Whenever the suspended and the newly appointed governors came to Petrograd to get at least some instructions and details, they would be always refused by Prince Georgy Lvov, "This is a matter of the old way of thinking. The Provisional Government has dislodged former governors and isn't going to appoint anyone to their posts. Let them choose locally. Such matters shouldn't be solved by Central Command, people should do it on their own."[2]

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[1] The State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. 1788. Op. 2. D. 320. L. 44.

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 57–58.

Can you imagine how much effort is required to build a new government machine? *Perestroyka* in the USSR started in 1985, and our government still hasn't got over it yet. And here all those colossal transformations happen in mere days, and the country leaders actually abandon their liabilities — choose yourself, we are not going to appoint anyone. The result could be easily predicted — the chaos is inevitable. And all of it happens in wartime when army commanders are being suspended and their orders are being discussed in the meetings. Are you still wondering why Russia turned to a vast domain of chaos and anarchy that fast?

At that moment those who were in the first line of the new "democratic" government broke out in a cold sweat. The optimistic Rodzianko, who had reasoned Michael Romanov into abdication on March 3, in only two days had to reason again. This time — with Prince Lvov, the chairman of the Provisional Government. Rodzianko tried to explain all the fatality of the local government cancellation order, but no one would listen. In fact, he wasn't a member of the government, and the Provisional Committee of the State Duma had been actually eliminated: most of the deputies stopped attending the Tauride Palace or even fled the capital. No one needed Mikhail Rodzianko anymore. The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can watch how the Provisional Government is making its predetermined "incidental" mistakes, its leader incredibly optimistic. "We can constitute ourselves the happiest people; our generation is lucky to live in the happiest period of the Russian history," Prince Lvov said on April 27, 1917, at the festive anniversary meeting of four Dumas.[1] His words seem awfully idiotic when one remembers that the October happened only half a year after that. And yet, the head of the Government wasn't downright stupid. He was simply happy about something else. Those who strived to see Russia destroyed and ruined were going to be the happiest people in the coming years...

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[1] Ib. P. 58.

Any reforms started by the Provisional Government could only lead to one result — a disaster. All the statements that they "tried their best, you know the rest" hold no water. They knew what they were doing. The country was instantly in trouble in every sphere, wherever the piping hot revolutionaries nosed into. Irefully declaiming the tsarist regime inefficiency, having made bread deficiency an excuse for the shift in power, "Provisionalists" managed to introduce food coupons in the first month of their rule. In June, bread, cereals, and sugar were distributed on the coupon basis, and after July 1, meat, butter, eggs, and other provisions were included in this system.

And the worst thing was that all those troubles were created artificially and were absolutely useless, there was no practical sense in them. The government was **PROVISIONAL!** Say, the Constituent Assembly turns back to monarchy — would they have to reconstruct all the power vertical again? No state would be able to withstand that. For instance, the Soviet Union failed. And don't forget that *Perestroyka* in the USSR started in peacetime, and there were no Germans approaching Riga, and millions of men weren't yearning in fire trenches.

Might the new government have expected the ex-government machine to sabotage its decisions, and that was why it should have been replaced? No, there was no sense in rebuilding the government machine for that reason. No one threatened the Provisional Government inside the country, as its power was *absolutely legal.* The Tsar had abdicated, and his brother Michael was awaiting the decision of the Constituent Assembly, which was almost the same thing. He wasn't alone, though — the decision of the Constituent Assembly was also awaited by monarchists, who understood that any attempts to change the political situation during the World War would end in losing the war. In fact, all top commanders had betrayed their monarch. There was nobody to recover the old regime, and no one was wishing to do it. "The allies" had also supported the overthrow. But why would anyone want to change the government machine, then?

There can be only one answer to that — to cause chaos.

"The police should be reformed to the militia," wrote the Provisional Government in its circular order addressed to the dislodged governors.[1] But why? What was the difference between the militia and the police? A person living at the end of the 20 century might be able to answer this question somehow, but imagine how much it puzzled the Russian governors who had received their education at the end of the 19 century. How much time does it take to call at least one new "people's" militia? Do you know? I don't, but I think it takes rather long. Didn't big men in the Provisional Government understand that? Why would the new government try in mere days to reconstruct the entire government machine that had been created for centuries? Why all the haste?

Having become the minister of justice, Kerensky sent his first order by telegraph on *March 2, 1917*. It was as harmful as Order Number One — the prosecutors were instructed to release all political prisoners and to congratulate them on the new government's behalf. Take note of the date — it's haste again, weird and terrible. Kerensky wrote his first direction right on the day when Emperor Nicholas II abdicated. We know not only the date when the Russian Monarch abdicated, but even the precise time — March 2, 1917, 3:05 p.m.[2] The Provisional Government was also established on March 2, at night. Let's do some math.

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[1] The State Archive of the Russian Federation. F. 1788. Op. 2. D. 320. L. 44.

[2] According to Shulgin, who came to accept the Emperor's abdication together with Guchkov, Nicholas signed the paper only at 10:00 p.m., though it was all decided in advance. To be formal, they wrote some day time on the paper. In fact, all this story of abdication seems to be falsified. There is not any abdication text in the archives. What they call "the abdication text" is a machine-typed sheet headed "To the Staff Head". Abdications aren't made like that. Such haste was simply indecent. The case of abdication of the German Kaiser Wilhelm was an indirect proof that any "wonders" are possible in politics. His cousin, Premier Minister Prince Max of Baden had announced the Kaiser's abdication in public THREE WEEKS before Wilhelm actually did it. It is quite possible that our Emperor had never abdicated from the throne, but was unable to do anything after his "abdication" had been announced...

Naturally, information about the long-awaited abdication was immediately cabled to Petrograd and reported to the Duma plotters. But even in the best-case scenario, if:

- the lists of government members were ready in advance;
- everything was approved;
- the information arrived without delay,

the Provisional Government could have been established not earlier than at 4 to 5 p. m. After that, there should have been some mutual congratulations and hugs. Let it all take some 30 minutes more. It means that at 5 to 5.30 p. m. Alexander Kerensky rushed to the telegraph to send his first direction about the amnesty. Couldn't it wait till morning?

No, it couldn't. Next morning Kerensky had to go and make Michael Romanov abdicate in favor of the Provisional Government. And although the grand prince lacked willpower, it was hard to be 100% sure about the outcome. That's why it was necessary to approve the harmful decrees as soon as possible — later there might be no more opportunity for that. Just like with Order Number One published the night before…

All those who detonated bombs in the thick of the crowd in 1905, who killed policemen and soldiers, who disrupted delivery of army supplies by protesting and striking — all of them were now free. The government bought them tickets for freedom. Many heroes of the future Russian unrest were leaving their places of detention those days. One of them was the modest anarchist Nestor Makhno. "Being sure that freedom, free labor, parity, and solidarity were to triumph over slavery under the heel of the government and the capital, I left the Butyrskaya prison on March 2, 1917," he wrote in his memoirs.[1]

Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaya, the notorious "Grandmother of the Russian Revolution," one of the founders and leaders of the SR party, didn't just leave her place in detention in Minusinsk — she was provided with a special train car to return to Moscow. Indeed, she'd taken so much pain collecting money in the USA for the first Russian Revolution of 1905. The money was used to buy arms, and no one will ever know how many people were killed in Russia with those arms. But the times have changed — the naive democrats are no longer at power, now the power is with those who intend to ruin the country, and their imprisoned comrades go at large honorably. For instance, "Granny" moved from prison to stay with Kerensky ... in the Winter Palace.[1]

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[1] http://www.makhno.ru/lit/Makhno1/lit1.php

Of course, Mr. Kerensky didn't meet every amnestied person at the railway station with a bunch of flowers. After the political amnesty, a total amnesty was announced in Russia on March 6. Thousands of thieves and bandits, whom people called "Kerensky's nestlings," appeared in the streets. They were also given the right of free passage to their places of residence "in any train class." And when you wide-eyed listen about the infernal cruelties of the Russian Civil War, note *who* set all those murderers and stranglers free to allow them to join the ranks of the opposing parties. Criminals were set free right the day after the police had been dismissed. Surely, it was *pure coincidence*...

The leaders of the new Russia are working unremittingly. On March 3, 1917, they reorganized the justice court institution — since then local courts were staffed with three members, a judge, and two assessors. A day after they abolished the Supreme Criminal Court, the Public Office of the Governmental Senate, Court Chambers, and Regional Courts. Setting terrorists free and bringing back all political emigrants wasn't enough, it was necessary to grant amnesty to criminals. And destroying the justice system wasn't enough, either. On March 7, Kerensky goes to Moscow, where he meets members of the Moscow Soviet of People's Deputies and representatives of various public agencies. Mr. Kerensky informed them that "in the nearest time the government is going to publish a decree on abolition of the death penalty for political crimes, and all cases of that kind will be further heard before a jury."[1] So said, so done.

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[1] Breshko-Breshkovskaya E. Subtle Reasons of the Russian Revolution. M.: Tsentrpoligraph, 2006. P. 322.

***On the tenth day of its existence (on March 12), the government cancelled the death penalty not only for political but also for criminal and military offenders.***

Now the German spies and deserters, thieves, and rapists can't be executed — freedom is roaring in the country. Everyone is free to betray, steal, and kill. Now all defeatist emigrants and all agents of our enemy can return to Russia, as the secret service has been eliminated in this freest country. Whom could it oppose? This question can be answered at once — agencies that mainly deal with spies and traitors oppose, you know, spies and traitors. The situation at the fronts is very complicated. There is a dreadful war going on, the enemy is leading an assault. And the Provisional Government chooses this exact moment to amnesty and bring back all the political exiles and criminal convicts, to abolish the police and the gendarme corps. Weren't these actions odd, wasn't there a smell of treason in the air?

Later, in the twilight of his life, Kerensky wrote about the main achievements of the Provisional Government he led while transforming Russia, "We made courts and judges independent. We eliminated all the "special" courts, and since then all "political" cases or cases related to national security were to be heard by the trial jury, like any other criminal case."[2]

Well, good job. Cases "related to national security" were considered as regular criminal cases, First come, first served on the jury trial. If you don't like the faces of the jury, object them, ask for another jury. Then don't forget to appeal against the judgment, and remember that the government might change any moment. Mr. Kerensky was too modest — it wasn't his input in the transformation he should have written about but his personal great input into the October Revolution.

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt14.htm

[2] Ib.

And yet, if you, dear readers, think that after the total freedom announcement Russian prisons emptied out, you are sadly mistaken. Bolshevik agitators, who had called for defeat, were released, but they were replaced with "Reactionaries," the ones who remained loyal to their oath and loathed the chaos that reigned in the country. Arrestments started instantly, even before the Tsar abdicated. According to Shulgin, "Quite a few Duma members were attending the matter of discharging the prisoners... the Duma turned into a grand police station... with the difference that Russian street policemen used to bring the arrestees, but now it was them who were dragged in... There were loads of arrestees." [1]

Before the dissolved police turned into the people's militia, all arrested people had to patiently stay in prison. And the new government vigilantly took care of no one of the previous "tsarist" hounds to remain in service. Stay in prison for some time, while we find some new employees, while the prosecutor studies the papers, let him take time to study your case. In fact, long pre-trial detention isn't an innovation. For instance, naval officers arrested and imprisoned during the February, awaited their trials since March 2 till June 7. Only in June, the investigation committee started to study their cases.

And mind you again, it was a **PROVISIONAL** government. If the Constituent Assembly had turned back to monarchy, would they have dissolved the people's militia and call back the police? Wasn't it easier to hold all the innovations until the Assembly, didn't it make more sense?

And yet, everything the new government did seems odd only if we forget its true cause. Having caused complete mess in the management system, the Provisional Government started a conflict in the most tricky matter of the Russian Revolution, the land matter. Three weeks after the monarchy had fallen, the Central Land Committee was established. The Provisional Government declared a land reform "in accordance with the new requirements of our economy and programs of all democratic parties and on the request of most peasants." They explained that the reform was absolutely necessary and that it was to be postponed until the Constituent Assembly approved it. In other words, the government said A but didn't say B. The only specific step they made was appropriating the lands of the overthrown monarch in favor of the government coffers. Then they confiscated the lands from all other Romanovs, most of whom had taken so much delight in the falling of the Tsar, who used to protect them from all the miseries. In fact, here the specific actions under the land reform ended.

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[1] Shulgin V. Days. 1920: Notes. M.: Sovremennik, 1989. P. 212.

In the total absence of authority and with all the turmoil in the country, everyone acted as they thought was necessary. It resulted in spontaneous mass deforcement of private lands and most common thuggery. Instigated by the left-wing extremists, people went to destroy manor-houses of the landlords. Many peasants stopped working and started struggling and fighting and looking after their neighbors, deforcing lands here and there. Seeds of the Bolshevik propaganda will fall into fertile soil. Yet, didn't the government do anything about these demolition rides? That's the thing, all the vigorous actions of the Provisional Government were about absolutely different tasks. It was issuing formidable circulars for province commissaries demanding to put things right. However, these directions weren't followed, as the local governments had no real power to put them into practice. Moreover, looking forward to becoming popular among people, particularly peasants, the government often closed their eyes to many unlawful acts and called private landowners to peace and harmony in their villages.

The unprincipled ("black") land replotting boomeranged the army discipline, too. The German propaganda instantly took this initiative. "Go home!" the German flyers said.

"They are replotting land there, don't be late!" Many soldiers believed them and deserted.

After the agricultural sector, the conflict was diligently started in the industrial one. In a couple of weeks after coming to power, the Provisional Government together with the Petrograd Soviet made top industrialists of the capital sign an agreement about the eight-hour work day.[1] Just like everything else these gentlemen did, their benevolent intentions and proper deeds were double-bottomed. This generous action for protection of labor rights along with a set of other changes *as inexecutable in war time* quickly resulted in... the entire Russia stopping work and starting striking for its rights.

"There are massive protests going on: laundry girls have been on strike for already several weeks; clerks, office keepers, accountants, municipal, sales and hospital workers that are often led by doctors, as well as dockers and stewards... The Donetsk Basin has got agitated, too, which has made things much worse. And the worst situation is at the railroad — we are heading directly towards a total railway strike,"[2] Chernov was told by his party colleague Gotz. And everything he said was absolutely true. Like having forgotten there was the war outdoors, people started to demand pay rises. Of course, standards of life in the country had lowered, and whatever the strikers demanded would be fair, except that it was during the World War. Collective egoism plus absolute anarchy triggered the collapse of the Russian economy incredibly fast. Instead of some strong measures, the Provisional Government was multiplying committees. One of such committees led by Georgy Plekhanov himself dealt with the demands of the striking railroaders. Once, their total strike in 1905 made Nicholas II come to terms with them, and in 1917 they made the front and the entire country cliff hanging.

Performance results of Plekhanov's Committee were representative — they established new standards for payment based on the price index principle. This information was passed to the government that rejected the project in dismay. Fair, yet impossible, there were no funds for that. Why did they start all of it, then? To rock the boat. How else can we explain what the "Provisionalists" did next? Railroaders were going to strike as they weren't paid, but the government couldn't prohibit striking, as it would have objected the basics of democracy.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 159.

[2] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 328.

"Total strike was a terrible thing," Chernov says, "and yet, it would be even worse if the government prohibited protests right after its own committee determined that the workers weren't paid the minimum wage to make a living."[1] The Theatre of the Absurd, and nothing else...

Every sensible person understood the situation was absurd. On May 10, 1917, the meeting of the Provisional Government was attended by the representatives of the heavy industry — metallurgy and metal treatment, the backbone of any economy.

"The manufacturers said that their plants couldn't work in the current situation. The manufacturers had to pay their workers not from their income, but from fixed assets that were going to end within a short time, and then they would have to shut their plants down,"[2] says Milyukov, the KD leader. Don't forget that the Provisional Government has been at power for some two months, and there is already a matter of *shutting down* the basic industries. Shock work, I should say.

What is the problem? Money, as it usually is. For instance, in the Donetsk Region 18 metallurgical plants had fixed capital of 195 mln rubles and gross profit of 75 mln rubles per year, and investment return of 18 mln rubles, and the workers claimed their wages increased by 240 mln rubles annually.[3]

"The manufacturers agreed to increase the wages by 64 million, but the workers wouldn't listen to that offer. The manufacturers even offered to yield all their profit, but the workers still didn't agree. They said, *let the plant be passed to the state.* And yet, even the state couldn't pay the workers if it was disadvantageous for the plant's further existence," Milyukov said.[4]

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[1] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, 2004. P. 329.

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 160.

[3] Ib.

[4] Ib.

As early as in May they started to discuss industry governmentalization. Doesn't it ring any bells? Naturally, the Bolshevik program, their slogan "Factories to the Workers!" Who was impressing this idea within the workers? Was it Lenin? No, it was Alexander Kerensky. In fact, he was one of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, though we know more about his career within the government. Lev Trotsky gallantly names all the Soviet leaders in his memoirs "My Life," and Mr. Kerensky is on the top of that list, "I wasn't too familiar with Tsereteli, and I knew nothing of Kerensky. I kept company with Chkheidze, Skobelev was under my ferule, Chernov often opposed me abroad, and it was the first time when I saw Gotz. It was a group of Soviet democrats in power."[1]

It was the Soviet, which sessions Mr. Kerensky took part in, that proposed its solution to the problem, making Lenin look a pathetic plagiarist. On May 30, 1917, at a conference of factory committees and councils of headmen of Petrograd, the following was announced for the first time, "The only way to prevent the disaster in all industries is letting the workers control production and product distribution. The workers' control should immediately evolve into a full-scale regulation of production and product distribution by workers."[2] This is not a step, it's a half step away from the proletarian dictatorship, and it is only May! Lenin was thrilled about this document,

"This program is great," he wrote, "all the control, and governmentalization of trusts, and dealing with speculation, and the labor duty..."[3]

Back at the Soviet, Kerensky agreed with all rather extremist suggestions, but in the Government, he himself paved the way for discontent through inaction and sabotage of obviously necessary governmental acts like strike prohibition and pay rise moratorium until the triumphant end of the war. Yet, the problem was that if Russia had tightened its belt and if its army hadn't been poisoned with Order Number One, the war would have ended in 1917 — "the allies" and Russia would have won. Such victory wasn't what the British and the French wanted. Russia shouldn't have been among the victors, otherwise, they would have to share the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as promised. That was why Kerensky and Co didn't sort the mess out and veiled their disruptive actions with all the democratic chatter.

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[1] Trotsky L. My Life; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/My_Life/My_Life-00–02–01.html

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 167.

[3] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-L.html

The leaders of the Petrograd Soviet also made some stump oratory. Skobelev, Chernov, and Tsereteli were calling "the manufacturers to waive their profits and dividends for the current and the previous years."[1] That sounds great, but the consequences are rather predictable and very well-known to the Russian economy. A person can only be persuaded to give up his money if he is in a condemned cell. This is how Bolsheviks are going to withdraw capitals. Their success in this sphere is going to be howling. The Provisional Government can only reason, and thus Russian capitals started to flow abroad, and currency purchase rates in the country rapidly increased. Less patient and more careful ones started to move their assets abroad. Where exactly? Mainly to "the allies," to Britain and France, some were moved to Switzerland and to the USA. Nothing as idiotic happened in any country at war. Everywhere governments kept a tight hold on the economy and suppressed egoism within any social groups and redirected the common national power to the common purpose, to victory.

"You should know," said Arthur Henderson, the labor minister of Great Britain, "that the British government strictly controls all the industry, all the operations aimed at supplying the army. In England, there are hardly any conflicts with the workers when it comes to supervision over the manufacturers. Our government considers all demands of the workers and if it sees a way to meet their needs, it does. When the war started, we suggested that the workers should temporarily abandon their right to strike, and in favor of our state, the workers did so. *Sometimes our workers carried on for seven days a week without rest or days off.*"[1]

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 161.

This is how things should go if a nation wants to win a war. This is what was going on in all democratic countries. However, Russia became "the freest country." *Absolutely incidentally,* of course. And the Russian nation started to rapidly fall into anarchy, its different parts loathing each other more than ever. Manufacturers cried out about ravenous workers and threatened them with mass dismissals. In return, workers protested and spoke of enormous war-time profits and incredible savings of their masters. The Civil War hadn't caught fire yet, but the wood was prepared and even prudently sprayed with gasoline.

The most sensible members of the Provisional Government saw the coming storm and tried to resist it, yet in a most peculiar way — they simply resigned. For instance, Minister of Trade and Industry, *a Progressist* Alexander Konovalov resigned. "We could only have hoped to prevent the crisis if the government had demonstrated its full power, if after three months it had settled down to the course of violated and oppressed discipline," he said.[2]

Some time after that, during the meeting of military and industrial committees in Moscow on May 17 he spoke even more openly, "*Russia is being brought to a disaster with the anti-state tendency veiling its true face with soapbox slogans.*"[3] Bolsheviks were only starting to grow in strength, and Mr. Konovalov didn't mean them, he meant the Provisional Government. I guess, one couldn't have put it better. However, historians have never wondered why the ministers started to see the light only on the edge of their retirement and why those who stayed wouldn't listen to their leaving colleagues.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 165.

[2] Ib. P. 164.

[3] Ib. P. 165.

Road forks changed one another — honest and decent people left the Provisional Government, and villains stayed. And it continued this way till the government overthrow. Thus, if we want to know who was responsible for the destruction of Russia, we just have to check the lists of the government members that stayed in it till the very end. And things click into their places. This is a spectacular yet easily proven fact.

*Alexander Kerensky was the only person from the original cast of the Provisional Government who remained in its last car.* Everyone else either left or was made to leave when they interfered into bringing the country to an end...

And yet, the policy of the Provisional Government harmed the Russians worse than anything else. They say, our nation degenerated under the influence of the Bolshevik ideology, but that's not true. In only six months of their rule, Kerensky and Co managed to corrupt morals of peasants, workers, and soldiers. Lenin only finished what they had launched. It is well known that Lenin became incredibly popular after he had returned from exile in April 1917. People weren't as wildly delighted with his ideas before. This is what the Provisional Government did. Over a short period of time, they managed to make people loathe everything that had to do with the former mechanisms of the Russian government and the government itself. This was done with a most ungovernable propaganda that started right after they had come to power. The data blow was launched at the Russian Empire that the mass media called a dreadful "Prison of Nations." Discrediting the monarchical regime by vilifying the imperial family was a great way to do that. "The independent press" launched a most extended campaign to discredit the ex-Emperor and his wife. Pictured full-color magazines published incredible filth about the imperial family and Rasputin.

As if signaled by an invisible conductor, the tone of publications about all other Romanovs changed, too. "Fantastic and sometimes absolutely indecent stories appeared in different newspapers, even in those that till the very last day of the old regime remained the 'semiofficial' voice of the government and profited well from their loyalty to the crown."[1] And it wasn't some inveterate monarchist who said that — it was Kerensky himself. They must have been publishing something really disgusting that even he could stay calm. Those aware of how mass media works understand that whoever has money can make them publish anything they want. Thus, newspapers published the "straight truth," and then the government represented by Kerensky winced shy and falsely — that truth was overdone.

Prosecutor Sokolov, who had the misfortune to investigate the Romanovs' deaths, precisely described Kerensky's double conduct and his stance on the Tsar, "Mr. Kerensky did his best to swing the basis of the old government and create a certain public attitude in some minds with his speeches that he delivered in the State Duma, and he went to the Emperor's quarters as a judge, being sure that the Emperor and the Empress were guilty and had to answer to their Homeland. Holding that against them, Mr. Kerensky consciously tried to emphasize his generosity and greatness by being ethically correct."

Mr. Kerensky behaved oddly as if he acted on someone's order. At all accounts, it was necessary to find some evidence and to accuse and vilify the Tsar and the Tsarina, to cast dirt on all of the Russian monarchy. The White Guard prosecutor noticed this, too, "This was the main charge by Mr. Kerensky. The investigation group doesn't wish to use any forced arguments in its conclusions and is ready to acknowledge that Mr. Kerensky was simply mistaken, though such mistakes are rather weird in his position. Being an expert in law that pretended to suffer for people's truth during all this time, Mr. Kerensky can't have been unaware that any charge should be based on facts. And he did just the opposite — *at first, he formed his judgment and then tried to find some evidence.*"[2]

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt14.htm

[2] Sokolov N. Calvary of the Imperial Family // Moscow Patriarchy Magazine. 1996. № 6, 7.

The country was decaying so quickly that it actually started to collapse during the Provisional Government's rule. The army was the first to fall to pieces. Even before the February, some national units were formed — Latvian Riflemen, Caucasian Cavalry Division, Serbian Corps. And after the revolt the army nationalization became avalanche-like. Czechoslovak Corps was the first to be established, and then everyone demanded their own "armies"! It was hard to refuse mouthy national revolutionaries! Officers are oppressed, commanders are confused and don't know how to make the soldiers obey their orders. That was why General Brusilov authorized the formation of the First Ukrainian Regiment of Hetman Mazepa. This is where the Ukrainization of the army started — soldiers had a great motive to abandon the order to fight, *"Підем під українским прапором"* (Translator's note: "We will go with a Ukrainian officer only"), they would say.

We've watched (and are still watching) all this insanity and terror with our own eyes — not in 1917, but since 1991 till now...

...As the army started falling to pieces, the country did the same. This is how it normally starts. At first, people have to feel they are different, they are not like their neighbors. As soon as they have become aware of it, it will be so easy to ruin the multinational Russian Army into multiple national regiments and set them against one another. Then the great Russian Empire will fall apart into multiple national states hostile to each other and especially Russia. This is what our "allies" wanted, this is what was going to happen. London and Paris would race each other acknowledging the emerging states and withholding recognition of the Russian governments struggling with Bolsheviks.

All this nightmare started with the Provisional Government in place, and it only logically progressed in the times of Bolsheviks. Poland and Finland called for independence. The Provisional Government agreed to recognize the independence of Poland after the war, and denied self-regulation for Finland — it was Lenin who set the Finns free. The situation in Turkistan was so heated by September that they had to use force to restore order there.

In March 1917, a group of political parties and associations founded the Central Rada in Ukraine. In May, they decided to make the Provisional Government immediately proclaim the national and territorial autonomy of Ukraine. Admittedly, it had to include eight Ukrainian provinces, as well as lands of the South Coast of the Crimea, several districts of the Kursk, Voronezh, Bessarabia Provinces, as well as the Donetsk Region and Kuban, where the Ukrainian citizens prevailed. A good beginning is half the battle, and late in summer 1917, just like after the USSR collapsed and like today, there was fighting for the Black Sea Fleet. All the non-Ukrainian sailors, who made up about half of the crew, were boondocked from the vessels Volya and Pamyat Merkuria, and the St. Andrew's flag was replaced with the national Ukrainian flag. Soon after that, the Central Rada declared Ukraine's independence from Russia. It happened in the times of Bolsheviks, yet the basis for it had been laid by the "democratic" Provisional Government.

However, against the total decay of the military forces, the number of official employees rapidly increased. Only in the Military Department, the number of bureaucrats tripled. Minister of Finance Nekrasov had to declare during the state meeting in Moscow, "In no other period of the Russian history has any tsarist government been as generous as the government of the revolutionary Russia."[1] And that was easy to understand, as these generous gentlemen shortly after moved to Paris and Berlin and even New York. They had to somehow do their living there, so they were easing the state treasury, each in his own way.

Signs of the oncoming catastrophe were obvious. Yet, the Provisional Government only issued its "odd" decrees and didn't do anything to avert the disaster. Irakli Tsereteli, the Menshevik leader and the active member of the Petrograd Soviet, the post and telegraph minister in one of the governmental make-ups, had a great sense of humor. After the October Revolution, he took charge of the independent Georgia. In short, he took every effort to destroy Russia. Roman Gul in his "Emigration Apology" tells an anecdotic story that happened to the Menshevik leader much later, in emigration: the French Socialists invited Tsereteli to their meeting and asked him to deliver a welcome speech.

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[1] The State meeting on August 12–15, 1917. Transcript. M.; L., 1930. P. 34.

"Dear friends, I am flattered...," Tsereteli said. "I've already ruined two countries, Russia and Georgia, do you want me to ruin France now?"[1]

The French roared with laughter at his joke. However, we won't, as ruined Russia and the millions of victims don't seem to be a laughable matter.

The only threat to the Provisional Government was the chaos it had caused. Yet, it persistently sowed the seeds of hatred, invading the thorny issues of the Russian life and leaving them without answers. Russia was rushing to the disaster and disruption, but there was a need for some implementers. And in gloomy March 1917, they started packing to come back to their homeland...

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[1] Gul R. I took Russia away: Emigration Apology: In 3 v. M.: BSG Press, 2002. V. 2. P. 61.

# CHAPTER 4

# Why German Command Had No Clue It Had Ulyanov the Spy

> Our representatives and representatives from the Entente had multiple reasons to establish contacts...
>
> *Count von Czernin,*
> *the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary*

It is quite a task to keep up with the stream of Lenin's thoughts. His rapid decision-making process is beyond the majority's capacity. Just as his intuition is. Except that at the beginning of 1917 it failed him. On January 9, in Switzerland, presenting the Report on Revolution of 1905 he said, "We old men may not live to see the decisive battles of the imminent revolution. But it seems to me that I can confidently express the hope that the young people doing such a fine job within the Socialist movement in Switzerland and across the world will have the good fortune not just to struggle, but to triumph in the forthcoming proletarian revolution."[1] In other words, you, dear comrades, will see the bright future, but I, an old bloke, have no hope for it. But suddenly there comes the February! Revolution! All of a sudden. It may look strange at first but it's totally explicable. We are all humans, and Vladimir Lenin was no exception. He could also make mistakes despite his genius. Moreover, since 1900, he had practically lived abroad, in exile, and had simply lost touch with the Russian reality. He learnt the news about life in Russia from his friends' letters and articles in foreign press. Thus, the future leader of the world's proletariat missed the moment of revolution. Still, it would be incorrect to blame Lenin for political short-sight. The February Revolution was the fruit of the "allied" plot, and Lenin was not a part of it. Every cog in the dreadful machine of Russia's destruction only knew the information it needed, so no charges on Lenin. Whenever the behind-the-scene forces needed participation of a certain person, they just pushed him or her to the surface of the political life; if no longer needed — off they go. There was no need to use Lenin and his party in the February: "allied" intelligence services succeeded with massive workers' riots and a military mutiny without any of their assistance.

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[1] Lenin V. Works. GIPL, 1949. V. 23. P. 246.

A series of stormy sessions arranged by the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and SRs during the first Russian Revolution in 1905-1907 was suddenly followed by a calm period. Revolutionaries and their leaders were "conserved," living comfortably in the Western Europe. They arranged conferences, argued in small newspapers and waited for the right moment. It seemed the right moment had come — World War 1 started. The hope quickly vanished: the majority of revolutionaries supported their governments and turned into patriots, at least for the period of the armed conflict. That was true for most of the Russian rebels, as well. For instance, Boris Savinkov, the head of SR terrorists, demanded that any anti-state activities should be ceased for the period of the war. Those fighting against the tsar and monarchy in such days were fighting against Russia, he claimed.

However, Lenin at the very early stage of World War 1 grasped the idea that this terrible slaughter was the only chance for a socialistic revolution. That was why he spoke about the defeat of tsarism in the war. Lenin's logic was clear but for one thing: the situation in Russia back then was nowhere near revolution. After a series of unfortunate battles, the Russian Army was planning to end that war among the victors. Therefore, in his Swiss report, Vladimir Lenin referred to revolution as a distant prospect.

And then out of nowhere came the February Revolution. Lenin was quick on the uptake, almost as soon as he finished reading some fresh Swiss newspapers. As early as on March 3 (16), that is when Grand Prince Michael abdicated, he wrote to Alexandra Kollontai, "Dear A. M.! We have just received the second set of government telegrams about the revolution of 1 (14).III in Petrograd. After a week of bloody battles by the workers, Milyukov + Guchkov + Kerensky came to power!.. Great job! We shall see how the party of people's freedom… will give the people freedom, bread, and peace…"[1]

After receiving stunning news Lenin's ingenious brain started searching for options — how to get to Russia from the far-away Geneva. This task was not as simple as it might seem. The fronts of the World War were all around. Little Switzerland was surrounded by France, Italy, Germany, and Austria-Hungary fighting in a deadly combat. Thus, there were several routes. Or, to be more precise, only two: via a country that was the member of the Entente, or via the territory of the opposing party. It made sense to choose the first option because the second one could bring real troubles — according to the international law, a citizen of the opposing state had to be interned, that is to be placed in an internment camp until the end of the war. Lenin was well aware of that. That is why at first Lenin did not even consider the second option, *a trip through Austria or Germany* (which both were Russian war enemies).

He considered the best possible way **only** through the Entente countries fighting on one side with Russia, tested the waters in that direction. On March 5 (18), Inessa Armand received the following telegram, "Dear friend, we are dreaming of the trip… *I would like to ask you a favor to test the waters quietly in Britain whether they would let me pass.* Best regards, Yours, V. U."[2]

We should thank Minister of Justice Alexander Kerensky for amnesty! The one who was calling for a defeat of his own country could peacefully go home. But how? Lenin was tireless in searching any possible options. Even the most exotic and fantastic ones. *But solely in the direction "via the Entente"!*

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[1] Starilov N. Chronicles of Revolution; http://www.russiantext.com/russian_library/2/starilov/revolution.htm

[2] Ib.

Between March 2 (15) and 6 (19) 1917, Lenin cabled his comrade Ganetsky (Fuerstenberg) to Stockholm. This man was responsible for Lenin's "financial flows" and was a link to the foreign Bolsheviks' sponsors. Soon the mail delivered Ganetsky a book inside which there was a letter from Lenin, "No more waiting, there is no hope for a legal arrival. I should immediately travel to Russia at whatever cost, the only plan is to find a Swede who looks like me. I do not speak Swedish, so he must be deaf and mute. I'm attaching my photograph just in case."[1]

But Lenin would not be Lenin if he only explored one possibility. On March 6, he wrote to Vyacheslav Karpinsky, "Dear Vyacheslav, I am considering every way. The following thing is a total secret. Please, respond as soon as possible and better by express mail (I hope a dozen of express letters do not impoverish the party) to make sure that no one reads the letter. Prepare documents in your own name for travelling to France and Britain, *and I will use them to travel through Britain (and Holland)* to Russia. I can wear a wig. I will get a photograph of myself with a wig on, and I will go to the Consulate in Bern with your papers and wearing a wig. At the same time, you will have to leave Geneva for at least several weeks (until I send a telegram from Scandinavia): until then you should be most safe in the mountains, we will certainly cover all the hotel expenses. If you agree, start acting in the most active (and discreet) manner; let me know in any case. Yours, Lenin. Think over all the practical steps in this regard and answer in detail. I'm writing to you since I am absolutely sure that everything will remain completely confidential between us."[2]

Stop. Let's stop for a moment and catch the breath. Lenin's trip to Petrograd has always been enveloped in mystery. The Soviet history simply told us, "He arrived." Soviet historians omitted the details like wherefrom and whereto. Contemporary authors, who accuse Vladimir Lenin of espionage in favor of Germany, on the contrary, describe his arrival in every detail. Their story sounds very plain: Lenin took the German money and naturally travelled through Germany. Nobody explains why Vladimir Lenin *did not choose this plain and reasonable channel right away* — why he did not contact his German supervisors and request to deliver him to Russia. Why did he take so much effort to travel through the Entente countries? His odd request to Inessa Armand to "test the waters" not in Berlin but in London... Did Vladimir Lenin forget that he was a German spy? Or might he be unaware of that?

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[1] Ganetsky Y. Return of Lenin // Proletarian Revolution. January. 1924. No. 1.

[2] Starilov N. Chronicles of Revolution; http://www.russiantext.com/russian_library/2/starilov/revolution.htm

Contacting his German friends would seem to be the easiest way. Certainly not personally but through intermediaries, he could ask to deliver him to his Homeland. The Germans we supposed to be most interested in delivering Lenin's "warm lot" there. Time was slipping away with each passing day, cannons were firing on the Eastern Front, and German soldiers were dying in hundreds! Additionally, Russian General Staff together with the "allies" was preparing next offensive actions, and nobody knew whether the German Army would be able to withstand it. The Germans had nothing to wait for — time worked against them. Yet, it was quiet in Lenin's apartment. No postmen knocked on his door and brought any news from the German side. They seemed to have forgotten about the spy Ulyanov, who was on the list of their secret agents.

Or might they also have been unaware of that?

The Germans kept silent. Lenin was still desperately looking for options as if he was the only person willing to be in Russia, while for the German generals it was something secondary and insignificant. Vladimir Lenin mentioned Germany as a possible option for the first time in his telegram to Karpinsky of March 7 (20) (that is on the fourth day of thinking). This telegram is the first evidence that Lenin started considering other countries (Germany, in particular) on his way to Russia apart from the Entente countries. He was studying all the options and offers. Menshevik Martov suggested an interesting thing in that regard. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks have different paths in history books. In real life, all revolutionary personalities lived close to each other in Switzerland, they mutually signed the documents of the famous Zimmerwald Conference, jointly solved transport issues. They were even on friendly terms. Later, during the Red Terror, Lenin personally brought Menshevik Martov two train tickets for the latter to leave abroad and advised him to rush and catch the train. Martov's offer can be comprehended from the text of the telegram: neutral activists would ask the Germans to let Russian revolutionaries to travel to their Homeland. Once again, the German side appeared to be in a complete information vacuum during the events. According to Lenin's telegram, this idea belonged to Menshevik Martov rather than the German General Staff. Thus, Lenin wrote to Karpinsky, "Martov's plan sounds good, we will make arrangements, but we (and you) cannot act straightforward. It would be suspicious. Apart from Martov, we need to arrange non-party Russians and Russian patriots to address the Swiss ministers (including dominant figures, attorneys and so on, which can be done in Geneva, as well) with a request to talk to German Consul in Bern. We shall not take part either directly or indirectly; it will spoil everything. The plan alone sounds very good and is very right."[1]

Lenin wrote a lot and continued to make effort to solve his problem. He sent out telegrams and checked his contacts. A week after the first letter Lenin sent another message to his mistress Inessa Armand. He started his letter with a judgment of the situation in Russia, but we are more interested in the second part, "*...Apparently, we can not get to Russia! Britain won't let us through. Germany is also a no go.*"

Again, the picture is blurred. Lenin saw the journey through Britain as a primary one and indicated it first. The "German" option was secondary and backup. This is just the time to be surprised. Imagine the situation: it was a long time since Vladimir Lenin signed the deal with the devil, which is the German General Staff, and took the money for revolution. He promised to tear Russia apart and take it out of the war. And when the moment for action had finally come, he did not know how to get to the scene of action. Poor Lenin was racking his brain. He studied the options as if in a bad detective story: either "quietly" through Britain or in a wig with somebody's documents through France. He was ready to turn into a deaf and mute Swede to get to Petrograd. Only after going through all the spy's attributes, Lenin made a decision to try and go through Germany. He tested the waters and bitterly wrote to Inessa Armand that "Germany is also a no go."

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[1] Lenin V. Works. GIPL, 1949. V. 36. P. 381.

Just think about it: ***Vladimir Lenin was not able to make arrangements with his German "companions" about going through their territory!*** There must have been no vacant seats on the trains. Or German border guards were too watchful and would throw him into a cage as soon as they had seen his Russian passport. Apparently, the German government and its General Staff had their hands tied to deal with that. There was simply no way to deal with the German border guards, was there? German intelligence officers, tears in their eyes, were watching their dear *Vaterland* losing in the unbearable World War. They were weeping but could not assist Lenin in getting home.

Hilarious, isn't it? That is exactly what we get if we accept the version of the long-standing agreement between the Germans and Bolsheviks. If we accept that together they planned the journey of revolutionaries in a "sealed" railcar. German intelligence services were certainly working to destroy and defeat their opponent — Russia. For instance, they had programs for war prisoners — Germans actively worked with Russian soldiers, especially with the ones that were not Russian by nationality. They were trying to form military units of Poles; Austrians established the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. Every traitor received a better ration. However, the results were pathetic: out of 2.5 million war prisoners, only two thousand soldiers entered the Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. To be fair, we should note that every party in the war performed such disruptive propaganda. Pursuing the same propaganda objectives and aiming to damage the Germans, Russia announced liberation of Slavic people from the Austro-Hungarian and German enslavement as one of the goals of World War 1. As a result, soldiers of such nationalities massively yielded themselves as war prisoners, and the Russian Command formed war units being much more successful in this business than their Austrian counterparts.

Germany also sponsored revolutionary parties that called for their countries' defeat. Such affairs are not surprising.

We should be astonished not by the fact that the Germans delivered Lenin and his companions to Russia but rather that they had not done it the first place.

Or rather, they didn't even consider it. This is what Lenin was desperate about. He could not pass through the Entente, and Germany "was a no go." The circle closed.

Now, let's get serious. Very serious, if we take into account that Lenin's journey on a German train resulted in the collapse of Russia, in the Civil War and millions of widows and orphans all over our country. Lenin used to be a tough person, pragmatic with no sentiments. Chernov described a typical episode that had occurred in Switzerland in 1911. Spending time in a restaurant with Lenin's company and drinking beer, he asked, "Vladimir, once you come to power, will you start hanging Mensheviks right on the next day?"

"We will hang the first Menshevik directly after the last SR," replied the leader of the world's proletariat laughing and squinting. He was exactly the person to fulfil the final part of the plan on destroying the Russian Empire. Until the right time, he had been kept on hold. He peacefully lived in prosperous Switzerland, wrote articles and dreamt of the remote socialistic revolution. Finally came the days when there was no time to lose but Lenin could not find the way to reach Russia. He was all nerves.

His telegram to Ganetsky dated March 17 (30) said, "Your plan is unacceptable. *Britain will never let me through, it will sooner intern.* Milyukov will cheat. There's one hope — send someone to

Petrograd, arrange an exchange for interned Germans at the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Cable me back. Ulyanov."[1]

Was everything so simple in connections of Vladimir Lenin with the German intelligence services? According to contemporary historians, Ganetsky was that envoy between the Bolshevik leaders and the German government. He was responsible for all negotiations and dealt with the channels and cash flows from the Germans to Lenin.

*This so-called envoy, according to Lenin's respond, offered to go through Britain, not through Germany!* Did everyone at the German Intelligence Service go mad at once?

Let's think. As of the moment of the spontaneous February Revolution, there might have been some agreements between Lenin and the Germans, but very vague ones. Otherwise, his trip to Russia would have been no problem. Berlin and Bolsheviks would have started to act as long-agreed. The fact that Lenin was dealing with the issue personally, like in a badly designed thriller with fake moustache and a wig, proves that Germany wasn't ready for such progress of events in Russia. They didn't expect either a successful February coup or any revolution in general.

Because they didn't prepare the overthrow of the Russian government. This is the best evidence that the February Revolution was orchestrated by the "allies." Their agents led workers out into the streets of Petrograd and later did the same with the soldiers; the British and French ambassadors supervised the coup in Petrograd. It was unexpected both by Bolsheviks and the Germans. They did not have a plan for such an incident. Hence, there was a slight confusion.

Vladimir Lenin was in a rush to find a way home. The following question does spring to mind: where were the Germans? What were they waiting for? They were considering and discussing. In other words, they were working. On March 10 (23), German State Secretary Zimmerman telegraphed to his command about the report from the German ambassador to Switzerland, according to which "the leading Russian revolutionaries" wanted to return to Russia through Germany.[1] He wrote that it was in accordance with the German interest and expressed his opinion in favor of the permission. His opinion was not taken into account in Berlin, as two days later, on March 12 (25), Lenin wrote to Inessa Armand that Germany "was a no go." It means an attempt to establish contact was made, but the answer was negative, otherwise, Lenin would not put it like that. The Germans didn't consider it, they simply refused Ilyich!

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[1] Lenin V. Works. GIPL, 1949. V. 36. P. 387.

Meanwhile, there are multiple endeavors to tell us about the devious German agents who had perfectly planned and fulfilled Russia's destruction. What kind of agents were they? According to all available documents, it becomes obvious that the initiative of going through Germany came from Lenin's side. The Germans simply gave their agreement. Not at once but after giving it some thought. *And at first, they had even refused Lenin!*

Looks intriguing! Why did they think better of it in only a few days? At first, they found it unnecessary and unfavorable to let Lenin and his comrades pass through their territory, but later they suddenly agreed. So, there must have been a reason that affected the cast-iron German logic. There is nothing in history books telling us about the reasons for such fateful changes.

Having refused Lenin between March 10 (23) and March 12 (25), the Germans continued to analyze the coming information. On March 17 (30), 1917, the head of the Berlin section of the General Staffs' political department wrote in his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The authorized representative on this side, who had spent several days in Zurich for our assignment and returned on March 29, 1917, informed us that the majority of Russians living in Zurich were willing to return to Russia..."[2]

On the same day, Lenin's telegraphed Ganetsky sounding close to panic. He wrote that "there's one hope" — to send someone to

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[1] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 318.

[2] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M: Veche, 2002. V. 1. P. 95.

Petrograd and practically exchange Lenin and his followers for the Germans interned in Russia. So, the Germans still didn't agree to let Lenin pass but refused him.

He had received the news about the revolution in Russia 14 days ago but still could not find the way to get there. For two weeks the Germans could not come to an idea to send their "spy" Lenin to Russia. For two weeks, from March 3 (16) to March 17 (30), Ilyich had been improvising. Later Nadezhda Krupskaya recalled he was so desperate that he started to consider going to Russia by plane.

He had nothing to worry about. In the detailed plan every actor had the right time and place for entering the stage. Right when his or her special part could be played. Lenin's time came after the overthrow of the monarchy, after the disappointment in the Provisional Government, after the chaos and anarchy that this government had brought. There he came. Ruthless, intolerant, and aspiring, he would stop at no end.

On March 17 (30), everything changed drastically. First it was Lenin's mood and later the attitude of the German government. It is easy to notice reading Lenin's telegrams once again,

- On March 12 (25), to Inessa Armand "...Apparently, we are not getting to Russia! Britain won't let us go. Germany is also a no go."
- On March 17 (30), to Ganetsky, "Britain will never let me through, it will sooner intern... There's one hope — send someone to Petrograd, arrange an exchange for interned Germans at the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."
- On March 18 (31), to Grimm (the leader of the Swiss Social Democratic Party, the envoy whom Russian revolutionaries asked to negotiate with the Germans), "Our Party has decided to accept without reservations the proposal that the Russian *émigrés* should travel through Germany and organize this journey at once. We already expect to have more than ten participants in the journey. We absolutely decline responsibility for any further delay, resolutely protest against it and are going alone. We earnestly request you to make the arrangements

immediately and, if possible, inform us of your decision tomorrow. With gratitude, Lenin."[1]

At first, we can see desperation and fatigue in Lenin's texts, but starting with March 18 (30) the lines are full of energy and optimism. On March 19 (April 1) Lenin wrote yet another letter to his mistress Inessa Armand. Just look at this letter! Such a dramatic change, "You might say the Germans will not provide a railcar. *I bet they will!*"[2]

The same day Lenin attended a meeting where a member of the Committee on Russian Political Emigrants Return, a Pole Sergei Bagotsky, did not simply make a report but informed of negotiations with an envoy and reasoned the journey of the emigrants through Germany.[3]

Something incredible must have happened in the evening of March 17 (30) or the morning of March 18 (31), which turned the situation upside down.

We remember that the first attempts to get the permission from Germany had ended with a refusal. Now the answer was positive. We should not be confused by the word "proposal" in Lenin's telegram to Grimm. It was not a German proposal, it was Germany's response to Lenin's probing. Can we pass? Yes, you can! The "sealed train" that overturned the course of history wasn't initiated by the Germans, it is important to note and to remember that.

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[1] Lenin V. Works. GIPL, 1957. V. 36. P. 389.

[2] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M: Veche, 2002. V. 1. P. 94.

[3] Lenin actively interacted with Bagotsky during his stay in Austria-Hungary and Switzerland. According to the Swedish researcher Hans Björkegren, there are documents in the Swedish archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that give evidence of the odd interest of the British intelligence services to that Polish "patriot." Ideas were smoothly suggested to revolutionaries so that they made new attempts of getting the permission from the Germans who had already refused them. Bagotsky could have been the true "author" of Martov's idea about addressing the Germans once again (Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 315).

Tough German heavy minds underwent a 180-degree turn. Lenin didn't just hope to succeed, he was ready to bet on it. He knew exactly the Germans would agree by no means. Because they had been made a proposal they could not decline.

Who made that proposal? We would hardly ever know the exact name. But we can guess what intelligence service they belonged to…

***This book contains only one fact that does not have documented evidence. I am talking about the meeting of the German intelligence officers with their British colleagues.*** But these meetings must have had place. Then the rest of the facts add up. All the previous and further odd things and miracles get their explanations…

> …It is still cool in Switzerland in March. The sun shines and the grass turns green but it is cold in the cities. The mountains are still covered with snow. The Advisor of the German Ambassador to Switzerland, Count von Schulz, disliked this country. It seemed empty despite the fact that half the population spoke good German. The dialect was certainly very distinctive but such language specifics were true for Germany, as well. Heritage of feudal disunity, as linguists called it. Simply put, not every German could understand his countrymen from other parts of the country.
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> Von Schulz lifted his heavy frosty beer mug and took a sip. He did not have long to wait. People he was expecting were to arrive in a couple of minutes. Von Schulz could only guess who they were. He had never seen his future companions, did not know their names or positions. In other words, nothing. Apart from the fact that one of them identified himself as a reporter of a small American newspaper, Los Angeles Tribune. As a matter of fact, Count von Schulz doubted whether that newspaper existed at all. Since his own real name was Baron Wilhelm von Braun and he was a career intelligence officer under diplomatic cover, using a different name for disguise. He would expect the same from the counterparty…
>
> The conversation promised to be interesting. A week before, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany received some secret correspondence from the Americans. The Yankees informed that they had been authorized by the British government to arrange a meeting that would bring up some important proposals. Switzerland was suggested as meeting location, the time was appointed within a 2-week period. It was

the ordinary diplomatic etiquette. Fighting parties should not communicate directly, there had to be an envoy. For instance, neutral Americans.

Von Schulz took another sip. Americans' neutrality was only a cover. A rather leaky and rotten one. Them joining the war was only a matter of time. This was von Schulz's opinion, the government in Berlin was under no illusion, either. This made this invitation from the American State Department even more intriguing.

Germany's response was standard: they agreed to meet in the mentioned time period. They indicated the Advisor of Bern Embassy, Count von Schulz, as the contact person. Americans replied that a gentleman would contact him and introduce himself as a reporter of the Los Angeles Tribune. Yesterday, he called the embassy and appointed a meeting in a huge but still cozy beer house.

"Good afternoon, Mr. Schulz," a deep voice belonged to a tall and skinny gentleman in a tweed suit. Without waiting for a response, he sat on the bench next to the German. "Let me introduce myself — I am a reporter with the Los Angeles Tribune."

The German nodded and looked with surprise at the person that accompanied the reporter.

"Let me introduce you," smiled the American. "This is my companion, Mr. Smith. He represents one interested state."

There was something to be surprised about: Smith turned out to be Hindu! He was not tall, had grey hair and large intelligent eyes. The hint was very plain and clear — India was Britain's, so the second person represented Britain, naturally.

"Not bad," von Schulz's thought, "What would you ask from a Hindu?! In case of disclosure, the British government would have a perfect alibi: some representative of a permanently rebellious province had met with the German diplomat of his own accord. And talked some nonsense."

"Hello!" the German greeted him curtly. Von Schulz had experience of such meetings and knew that no special ceremonies had to be observed. The conversation should be utterly cynical and open. One condition — no rudeness. Both parties were equally interested in such secret informal contacts. Therefore, the count deliberately continued to drink his beer gazing at his companions. It was their initiative to meet, so they had to start talking.

The first to speak up was the American.

"Actually, I do not like beer that much," he said smiling broadly, "but here it is incredibly good."

"It is the national drink in Germany. This could be the subject of your next article in the Los Angeles Tribune."

"Thanks," the American smiled ironically. "You know, Schulz, there has been so much to do lately that I simply don't have time to write articles. I was going to write one today but instead, I am here, with you."

"What a loss to your readers!" the German nodded, pulling a sympathetic face.

As a rule, at the beginning of such conversations, the parties would always test each other. The best way to handle it was to use general phrases and be patient, especially when one did not know what the conversation would be about.

During this small talk, the Hindu was calmly looking at the German and even had time to make an order.

"Mr. Schulz," he said eventually, "I think we should start the conversation and get down to business right away."

The German diplomat only nodded.

"Our countries have been fighting for almost three years," the Hindu continued. "Rivers of blood and millions of victims seriously hinder the peace process…"

"Might it be that the British will suggest that we end the war?" This thought flashed in Schulz's head but the British, as if having heard him, returned to the matter.

The more the British talked, the more Schulz's astonishment grew. He had seen a good deal in his work but even he could not imagine something like that. It really was the proposal for peace, armistice. But… a very specific one.

"We would like to assist you in wearing down Russia," the Hindu said. "It is weakened at the moment and will get even weaker. We will not interfere if you subject Russia to defeat. Moreover, we are ready to help you. I would even call it some kind of temporary purpose-oriented alliance."

"Beware of the Greeks bearing gifts," von Schulz said through his teeth. "I am bewildered by the proposals brought up by the state that opposes my Homeland in the war."

"Call it whatever you like. It is for you to choose. It does not change the main point," the Hindu objected roughly.

"If you want the peace so much, wouldn't it be better to start peace talks instead of defeating your friends? How many human lives could be saved!"

"Mr. Schulz," the American engaged in the conversation. "Leave the slogans and parade of words to us, the reporters. Let us have some bread, after all."

"I am not authorized to offer any peace talks," the British said firmly. "My mission is a little different. I offer you to defeat Russia and remove it from the game. For this purpose, we are ready to assist you. We will request something in return."

Von Schulz took another sip of beer. It seemed like the time to ask about the minutest details. And he did, and the British answered. The new Russian government is controlled by the allies. Its actions are anticipated and identifiable. The Russian Army has already started to decay due to the agitation campaign. And the agitation influence is going to increase immensely. To support that, a group of revolutionaries should be sent to Russia, gifted and generously sponsored propagandists. They should have really much money to become the richest group, and their money will accomplish every task that their agitation campaign can't. These people are tried-and-true and smart and are well-known to the German intelligence services. They have already tried to find their way home through Great Britain, but they have been given to understand that it was impossible.

"Then they came to you, dear Mr. Schulz. And were refused once again. Now they are almost desperate. Yet, we are able to make them self-assured and dynamic. For that you need to agree to let them pass to Russia through your lands," and having said that, the Hindu took a large golden watch out of his pocket, opened it and then closed it with a bang, "Three hours ago they contacted our agent again and are now waiting for your decision."

"Before making any decision, I'd like to hear you out," the German sneered.

"Naturally. Propaganda and agitation of our revolutionaries will quickly hit their target. We can guarantee they won't be opposed. One military strike on the Russian Army weakened with interior disarrays will bring you victory," smiled the British. "And in return, we'll let you deliver this strike. While you are whacking the Russians, our armies will stay still. Yet, for the mean time, you won't take any dynamic actions at the Western Front, at least at large scale. Minor scuffles, naturally, don't count."

"What about the military supplies?" von Schulz asked.

"You must understand that we can't halt them completely, but I assure you," the British spy smiled, "we have as much mess and confusion in Britain, especially with our supplies to the Russians. And in the nearest future, there will be much more confusion. We'll do our best."

"And we'll do what we can," the American rejoined the conversation. "You will have your loans and can risk them and generously pay the revolutionaries. Yet, there is no risk, actually. We know you are short of money, so we offer you a fair deal."

When the German heard that, his eyes flashed with loathing, but he managed to hold his temper. He saw the others did a good job preparing for the meeting. They answered most of his questions before he asked them. Of course, the enemy's proposals should always be considered with great care, but this time everything looked so smooth and nice. The Germans were offered to deliver a group of defeatist agitators to Russia. The Americans were ready to sponsor it, the British ensured the Russian government wouldn't interfere and promised to stay neutral.

There was one last question left.

"Why should I trust you?" von Schulz asked and took a look at the company. "Maybe, you just want to provoke the German government. And later you," he nodded towards the reporter, "will publish in your newspaper a long article about the vicious things the blood-thirsty Huns are ready to do when they can't defeat the Entente countries by fair means."

"You may not believe us. Yet, our offer is your slightest chance to successfully exit this war," the Hindu said. "Unless Russia is destroyed, there is not a remote possibility for you not to be smashed up. And your smashup is inevitable."

"But why now?" the German tried to be sarcastic.

"Because in a couple of weeks the United States will declare war on the German Empire," the Hindu sneered. "This matter has been settled."

The American puffed some smoke, "Consider our answer as follows. If you want to end the war as soon as possible, this is the shortest way. After Russia drops out of the game, which is the final objective of this entire operation, the force balance will drastically change. Your Austrians and Bulgarians will have a lift in spirits, and my government might prefer just nominal war participation. We need to spill at least some blood to have equal grounds with the others when it comes to the world repartition. In that case, the Entente might listen to Germany's plea for peace."

"That sounds good," von Schulz took yet another sip of beer, "but I need some real proof that your intentions are serious. We must be sure that you wouldn't backstab us when most of the German forces gang up on Russia."

"Our intentions are most serious, and here is the proof," the Hindu reached deep into his pocket and extracted a white envelope, absolutely unremarkable.

"This is the plan of our spring offensive," he said and looked the German closely in the eye…

March 17 (30) — 18 (31), 1917, is the key day in the Russian history. On this day, the German government verbally agreed to send Lenin to Russia. They decided to accept the offer of the British.

Naturally, the British negotiators were the first to learn about it. We can figure out precisely when Lenin learnt the joyful news — it was at night on March 18 (31) or early on March 19 (April 1). How do we know? Very simple — for Lenin to travel to Russia successfully it was not only the Germans who had to let the "sealed" railcar pass, but Ilyich was supposed to agree to board it. And if we take Lenin's collected writings, we'll see that on March 15 (28) he wrote that he would never travel to Russia in that way.

This is an excerpt from his telegram to Jacob Ganetsky,

"I can't accept Berlin's permission. Either the Swiss government gets a railcar to Copenhagen, or the Russian government makes an agreement about all the emigrants exchanged for the German internees."[1]

So, at first, Lenin didn't agree to go home on March 15 (28) and demanded "a railcar to Copenhagen," but then on March 19 (April 1) Lenin boasted to his mistress Inessa Armand that the Germans provided a train for him. That was only four days later. In these four days, the British intelligence did some great work and used all of its agents. Someone met the Germans and made them a proposal, someone pulled the strings to make Parvus, who was reputable among the Germans, influence them and persuade them into letting Ilyich pass through their country. Other agents negotiated with Lenin personally reasoning him into obeying and not causing unnecessary difficulties. And Ilyich obeyed — in fact, the "sealed" railcar didn't target Petrograd or Copenhagen but only reached the German port of Sassnitz.[2] Someone powerful and unseen must have helped the revolutionaries to arrange everything with the Germans in just three days (March 16, 17, 18), as they hadn't managed to agree in the previous two weeks. After all, they were the same personalities with the same ambitions.

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[1] Lenin V. Essays. GIPL, 1957. V. 36. P. 386.

[2] Our revolutionary passengers traveled from the German-Swiss border by regular public transport to Russia — by train, by sleds, and then by train again.

General Ludendorff wrote in his memoirs, "Sending Lenin to Russia, our government undertook a special liability. From the war point of view, his passage through Germany was justified: Russia was to collapse into the abyss."[1]

In his autobiography, Lev Trotsky tries to explain the motivation of the Germans and Bolsheviks, although we can understand it without his explanations, "On the part of Ludendorff it was a reckless affair resulting from the tight wartime situation for Germany. Lenin used Ludendorff's calculations for his own cause. Ludendorff thought, "Lenin will overthrow the patriots, and then I'll throttle Lenin and his comrades." Lenin thought, "I'll take Ludendorff's train and pay him off in my own way."[2]

Trotsky doesn't explain why the German General is that nervous. There is a war going on, and infiltration of defeatist agents, and whoever can draw the long-awaited victory nearer is justified and reasonable. Yet, in every Ludendorff's word, we feel how difficult it was for the Germans to make this decision, fatal for Russia. If we consider it, the Germans don't have a reason for remorse. A special operation is prepared that may help to disable one of Germany's war opponents. The results of this operation are hardly predictable, so why should the Germans eat their hearts out in vain? This is what secret services are established for — to give hell to their opponents and hand them nasty surprises.

And yet, Ludendorff's words sound like an apology, "From the war point of view, ... passage through Germany was justified." As if the German general is explaining himself to us, the Russians. But in fact, he tried to apologize for the actions of the Berlin government not to us, the Russians, but to the future generations of Germans. In August 1914 Germany declared war on Russia, which even its own generals didn't expect. In March 1917, the Germans let a group of revolutionaries pass through their country in a "sealed" railcar. Both of these decisions combined into a single disastrous mistake and ended with its defeat in the war, the end of its monarchy and numerous woes for the German people. Who made the Germans make a fatal solution for the second time? Just like the first time, it was the British.

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[1] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War 1914–1918. M., 2005. P. 342.

[2] Trotsky L. My Life. M., 2001; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/My_Life/My_Life-00–02–02.html

And we are at the most important point here. Finding out who actually delivered Lenin to Russia is actually the key to understanding all the further events. Lenin was infiltrated to Russia by the Anglo-Saxons (who used the Germans). All historical inconsistencies, absurdities, and oddities sink in if we know this fact.

The proposal made by the British looked a little bit odd. The Germans were to send Comrade Lenin to Russia and were offered money. This is where the Germans must have been surprised — let us see, if we, the opponents, send him home, his comrades will arrest him as soon as he arrives. And indeed, the Provisional Government has published an announcement in the Paris Petit Parisien Newspaper, promising to accuse of treason any Russian citizen that had passed through German territories.[1] The publication seemed to be okay, it warned not to try to return through the enemy's lands, as it would be severely prosecuted. And yet, the puppets from the Provisional Government published it for a different reason.

This article was written for Lenin and the Germans. The Germans read the newspaper and thus didn't dare to take any action. The Russian government had it in black and white: if you pass through Germany, we'll put you on a court bench. Treason felony in war time is a sure death penalty. And it doesn't matter that the Provisional Government abolished the death penalty two weeks before. The penalty of life servitude wasn't any better, and by the way, who could guarantee that the death penalty cancelled today wouldn't be imposed tomorrow "by popular demand"? You can lose all and sundry that way. The rational and law-obeying Germans can't imagine that someone might be not sentenced for obvious treason. Or even might be not charged if needed.

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[1] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M.: Veche, 2002. V. 1. P. 97.

How can anyone of sound mind imagine that a person coming to overthrow the government would be welcomed not by gendarmes with handcuffs, but by a music band and people with flowers? And this is exactly how Lenin was welcomed…

This is why the article was published in the Petit Parisien — to make the "allied" support for infiltration of Lenin absolutely necessary. The "allies" that completely controlled the Provisional Government could guarantee that the threat would remain a waste of breath. No one was going to arrest anyone. And yet, it would be so convenient if as soon as the Russian counterspies arrived at the rail station, the train would be surrounded and all troublemakers would be apprehended and dragged to prison. But the February had been orchestrated not for the high traitors to be sent to prison, though, it had absolutely different objectives and tasks.

The Germans finally made up their mind and delivered to Russia a burning torch, whose sparkles would ignite Germany itself in only a year. That is why Ludendorff lowers his eyes in his memoirs. He knows that the "allied" spies ensured the collapse of Russia. It is uneasy for an honest German military man to dive into all the filth and dirt of making agreements with the enemy and betraying his opponent. The manner of Prussian soldiers didn't allow such behavior. Yet, the Germans didn't have any other way out…

As soon as the first preliminary results of the meeting with the German representative were known, the intermediaries contacted Lenin (it was on March 18 (31) or the next morning). On behalf of the "allied" intelligence services, they offered him a deal. It was really simple: the British would make Germany let Ilyich's group go to Russia; they would provide generous financial support on behalf of the Germans; they would guarantee cooperation from all their agents in Russia. And they would demand only one thing from Lenin in return: after his arrival in Russia, he was to organize a revolution there and to take power in his hands. And Vladimir Lenin instantly agreed. Lenin didn't need to think twice — he was offered money, support, and resources and was only asked to fulfil his dearest dream.

Then they turned to details. Lenin had to be tough with the Germans and maintain any reasonable claims, they would agree to anything. Yet, cooperating with the German special services, he was to remember who actually delivered him to Russia. In short, making an agreement with the Germans, Lenin still needed to approve all his next actions with the British (and the French) intelligence and continuously communicate with his supervisors.

After this meeting, everything changed in a flash. *Just like Lenin has been promised,* the Germans give their long-awaited approval, and Lenin telegraphs to Robert Grimm. Then, bewinged, he cables his mistress Inessa Armand telling her as much as the conspiracy allowed. And on the same day, March 19 (April 1), Mr. Lenin, who had no more doubts, sent a message to his finance officer Ganetsky, "Please provide two thousand, or better three thousand, crowns for our trip."[1]

He was in a terrible haste to make up for the lost two weeks. But Grimm, acting as the envoy, can't settle all the matters with the German diplomats. And then Lenin changes the envoy — Fritz Platten, a Swiss Social Democrat, becomes his magic wand. He negotiates in Berne with Romberg, the German ambassador. The new envoy definitely moved in much higher circles than the previous one. *And just as Lenin had been promised,* the Germans were willing to help — on March 20 (April 2), State Secretary Assistant Bouche sent a telegram to Romberg saying, "If possible, the Russian revolutionaries should be transferred through Germany as soon as possible."[2]

On March 22 (April 2), Platten brings Lenin's demands to the German Embassy. Reading these demands, you'll think that the Germans needed Lenin more than he needed them. It is a very important and indicative moment: the Bolshevik leader doesn't petition to be allowed to go to Russia, *he dictates his own terms to the Germans.* And they were quite a few:

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[1] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M.: Veche, 2002. V. 1. 1. P. 95.

[2] Lenin and Russia. A Collection of Articles by Pushkarev S.; http://lenin-rus.narod.ru/01.htm

- all the emigrants were to go regardless of their take on the war;
- the railcar was to have the extraterritorial rights;
- no one was allowed to enter the railcar or leave it unless allowed by Friedrich Platten;
- no passport or luggage checks.

Addressing the agency that HAS ALREADY REFUSED HIM Vladimir Lenin doesn't ask, he actually demands. Might he want to be refused once again? No, he is sure the Germans will agree. And why is Ilyich so sure? Who can guarantee that his rather bold appeal to the representatives of the German Empire will be successful?

Do you find it odd and remarkable? This is the same feeling that Romberg, German Ambassador to Switzerland, had.

"Odd enough," he said sneering. "As far as I remember, it is not me or my government that appeal for passing to Russia, but it is Mr. Ulyanov and others who request the passage. Who of us is in place to lay down terms?"[1]

On March 23 (April 5), a surprised and to a certain extent outraged Romberg sent an encrypted telegram to the state secretary through the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking "to give instructions just in case for me to fulfil *promises of that kind.*"[2] The German ambassador expected his command to send a refusal, but *just as Lenin had been promised,* the Germans agreed to everything. A day later, on March 25 (April 7), an answer arrived that the German command didn't object to the Russian revolutionaries passing through Germany, provided they would travel on a separate train. And this is when Lenin and his companions write their undertaking letters,

*"I, the undersigned Ulyanov (Lenin) V. I., certify with my signature that:*

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[1] Platten F. Lenin from Emigration to Russia. M., 1924. P. 63.

[2] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M.: Veche, 2002. V. 1. P. 99–100.

*1) I have been briefed on the terms defined by Platten and the German Embassy;*

*2) I will obey directions of Platten, the trip supervisor..."*

Lenin paused for a moment. Right to the end he wasn't sure about the success and now all of it seemed to be going well. He couldn't believe how rapidly the situation was developing. Even he, always ready to change, to come over, to explain that there are "these compromises and those compromises," was hardly keeping pace with the rapid time flow. And the feather pen led by Ilyich's steady hand scratched the paper again,

*"3) I am aware that according to the Petit Parisien, the Russian Provisional Government threatens any Russians who have passed through Germany with state prosecution for treason felony;*

*4) I solely undertake all political responsibility for my trip;*

*5) I am aware that Platten guarantees my passage only as far as Stockholm."*[1]

And on March 27 (April 9), he was already on his way to Russia...

Albeit Vladimir believed it would come out successfully, he naturally was anxious. He was perfectly aware that his act was treason felony, but he was ready to do anything for the revolution. The "sealed" railcar traveled for a long time, from Zurich to Bern, then to Stuttgart and to Frankfurt am Main, and then to Berlin and the German port of Sassnitz. Then they took the Swiss train ferry Drottning Viktoria to Trelleborg, where they took another train to Malme and then to Stockholm, where Lenin and comrades arrived on March 31 (April 13). And there Lenin got another confirmation that everything was going just like the "allied" spies had promised. The first one was when the Germans changed their decision from refusal to agreement, and the second one had to do with the Russians.

When the historians tell us how challenging was Bolsheviks' struggle with the Provisional Government, they tend to leave out some "details."

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[1] Starilov N. Chronicles of the Revolution; http://www.russiantext.com/russian_library/2/starilov/revolution.htm

Lenin (with umbrella in his hand) in Stockholm on his way to Russia

And here they are.

— ***In Stockholm Lenin and all his comrades obtained a group entry Russian visa at the Russian Consulate General.***[1] It was perfectly known in the Consulate *how* this group had arrived, and yet they were given the documents. Moreover, these documents had been issued before Lenin and his comrades arrived in Stockholm.[2]

— ***It was the Provisional Government that paid for the tickets from Stockholm to Russia of their "opponents" and subverters.*** Lenin was given these tickets right there, in the Russian diplomatic representative office.[3]

Wonders will never cease! *Just like Lenin had been promised* by his new friends. Hold on, why were they new? Bolsheviks, like all the other revolutionary parties, started to cooperate with the western intelligence as early as in 1904–1905. And if we pay more attention to their leader's bio, we'll see that all of it started even as early as in 1895...

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[1] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 375.

[2] Ib.

[3] "There were 20 second-class tickets for sleeping saloon and 9 tickets for sitting saloon provided". Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M.: Omega, 2004. P. 375.

Let's recall the life journey of this leader of world's proletariat. In 1881, Lenin's brother, Alexander Ulyanov, was arrested, sentenced and executed for the attempted assassination of Alexander III. However, Volodya Ulyanov was still admitted to the Kazan University, though expelled in 4 months for taking part in student protests. Without getting into details, Lenin's family was in need of some money. Lenin's mother Maria Ulyanova was the main breadwinner in the family, as she was paid the pension for her late husband (100 rubles) and supported her children that were either studying or fighting the tsarist regime and thus had no personal wages.

Having no proper education, Vladimir Ulyanov couldn't get any decent job. Yet, after lettering to high agencies and his mother's suing out, with regard to his father's record in the sphere of popular education and after several refusals the young, Ilyich was allowed to pass his exams without attending the lectures.[1] In November 1891, the Examination Board of the Law Department of St. Petersburg University granted him a first place degree. Vladimir instantly used it for his purpose and got a job of the law attorney's assistant in Samara. In September 1893, he moves to Petersburg where he works as a legal advisor and conducts court cases. No great or life-changing revelations in the revolutionary ideas yet. It's rather obvious, though: Lenin is only 23, and his destiny has only started to take shape. Everything is so vague and unsteady yet. He is still restrained — whenever he appeals to authorized agencies asking to let him go abroad, he is refused.

*We should note the fact that before his first trip ABROAD Lenin used to be in need of money.* A young gifted lawyer is quickly progressing as a revolutionary theoretic, too. After a couple of good-for-nothing works presented in a Marxist group session,[1] Lenin writes something really good. To see the true value of Lenin's work one should recall that at that time there were no revolutionary organizations in Russia. Whoever tried to do something were sent to prisons or for penal servitude.

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[1] Vladimir's letters to Minister of Enlightenment are rather spectacular, "Being in need of some job that would help me to provide for my family (my elderly mother and preteen brother and sister, I humbly ask Your Excellence to allow me to take my Ph.D. examination in law without attending the lectures".

There were still no SRs or the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. There was no one, and in this vacuum, *in summer 1894,* Lenin wrote his work "What Friends of the People Are." There he mapped out the main objectives of the Russian Marxists. Their main task was to unite independent groups into a single Socialist party. "Then Lenin indicated that Russian workers and peasants would overthrow the tsarist autocracy," reads the legendary Short Course in the History of VKP(b) (Translator's note: The All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)).[2]

*This is a breakthrough in the ideology — for the first time it was not about fighting for minor indulgences, but about total destruction of the Russian Empire.*

Whom were these theses interesting to? To the opponents of Russia. Just like the Wahhabites and their followers in the modern Russian Federation have been generously sponsored (and are still trying to get such financial support) from the abroad, because all of it should result in destruction and ruination of our state.

Lenin was noticed and distinguished among all the revolutionary babblers and dreamers. Events proceeded rapidly. In three months after Lenin's important work had been published Emperor Alexander III died in his Palace in Livadia (on October 20, 1894).[3] "The untimely demise of Emperor Alexander III draw the revolutionary explosion at least a quarter of the century nearer,"[1] Grand Prince Alexander Romanov wrote in his memoirs. And this wasn't some idle chatter, no exaggeration. The situation in the country changed. Whoever survived through two eras that can be called by the names of two leaders knows what it is like.

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[1] Even those who studied the History of KPSS (Translator's note: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the Political Economy in the USSR will hardly recall these names, "New Economic Achievements in Agriculture", "About the So-Called Market Matter."

[2] History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). M.: OGIZ, 1946. P. 20

[3] Death of the 48-year-old hero tsar looked very much like poisoning and occurred right after he had ratified the Franco-Prussian Treaty that became the necessary basis for the upcoming World War 1. For more details

Intangible and slight changes to the policy line — everything seems to be like it used to be yesterday, and then the state, the political system, and the country itself change. This is what happened when the epoch of Stalin ended and the epoch of Khrushchev started; it was all the same when Gorbachev came and then left. And just recently, when Yeltsin left — *everything* changed in the country. This is a paradox: the people and the state are same, but things go on differently. If we open any book about the life of the leader of world's proletariat, we'll see that in December 1894 he wrote his first agitation leaflet and a notice for the workers of the Semyannikovsky factory in Petersburg who had been on a strike.

At first sight, nothing has changed in the Russian Empire, but no one comes to arrest Vladimir Lenin — instead, he was given a foreign passport. He was refused so many times, but as soon as he decided to struggle with the regime, voila. In May 1895, Lenin with a new passport in his pocket went to Plekhanov and Axelrod, Social Democrats in exile — this is what is written in his bio.[2]

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see: Starikov N. Who Is Financing Russia's Collapse? From Decembrists to Mujahideen. St. Pb.: Piter, 2011.

[1] http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_a/al_mih09.html

[2] These gentlemen are champions among revolutionaries as regards to how much time they spent abroad. Pavel Axelrod, one of the eldest autocracy fighters, emigrated in autumn 1874. Revolutionaries weren't comfortable in Russia, not in tsarist Russia, but in general. That is why Pavel appeared there only twice, for the first time in 1878-1879 (and then returned to his favorite Zurich) and for the second time only 37 (!) years later, in May 1917, in the "sealed" railcar through Germany. It wasn't Lenin's train, actually, but the next one. And in some three months, in August 1917, he left the country again. And Georgy Plekhanov hadn't been to Russia for about 37 years, too. He was so much away from Russia, that even his two daughters were hardly able to speak Russian.

You should only imagine. Volodya just took a train to Geneva, and then what? Did he come to a passport service to ask for the addresses of the emigration leaders? Of course, he knew the addresses, the passwords, and the safe houses in advance. Naturally, no one would for no particular reason talk to a tonsured and bearded 24-year-old. Who is he? Oh, he had written a brochure? And so what? And why would Plekhanov believe that this was the author, not a secret police agent? The brochure had Ulyanov's name on it, there was a pseudonym! Thus, even his passport couldn't be a proof.

He could only have come to the emigrants leading and coordinating the counterwork in Russia if *someone* had given him the necessary information. And this *someone* should have warned the emigrants about his visit. And where could Lenin get all the knowledge necessary for his trip? Who could announce him coming? Remember, there wasn't any Social Democratic Party in Russia at that moment. Whoever wanted to fight Russia were ringing their shackles in penal servitude or squeaking their felt boots over snow in the exile. There were small groups where the members presented their essays. And according to history books, Lenin was the most well-read and intelligent person among them. Was it how he introduced himself to the emigrants? Let me introduce myself, an intellectual from Petersburg, comrades...

Seriously! On the one hand, they want to persuade us that independent Marxist groups, which Lenin united later, had no relations with the abroad. On the other hand, the envoy of these structureless groups was warmly welcomed by the emigration leaders. Could there still be some relations? There was someone among twenty to thirty Marxists — very inconspicuous, he didn't speak much, but he listened attentively. He was in search. And he found what he was looking for.

The young man and everything he has written make a good impression. He might be the one to direct the emerging trade union movement to the course harmful for the state. This can be sponsored. *"Early in September 1895,* Vladimir Lenin, enriched with new ideas and plans, returned to Russia," says the History of VKP(b)."[1]

And yet, Ilyich brought not only the ideas (meaning the methods of counterwork) but money, too. Right after he returned the anti-state activities moved to a new level. It is laughable how the first Lenin's leaflet was distributed in Russia — four copies were made by hand and dropped over the factory fence.

After Ilyich came back, no one had to manually copy the leaflets anymore. They started to print them, and this means they found money to pay the print shops. During a short period over 70 leaflets were issued, and in all of them, certain economic demands were coupled with political claims. They were calling to destroy the existing government machine and, correspondingly, the state itself. By December 1895, they prepared the first issue of the illegal Social Democratic newspaper, Rabocheye Delo with Lenin's articles in it. The ball started rolling...

So, where did they "suddenly" get the money from? Like a great Soviet movie had it — "therefrom" (Translator's note: The author refers to the Diamond Arm Comedy, where the hero is suspected of being a spy after coming back from the abroad). Lenin, who was short of money and had low wages, starts sponsoring the print shop. He brought the money from the abroad, but who gave it to him? The revolutionaries? Plekhanov, Axelrod or somebody else? Where did they get the money themselves? Did they exist from the shares paid by their party comrades from Russia? The ones whom Lenin brought some money from the abroad, who had no money to pay a print shop? The ones who hadn't had the money before? *Ask yourself, where do people get money if they don't work for 37 years in a row and only write some essays and brochures calling to explode Russia from the inside?* Who has been paying them for all this time? And not only them, all our "freedom fighters"? Take the bio of any Russian revolutionary, and we'll see that they spent most of their time abroad and didn't work anywhere. And they were dozens and hundreds...

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[1] History of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks). M.: OGIZ, 1946. P. 23.

If the intelligence services hadn't sponsored the revolutionaries, the latter would either have starved to death or would have had to earn their living not by chatter in meetings, but by labor. And if they had had to work, they wouldn't have had time or force to proceed with their revolutionary business.

And yet, these are not all the "miracles" that happened in the life of young Ilyich after he visited the revolutionaries in their exile. Right after his first foreign trip Vladimir Ulyanov became a master of conspiracy. From the bios of Lenin's friends and comrades, we can learn things not only about themselves but about the young leader himself,

"He (Lenin. — *N. S.*) taught them to communicate putting dots over letters in the books and writing with chemical agents between lines. He explained how to cover up traces when visiting safe houses and how to trick tailers by turning at the corner, entering the first door, going by a through yard; he taught them how to change cars in the horse-tram, and how they should frame someone alike... He called to be careful with storing illegal books and documents and reasoned into inventing intricate hiding places. He established a system of "heirs" who were the most "clean" and absolutely uncompromised people that weren't spied on..."[1]

Conspiracy is a complex art. Who taught young Vladimir all these tricks? If he learnt it himself, then why did he start sharing the knowledge only after he returned from the abroad? Why had he never told his comrades about that and had never taught them any of it?

So, who sponsored the counterwork against the Russian Empire? Were it the Germans, or the Japanese? If we check the dates, we'll see that Germany and Japan had nothing to do with that. The Social Democrats stayed in the west since 1874, but previous generations of "freedom fighters" had lived there well off. The German Empire simply didn't exist at that time, and Japan was a backward country, ruled by shoguns, not emperors.

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[1] Kartzev V. Krzyzhanowski. M.: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1985. P. 73.

And if we remember which country was Russia's geo-political opponent in the 19 century, it will all add up.

***Great Britain — this is the main sponsor of our revolutionaries and the chief orchestrator of our revolutions.*** Was Lenin related to the German intelligence? Definitely, yes. Like any other politician of no principles, Vladimir didn't pour scorn on any contacts or any money source. Naturally, the opponents of Russia became ten times more interested in him as World War 1 started. *Yet, we need to understand that for almost 20 years before it started Lenin had been getting money from some unknown sources.*[1]

If we realize this, all mysteries of our revolution will become plain and comprehensible. There won't be any blind spots in the story of the "sealed" railcar...

...After a short stop in Stockholm, Lenin moved further — he travelled by train to Haparanda at the Swiss-Finnish border. And not the national tricolor, but a Red flag was hoisted at the Russian customs to welcome the emigrants on the Russian land. There they had to transfer to a horse-drawn sleigh to get to a Finnish town of Tornio, and from there they proceeded right to Petrograd via the Beloostrov station. The passengers of the "sealed" railcar were rather nervous and lost quite a few neurons despite all the initial lucky "coincidences." Vladimir Lenin was a determined man, but he and his companions were naturally anxious not to be arrested. So many things could have gone wrong in the most complicated game started in order to deliver him to Russia. And yet, the Social Democratic misters worried in vain — everything happened *just like Lenin had been promised.* On April 3 (16), 1917, the revolutionaries were met by a guard of honor. Right on their arrival, the leader of world's proletariat made a speech and in the end proclaimed "Long live the socialistic revolution!" In fact, he called for a forcible overthrow of the existing regime, which is worth a severe penalty in peacetime and is one hundred percent worth a death penalty in wartime.

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[1] Let's hold the true for Vladimir Lenin — he might have been not in direct contact with MI6 agents, or he might not have been told that the support came from the British. There just could have been revolutionaries telling him about their "friends" supporting the noble cause of freeing Russia from the "rotten corrupted regime". And Lenin took the money and got help and most probably, didn't have any written or even oral obligations to the British intelligence.

And what did the state agencies do? How did the Provisional Government react?

*Just like Lenin had been promised* by the "allies," no one did anything. The government seemed not to notice Lenin's arrival. And it was he who overthrew them *in only seven months...*

Why was it so important for the British that Lenin was delivered to Russia by the Germans? Why all the trouble?

If Britain and France had let Vladimir Lenin to his homeland, it would have caused quite a few problems:

- they would have to explain how they could have let through someone who destroyed Russia;
- the very destruction of the Russian state could look like the plan of the British and the French;
- the revolution itself would be in danger — if they gave money, there would be traces, if they didn't, there would be no coup.

If Lenin was to be infiltrated by the Germans, it instantly solved all the problems:

- Germany would be the only one held responsible for the country's destruction. As soon as Germany started World War 1, the "allies" would leave the global slaughter they had triggered with hands clean;
- the future revolution needed money. It was necessary to use somebody else to organize it, to make someone give out the cash instead of the "allied" party. Later the documents verifying that the Germans financially supported Bolsheviks would float to the surface here and there obscuring the true orchestrators of our woes;
- the new Lenin's government wouldn't be able to hold power if the Germans were hostile to it. Then the entire plan would overset, as Russia was to infect Germany with Bolshevism for

the latter to collapse, too. Yet, before that, the Russians were to catch this "disease." German monarchists wouldn't be too soft with revolutionaries, but they wouldn't touch "friendly" Bolsheviks.

The logic is iron-cast. Even Lenin at first failed to understand why Britain refused to let him pass to his homeland. And yet, at the same time, the "allied" special services contacted the Germans. They were the British, as the Americans and the French were preparing the "sealed" railcar for Lenin and the alibi for themselves. Plus the destruction of Russia and Germany...

This is where the legend of cunning Germany that destroyed Russia originates. Just fancy, the special services were preparing an unprecedented operation. With a couple of risk takers, one country was going to blow another — which, by the way, was the ally of Britain and France. A great amount of German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish armies were at the Russian Fronts. If their operation on revolutionary withdrawal of Russia from the war succeeded, all these powers would set on the French and the British soldiers. The effect could have been disastrous, they even could have lost the war. However, for some reason, the French and the British stayed calm in March 1917 and did nothing. Might they have not known the plans of the Germans? Oh no, they did, and all their easiness was nothing but demonstration. In fact, the main task of the "allied" special services was not preventing but ensuring Lenin's delivery to Russia. While Lenin was going by ferry, the Russian, British, and French ambassadors met in Stockholm and decided not to interfere with his travelling in transit...[1]

Let's study one intriguing document,

1. Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin);
2. David Suliashvili;
3. Nadezhda Ulyanova (Krupskaya);
4. Inessa Armand;
5. Georgy Sapharov;
6. Valentina Sapharova-Martoshkina;

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[1] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 357.

7. Moisei Kharitonov;
8. Anna Konstantinovitch;
9. Grigori Usiyevitch;
10. Elena Kon;
11. Sarra Gavvitch;
12. Mikhail Tsakaya;
13. Abram Skovno;
14. Ovsey Gershen Radomyslsky (Zinoviev);
15. Zlata Radomyslskaya (with a 5-year-old son);
16. N. Boitsov (Karl Radek) (Karol Sobelsohn);
17. Zalman Berk Rivkin;
18. Nadezhda Slusareva;
19. Mikhail Goberman;
20. Shaya Zelikov Abramovitch;
21. Arnold Linde Johann;
22. Grigori Brilliant (Sokolnikov);
23. Ilya Miringof;
24. Maria Miringof;
25. David Rozenblum;
26. Semyon Sheinesson;
27. Fania Grebelskaya;
28. Bunia Pogovskaya (with a 4-year-old son);
29. Meyer Kivov Aizenbund.[1]

What is this? A payroll? A waiting list for persons wishing to attend Synagogue? No, this is a list of passengers who traveled in that Lenin's "sealed" railcar. In summer 1917, it was printed in Russian newspapers. There were 32 persons there (29 adults plus two kids). Fritz Platten is not on this list, but he was on the same train, and all persons that had given the written undertaking to the Germans were to obey him as the leader of that trip. Platten and Karl Radek had some problems with their documents and were held at the Finnish border. They arrived in Russia later. Yet, misters Rubakov and Egorov, who in fact were Anders and Erich, the squadron leaders of the German General Staff, successfully arrived in the boiling Petrograd...

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[1] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 337–345.

If fact, all upcoming disasters and problems of Russia bump into a single person, Lenin. Hence, all the upcoming nightmare could have been prevented, if a single person had been terminated. They at least could have tried. This is what special services are established for, to handle such tasks. They would have almost nothing to do — there were almost no boundaries. Ilyich always walked alone, without any guards. Anything could have happened — he could have been hassled by ruffians or robbed. Two noisy minutes, and a breathless corpse is just lying there on the pavement. Or it could have been done even more gentle. The target could have had some Swiss coffee and fallen sick. Intelligence services have so many methods, and who am I to teach them? And yet, in March 1917, the "allies" were at a standstill. However, even now, after the CIA and KGB have been established, the British intelligence remains the most powerful in the world. Let alone the early 20 century — no one could be compared to it at that time. If proved necessary, the special services of the "allies" demonstrated their efficiency, but when it was required to notice nothing, they failed to see the most obvious facts. Like a trip in a "sealed" railcar being prepared.

All the departing revolutionaries had their nearest and dearest. Such information couldn't have been kept secret. There were so many intermediaries, and a leakage was unavoidable. And in fact, no one tried to keep the lid on. The trip was outspokenly discussed in newspapers, and seers-off waved their handkerchiefs at the station. Let's put the Russian intelligence aside — it reported to the Provisional Government unknowingly that the destroyers of the country were not actually coming to save it. But did the "allied" intelligence services know nothing of that, either? I bet their "blindness" wasn't occasional. There were too many coincidences. And when the facts, so different at first sight, get settled in a specific order miraculously, we can consider their correlation. At first, Russia's "allies" from the Entente orchestrated and sponsored the February, and then they supported the Provisional

Government, which made one stupid thing after another. And then they oddly failed to notice Lenin leaving for his homeland. And all of it resulted in a national-scale disaster in Russia…

And there is one more curious thing here. The historians don't like to speak about it, but in a month after Lenin's departure Mensheviks, SRs, Bundists, and other revolutionaries went to Russia IN THE SAME WAY. For instance, the Menshevik leaders Martov and Axelrod arrived in Petrograd in a similar "sealed" railcar. It was all arranged on a grand scale — there were three trains that brought several hundred people. All of them passed through Germany, and in every train, there were German guards at the doors.

*How come only Lenin and his Bolshevik party are believed to be German spies?*

# CHAPTER 5

# Why the Sealed Train Transporting Lenin Hurried That Slowly or What for the French Put Oil Cans on Their Tanks

> Holding a threat of revolution over the foreign states has rather long ago become the craft of the British.
>
> *Otto von Bismarck,*
> *the German Chancellor*

> To warm Russia up some are ready to burn it.
>
> *V. Klyuchevsky*

Topical issues can't be resolved at once. Especially those of war and peace. There were far more meetings of the German and British representatives than one. There definitely were more of them. We don't know where and when they took place, and we don't know the names and the titles of the participants, either. But further events definitely confirm that those meetings took place. Just because the behavior of the "allies" and the Germans can't be explained in any other way...

The second meeting took place in another end of Berne. The location was chosen by von Schultz himself. It was a quiet café in a calm street of the Swiss capital with a lovely blonde hostess and extremely tasty fragrant coffee.

Sending his detailed report of the meeting to Berlin, von Schultz had no doubt that the Berlin command would agree with him. Everything came out too nicely to have the offer of the British rejected. The beauty of the plan scared and attracted at the same time. The opportunity to kill two birds with one stone — to kick Russia out of the game and to prevent the USA from entering the war — seemed too enticing. Though, he personally didn't doubt a minute that the Americans would take their part in the struggle. The reports on the recent months told of serious preparations and said the Americans were almost ready to enter the war. The tone of the American diplomats was also getting increasingly categorical, and actions of the German submarines made Washington really hysteric…

The guests were not late for a minute. They greeted each other, sat down on their chairs with beautifully carved backs and ordered coffee. The American immediately lit a fragrant cigar, and the Indian gazed at von Schultz questioningly.

Today it was his turn to start the conversation, "The answer from Berlin has arrived, but before I give it to you, I have to announce some terms."

"The terms of your consent?" the American smiled.

"The terms that must be fulfilled, or we won't be able to come to an agreement."

"I am all ears," the Indian inclined his head a little, which in the body language meant his negative attitude in regard to whatever was going to be said.

"We have carefully studied the given plans," von Schulz started. "They came as no surprise to us. We expected a strike in that direction. That's why we have preliminary withdrawn the troops to our new Siegfried line."

"That's good," the British softly interrupted him. "We have not reached any agreement yet but you have already started withdrawing the troops from the future killing ground.

If I were you, I would do exactly the same. And that's why, I'm sure, we'll get along."

"The plan of the offensive is convincing and is most likely real. We cannot be sure that your commanders don't have a couple of alternative drafts, though. Anyway, at the moment, the main idea of the planned operation no longer corresponds to the situation. You've given us the plan, but how can we be sure you won't strike in a different place?

"What for?" the Indian frowned. "To launch an unexpected offensive we don't need to drink beer and coffee in Switzerland in your genial company, Mr. von Shultz."

"That's right but we need to be 100 and even 200 percent sure that Germany won't be stabbed in the back. These are the only terms we can agree to. Sending a train full of defeatist propagandists to the Russian home front is a strong crackdown on the Russian might, but there is absolutely no guarantee that this straw will break the camel's back."

"Heh," the American sighed. "Don't you, Germans, underestimate the power of the idea? And yet, you can estimate the power of money. Here are our loan offers. See the approximate calculations." With these words, the "correspondent" put an envelope on the table. It was just like the one von Schultz was given in the previous meeting.

"You haven't finished," the Indian said. "What do you consider a reliable guarantee that we will fulfil our obligations to the letter?"

"You must start your offensive not just in the place you planned, you should start it earlier than you planned. Poorly prepared and according to a different scenario. Instead of the attacks on the encirclement, you should begin the frontal assault of our new Siegfried line."

"Don't you ask for too much?" the British asked in a serious voice.

"We don't ask, we demand. It's quite enough to be sure that after this assault your troops won't be able to backstab us. They have to get weak. They have to bleed off. This is our only and the most important condition."

The Entente representatives were silent for a second and exchanged glances.

"And what is the guarantee that you will fulfil your part of the deal?" the American asked after a short pause.

"A word of honor of a German officer and a nobleman," von Schultz answered. "Moreover, your offensive must begin before the propagandist group leaves for Russia. To be exact, the Russian revolutionaries can only depart after the offensive has started. And after your assault fails our divisions will quickly move to the east without trying to seize the initiative in the western direction," he added with a smile.

"We can call it a deal," the Indian said and put his cup on the table after taking the last sip. "Tomorrow I will be able to tell you the date when the assault is to start..."

... In 1917, Berlin was most afraid of a concerted and concentrated strike by the Russian troops and the "allies." The strike, which the Germans feared, was being planned. Remember the conference in Petrograd on the eve of the February Revolution. On the third year of the war, the coordination between the Entente members must have become perfect. The plans of the Entente for 1917 were ready and agreed upon. Alexander Kerensky describes them in his book in detail.

"The third year of the war (1917) had to be the year of the final victory over the central states. That was the main idea of the decision taken by the military command of the Entente at the meeting in Chantilly on November 3, 1916. The plans of the military campaign of 1917, which involved operations on all the allied fronts, were drafted; all the participants of the meeting believed that a decisive joint offensive by the Russian and Romanian troops in the north and by the Entente armies in the south had to unfailingly force Bulgaria to immediately withdraw from the war. The Russian and Romanian *offensive was planned for the first week of May.*"[1]

The plan was consistent. First, you knock out Bulgaria, the weakest link in the chain of the German satellites. Next comes the turn of Austria-Hungary. Being on their on, the Germans would not last for long, especially after the new American divisions appear at the combat theater. The US entered the war on April 6 (March 24), 1917, declaring the war on Germany. Of course, it had been decided much earlier. The military potential of the United States grew up too rapidly, and it would not be possible to increase it in such a short period without serious preparation. When they declared war, the armed forces of the country numbered just 190 thousand people. And yet, early in May, the Law on the universal military service was issued (that happened for the first time since the end of the Civil War in the USA!), so by September the Yankees had 2 million and 800 thousand conscripts. By the end of the war, the American Army had 4 million soldiers.

As these additional millions of soldiers appeared at the frontline, the Germans weren't left a ghost of a chance. However, the smiling intelligence officers of the "allies" brought hope and promised to let the Germans ruin and rob Russia easily. And that was highly appreciated in Berlin. Defeating and rapid knocking the Russians out of the war would help to settle several issues at once:

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn. M.: Terra, 1996; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt15.htm

- free the troops for the prospective transfer to the Western Front;
- rob Russia of the necessary materials and enrich the industry and the country.

Hence the terrible haste in Lenin's expedition. Judge for yourself. At first, the Germans don't offer anything to Ilyich, then they say no to him, then all of a sudden all the issues get resolved as if in some state of emergency. Why? They have to take their chance before the United States join the war. The Germans don't know that the issue of entering the war has been finally resolved in Washington and that it will be announced *in three days* after Lenin's arrival to Petrograd.

But the main part of the secret arrangements between Germany, Britain, and France was the commitment not to undertake active offensive operations on the West Front for the period of the "Lenin's" operation. Even in case the German units were transferred to the east, in case the West Front was exposed, the "allies" of Russia had to miss the favorable moment and not to attack the German positions. In return, Germany also undertook not to attack the British and the French on the Western Front.

For a start, as an "act of goodwill" the British gave the Germans time and place for their own offensive. However, the Germans didn't believe the British, who betrayed Russia in their plain view. The secret plans of the British offensive provided by the "allied" intelligence weren't reassuring, either. Plans tend to be changed. The best safeguard against the British guile was the exhaustion of the British and French troops. When they are absolutely unable to advance, it will be possible to safely move the troops to the Eastern Front and completely defeat Russia. Germany demanded that the British should begin the offensive being poorly prepared for it to minimize the power of the forces of the Western Front and to deprive them of the opportunity to resume the offensive after the German forces leave to the east. All of this had to be done in advance before the "Sealed Train" operation started…

The British agreed to fulfil all the demands of the Germans.

They promised to begin the offensive before Lenin's departure.

To begin it without thorough preparation.

What for? To exhaust their own army. Isn't that madness? No, it's politics. The leaders of Britain and France deliberately betrayed not only their Russian ally but also their own soldiers. Because the circumstances required that along with the agreements between Britain and Germany.

This is a grave accusation. To say it aloud one needs serious reasons. What are these?

They are memoirs, facts, and dates. And they are as follows: in December 1916, Marshal Joffre was succeeded by General Nivelle on the post of the commander-in-chief of the French Army. At first, this did not affect the course of military operations. Nivelle was a sensible and decent military leader. But in March of 1917, his conduct "suddenly" changed to not just inadequate — his actions became simply incomprehensible in terms of positive logic.

Let's call on Alexander Kerensky. We cannot suspect him of having any liking for the Germans. Yet, there is definitely no doubt of his political preconception towards the democratic countries of the Entente. That's why his memoirs are of particular interest to us. As a matter of fact, what General Nivelle did to his offensive made even Kerensky's short-cut hair stand on end!

"... General Nivelle, without any preliminary discussion with the Russian supreme command, decided to launch military operations on the Russian-Romanian Front not in May, but late in March or early in April," Kerensky writes, his tone surprised and indignant.[1]

General Nivelle sends a very short telegram to the Russian military command, "I am asking you to inform General Alexeyev of the following: as agreed with the top British command, I've planned to start the joint offensive on the Western Front on April 8 (New Style). *It cannot be postponed.*"[2]

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn. M.: Terra, 1996; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt15.htm

[2] Ib.

The Parisian general goes on, "I will engage *all the forces of the French Army* into the offensive on the Western Front, as I will try to achieve decisive results, and these achievements cannot be postponed in this period of the war. Thus, I also ask you to begin the offensive of the Russian troops on the first day or in the middle of April (New Style). It is absolutely necessary to begin both operations at the same time (within few days), otherwise, the enemy will maintain the ability to operate the reserves that are significant enough to stop our offensives one after another in the early stage..."[1]

The main idea of the offensive planned by the Entente in 1917 was to strike Germany *at the same time*. However, with regard to the serious debilitation of the Russian Army, moving of the Russian offensive a month earlier was absolutely impossible. The troops would not be ready, which meant that such a sudden change in the agreed terms would only lead to one thing: the Germans would be able to maneuver their army reserves during the Anglo-French offensive as freely as before. In such circumstances, the whole meaning of the impending strike was lost. So, was it reasonable to deliver it? If Britain and France wanted to win the war, the only good solution was to execute the planned operation on schedule. After all, it was not a local or a tactical offensive. The scheduled operation could decide the outcome of the entire war. It involved enormous armies — the French alone had 1.4 million soldiers, 5 thousand artillery units, and 33 million missiles for them.[2] 300 newest tanks were getting ready to move forward, which for that period was a lot. (Suffice it to say that during our Civil War Judenitch used a great force of FOUR British tanks to attack "Red" Petrograd, and the city was almost taken). Yet, the "allies" did not postpone the strike and delivered it a month earlier — because it was agreed with the German representatives...

We can open a wonderful book by A. Strokov titled "The History of Art of War" and read the following, "On April 9, an attack by the British near Arras began the April offensive operation of the French and the British troops, its success believed to cause the defeat of Germany and the end of the war."[1] To dispel the last doubts, let's surf through the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, "The Nivelle Offensive is an offensive strategic operation by the British and the French forces. It took place from April 9 until May 5 in France during World War 1..."[2]

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn. M.: Terra, 1996; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt15.htm

[2] http://www.hrono.info/sobyt/1900sob/1917nivel.html

Coincidences, concurrences, and irregularities — they are so many within a small period of World War 1 and two Russian Revolutions!

***The Entente offensive started on April 9 according to the New Style or March 27 according to the Old Style.***

Readers can get lost in numbers when there is the Old Style here and the New one there. You can get them confused. And it was necessary to confuse the readers, because otherwise they may notice that —

***Vladimir Lenin left Switzerland in a "sealed" train car exactly on April 9 (27 March), 1917.***

Right on the day of the offensive that General Nivelle had rescheduled, his motives unclear.

The "sealed" train car left the station only after the German command confirmed that the British and the French had started the offensive. A coincidence, historians might say. No, there are too many coincidences, concurrences, and riddles. And if some of them can be easily dismissed, hundreds of other "coincidences" require a different explanation. Open some historical books and have a look.

*For some reason, the dates of Lenin's departure are given in the Old Style, and the time of the beginning of the military operation of the "allies" — in the New Style!*

They always tell about it this way, otherwise, "the coincidence" will be too obvious.

Though, in fact, originally the "sealed" train car was supposed to depart from Zurich on a different day. Let's recall Lenin's telegram to Ganetsky sent on March 19 (April 1), "Please, provide two thousand or better three thousand crowns for our trip ..."[1] The amount requested for the "sealed" train is of little interest to us now. The important thing is that in this telegram Ilyich speaks of his intention to leave Zurich on March 22 (April 4), 1917.

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[1] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb., Omega-Poligon. V. 5. P. 551.

[2] http://bigsoviet.org/Bse/KOND-PLAS/1738.shtml

Lenin was really going to leave on that day. There is enough evidence to that. To do it, you just need to come to Zurich and look at the memorial tablet that decorates house 14 on Spiegelgasse Str., where Ilyich used to live. The inscription says that Lenin lived in that house until April 2 (March 20), 1917. He left the apartment when everything had already been settled, just on the eve of his departure. And yet, the Germans unexpectedly postponed the deadline and told Lenin's envoy Fritz Platten that the train would leave only on April 9. Why did it happen?

***It happened because the German leaders didn't trust the British and decided to let the "sealed" train depart exactly on the day when the British offensive began.***

Vladimir Ilyich had already left his apartment. And the pedantic Swiss put the period of his stay to the day on the tablet. Now tell me why would Lenin leave his apartment a week before his departure, if it was a ten minutes' walk from it to the Zurich train station?

It seems to be a trifle but tells us a lot. It perfectly demonstrates us how the situation developed in those far-off days. The devil — he is in details, indeed! If our logic is correct, the "sealed" train was supposed to depart after the British infantry had started the offensive. The preliminary bombardment that had begun on April 7 (and lasted for 48 (!) hours) did not mean anything — the cannons might have shot but the offensive with hundreds of thousands of victims might never have happened. The Germans could not afford to be deceived, they had to make sure that the British would follow their agreements and really put their soldiers to the slaughter.

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[1] Arutyunov A. Lenin. Personal and Political Biography. M.: Veche, 2002, V. 1. P. 95

HIER WOHNTE
V.21.FEBR.1916 BIS 2.APRIL.1917
LENIN
DER FÜHRER DER RUSSISCHEN
REVOLUTION

The Memorial tablet on house 14 in Spiegelgasse Str., Zurich, where Lenin lived.

It wasn't too difficult to determine the time when the British attack near Arras began on April 9, 1917 — it happened at 5:30 a. m.[1] It was more difficult to discover when Lenin's train departed from Zurich. But all good things come to he who looks. This information was found in a rather unexpected place — in the book titled "Comrade Inessa." The title clearly tells us that the book is about Inessa Armand. However, we are not looking for the details of the titbit relationship between our revolutionaries, we need numbers. The writing published in 1987 contains the exact time we need — the train departs at 3:10 p.m.[2]

All the numbers add up. In the morning the British attack, the Germans wait for several hours, look at the scale of the offensive and give a go-ahead — Lenin can leave.

The "sealed" train swirls through the German territory like the wind. Germany gives it the green light, and everybody lets it pass. Even the crown prince's vehicle gives way to the "sealed" train. This is what most researchers write — *the ones, who didn't understand a thing in the story of Lenin's return to his motherland!*

And we, having captured the logic of the events, can make another most interesting observation — and bust another myth, the one concerning the speed of the "sealed" train.

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[1] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb., Omega-Poligon, V. 5. P. 551

[2] Podlyashuk P. Comrade Inessa. M.: IPL. P. 201

Everything is very simple. The direct distance from Zurich to the German Port of Sassnitz, where Ilyich took a ferry to Sweden, is about 850 kilometers. If the train moved at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, it is a 17-hour trip. But the "sealed" train follows a very odd route, which is far from optimal: Zurich — Bern — Stuttgart — Frankfurt am Main — Berlin — Sassnitz. It seems to be about 1400 kilometers. Thus, the travelling time is extended to 28 hours. Let's add 10 hours for stops to solve unexpected problems. So, the "sealed" train car going at full speed, as we are told, is to arrive in Sassnitz in about a day and a half. But the book "Comrade Inessa," which is so valuable to us, says, "The three-day trip through Germany was hard. Everybody's nerves were on the stretch. Everybody feared provocations and unforeseen difficulties."[1]

Dear me! Why is the "sealed" train hurrying so slowly? In fact, it is not going, it is crawling like a turtle. That's why its passengers are worried and expecting provocations. So, why do the German leaders behave so odd after giving their consent and sending Lenin and his comrades to the trip? Why should the German intelligence make its agents move so slowly? Why would it arrange any provocations against them or create any "unforeseen difficulties"?

The answer is simple — because the German authorities don't trust the British. They are still waiting for some dirty trick, and therefore, even in view of the onset offensive, they order the train to take the longest route and to go as slowly as possible just to be on the safe side...

The next "sealed" train with Russian revolutionaries managed to travel through the whole German territory not in three days, like Lenin, but in just one day! Because there was no need to delay that train any longer. This fact can be easily verified, it is enough to read Lunacharsky's letters to his dearest wife, "At five o'clock in the morning on Saturday we entered Germany. Everything turned out to be perfectly well-organized. We were amazed when we learned that our train was going as a courier's and that at 4 o'clock next day we were going to arrive in the Port of Sassnitz and would be able to go to Sweden."[1]

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[1] Podlyashuk P. Comrade Inessa. M.: IPL. P. 201.

Lenin is the key figure of our revolution, and the Germans supposedly give him the green light. And his train travels three times slower than the train with comrade Lunacharsky, who is good and kind but still much less important for the revolution.

In the case of Lenin, the Germans tried to temporize as much as they could. On April 11 (March 29), 1917, the "sealed" train arrived in Berlin.[2] But instead of being sent further to the German coast and then to Sassnitz, the train was dragged to the side track of the Szczecin railway station of the German capital. Why was this done? Historians are trying to explain this train standing by some negotiations between Lenin and the German command. In fact, everything is much more prosaic, the Germans were simply temporizing. Therefore, no one tells us for how long the train stayed on the side track.[3] NONE of the published books explains where Lenin and his companions spent nights. Either on the train left in the dead end in Berlin (Lenin V. Works. M., 1981) or somewhere in the Port of Sassnitz (Hefner Schubert, Lenin in Germany, M., 1985). But what to say, how to explain the delay? There are no negotiations, no contacts, and the Germans aren't taking Lenin any further. In such a situation, it is better to avoid discussing the delay...

The actions of the Germans are clearly not coordinated with their British "partners." It's a purely German improvisation. We can find the evidence of the mysterious temporizing by the Germans in the memoirs of people related to the "sealed" train. Knowing how long it takes to travel by train to the ferry sailing to Sweden, Lenin cabled Ganetsky and instructed him to organize the reception of the arriving revolutionaries. And Ganetsky (Furstenberg) is waiting in Trelleborg, to which the ferry from the German Port of Sassnitz is to arrive. According to all the terms, Lenin and his companions had to get on the agreed ferry. To Ganetsky's astonishment, there were neither Lenin nor his companions among passengers coming ashore from Drottning Victoria. Lenin's puzzled contact returned to Malmo, and the next day he went to meet the ferry again. And again there was no one there. The travelers were already late for a day.[1]

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[1] A. Lunacharsky to A. Lunacharskaya, Letter №8. April 30 (May 13) [1917]; RGASPI. F. 142. Op. 1. D. 12. L. 13-14; The Issues of KPSS History. № 1990. № 11. P. 29-31.

[2] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M.: Omega, 2004. P. 354.

[3] A scrupulous Scandinavian researcher Hans Björkegren writes, "It was impossible to find out how long the delayed train really stayed in Berlin (in mere hundred meters from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Wilhelmstrasse)." (Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M,: Omega, 2004. P. 354)

Ganetsky calls his wife Gisela in Stockholm, but she cannot say anything new. The urgent telegram sent to the old Lenin's address in Zurich remains unanswered. Lenin's group just disappeared without leaving any information about their whereabouts.

Just think, would Lenin's contact have worried if the "sealed" train had moved at a normal speed or even faster, as some no-good historians write?

Being desperate, Ganetsky finally finds a way out of the situation. He sends a radiogram to the ship. It only accepts official telegrams, so he calls an employee of the Russian Red Cross, who has been instructed to meet the emigrants. The ferry captain receives the following text, "Mr. Ganetsky is asking whether Mr. Ulyanov is traveling and how many men, women, and children he has with him."[2]

Ganetsky was overwhelmed with joy. "I'm almost delirious...," he writes.[3] Of course, Lenin and his companions suddenly disappeared and then reappeared in the same manner. (Being late for two days!) The most difficult part, the German land, has already been passed. In Stockholm, they are being waited for. And there were not only their friends, the Swedish Social Democrats, but also the tickets to Russia paid for by the Provisional Government.

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[1] Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M.: Omega, 2004. P. 359–360.

[2] Ganetsky J. About Lenin. Fragments of the Memoirs. M., 1933. P. 361 // Björkegren H. Scandinavian Through Train. M.: Omega, 2004. P. 361.

[3] Ib. P. 362.

... Frankly speaking, when I first realized WHAT the British were up to, I felt cold sweat on my back. Deep in my heart, I still had a faint hope that all of it was an enormous and an incredible coincidence. However, you cannot poke holes in the obvious. And the facts unequivocally testify that on the verge of their offensive British leaders entered into a collusion with the German command. After all, while you can try and cheat using numbers and dates, it is impossible to do it with the exact historical facts. Though, you can ignore or fail to comprehend them. The issue is not that the "allies" suddenly and for no apparent reason rescheduled their offensive to a month earlier, but that *there was no sense in launching it at all!*

Let me explain. The plan of the Entente's prepared offensive was to make a pincer movement at the Noyon Salient ("the Noyon Pincers"), cutting it off on both sides and surrounding the German troops located there. This base area between the French and the British troops was rather extensive. There were lots of German soldiers there. In case the plan of the "allies" worked, a rough luck would betide all of them. So, the Anglo-French offensive did not make any sense, because right before it the Germans had withdrawn all their troops from the endangered area. Just incidentally, of course.

It is a fact. Let's open "The History of Art of War" again, "When the French and the British started to prepare for the decisive operation in accordance with the Nivelle plan, the German commanders withdrew their troops (the withdrawal began on March 16) from the Noyon Salient (the front line from Arras to Soissons was about 135 kilometers, 30 to 40 kilometers deep in some places) to the prepared position on the Siegfried line."[1]

One source is not enough — let's look at some more. For example, a book by the great military theoretician Zaichonkovsky, which we have already cited, "And while the French headquarters were working on the operation plan, the Germans ruined the game of the French by an unexpected withdrawal on March 17 to a cut and dry position along the entire front line from Arras to Vailly, which is on the Aisne river."[1]

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[1] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb.: Omega-Poligon. V. 5. P. 549.

The historians are ready to consistently explain the reason for the German withdrawal. In 1917, the Germans have no forces to strike, and they are preparing to defend themselves. A huge protruding base area, a protuberant curve, always makes the enemy want to cut it off. In such a place you need either to advance or defend yourself. However, this place is not good for defense, the enemy troops are "hanging" over your flanks, threatening to encircle you.

A similar situation took place in 1943 on the Kursk Curve, and that is how the curve got its name. At that moment the Germans decided to cut off the Soviet defense. Yet, in 1917, it is Germany that needs to defend itself, and to do so it creates a new strong defensive line in its rear called the Siegfried line. There are no scratchy trenches, this area is perfectly fortified, which significantly reduces the defensive front; it is 8 to 10 kilometers deep, and there are good observation posts with 20 kilometers view.[2] The main point for the Germans in the prevailing conditions is to avoid the encirclement and to timely withdraw, and for the "allies" — to timely surround Germans on their old positions.

All really dreadful battles of World War 1 are the same. There are frontal attacks on the well-fortified positions, lots of victims and a couple of square kilometers of seized territories. So, as soon as the French and the British planned something different for the first time, their enemy *accidentally* ruined all of their plans. "The loss of surprise was essential for the April offensive of the French and the British to fail,"[3] it is concluded in "The History of Art of War." The Germans withdraw right before the offensive of the "allies." They withdraw after they find out about the prepared strike. But who informed them?

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[1] Zaichonkovsky A. World War 1. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 634.

[2] History of World War 1, 1914–1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 332.

[3] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb., Omega-Poligon. V. 5. P. 554.

The Germans and the future historians needed to explain somehow this extraordinary perspicacity of the German commanders. And the answer was invented. It was said that the Germans ostensibly got hold of some orders intended for the 2nd French Infantry Division and dated January 29; these orders clearly indicated that a large French offensive was planned for **April.**[1] This is what German General Ludendorff writes in his memoirs, the very Ludendorff, who exonerated himself for sending Lenin to Russia.

But this is impossible.

Let us recall the meeting of the "allies" in Petrograd, **in February**, on the verge of the revolution.

The participants spoke of the Entente's general offensive in **May or June**. These time limits were accepted and approved by all the Allied Countries. However, in **January,** General Ludendorff already had the seized a French order about the **April** offensive! All of this does not coincide with the words of Kerensky and other Russian commanders, who **only in March** learned that Nivelle wished to change the time of the strike **from May to April.** In January, nobody had changed the terms of the strike and had not written or said anything. It looks like Ludendorff either lies ineptly, covering up his information provider and inventing a non-existent French order, or the "allied" commanders get ready for the April offensive secretly from St. Petersburg and, for some reason, announce a different timeline to Russians and other members of the Entente.

The German troops begin their withdrawal from the Noyon Salient on March 3 (16), before all the Lenin's story. The whole Anglo-French campaign plan is ruined. Encirclement is impossible. In this situation, the whole prepared operation has no sense, because the Germans retreat on their own, and there is no need to attack them. Changing the dates of the offensive also makes no sense — the prey is gone. Now General Nivelle has nowhere to hurry. He can act in accordance with the old arrangements with the Russians, simultaneously, which increases the chances of success. However, the "allied" commanders don't change the plan of the operation and begin to storm the new German positions:

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[1] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War. M., 2005. P. 408.

- Frontally;
- One month earlier than arranged;
- When the Russian Army couldn't help in any way or at least draw a part of the German forces upon itself.

The key mystery of the Nivelle offensive, or, as it was called, "the Nivelle massacre," lies not in the sudden retreat of the Germans, but in the frontal assault of the Siegfried line. Such progression was unexpected by both the Russian military command and by many French generals, who spoke of the inadmissibility of the frontal assault on the new German fortifications.

The "allies" attack the Siegfried line. The British, as we have already said, strike first after the 48-hour preliminary bombardment.[1] This is just a demonstration attack, not the major one. The major attack of the French troops followed on April 16 after a preliminary nine-day (!) bombardment.[2] The Germans moved their reserves forward and strengthened the artillery. Then the usual "gnawing" through the defense began. But when General Nivelle was appointed, commanders expected something completely different from him. They hoped that he would not stick to the common tactics of "breaking human bones and tearing human flesh over the most powerful enemy fortifications," as the British Prime Minister Lloyd George wrote. In fact, Nivelle once again launches a frontal attack on the newly erected defense line. Nothing comes out of it. How can this be?

As soon as we start reading the history of the military operations of that period, we come across some "randomness" or "oddness." Any serious book about World War 1 gives a few reasons for the failure of the offensive and its development into a slaughter. They are all very noteworthy. It turns out that on the verge of the attacks, on April 4, the Germans again managed to capture a "tongue" (Translator's note: In the Russian military slang, "tongue" is enemy soldier captured for the purposes of interrogation.)[1] And an important one! Of course, in the captured officer's map case there was an order that disclosed the plan of the operation. Therefore, the German commanders knew in advance that the strike of the British was a demonstration attack and did not spend its reserves on it.

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[1] Zaichonkovsky A. World War 1. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 637.

[2] History of World War 1, 1914–1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 331.

What can we say? These Germans are fantastically lucky. If they take a prisoner, he definitely carries the full set of the most important documents. They took one prisoner and withdrew from the killing ground in time. They took the other and rebuffed the attack, as they found out when and where the bombardment and the attack would begin. The German troops retreated to the main line of defense beyond the reach of the enemy artillery in advance. Their losses from the unprecedented preliminary bombardment were minimal. When the British and the French moved forward, though, they faced the mass intense fire of the undefeated German cannons and machine guns. Reading the works of military historians concerning this offensive, you get constantly surprised by their ingenious explanations of why it was to no avail. The British, for example, took over the first defensive line of the Germans. They didn't have to move further, as you know. So the "communication between the infantry and artillery was immediately disrupted."

*It turns out that it was difficult to move British cannons around the battlefield, all in shell craters!*[2]

If you shoot cannons of different caliber, including very powerful ones, at an open field for two days, you can be sure that you plow it splendidly. There will be nothing but the craters of different sizes.[3] It can be expected. But the British generals, after two and a half years at war, expect to see a smooth surface instead of craters. They can't drag their cannons forward. And the British infantry, which is *suddenly* left without artillery support, leaves the overturned line of German defense and retreats...

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[1] Ib. P. 336.

[2] History of World War 1, 1914-1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 335.

[3] There were 2,800 cannons of different caliber.

Besides that, the historians say, the weather got worse, it started raining and snowing. So, the French did not support the British offensive due to bad weather and postponed it until April 16, 1917.[1] This reason is at least ridiculous. It seems that the cold weather affected the British and did not affect their enemies. And what about the tanks on which they placed so many hopes? You can guess the answer. They got stuck in the mud and couldn't effectively support the advancing British Army...[2]

The picture of the attack of the French Army looks as unrealistic. Machine guns and cannons, which the Germans somehow timely hid and took back, spoiled it, too. Then goes the bad weather, of course. It was a complete surprise. How can the French know what the weather is like in France in the middle of April? Snow storms and rains prevented the correction of artillery fire, which could simply level the entire German defense line to the ground with millions of shells. But it didn't. After all, such a huge concentration of artillery of different calibers led to confusion in the ammunition delivery. The artillerists *accidentally* began to receive shells of the wrong caliber.[3] What a nuisance, it has never happened to the French Army neither before nor after this offensive...

You have probably already guessed that the attack of 128 French Schneider tanks did not help. Of course, they got stuck in the mud. Later almost all of them were hit by the German artillery and aviation.[4] Not more than 10 tanks survived. What happened to the huge number of the "allied" aircraft (1,500 planes), which were to blanket the sky over the place of the French strike? Due to a tragic *contingency,* at the decisive moment, they were on another front...

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[1] Zaichonkovsky A. World War 1. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 637

[2] Fuller J. Tanks in the Great War: 1914–1918/ Translation from English. M., 1923. P. 71.

[3] History of World War 1, 1914–1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 333–336.

[4] Boucher J. Armored Force Vehicles at War. M.: Foreign Literature Publishing House, 1956. P. 38.

**And the French tanks had additional fuel cans outside** (!)[1] Not every hit of an artillery shell is fatal for a tank. But here even the machine-gun bursts from German airplanes made the cans explode and turned the menacing machines into moving torches.[2] If you think that the French commanders hung these damn cans on their tanks in order to make it easier for the Germans to exterminate them, you are greatly mistaken. This was done to increase the power reserve...[3]

In general, the failure of the offensive, as "clever" books would say, was caused by a bad choice of the main strike direction.[4] The British and the French were striking right into the enemy's strongest fortified points with the highest number of artillery and machine guns, and where the walls of concrete bunkers were the thickest. Who chose such inefficient strike directions?

The western historians would invent anything to hide the truth! Usually they prefer to make Russian generals look like idiots and bloodthirsty maniacs. But for the sake of disguise, in this case they had to make their own general a blunderer. It turns out that General Robert Nivelle, being confident of success, claimed that a massive strike on the German line would lead to the victory of the French within 48 hours. He was so carried away by this that he willingly shared his plan with anyone who would listen, including the journalists! That's how (!) the German commanders learned about the offensive. The element of surprise was lost...[5]

And the German General Ludendorff said the best phrase about the failed April offensive of the Entente, "The British offensive was undoubtedly pursuing major strategic goals, though, they remained unclear to me."[1] So, the British were advancing boldly and massively, but what for? This was what the head of the German Army failed to understand...

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[1] History of World War 1, 1914–1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 336.

[2] Ib.

[3] Ib.

[4] Ib. P. 334.

[5] See online encyclopedia, Robert Nivelle section.

There is one more fact that allows to make a precise suggestion that the April offensive could not have lead to a victory in the war. The US entered the war on April 6, 1917. If the offensive, which has begun on April 8-9, will lead to the defeat of the Germans, the American soldiers will not have time for a shot. How then will the US government receive postwar preferences? No, the Americans had to fight, to spill enough soldiers' blood to let President Wilson rightfully dictate the world the new rules of play and guide the postwar world order.

For the French Army the hasty offensive ended badly, with huge losses and complete demoralization. But the agreed exhaustion of the army was performed brilliantly. The troops became completely unfit for action. Of course, there are some unpleasant side effects — the soldiers grow increasingly dissatisfied with their officers, anti-war propaganda is spreading increasingly, the demands to make peace as soon as possible intensify. Soon the widespread military riots began. In May, the riots encompassed seven French corps. 113 military units, including 75 infantry regiments, 22 rifle regiments, 12 artillery regiments, 2 regiments of colonial infantry, 1 dragoon regiment, and 1 Senegalese battalion were disorganized.[2] Finally, two rioting corps set off on a march to Paris. The result, which was negotiated with the Germans, was achieved, and the "allied" armies could lie low for the rest of 1917. No one would suspect them of anything. What offensive can we talk about when the army is on the verge of a rebellion! So, the Entente achieved the desired result by betraying their own soldiers.

"After the failure of the April offensive the western countries don't undertake massive offensive operations and refuse to pursue major strategic goals," "The History of Art of War" claims.

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[1] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War. M., 2005. P. 421.

[2] History of World War 1, 1914-1918. M.: Nauka, 1975. V. 2. P. 339.

Offensive operations that are carried out pursue limited goals. The fight is waged for better positions and occupation of separate tactical points."[1]

At the time of the rebellion the situation in the French Army was dangerous. There were only two faithful divisions between the Germans and Paris. In fact, at that time the road to Paris was open. But Germany did not take the opportunity to attack the French capital, as all the forces *contingently* and hastily were being moved east. And again, Ludendorff explains it in his memoirs. It turns out that the German commanders did not know about the trouble in the French Army and learned about it only after some time.[2] By this, Ludendorff justifies why he did not attack the French Front in May 1917 and did not use its temporary weakness. In fact, the Germans made sure that the "allies" are following their secret agreements, so they followed these, too.

There was no "May Revolution" in France; the rebellion was suppressed in the very bud — by means of executions. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1917, the French military field courts worked tirelessly and brought the army to discipline and order.[3] It was enough to change one commander-in-chief, who "failed" the offensive so disgracefully, to ease the public discontent. General Nivelle was dismissed from the post of the commander-in-chief and replaced by General Petain, who had previously organized the defense of Verdun and had great credit of the army.[4]

The Moor has done his duty, the Moor can go. By virtue of General Nivelle, or rather, of the governments of Britain and France, who ordered him to attack earlier, the war was to last for over a year. Millions of people would die, hundreds of thousands would become disabled, but the "allied" intelligence would keep their word. The new Commander-in-Chief Petain is not going to advance after bringing the French Army to its senses. The "allies" got defensive for summer and fall of 1917. It is the period when the Germans finally broke the Eastern Front...

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[1] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb., Omega-Poligon. V. 5. P. 557.

[2] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War. M., 2005. P. 431.

[3] Zaichonkovsky A. World War 1. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 642.

[4] Already a marshal, Petain will also bring dishonor upon his name by becoming the head of the French government in Vichy, which will capitulate to the Hitlerite army in June 1940.

"Thus, Nivelle's reckless attempt to bring the entire French Army into action and achieve decisive results without the support of the Russian Front ended in defeat and not only prevented the joint offensive from the east and the west, but also deprived the countries of the Entente of all the hopes to end the war in 1917," Kerensky concludes.[1]

He can speak rhetorically too well, but he doesn't say a word about the reasons for such "odd" decisions of the French commanders. Don't the actions of the "allies" look implausible and impossible to you? Isn't is weird that they betray their comrades-in-arms? Let's keep in mind that there is no trade in the world that is dirtier than politics. You can't measure the actions of politicians with the moral and notions of a regular person, as too many things will seem odd. So let's forget for a moment that Russia has always been in the way of the British and the French, that they have wrecked our nerves for centuries. Let's put aside our knowledge about the plan to break Russia down. Let's not recall why World War 1 began in the first place. Let's just look at the situation in 1917 through the eyes of "allied" leaders.

In Russia there has been a revolution, its army is rapidly decaying. As a fighting unit, such an armed force has little value if sent to attack. It is not ready to fight, and the heat of war can be heard only in the speeches of the Provisional Government. But the Russians will have to fight if the enemy attacks first. In other words, it is necessary to provoke Germany on the Eastern Front. The benefit is clear, if the Germans attack the Russians, they will not attack the French, as they will not be strong enough. It's not 1914 anymore, it's already 1917, and the German Army can't afford to advance in two directions. The Russians, however, will have to defend themselves if pressed by the Germans. The war will start. People will die but... not your *nationals.* The people of the country entrusted to you will remain alive. Besides, Russia is made so that it is easy to enter it and almost impossible to get out... alive. After attacking Russia and going deep into its vast snowy territories, the German armies will disappear there forever. This is what will happen. No, the Germans will not be killed by the Russians like the soldiers of Napoleon and Charles XII, hundreds of thousands of them will just stand guard over the roads, warehouses, and relocations in the occupied country. Other hundreds of thousands will borrow provisions and clothing, machines, and valuables from the locals. Hundreds of steam locomotives and thousands of cars will carry the stolen stuff to Germany. *And all these German soldiers will be away from the Western Front!*

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn. M.: Terra, 1996; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt15.htm

It is when you will strike the Germans and finish the war victoriously. The beauty of the plan is captivating, but there is a hitch. The Germans are afraid of Russia, they read about Bonaparte and know what happens to those who go far into the Russian plains. What does the February Revolution look like from Berlin? Russia looks as strong as before from there, the elite that earlier sat next to the Tsar, in the Duma, took the power in the country. These "*crème de la crème of Russland*" promised to fight the Germans till final victory, while they are preparing to transfer the rule to the Constitutional Assembly. It looks as if in Russia they decided to suspend the bad Tsar and arrange a certain plebiscite on "how to live good in Russia." If people decide so, there will be a new tsar, if they decide differently, there will be a republic. The question of proceeding with the war is not even discussed, the battles are raging. If you were the Germans and had the French and the British in the rear, would you agree to attack Russia upon seeing all this? Hardly so. Thus, they must be convinced that Russia is weak now and is going to become even weaker, if Vladimir Ilyich reaches Petrograd. Let me remind you that the decision to send Lenin to Russia was made almost two weeks after the February Revolution, when all the depth of the destructive work performed by the Provisional Government was not obvious yet. Berlin could make such a decision only after receiving lots of new first-class information, as if having travelled ahead and seen the miserable Russian events to-be. The "allied" intelligence and diplomats played the roles of foretellers.

They told the Germans:

- what the Provisional Government will do to the country;
- how it will destroy the army and the navy with its decrees and orders;
- how it will remain inactive, pandering to Bolsheviks, and after a short time will pass them power, which will be followed by some unimaginable events all over the country.

The Germans nodded — it was obvious that the British and the French were involved into the February Revolution. And yet, what do the Germans lose if they believe them and start acting at the enemy's prompt? There is always a chance to outplay your partner. At least, there appeared at least an illusive chance to bring the war to a draw or even to win it after defeating Russia and getting fuelled by its resources.

And the "allies" provided the time and the place of their offensive as a confirmation of their "good intentions." They even began it exactly on the verge of Lenin's departure from Switzerland. Isn't that astonishing? Not at all. To enjoy the silence at the front, first you need to fight a little. It is impossible not to advance at all, you can't tell your French soldiers that you've reached an agreement with the enemy and betrayed the Russian ally, as then they will ask, "What we've spilt the blood for? Why? Why did not you agree with the Germans before?" And they can ask the most horrible question, why did we start the war, if we can agree so well?

No, you can't allow such questions. In politics, you often say one thing and do the other. If during such a conversation with the Germans you catch an "allied" intelligence officer red-handed, it is a treason felony, and if you don't, he will become a hero later. A secret hero, of course. Though, in two hundred years, the whole world may know about him. Due to a special operation, the Germans withdrew their troops from the Western Front, sent them to the Eastern Front and got bogged down to the very neck in the Russian mess and chaos. Then they caught the bacillus of the revolution and collapsed into the mud after four years of successful struggle. Hundreds of thousands of the British and the French stayed alive, the war was won — isn't that intelligence officer a hero?

The scaffold and the medal are only one step apart, and you just need to know when the political machinations will ascent to the surface. That is why the "allied" diplomats and intelligence officers gave the plans of their offensive to the enemy. It was easier for politicians: the offensive bogged down, it is impossible to advance any further. The explanation for the public of why everything ended so miserably is ready — the dates of the offensive were mistakenly changed. Then there is absolute peace on the Western Front, which, in turn, the Germans were supposed to guarantee; it meant millions of saved, not killed or mutilated fellow countrymen. The disrupted attack meant tens of thousands of dead. The arithmetic is simple. The number of spared human lives is incredible. That is why the politicians commit such infamy as selling their "ally" to the enemy. They betray their own attacking soldiers, who are going to attack in order to save a huge number of the rest of their fighters!

(For reference: during the "Nivelle massacre," the French lost 180 thousand people killed and wounded, the British — 160 thousand people; 5,183 Russian soldiers, who also participated in the offensive, were killed. The Germans lost 238 thousand soldiers, too.)[1]

As we know, the "allies" promised the Germans not to launch serious offensive operations any more. Having started ruining Russia, having given the Germans this idea, they should simply sit still and wait while the Germans are defeating the Russians.

That is exactly what will happen! The French Secretary of War Painleve straight from the stand at the parliament (!), as if once again convincing the Germans not to worry about anything, will *officially declare* that the French Army does not intend to undertake any serious offensive operations in the summer and fall.[1] Having heard this, the German commanders send six more selected divisions to the east. Although the German commanders can't simply believe what the French Parliament says, and they can't remove the troops from the Western Front. The offensive of the "allies" is repelled, but it's only April, and there is so much time ahead suitable for decisive attacks. The Germans can be less afraid of the Russian offensive, as the Russian Army is weakened by the revolution, but the British and the French can proceed attacking. And the Germans send the troops from the west to the east, which is quite illogical. Why?

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[1] http://www.hrono.info/sobyt/1900sob/1917nivel.html

There is a good old saying: if someone's actions look illogical to you, you may be just poorly informed. In Berlin the commanders know that they have agreed upon the peace on the Western Front, and that the repulsed "allied" offensive will not be repeated. They dispassionately send their troops to the Russian Front, fulfilling their obligations to the British and the French and preparing to attack Russia only.

But let's return to the actions of the Provisional Government. The Russian Army is ruined, the discipline is void. They should have sat still and revived the army. But no! They oddly reasoned from the experience of the defeat suffered by the French and the British. The Provisional Government... says that the Russians will attack. Attack no matter what and support the "allies"...

Our offensive could not end in anything but defeat. And indeed, it ended in a defeat and the Bolshevik revolt, as soldiers got finally disappointed in the government. It turns out that military failures make excellent food for the revolutionary ferment, and the "yeast," Lenin and Co, have already been delivered to the spot. However, what if Vladimir Ilyich's indefatigable energy and brilliant resolution is not enough to blow the huge Russia up? He may hesitate or make a mistake. The "allies" prepared the destruction of Russia so scrupulously and carefully that they had an alternative option for this case, too. The "yeast" for the future socialistic revolution were brought to Russia from all over the world.

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[1] Kersnovsky A. History of the Russian Army. M.: Golos, 1992. V. 4. P. 156.

If Lenin's example is not enough, we can see how another fighter for the people's happiness, Lev Davydovich Trotsky (Bronstein), traveled home. His path was even longer and thornier. The point is that in February 1917 Trotsky and Bukharin were in New York, where they edited the radical Novy Mir Newspaper. It turned out that Trotsky got there not quite voluntarily. In 1916, a year before the Russian Revolution, the internationalist Trotsky was deported from France and politely escorted by the French police across the Spanish border. He didn't stay there for long; a few days later, the Madrid police arrested the future founder of the Red Army. After that, Trotsky was transported to Cadiz, then to Barcelona, and finally was taken aboard the Montserrat steamer of the Spanish transatlantic company. Monserrat took Trotsky and his family across the Atlantic, and in January 1917 they got off in New York.

Following him, some of his adherers crossed the ocean. When we assess Trotsky's contribution to the world revolution, we shouldn't forget that he's not inferior to Lenin. Both were fine speakers and publicists. Both theorized a lot. Both had their own followers, and Trotsky's adherers were even more active on the world stage. The group of Trotskists in Mexico had such an influence there that they even wrote the constitution for the local revolutionary government of in 1917. Thus, this country was the first in the world to receive a government that adopted a Soviet-type constitution. That was Mexico, where Trotsky would later flee from the USSR, and live there until the Stalin's agent Mercader would brake his skull with an ice ax.

How did Trotsky, who only spoke German and Russian, survive in the capitalist America? Judging by his book "My Life," his only profession in New York was being a revolutionist. Well, apparently, this profession was highly valued in the capitalist America because Trotsky comfortably waited there for the unexpected February Revolution. Sweet financial "miracles" happened to Trotsky very often and in good supply. Coming aboard the Montserrat steamer to sail to the US capital, Trotsky sent a letter complaining that he only has 40 pesetas left. And then he "unexpectedly" buys expensive tickets for a trip across the Atlantic; arriving to New York, he fills a customs declaration which shows the round amount of $500 (about $10,000 today). His life looks like a fairy tale, "... He gets ashore in a country where he has never been before, besides, Trotsky does not speak English; the revolutionist will give away all the money earned for three months but will live in a fashionable district... Trotsky had a fridge, and a telephone in his rented apartment — these were luxury attributes at that time, just like a personal car with a driver. Who financed Trotsky?"[1]

Indeed, who? Were these, once again, "the party comrades" and their contribution fees?

And still, they had to make the revolution. Without its heroes, the revolution simply could not have happened, that's why in three months Lev Trotsky, just like Lenin, started to pack things away to go home. The routes of two leaders-to-be of the Russian Revolution were very different, but there were certain coincidences of really miraculous kind. *Just like Vladimir Lenin, Lev Trotsky received all the documents necessary to enter Russia from the Russian Consul in New York.*[2]

On March 27 (14), Trotsky with his family left New York on the Norway steamer Christianiafiord.[3] Yet, having barely reached Canada, Mr. Trotsky was extremely surprised and upset — he and some of his comrades were taken off the steamer and sent to a camp for German war prisoners...

A group of revolutionaries was withdrawn from the steamer in accordance with official directions that the duty naval officer in

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[1] http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=447700

[2] Trotsky L. My Life. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.revkom.com/biblioteka/marxism/trotckii/my%20life/XXIII.htm

[3] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. M.: 1998; http://rus-sky.com.

Halifax received by telegraph on March 29 (16), 1917. The telegram said that Trotsky & Co were aboard Christianiafiord and that they were to be "detained and arrested until further directions." The reason for arrest was as follows — "these are Russian Socialists that are going to Russia to start a revolution against the acting Russian Government there, for which Mr. Trotsky has 10 thousand dollars on him, raised by the Socialists and the Germans."[1]

The British ramrods explained the reason for arrest rather clear to Mr. Trotsky, "You are simply dangerous for the acting Russian Government."

"But the New York agents of the Russian Government have given us passes to Russia, and why don't you let the Russian Government take care of itself!" the arrested leader reasonably objected.

Colonel Morris took a thought, moved his jaw and added, "You are dangerous for the allies in general."

"And they didn't show us any documents concerning our arrest,"[2] Trotsky writes in his memoirs.

Shouldn't we be happy? Didn't we blame our "allies" in vain? Of course, they had failed with Lenin, but they managed to hold Trotsky. Oh, wait. How can it be? Didn't Trotsky become the leader of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petrograd soon after this arrest? This is a historical fact, and he hardly could have done it from a detention camp in the distant Canada. But wait! Did they let him go?!

Indeed! You'll be surprised to read this story in the books and learn that the Deputy Director of the British Intelligence Claude Dansey didn't believe "the wild guesses about the revolution upcoming" and ordered to set Trotsky free. By the way, if he had believed them, would he have shot Mr. Trotsky right in the middle of the camp?

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[1] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. M.: 1998; http://russky.com.

[2] Trotsky L. My Life. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.revkom.com/biblioteka/marxism/trotckii/my%20life/XXIII.htm

Actions of the British intelligence are as stunning as a Believe It or Not game of cards. Meanwhile, Lev Trotsky in his "History of the Russian Revolution" wrote that on April 14 (1) the British Embassy in Petrograd published in the newspapers an official message in imperfect Russian, saying, "Russian citizens have been withdrawn from Christianiafiord steamer in Halifax, as the British Government has been informed that they are associated with the plan for the Russian Provisional Government overthrow, sponsored by the Germans..."[1]

Somewhere in the complicated chain of the British intelligence agencies there happened a data breach. Trotsky, so dangerous for Britain, was supposed to steadily sail to Russia with a view to fulfil the secret plan of the "allies" together with Lenin. Yet, it was impossible to explain to every employee of the British Secret Service why the World War started and why ruining Russia was for the benefit of Britain. Somewhere in the depths of the British intelligence a person out of subject received a notice that a man who was going to overthrow the Russian government and help Russia exit the war was on his way to Petrograd. Just that once, the British special services did what they are intended for — they arrested the dangerous traveler.

There were some honest people in the British intelligence, the ones, who really cared for the fate of Russia, their ally, and that was why Trotsky was arrested. Alas, they didn't run the show. Those who had delivered Lenin to Russia quickly fixed the "mistake" with Trotsky. "I should say that today I still fail to understand all of the backstage mechanics of our arrest and release," Trotsky sincerely confesses in his book. We hear much surprise in his words. He shouldn't have been arrested. That was what he had been promised. *Just like with Lenin, it should have been a mode of the most preferential treatment.* However, there was this weird arrest, and then even a weirder release...

We should expand on this release in more detail. The "allies" didn't just let Mr. Trotsky go due to their mistake.

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. M., 1997; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/

***The British released Trotsky at the request of the Provisional Government!***

It seems incredible, but Milyukov, the foreign minister, turned to the British command with such a request. Was Mr. Milyukov in his right mind? Oh yes, he was fine, it was that the British weren't able to settle this situation nicely. A special request was needed. Trotsky writes rather frankly about it, saying that Milyukov "was *made to* ask Nabokov, the Russian ambassador, to appeal to the British Government for them to release Trotsky and let him enter Russia."[1]

KD Nabokov was surprised to get such a request from the leader of his party and his ministry as much as we are, "Knowing Trotsky for his activities in America, the British Government wondered if that was some evil will or blindness. The British shrugged their shoulders, they understood the danger and warned us. Lloyd George had to give in, though."[2]

How much care our "allies" pay! They warned the Provisional Government about the danger, but it seemed not to have heard it. Why did the KD leader reply that "the Government allows an unconditional return to Russia *for any emigrants, irrespective of their views of the war* and their presence on the international wanted lists?"[3] The historians give us an answer to that — the Provisional Government most feared to be accused of insufficient democratism. Should the government be afraid of not losing the most dreadful war, but such ridiculous accusations, when the fate of the country and all of its people are at stake? The answer is clear — the degree of democratism and freedom is just a temporary thing that should give way to more terrible and critical things. Zhdanov and Zhukov in Leningrad at Siege least feared to seem insufficiently democratic to someone. This isn't what statesmen should be concerned about.

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. M., 1997; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/2–4.html

[2] Ib.

[3] Denikin A. Sketches of the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. P. 173.

However, it was necessary to give some explanation of the odd acts of the Provisional Government ministers to the readers and the descendants. That's why they used some excuses that covered the true essence of events and didn't provide any answers to the questions bursting out. Why did Milyukov was "made to" do an apparent foolishness and ask the British to release Trotsky? Who made Milyukov require releasing a man who in the nearest future caused him lose all the property and even his Homeland and fled to emigration? Is it absurdity or idiocy? No, it's politics. Absolutely non-self-maintained and completely dependant on its "allied" masters. Remember one more thing, Milyukov was friends with Jacob Schiff, an American tycoon, the "general sponsor" of all Russian Revolutions. This was why the Provisional Government asked to release Trotsky, who would instantly turn to overthrowing it.

***Trotsky was a backup, a twin, and a double of Ilyich.*** The same force — the "allies" — made the Provisional Government act that oddly towards both locomotives of the Russian Revolution. This becomes even more obvious if we look at some spicy details of the unexpected arrest and even more unexpected release of Lev Trotsky. *It turned out that Trotsky was an American citizen, he traveled with an American passport, in which there were a transit British visa and a visa for entering Russia.*[1]

How come Trotsky had American citizenship? Might his passport have been forged? Oh no, it was a most genuine passport issued by the American government. When Trotsky was arrested, he had 10 thousand dollars on him, which at that time was a rather large sum. If we assume that Mr. Trotsky was an honest and fervent fighter for people's happiness, he can't have had that much money. He can't have earned that much from writing articles for revolutionary newspapers, the sum was too big.

Let's not be naive. That was his pocket money only. The real MONEY from American bankers had been quietly transferred to the accounts of trusted people. We can only imagine how much money there was if the fighter for happiness of workers had a solid bundle of American money in his wallet. Paying for the Russian Revolutions wasn't a new experience for Jacob Schiff and other US bankers. They allocated funds for the SRs and the Social Democrats in 1905, they financed the orchestrators of the February. And now it was time to support even greater radicals, namely — Trotsky, who wasn't a foreigner in the circle of American multimillionaires. Lev Trotsky had a very fortunate marriage — his wife Sedova was the daughter to Zhivotovsky, a rich banker. In his turn, he was a companion to the Wartburgs, the bankers who were companions and relatives of Jacob Schiff. Thus, the revolution was merely a family business for Lev Trotsky.

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[1] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. M.: 1998; http://rus-sky.com

Lenin and Trotsky moved to Russia almost on the same day. They had the same task. Having opposed each other before, they united in the revolutionary Petrograd. In 1903, Trotsky dropped Lenin and Bolsheviks, and in 1904 left the Menshevik faction and took some middle position between them. He acted with an independent group: since 1908, he started to issue the Pravda Newspaper, at first in Lvov, and then in Vienna. At that time it was one of the most popular newspapers illegally brought to Russia. Thus, when in 1912 Lenin once again decided to issue his own newspaper and "stole" the name from Trotsky, the latter was outraged. His anger only settled in 1917, when both "emigrants" cooperated to prepare revolution. Or, to be more specific, combined their money coming from the same source.

*The German money Berlin provided to Lenin were mostly foreign loans, generally from the American banks.* The same banks and people allocated the funds for Trotsky. The American Professor Antony Sutton wrote perfectly well about this little-known phenomenon in his book "Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution." He mentioned many peculiar facts. Under the international law, neutral countries (and the USA remained neutral until April 1917) weren't allowed to lend money to belligerents. And still, they provided loans to Great Britain and France. The forms of such loans were determined by Wilson, the US president, in

October. The president explained that "selling bonds in the USA for the benefit of foreign states is actually saving loans to the belligerents, not financing the war. On the other hand, the acceptance of Treasury notes or other evidence of debt in payment for articles purchased in this country is merely a means of facilitating trade, not financing of the belligerent action."

In one word, the neutral USA gave the British and the French money for the global trade development — this was what they called it.[1] Russia once placed its bonds in the USA, joining the vivifying stream of the American gold. And Germany didn't waste any time, either. Professor Sutton gives an example in his book, how against the actual military restrictions it managed to gather in New York significant funds for its subversion "in Mexico" — Germany got loans from the American banks. In 1919, Senator Overman's Committee discovered that "Deutsche Bank managed to get 4 million and 670 thousand pounds from London through its branches in the South America."[2]

Where did that much money go? Did Germany spend the acquired dollars and pounds only for the distant Mexico? In Mexico, the revolution was at its height, the rebels repeatedly attacked the American land, but it never came to the real war. The Germans couldn't have spent all of their money there. But the Russian Revolution was a different thing. No budget would be too small there.

There is not much evidence that the "German" money Bolsheviks acquired had come from the "allies," but we still have some of it. Thomas Masaryk, the president-to-be of the independent Czechoslovak state, wrote in his memoirs about the American-British-French Investigation Bureau that used to investigate how the Germans plotted against Russia, "We discovered that some Mrs. Simons, who was employed by the Germans, helped to pass the German money to some Bolshevik leaders. Such money were sent through the German Embassy in Stockholm to Haparanda, where this lady received them."[1] The information was passed to the Provisional Government. Masaryk writes that the Bureau ceased the investigation "when it was discovered that an American citizen holding a senior position was involved. Non-discrediting the Americans was for our own benefit."[2]

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[1] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution. M.: 1998; http://russky.com

[2] Ib.

By 1917, Germany was on the edge of exhaustion, and thus, it was unable to allocate enormous municipal funds for a doubtful concept of the Bolshevik Revolution. They had more important things to deal with. If Bolsheviks failed, nobody would pay the money back, and at that moment Germany needed the money to buy priceless materials and provisions for the German kids and soldiers. Berlin couldn't risk its last. However, some spare cash might be invested into the fishy business of ruining the opponent. Germany could only give Ilyich a couple of millions of golden Reichsmarks if someone had given the money to Germany, that is if someone had given the required loan to Berlin. And that really happened. Everything developed perfectly for the Germans — they had the moment, the executor, the warranty of success and even the money needed. Why should they think further? The Germans understood that the smiling British intelligence officers weren't concerned with the German interests, but the plan they offered was so simple and nice that it was impossible to resist.

The revolutionaries smoothly received their visas and documents, and like crows coming after carrion, flew from all over the world to pick on the weakened body of Russia. And to unite. Lenin, who used to criticize everyone with all his might, suddenly turned conscious and tolerable towards Trotsky. "Lenin's attitude to me during 1917 passed several stages. He met me close-tongued and expectant, but we became much closer in July."[3]

Mr. Trotsky is laconic, isn't he? "In July" means when Bolsheviks tried to seize power for the first time. Trotsky was the only one to support Ilyich's course to seizing power no matter what. The others failed to understand his aspiration. That was what made Lenin and Trotsky close.

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[1] Melgunov S. The Golden German Key of Bolsheviks; http://www.netda.ru/belka/texty/kluch.htm

[2] Ib.

[3] Trotsky L. My Life. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/My_Life/My_Life-00–02–06.html

They were delivered to Russia by the same force, they were given the same tasks, and they couldn't release that information to other top members of the party. Since Lenin's arrival, his main problem wasn't the struggle with the Provisional Government. On the contrary, it played along with him. His main challenge was to get his comrades round to his way of thinking, not releasing any indiscreet information to them. Not once we are going to run into this challenge of Lenin's.

Yet, if you think the Provisional Government hadn't tried to defend its interests before, oh, you are mistaken. Right after Trotsky arrived in Russia, when the fat had already been put on fire, the Russian government finally seemed to have opened its eyes. The American diplomatic mission in Stockholm in the middle of June 1917 sent a telegram to the State Department saying, "The Mission has been confidentially informed by the Russian, British, and French Passport Bureaus on the Russian border in Tornio that they are seriously concerned about the passage of suspicious persons with American passports."[1] The border was locked again. In the end of the same month Herman Bernstein, a reputable New York reporter, was held at the border and refused access to Russia. The New York Herald Newspaper was left in Petrograd without its representative. Trotsky, his real name Bronstein, was let into Russia, and amicable Bernstein wasn't. Later, in the middle of August, the Russian Embassy in Washington appealed to the State Department asking "to deny access to Russia to criminals and anarchists..."[2] The Americans were glad to help. The operation for Trotsky's delivery had been finished, so why not help? The puppets of the "allies" in the Russian government would be able to put a good face on the matter, like, you know, we tried to fight and even protested. Anyway, all the criminals and anarchists were already in Petrograd.

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[1] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution; http://www.rus-sky.com/history/library/sutton/sutton1.htm

[2] Ib.

The Provisional Government did many other things, equally odd. We are going to try to tell you about all of them.

Where is Lev Trotsky coming from? From New York. Where is Lenin coming from? From Germany. What is their purpose? To master a revolution and overthrow the Provisional Government. What shall the government do? It should protect itself. And what does it actually do? It meets Lenin with hugs and guards of honor, it demands that Trotsky is released. Some Theater of Absurd. Yet, when we come to analyze this information, astonished and outrageous, let's remember that a REGULAR government would protect itself in such situation. The puppets put at the wheel to foul the things up and cause anarchy, the ones aiming to pass the power to even more violent madmen, Bolsheviks, won't resist! They would behave as their "allied" masters tell them. They would harm the state, act against any common sense and manifest truth. The more power Kerensky and the Provisional Government had, the closer Bolsheviks were to victory, as the former did everything vice-versa. Announcing their struggle with Bolsheviks, they contributed to the October revolution not less than Lenin and Trotsky, and they really deserved their places among the orchestrators of our national disaster!

Let's sum the things up.

Looking for a way to Russia, **Lenin** was unable to find it:

- he couldn't go through the Entente countries;
- Germany refused him.

When he was almost desperate, he suddenly succeeded:

- the Germans that had refused him unexpectedly gave him a go-ahead and agreed to all of his terms;
- the intelligence of the "allies" closed their eyes;
- the Provisional Government didn't counteract;
- the Russian Consulate issued visas to the Leninists as if nothing had happened.

On his arrival to Russia, the Government didn't arrest Lenin and even allowed him to actively propagandize its own overthrow.

**Trotsky**, sailing from New York to Russia almost at the same time when Lenin took his train:

- had an American passport in his pocket;
- had his "last" 10 thousand dollars on him;
- the Russian Consulate in the USA issued him a visa;
- he had a British transit visa, too;
- after the unexpected arrest the Canadian Government quickly released him;
- the Provisional Government sent a petition to release "the prisoner";
- right after his crossing the border the passage regulations were tightened.

Having dethroned the Russian monarchy, **the Provisional Government**:

- dynamically destroyed the army and the special services;
- eliminated the Police;
- in mere days destroyed the country management system;
- announced total amnesty;
- thrilled the public with the on-coming rural replotting;
- didn't prohibit strikes and meetings;
- catered to national separatists;
- instead of defending, was getting ready to attack with its weakened army.

**Germany** was in great trouble in 1917 and was getting ready to defend itself:

- demonstrated the miracles of clairvoyance when it withdrew its troops from the "Noyon pincers";
- rather smoothly repelled the started offensive of the "allies";
- failed to use a great moment to head-start to Paris;
- felt free to move its troops to the East, where the dynamic offensive started in summer 1917;

- having refused Lenin, it suddenly found lots of money for a fishy and incredible operation to make Russia exit the war.

All these "miraculous" events coincided in time with a rather odd behavior of the **British and French,** who:

- broke the symmetry and simultaneity of their scheduled attacks on Germany;
- unexpectedly and with no clear reason changed the date when the key operation of the entire war should have started;
- made the Russian troops unable to strike their opponent a month before the agreed date;
- when the opponent withdrew its troops, thus nullifying the aim of the "allied" operation, they started a pointless frontal attack.

*And all of these odd events happened at the same time...*

As we've already seen enough of the "miracles" all over Europe in March and April 1917, let's get back to December 1916. Let's find an answer to the question, which at first seems to have nothing to do with the February and the October. Don't forget, it only seems to be irrelevant, as these two stages of our revolution are directly connected with the matter we are going to investigate.

***And this matter is the assassination of Grigori Rasputin.***

# CHAPTER 6

# Who Assassinated Grigori Rasputin and Why

> The sun shines so brightly. I feel so calm at his dear grave. He died to save us.
>
> *From the letter of Empress*
> *Alexandra Feodorovna*

> ...The bullet that finished him hit the very heart of the dynasty.
>
> *Alexander Blok*

We'll start our story from the very end. On March 10 (23), 1917, the ashes of Grigori Rasputin were scattered in the location where today there is the Polytekhnicheskaya Metro Station in St. Petersburg. This was the second death of the old monk, his second funeral. And if "the first" one was attended by the inconsolable Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, "the second" was attended by the servitor of Alexander Kerensky and several students of the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute named after Peter the Great...

Let me put it straight — we are not going to assess Rasputin's personality. It is incredibly hard to say if he was a saint or a villain. The fact is that his life and death had a great share of oddities, coincidences and miracles that completely up-ended the Russian life at the beginning of the 20 century. Moreover, the murder of Rasputin became a starting point of the upcoming Russian catastrophe. Nicholas II abdicated only 10 weeks after Rasputin's death. Let's not jump ahead, though...

Grigori Rasputin (Novykh) appeared in the capital of the Russian Empire in 1904. And a year after that he was already introduced to the Russian Emperor. His career was a great success. A regular peasant entered the Tsar's and the Tsarina's circle and enjoyed their confidence. He was giving advice and making predictions that Empress Alexandra Feodorovna undertook as revelations of the saint. Nicholas II was a little bit more critical to Rasputin's words but in the course of time even he was unable to resist the magnetic charm of Rasputin's personality.

The reason was plain — Rasputin definitely had some healing abilities. Today they would call him a powerful psychic. How he healed people, how he did it, is yet unknown, but there were enough facts of mysterious curing.

For the first time Rasputin demonstrated his incomprehensible skills when Anna Vyrubova, a close friend of the Empress, got into an accident and was practically dying, but Rasputin healed her. He just came up to her and said, "Annushka, open your eyes," and gave the blessing over her. She ended up almost completely recovered after this unconventional treatment.

After that event Rasputin was welcomed by the Emperor's family. Heir Alexei, the son to Nicholas II, had hemophilia, a genetic disease causing poor hemopexis. A person suffering from this disease can die because of unceasing bleeding. Every cut or scratch can cause death — the blood simply won't stop, and the ill person can just bleed to death. And while there are some means for stopping external bleeding, there is simply no remedy for internal bleeding that any injury can cause.

There was no medical remedy for that disease. That was why a huge sailor was assigned to carry Alexei Nikolayevich in his arms to prevent any injury. Naturally, whoever could soothe Alexei's sufferings, was welcome in the Imperial family and treated as a saint. Rasputin the Psychic took the place of the home saint of the Romanovs. Several times he, indeed, delivered the young prince from death, stopping him bleeding in some inexplicable way.

Gradually, his influence expanded beyond pure medicine, and he started to make predictions, and then turned to giving political advice. It doesn't matter to us if Rasputin was a saint or a first-class villain, if he prayed day and night or helled around with girls in the pubs. We don't care if he was a megaphone to mundane or extramundane forces. *We need to know what was Grigori's advice for Nicholas II.*

In fact, Rasputin wasn't killed for being a psychic, he was killed for being close to the Tsar, for the influence he had over the Russian autocrat (or for whatever influence he could have had over him). Those who thought Rasputin was hampering their plans organized his assassination. So, whose toes did Rasputin step on?

The matter of orchestrating World War 1 was on the agenda of the European politics early in the 20 century. Or, to be more specific, the matter of the large-scale German-Russian encounter. The war started in 1914, but it could have begun earlier. The tinderbox at the Balkans had already been planted. They only needed to set it on fire and put Russia and Germany atop. Mind, the award involved was as much as the global domination.

And suddenly some ignorant Siberian peasant appeared in the way of the Russian Revolution upcoming. In 1912, when Russia was ready to get involved in the Balkan conflict for the first time, Rasputin on his knees begged Nicholas not to join the war — and succeeded. Count Sergey Witte in his memoirs specifies, "he (Rasputin) indicated all the fatal results of the European fire, and the hands of history rotated differently. The war was averted."[1]

And this wasn't a mere assertion. World War 1 started in 1914 according to the same scenario that had been prepared two years before. The conflict in the Balkans, Russia supports Serbia, Austria is supported by Germany, and here we go. All of a sudden some peasant ruins the game — the war doesn't start, no revolutions, no civil war, only the Russian Empire is steady as a rock still towering in the European continent.

Here my dubious reader might wince and ask an absolutely reasonable question — why didn't Rasputin the psychic persuade Nicholas II from joining the war in 1914, if he had so artfully done it two years earlier? And here the most interesting things start. Something unbelievable, odd and mysterious. Wonders will never cease. This is when a bridge to the February and the October Revolutions appeared, more of a catwalk yet, almost invisible and transparent...

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[1] Platonov O. Life for the Tsar. St. Pb.: Voskresenie, 1996. P. 254.

"In June, shortly before Guseva had attempted to assassinate him, Grigori kept telling his Tsar that it was necessary to beware of France and get closer with Germany," Maurice Paleologue, the French ambassador to Russia, wrote in his memoirs.[1] The respectable Parisian diplomat forgot one critical detail, "June" stood for June 1914. It was only a month before World War 1, as according to Julian Calendar, it started on July 19, and by Gregorian Calendar — on August 1. In fact, Rasputin warned Nicholas II against the mistake that resulted in the collapse of the Russian Empire. The French diplomat remembered and wrote down the monk's words in his diary, because Rasputin had hit the mark with his advice, his prediction was right on the money. Why didn't Nicholas II follow his advice this time?

*It was because when the fatal decision was made Rasputin was on his deathbed!*

And even when historians mention it, they do it in small print. They try to ignore it and avoid explaining it. The fact is that the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand that initiated the global conflict occurred almost at the same time with the attempt... on Rasputin's life.

***On June 15 (28) the Austrian heir was killed in Sarajevo, and in two weeks on June 30 (July 13) 1914 Rasputin barely escaped death in his native village in Siberia.***

Khioniya Guseva, a commoner from Syzran, her face lacking a nose due to syphilis, stabbed Rasputin with a knife into his stomach. She could hardly have been in collusion with the murderers of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, but let us not jump to conclusions. We already know that after Rasputin's death, the Russian

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[1] Paleologue M. The Tsarist Russia in the World War. M.: International Relations. 1991. P. 102.

Empire survived for some two months only. This is not a mystic coincidence but a skillful operation of the British intelligence designed to destroy the Russian Empire. Stay with us, and we'll see a visible and sustainable "British" trace in Rasputin's murder case. We'll learn so many interesting things when we try to follow all the participants of Rasputin's murder, when we check what happened to them during the "democratic" rule of the Provisional Government and the "bloody dictatorship" of Bolsheviks. Yet, we'll talk about it later.

Let's turn back to our two assassination attempts. Murdering Franz Ferdinand was a motive to start a war, it was the Bickford fuse of the global conflict. Yet, the bomb planted under the European peace can't explode while the Russian Tsar keeps to his unyielding stance. Rasputin was the only one who could have reasoned the Tsar against the war. Grigori Rasputin not once repeated later, "If this bitch didn't stab me, there would have been no war, I wouldn't have allowed that."[1]

It wasn't a coincidence that the attempt on Rasputin's life happened two weeks after Franz Ferdinand had been murdered. The global political environment can't change instantly, and World War 1 started only a month and three days after Franz Ferdinand had been killed. Two first weeks after the event were rather calm, and didn't pre-echo any dreadful outcome. Yet, Europe quickly slid into the war after they had passed. At this critical moment, Rasputin was supposed to be dead and be unable to deter Nicholas II from this disastrous step. The attempt failed, and Rasputin didn't die, yet he was unconscious and on his deathbed. He only came round right before the global conflict started. Rasputin's influence and his authority were so powerful that the Tsar could not but ask for his advice. Pierre Gilliard, the Frenchman who taught Prince Alexei, justifies that the Tsar came to ask Rasputin's advice about declaring the war. Hardly having come round, the monk started to telegraph the Tsar "begging him not to start the war, as this war will bring the end to Russia and all of them [the reigning dynasty] will be killed."[1]

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[1] Sokolov N. The Imperial Family Assassination; http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_s/ubi07.html

However, it was too late. Russia had already been dragged into World War 1. Tremendous losses and wartime hardships detonated the revolutionary explosion that wiped the Russian Empire off from the Earth. The revolution couldn't have been organized in Russia in peace time, it required a war. Rasputin, as far as we can see from the odds of memories of him, was totally against it. *Thus, Grigori Rasputin was in the way of those who wanted to explode Russia from the inside by drawing it into war operations...*

Furthermore, Rasputin was a perfect target to start a discrediting campaign. Not against the monk himself, but against the Imperial family. If a rascal is in the nearest circle of the Tsar and the Tsarina, they must be rascals themselves. "Every Russian anti-governmental party would use exaggerated rumors about Rasputin to discredit the monarchial regime and the Tsar and the Tsarina," General Kurlov wrote in his Memoirs. "This method turned to be effective. And there is no doubt that Rasputin's reputation villainously exaggerated through lies and scandals served a good deal to the revolutionaries and set the stage for ruining of the Russian monarchy."[2]

The campaign attempting to discredit Rasputin was deliberate and meaningful. It might have been one of the first black PR campaigns of this scale. Tatiana Botkina, a daughter of the Tsar's doctor, who was shot along with the Imperial family, repeats her father's words in her memoirs, "If not Rasputin, the opponents of the Imperial family and revolution orchestrators would have created such personality by means of rumors using either Vyrubova or me, or anybody else."[3]

*They were thoroughly creating a myth of the seducer and bribetaker, who had enchanted the Imperial family.*

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[1] Taneyeva A. (Vyrubova). Pages of My Life // Print and Revolution. 1924. № 4. P. 89.

[2] Kurlov P. Death of Imperial Russia. M.: Sovremennik, 1992. P. 160.

[3] Melnik-Botkina T. Memories of the Tsar Family. M.: Zakharov, 2004. P. 38.

*They were preparing the ground for the future murder.*

*They were paving the first step of the coming revolution.*

They didn't only spread slanderous rumors, though, they also exerted strong pressure on the Tsar from literally every side. Everyone demanded changes and forming "a liable ministry." This is what they said from the stand in the State Duma, this is what they openly discussed in high society salons. **Other members of the Imperial family** also demanded the same from Nicholas. What a surprising blindness struck all members of the ruling Imperial family! Members of the Imperial family demanded that the Tsar should establish a liberal Duma government!

There was a single idea in every advice, in every letter the Tsar received — "establish 'a liable' ministry, make concessions." While Rasputin was alive, Nicholas II managed to hurl back all the advice givers, but as soon as Rasputin was killed in December 1916, the Russian Tsar yielded to the pressure and all the fast talk in only a couple of months. Having abdicated, he established a government liable to the Duma, a government of national confidence. It was called the Provisional Government. And we already know the end of this story — it's tragic and full of blood of Nicholas's innocent children...

It was the Provisional Government that put out the red carpet for Bolsheviks to come. In mere months it managed to throw the country into turmoil, let all the prisoners free, dissolved the police and destroyed the power vertical, dismissed all the Russian governments and didn't appoint anyone instead of them. Kerensky and his colleagues ruined the army, destroyed the discipline and triggered the collapse of all the military power of the Russian Empire.

However, none of it happened yet. It was only coming. At first, they needed to kill Rasputin. There was a real plot against him. Preparation and orchestration of Rasputin's liquidation was studied really well. There are many books about it, including the memoirs of the killers themselves. And yet, the depths of history have a great surprise in stock for us. As usual, the history will learn its heroes out-of-time. But we'll come back to it later.

Now let's talk of those, who for about 90 years have been considered to be the murderers of the holy elder. Many books telling about Rasputin's death give us a detailed story of how he was killed and by who. The chronicles and the process of killing were thoroughly investigated. And yet, there is a single question that has no answer yet — *why did these people, in particular, decide to murder Rasputin?*

Really, why them? It is peculiar, indeed. Dozens of thousands of people turned to hate Rasputin thanks to the campaign unleashed. The high society, the officers, the revolutionaries, some of the Romanovs, Duma members — all of them believed that he was harming Russia and bringing it to its end. It was believed that the German spies and agents had nested around him. Many believed that Rasputin led the negotiation about the separate peace agreement that was as nearly as made. And yet, no one attempted to kill him! By the way, he had almost no guards, both before loony Guseva attacked him and after it. And when he was so easily killed later, only confirms this. They just came and killed him. Why wasn't anyone on it before?

It was because it isn't easy to become a killer. And to become a killer of someone close to the Imperial family is twice as difficult. The Monarch could have been terrible in anger. The entire state machine turned to a single person or even a group of people can easily crush them to dust in detention camps. It is scary to oppose such a machine. What could be done? They really needed to get rid of Rasputin, as his improper sensible advice prevented the Tsar from making correct decisions. His death would open way to the force ready to push aside the Russian monarchy and to destroy Russia itself. But they were scared to kill him, and no one was ready to take the mission. There were two alternatives here. They could find some fanatics, whose loathing for Rasputin was immense, and who wouldn't be punished for killing him. Hatred and impunity are the driving forces of the oncoming crime!

The idea could be planted. They could gradually and softly ingrain the idea that Rasputin had to be killed into a mind of a chosen person. For the sake of Russia, naturally. The main thing was for these seeds to fall on the prepared ground and for the future murderer to be an unequable so that he would easily undertake the idea and in some time believe it was his own. And such people were found, indeed. All Rasputin's murderers were:

- queer and unbalanced people (and thus, they easily yielded to suggestion);
- almost beyond the law (and thus, they were to remain unpunished);
- had their reasons to loathe Rasputin.

And this is a very important point! It helps to understand how the plot against Rasputin was organized, and why the truth of its true orchestrators and aims was concealed until very recently.

Judge for yourself. If we turn to historiography to find out about the main orchestrator of Rasputin's murder, there is only one name, Prince Felix Yusupov. This 27-year-old graduate of Oxford University was a heir of the high-placed and rich family. This is how he felt about Rasputin, "After all the times I've met Rasputin, after everything I've seen and heard I believe that he contains all the evil and is the main reason of all the disasters of Russia. If there were no Rasputin, there won't be this satanic force that has it hands over the Emperor and the Empress..."[1]

It would be patriotic to decisively break the gives befouling Russia and the dynasty. And supposedly Felix arrived at this idea on his own. Yet, it's not that simple. It happens that highly bred Felix the Beau had some quirks — he loved to wear women's clothes. He used to wear dresses at home when he was a kid, and in his 20ties he made a public appearance. He openly attended public places like that — restaurants and theaters, and not only in Russia, but abroad, too. Once Felix was in a theater in Paris and noticed "that an elderly man from a reserved box was lorgnetting me persistently."[2] That man was the British Monarch Edward VII...

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[1] Yusupov F. The End of Rasputin. M.: Otechestvo, 1990; http://bookz.ru/authors/knaz_-feliks-usupov/feliksusp01/page-3-feliksusp01.html

[2] Bokhanov A. The Romanovs. Secrets of the Heart. M.: AST, 2000. P. 205.

After such success with the top European lover-boy the young aristocrat came back to Russia encouraged and decided to perform in a trendy Petersburg cabaret. In a women's dress, naturally. Felix the Beau performed in a blue veil chiton embroidered with silver threads. Moreover, this costume was decorated with many large family diamonds.[1] And thus, some family friends recognized the stones and knew that the cabaret star was Felix. The prince's father was mad with anger, but having cooled down, he decided to cure his son's odd fancy. His parents sent their fetishist and gay son to reinstate at… Rasputin's. To heal Felix the monk used the treatment of hypnotizing and whipping. You must admit that Yusupov's relations with Rasputin were rather discriminating.

Whether Rasputin's treatment had helped or Prince Yusupov had come to his senses, in 1914, he put his skirts and crinolines aside and married the daughter of Prince Alexander Romanov, thus coupling the crown name and his countless treasures. Irina, Yusupov's spouse, was a grand-daughter of Emperor Alexander III and a niece to Nicholas II.

This was our first plotter — an extravagant gay transgender with instable gender identity married to the Tsar's niece. It is hard to believe that such person could have worked out Rasputin's murder in cold blood. The future plotters had the best of intentions that were further used to destroy the country. *Killing Rasputin, they tried to prevent the revolution, the dynasty's end and ruination of Russia, all of them eventually destroyed in the fire ignited with the holy elder's death!*

The second plotter was Grand Prince Dmitry Romanov. His mother, Grand Princess Alexandra Georgiyevna, Princess of Greece, died at childbirth — Dmitry came to this world, but his mother left it. His father fell for Princess Paley and completely abandoned his little son. Dmitry was nurtured by General Governor of Moscow Grand Prince Sergey Alexandrovich and his wife Elizaveta Feodorovna. After the terrorist Kalyaev killed the grand prince on February 4 (17) 1905, Elizaveta Feodorovna retired from the wicked world to a monastery she had founded, and Dmitry moved to Tsarskoye Selo with the Emperor and the Empress. He called them Mama and Papa as they became his official custodians. Grand Princess Elizaveta Feodorovna left him a magnificent palace in Nevsky Prospect that her husband had bought from Belosselsky Belozersky. And the young "orphan" came to live there.

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[1] Bokhanov A. The Romanovs. Secrets of the Heart. M.: AST, 2000. P. 205.

He had old-established friendship with Felix Yusupov. In the suburbs of Moscow Felix's manor was next to the lands of Grand Prince Sergey Alexandrovich, where young Dmitry used to live. According to memoirs of his contemporaries, Dmitry was light-minded and good-natured. He was also aware that Rasputin was of enormous importance for the family of Nicholas II, as he was able to save the life of Tsarevich Alexei. And yet, this fact did not confuse the young grand prince. To repay the caress and loving of the Imperial family Dmitry took part in the plot aiming to kill *the closest person of his "Mama" and the main advisor of his "Papa."* Well, this young man was soft-hearted and kind, grateful and fair. Only a person of such character could have requited all the good with *such evil.* His friend Felix was of more importance to him — as Grand Prince Dmitry was gay, too. And Felix Yusupov soft on women's clothes was more than a friend to him...

Yet, Dmitry had his own motive for loathing Rasputin. The Tsar and the Tsarina considered marrying him to one of their daughters, and Rasputin opened their eyes telling them about his nursling's sexual preferences. And he also told them who had turned Dmitry on to the "true" gay love. The seducer was Felix Yusupov. Disappointed and resentful, the Emperor and his spouse instantly stopped considering their daughter's marriage with such a man. And Prince Yusupov was also punished for his wrongdoing. He studied in the Cadet Corps, but entrance to the high Guards Corps closed for him. Thus, Felix Yusupov got another impulse to hate Rasputin, and Dmitry was absolutely under his fellow's influence.

And one more important notice here — both Felix and Dmitry were unlikely to be prosecuted for any wrongdoing. The grand prince was a member of the Romanovs' family and was outside the jurisdiction of regular justice. Yusupov married to the Emperor's niece could also have expected an easy ride.

The third plotter was Vladimir Purishkevich, a landlord, a monarchist, a member of the Union of Russian People, and the Union of Russian People of Archangel Michael. He was extreme right and a Black Hundreder. He was a Member of the State Duma for the Bessarabia Province. Nobody knew Purishkevich when he entered the Tauride Palace, but he quickly became famous for his brawling. He was like a sightseeing attraction of the Russian Parliament. For instance, on May 1, Purishkevich came to the Duma session with a red gillyflower in his pants zipper to sneer over the lefts. When other Duma members made their speeches, he never stayed in his place wandering along the rows and shouting his comments right from where he stood. Purishkevich's name quickly became a common noun. Cab drivers in Petersburg used his name as an abusive nickname, and a nobleman would demand satisfaction if compared to him.

In 1910, when the Duma discussed a project on county councils in the western provinces, Purishkevich sent his glass flying to the KD leader Milyukov — just because he believed this party acted to the damage of Russia. Purishkevich loathed Rasputin because he was sure the latter acted bad for the monarchy. In November 1916, during the Parliament session he darted not just a phrase but a heart cry, "We need to do something to prevent appointment of the most vile persons to the top posts only through Rasputin's recommendation. Today Rasputin is more dangerous than Lzhedmitry used to be. Dear ministers, if you are truly patriotic, go to the Headquarters, throw yourself at the Tsar's feet and beg him to free Russia from Rasputin and his associates of all kinds."[1]

Hysterical, instable and fanatically fighting his opponents — an ideal portrait of the potential killer. And by the way, Purishkevich was also immune to the prosecution, as he was a Duma member. Consequently, he hardly could have been put to justice.

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[1] Iroshnikov M. Nicholas II — The Last Russian Emperor. St. Pb.: Dukhovnoye Prosvestcheniye, 1992. P. 199.

Yusupov, Purishkevich, and Grand Prince Dmitry Pavlovich — this was the main killing trinity. Two more gays took part in the evil deed — Lieutenant Sukhotin and Doctor Lazavert. The Chairman of the State Duma Rodzianko knew about the prepared murder, who was the uncle to Prince Felix Yusupov. "I am sure that assassinating Rasputin will be undertaken as the act of patriotism,"[1] this is what head of Russian parliamentarians told his nephew. A month later, he persuaded Grand Prince Michael Alexandrovich not to take the throne, which really supported the cause of the February revolution. Nine months later Rodzianko had to flee from Petersburg to escape Bolsheviks. The head of the Russian Parliament was wise. And far-sighted, indeed.

But what made him call a murder an act of patriotism? This is the version given almost in every book about Rasputin, supposedly, he was used in negotiations with the Germans. Either they were to start, or Rasputin wanted to initiate them. And that was why "gay patriots" murdered him...

Yet, was Rasputin a friend of the Germans, indeed? Did he negotiate separate peace with them, which grand princes and Duma members didn't want? There is no definite answer to that today, but there are two points of view. The first one says that he, indeed, contacted the Germans, and considers negotiation with them like a historic fact. The second one is that he only probed the water and attempted some first contacts. It is hard to understand all the political intricacy of that period — the information is contradictory and confusing. Assessing *intents* is always more difficult than assessing *deeds.* For instance, let's take the fact of Lenin's cooperation with the German command. It is obvious that their contacts started way before March 1917. And yet, if there weren't the "sealed" train and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, what real documents would the modern historians have to confirm this? Telegram checks? Some implied evidence?

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[1] http://www.newsru.com/world/20sep2004/rasputin.html

Rasputin himself wasn't the person to negotiate about peace and war, his grade wasn't high enough. He only could give advice and affect the imperial couple this way or another. Presuming that Rasputin's clique could have negotiated with Germany, means we should be presuming Nicholas II could have had negotiated separate peace with his opponent in the backstage.

As soon as Germany understood that instead of fighting Russia, it had been imposed an absolutely no-chance fight with all the world, the Berlin command started to consider ways out of this situation. Moreover, Kaiser Wilhelm was perfectly aware how the global conflict was being orchestrated. And as soon as they saw *who* profited from the war between the Russian and the German monarchs, Berlin decided to try and stop it. The best way for Berlin to withdraw from the war was to make peace. I mean, Britain and France didn't just need to win the war, they needed to destroy the German Empire. Thus, the universal peace was impossible at that moment, as the British would torpedo any opportunity for such outcome. The only way-out for the Germans was the separate peace with Russia. They started to test the waters from Berlin. Through the Danish and Swedish kings the information was passed to Petersburg that the Germans were ready to make a settlement that would favor Russia. And yet, making such proposals, the German command erred in their judgment of how the Russian Tsar classified the World War going on. Nicholas II refused to negotiate with his opponent. He burnt with righteous anger about his "treacherous cousin Willy" and wouldn't listen to any peace proposals. The high-minded Russian monarch wasn't aware how cunning his "allies" were and thus couldn't have considered betraying the allied cause.

*All attempts for separate peace negotiations and all water testing were undertaken by the Germans.* Although, the historians tend not to emphasize this feature of the "peace negotiation," they are eager to describe the attempts. The Germans made every endeavor of contacting Russia, let alone the crowned heads. One of the Berlin emissaries was an elderly Russian noblewoman Maria Vasilchikova. When the war had been announced, she lived in the suburbs of Vienna, in a villa that belonged to her friend Prince Franz von Liechtenstein, who used to be the Ambassador of Austria in Petersburg. Vasilchikova had stayed there for a long time, and when the military operations started, she wasn't arrested or interned, but was prohibited to live the villa. Yet, being confined to her quarters, she still managed to live the high life and to host many visitors.

Some time later another high-ranking friend of Maria, Grand Prince von Hessen, asked her to come to Darmstadt, and sent her a pass. The princess agreed. "In Darmstadt the grand prince asked her to go to Petersburg and to advise the Tsar to make a peace agreement without any delay," Maurice Paleologue, the French Ambassador to Russia, wrote in his memoirs.

"He insisted that Emperor Wilhelm was ready to offer some very favorable conditions to Russia, and even gave hints that Britain had made it with the Berlin ministry to conclude a separate peace agreement; in the end he said that Germany and Russia should pacify to retain the dynastic tradition in Europe."[1]

Vasilchikova agreed and traveled to Russia through the countries that were neutral and delivered the message from the Germans. Nicholas's answer was described by many and in general words was the following,

"Isn't it foul to make such proposals to me?! And this intriguante, this madwoman has dared to pass them to me. This paper is all lie and treachery. Britain is going to betray Russia, honestly! Ridiculous!"[2]

The resentful Russian Monarch can't admit that Britain can betray him. He won't ever learn the truth and will die assured that his "allies" are as noble and honest with him as he is with them. On the personal order of the Russian Emperor Princess Vasilchikova was arrested and sent to Chernigov, where she was to be imprisoned in a nunnery.

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[1] Paleologue M. The Tsarist Russia in the World War. M.: International Relations. 1991. P. 235.

[2] Ib. P. 236.

Yet, the Germans wouldn't calm down. The disastrous end was still hovering ahead, despite all of their military success. Kaiser Wilhelm kept attempting to save himself and his country. The committee for criminal investigation in regard of the Tsar and the Tsarina, established by Kerensky, avidly delved into their archives trying to find evidence that the crown-bearing couple were traitors. Finally, they found a letter from Kaiser Wilhelm (*in German),* in which the German monarch proposed Nicholas to make a separate peace agreement. Kerensky's employees were overwhelmed with joy — until they found the reply. Nicholas had entrusted someone to inform Wilhelm (*in French*) that the Russian Tsar had no desire to answer his letters. Prosecutor Sokolov learnt this fact from Kerensky himself. And Kerensky didn't just tell him, he also said, "The Committee investigated the case (the matter of evidence of treason in the actions of the Tsar and the Tsarina) and reported to me that the essential of the crime wasn't discovered in actions of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna. This was what I instantly reported to the Provisional Government."[1]

No facts were discovered that Russia had initiated any negotiation, no evidence of mere consultations. Historians have at their disposal only proposals from Germany and negative responds of the leader of Russia. Yet, to be totally honest, in the second half of 1916 the situation looked different and could have caused some suspicions. After certain government reshuffling on January 20 (February 2), 1916, Boris Shturmer was appointed the chairman of the council of ministers of Russia. From March to July 1916, he was additionally provided with the powers of the minister of internal affairs, and from July to November, he was also the minister of foreign affairs. To empty the chair of the MFA head, Mr. Sazonov, who consistently pursued the policy of friendly relations with the Entente no matter what, was dismissed.

The British couldn't have let Russia off the war. Even if there was the slightest chance that the new Russian prime minister would negotiate peace with the Germans, it should have been nipped in the bud. The war was going to bring the February, the October, and to completely ruin the Russian Empire. And its opponents, the German and the Austro-Hungarian monarchies would be crushed to dust. Peaceful negotiations couldn't have been allowed. It was not by chance that *the first real* official document of the Entente was the declaration that Russia, France, and Britain wouldn't conclude a separate peace agreement with Germany. The declaration was signed in September 1914...

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[1] Sokolov N. The Imperial Family Assassination; http://www.hrono.ru/libris/lib_s/ubi07.html

Objectives and interests of the British are obvious. Now, let's find out if Mr. Shturmer, seated in the prime minister's chair with the certain support from Rasputin, was looking for this separate peace.

"The position of Boris Shturmer became tragic due to the slanderous campaign launched against him right after he had taken the post," General Kurlov writes. "Because of the ongoing war with Germany his German name made him a target for violent attacks that actually were aimed at the authority of the reigning dynasty. In their speeches Duma members referred to him as to an outstanding member of the Germanophils Party, supposedly headed by the Empress, and he was said to support the idea of making the separate peace agreement with Germany. Yet, no one can blame Boris Shturmer for his opinion *that the war with Germany was a great disaster for Russia and didn't have any significant political reasons.*"[1]

If you thoroughly study the story of how World War 1 started, if you attentively follow all the masterful diplomatic combinations of Great Britain that resulted in this terrible slaughter, you'll agree that the Russians and the Germans had no reason to fight.[2] However, careless historians often use *the opinion* of Prime Minister Shturmer as a proof of his *deeds*. There are no facts confirming that he negotiated with the Germans, and this is when the real facts are substituted with inconsiderate remarks.

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[1] Kurlov P. Ruining of the Imperial Russia. M.: Sovremennik, 1992. P. 154.

[2] All details about how the British organized this dreadful war are provided at the end of this book, "Who was Behind the Set Up of the First World War."

"The last Tsar's Minister of Interior Affairs Protopopov on the eve of joining the government had negotiated with the German diplomat in Stockholm and reported his Tsar about it," Lev Trotsky recalls in his memoirs.[1] And today researchers repeat the same thing without any reference to the author. Could Trotsky and his followers have found the proof that Shturmer, Rasputin or whoever else had negotiated with the German government?

Trotskist historians simply fabricate the sensation, as the fact itself was mundane and uninteresting. It didn't bring anything new to the global politics, but another expression of Germany's wish to make peace. Protopopov, who wasn't even yet a member of the government, stayed in neutral Sweden and was visited by the Counselor of the German Embassy Warburg. "They had a very general conversation, and Protopopov wrote down both the questions and the answers,... and the matter of separate peace hasn't been touched," General Kurlov writes in his memoirs about their meeting, and goes on, "Boris Shturmer couldn't consider the separate peace opportunity as he knew how chivalrous was his Emperor's attitude in that regard."[2]

Can it be that fellows of the Russian prime minister with his German name just protected him? Let's open the book "My Memoirs of War 1914–1918" by General Erich Ludendorff, "Establishing any relations with Shturmer was absolutely out of question, and he himself didn't take even tiny steps to establish them. No one believed that peace with Russia was possible."[3] Thus, neither the Tsar, nor the Tsarina, nor the most "suspicious" prime minister negotiated with the Germans and could have done it. And yet, their political opponents kept crying it out at every turn. Their only evidence was the following:

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-5.html

[2] Kurlov P. Ruining of the Imperial Russia. M.: Sovremennik, 1992. P. 154.

[3] Ludendorff E. My Memoirs of War 1914–1918. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 352.

- Prime Minister Shturmer with his German name;
- the dismissal of Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, a zealous supporter of the Entente.

No more proof and vague evidence. This is where the mysterious Rasputin was needed, to hold all these weak facts together with his demonic personality. Rasputin's murder has always been presented in the contemporary historiography as an act to prevent Russia exiting the war, to prevent separate peace treaty conclusion. And yet, there was no evidence that the Russian Government negotiated with the Germans in the backstage during the war. "No evidence at all has been found that Rasputin's associates were related to the German Headquarters after the (February — N.S.) revolt, too,"[1] and even Trotsky wrote about it, who had all the time he needed to look for such documentary evidence after the next revolt in October. This means the reason of the murder was different. And the version passed on by the historians is a false trail!

***Rasputin wasn't killed for some perspective negotiations with the Germans, but to finalize the preparation for the February revolt, when the Tsar was to abdicate under the pressure of "the community."***

Unless Nicholas II abdicated, the entire plan for February would burst like a bubble. Rasputin was the needle that could have pinned that bubble. If he had been alive in February — March 1917, he would never have let Nicholas II consider the idea of abdication, he would have supported him against the terrible pressure from the Duma delegation, the bad news and the treachery of his nearest circle. And this was enough to get him killed. On March 1917, when the Tsar made his fatal decision, embalmed Rasputin was already in his grave. And on March 10, he, already dead, was burnt at the Polytechnic Institute.

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-5.html

The British command was so scared that Russia and Germany could have hypothetically established some relationship that they decided to act with no further delay. They decided to strike the perspective peace agreement from both sides. They planned to let the information "slip" from the Duma tribune and thus discredit the possible negotiations in front of the community, and also to blur over the "pro-German" government of Shturmer. At the same time, they vilified Empress Alexandra Feodorovna. Rumors that "the German" Empress was betraying every Russian secret to the Germans should be spoken from the high Duma tribune. German by birth, Alexandra Feodorovna was to be presented as the chief traitor. In fact, being the Hesse-Darmstadt Princess, she was a cousin to the German Emperor. However they didn't announce or even mention that the Russian Tsarina was also a granddaughter to British Queen Victoria and a cousin to the ruling British King George. And thus, the breath of suspicion covered Nicholas II, too. On the other hand, they needed to strike a blow on the person, who had the key part in the rapidly developing situation, Rasputin. Kill the most dangerous opponent and discredit everybody else — this was the tactics of the "allies" here.

Pavel Milyukov, the KD leader, became the voice of the Duma. During his speech at the State Duma session on November 1 (14) 1916 he said a phrase that later became famous, "Is it stupidity or treason?" Milyukov's speech was brilliant.[1] Demasking "traitors and betrayers," meaning everybody who wanted to save the country through making a peace agreement with Germany, he succeeded, indeed, and as soon as on November 10 (23) Shturmer's government was retired.

And yet, the leader of KDs didn't provide any evidence in his speech. What he said was a classic example of manipulation with the human mind. He repeated his "Is it stupidity or treason?" so many times that night that after he finished barely any listener doubted that it was treason, indeed. He gave many quotes from the German newspapers, and it made him sound more convincing. Listening to him, the Duma members didn't consider the fact that *none of the European newspapers would have hesitated to publish something to overthrow the undesirable Russian government.* In fact, they had the global domination at stake...

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[1] I'd love to show you the complete speech of Milyukov, but it is too long. If it falls into your hands, please, read it. There hasn't been a more harmful addressing in the Russian State Duma ever…

Meanwhile, Minister of Internal Affairs Protopopov, the one that had had "negotiations" and had written down all the questions asked by the Germans reported to Nicholas II something much more real. Particularly, about how the British Ambassador Buchanan permanently communicated with political leaders of the "Progressive" Duma block. He is absolutely sure which way the wind of Milyukov's speeches blows. Protopopov suggested that they should set up a watch at the British Embassy, Nicholas II didn't approve it. He believed watching the ambassador of the allied country wasn't "according to the international tradition"[1]...

And we've come down to the main point. The crime was committed at night of December 17 (30), 1916. Rasputin was under a special excuse wiled into the palace of Felix Yusupov — like they wanted him to examine sick Irina, Yusupov's wife. Then, as the murderers explained it later, they intended to kill the monk with poisoned eats and drinks. Yet, for some reason the poison didn't work. In fact, the crime story told in Felix's memoirs looks like a gothic horror movie, where the killed villain comes back to life several times. Rasputin "came back to life" for the first time when he easily tasted poisoned cakes. Yusupov had to shoot, though he doesn't tell us where he aimed, "Where should I shoot, I thought, his temple or his heart? I felt like a lightning went through my body, and I shot."[2] Later he adds, "We've examined the wound — the bullet passed through his chest near his heart."

Thus, he shot Rasputin in the chest, and Purishkevich also says, "the bullet passed through Rasputin's chest."

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[1] Yusupov F. The End of Rasputin. M.: Otechestvo, 1990; http://bookz.ru/authors/knaz_-feliks-usupov/feliksusp01/page-4-feliksusp01.html

[2] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-5.html

And at that moment Rasputin came back to life for the second time. Why would they invent it all? Because their story is as far from the truth as the Hollywood blockbusters are. Why not come up with some blood-chilling story?

***Felix Yusupov***: "Suddenly I felt some odd alarm and ran down. Rasputin laid there right where we had left him I tried his pulse and didn't hear any beating. He truly was dead. *I don't know why,* but I grabbed the body with my both hands and gave it a shake."[1]

And according to Yusupov, this shaking caused Rasputin regain conscience and attack him. And then he tried to flee!

***Vladimir Purishkevich***: "...suddenly I heard a wild inhuman cry from downstairs that sounded like Yusupov to me, 'Purishkevich, shoot, shoot, he is alive, he is running away!'"[2]

Dead Rasputin, whose death has already been confirmed by Doctor Lazavert, is running away.

***Felix Yusupov:*** "Kneeling and belling, wheezing and growling like a wild creature Rasputin quickly climbed the stairs. Drawing himself together, he made a great leap and appeared at the secret door that led to the backyard. I knew the door was locked and stopped at the stair landing. Imagine how surprised and horrified I was when the door opened, and Rasputin disappeared in the darkness!"[3]

***Vladimir Purishkevich***: "There was no time for delay, and I didn't lose my head. I whipped out my Savage, released its lock to fire and ran down the stairs. Grigori Rasputin, whom I had just an hour ago seen on the stone floor of the dining room dead, was running fast, waddling over the loose snow along the iron fence that faced the street. I started in pursuit of him and shot. In the dead of the night the extremely loud sound of my pistol redoubled in the air, but I missed. Rasputin sped up, and I shot again — and missed. I cannot express how furious I was with myself. I was more than a good shooter, and I had enough practice in the shooting gallery at the Semenovsky training ground, and I always managed to hit small targets, but that night I couldn't drop a person only 20 steps away from me. Seconds were passing by. Rasputin was already at the gate, when I stopped and gave myself a violent bite on my left hand to concentrate, and then I shot for the third time and *hit him in the back*. He stopped, and I aimed more accurately and made a fourth shot from the same position that *seemed to have hit him on the head,* as he fell down on snow shaking his head. I ran up to him and with all my force kicked him on the temple. He was down with his hands stretched out, scratching the snow. It looked like he wanted to belly further, but was unable to, and only chattered and gritted his teeth."[1]

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[1] Yusupov F. The End of Rasputin. M.: Otechestvo, 1990; http://bookz.ru/authors/knaz_-feliks-usupov/feliksusp01/page-4-feliksusp01.html

[2] Purishkevich V. The Story of Rasputin's Death / The Legend of the Fornicary Monk Grishka Rasputin. M., 1990; http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/191_dok/smert_rasput.html

[3] Yusupov F. The End of Rasputin. M.: Otechestvo, 1990.

Then the plotters dropped Rasputin's body from the bridge into the ice-hole at Malaya Nevka. The legend has it that he was still alive and even managed to untangle his braced hands in the water. And that is said to be the third time that Rasputin came back to life…

Now let's concentrate. According to the memoirs of the killers, Rasputin should have had at least three bullet wounds:

1. Yusupov shot him in his heart, or rather, in his chest.
2. Purishkevich shot him in the back.
3. Purishkevich shot him on the head from a distance. The Duma member was behind Rasputin, so we can assume the latter was shot on the back of his head or the neck.

Thus, there should have been THREE bullet wounds from TWO different arms in Rasputin's body. For Rasputin's murder a criminal case was started. Investigators did everything that was necessary, including the autopsy. Its results were surprisingly and even miraculously different from the version the murderers provided in their memoirs. Let Doctor Kosorotov, who made the autopsy, speak,

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[1] Purishkevich V. The Story of Rasputin's Death / The Legend of the Fornicary Monk Grishka Rasputin. M., 1990; http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/191_dok/smert_rasput.html

"The right side of the head was all crushed and flattened as the body hit the ice when fell from the bridge. Death happened because of excessive bleeding caused by a bullet wound in the stomach. As I can conclude, the shot was made at a very short range, from the left to the right, through the stomach and the liver, the latter crushed on the right. The bleeding was highly excessive. The body also had a bullet wound in the back, at the spine, the right kidney crushed, and one more wound on the forehead, from the shot made at a short range, when the person in question was already dying or even dead. Thoracic organs were undamaged and thus studied skin deep, yet, there were no signs of death by drowning. Lungs weren't swollen and there was no water or foamy liquid in the respiratory tract. When Rasputin was thrown into the water, he was already dead."[1]

Indeed, the murderers of Grigori Rasputin had a very short memory. The autopsy confirmed almost nothing of their story, but completely contradicted the scenario of Rasputin's death in detail told by both Purishkevich and Yusupov! There were enough mismatches,

- The shot aimed by Felix Yusupov to Rasputin's heart that killed him for the first time turned out to be a shot in the stomach.
- The shot in the back made by Purishkevich was confirmed.
- What he claimed to be a shot on Rasputin's head from a distance, according to the autopsy turned out to be A POINT-BLANK SHOT ON THE FOREHEAD!
- Rasputin didn't die because of drowning. He died because of excessive bleeding and an insurance shot on the head. And when they threw him into the water, Rasputin was already dead.

This last point is important, as right after the monk died, they started to consider his canonization, but the Orthodox Church prohibits sanctification of the drowned. To prevent his sanctification, they made a rumor that Rasputin had come back to life under the ice in the water.

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[1] Platonov O. Prologue of the Regicide. M., 2001. P. 307–308.

Let's assume that Felix and Purishkevich were in such haste and agitation that they didn't check properly if Rasputin was dead. But how could they have failed to remember the shot on the forehead? Shooting from a long distance and from a very short distance are absolutely different things. They can't be mistaken.

Both Purishkevich and Yusupov are confusing things, but why? ***Because they took every effort to conceal how Rasputin was actually assassinated.*** If they had told everything straight, the personality of the true killer would have been discovered. The one, who made an insurance shot on the forehead and draw a line under the December tragedy. Roughly, without comic cries and Hollywood-like resurrections, with a steady hand he shot a bullet on Rasputin's forehead and knocked the first nail in the coffin of the Russian Empire. It was he who orchestrated this crime. This person bent all the instable crime committers to his will and put the idea of killing Rasputin in their heads. He was glad to give them all the glory of Herostratus and allowed them to write whatever they wished in their memoirs. Yet, with one restriction, they shouldn't have written the truth…

However, all secrets come out earlier or later, no matter how hard someone tries to conceal them. We learnt the truth about Rasputin's murder only 88 years later, late in September 2004. Everything clicked in its place. All the mysteries and misconceptions became clear. It became clear why Grand Prince Dmitry Pavlovich grieved later, in his emigration. Why Felix Yusupov and Purishkevich invented all these odd things. It became clear why it was necessary to burn and destroy Rasputin's body on the freezing night on March 10 (23), 1917, to destroy it completely, to prevent the corpse exhumation.

***It was because Grigori Rasputin was shot on his forehead by a British intelligence officer Oswald Rayner.***

Yusupov, Romanov, and Purishkevich, who became wax in the hands of the British intelligence, were covering up his name.

Rasputin's body with a bullet wound on the forehead that his murderers "forgot" about

On October 1, 2004, the British TV channel BBC 2 demonstrated a movie about Rasputin's murder in the Timewatch program. Richard Cullen, a retired Scotland Yard commander, and Andrew Cook, an intelligence historian, used the pictures of the body, the autopsy documents, papers and memoirs of that period to reconstruct the crime. And as soon as they did it, it was revealed that the existing version of Rasputin's murder had been initially falsified. Yusupov and Purishkevich, indeed, shot at Rasputin. But the third, the insurance shot on Rasputin's forehead, was made by the British agent.

Oswald Rayner isn't a new figure in this case, actually — Felix Yusupov frequently mentioned him in his memoirs. Prince Yusupov wrote that a day after the murder he had dined with Rayner, who "learnt about the plot and came to hear the news." And the memoirs of Yusupov published in 1927 were written in cooperation with Rayner. If you open the front page, you'll see that they were translated into English by... Rayner. Thus, the British intelligence actually was the coauthor of the "truthful" memoirs of Felix Yusupov. Should we wonder about the odd lack of coincidence and miraculous forgetfulness of the prince? Rayner and his commanders didn't need the truth. In fact, he was the intelligence lieutenant at the Secret Intelligence Bureau, as it used to be called. Today this agency is known as MI6. The legendary James Bond was its officer. And his colleagues also had to do some grim business early in the 20 century.

Oswald Rayner came to Russia in 1915, and in 1918 he left, feeling that his mission had been completed. After his success in Russia he worked in the Bureau of British Intelligence in Sweden and Japan, and in 1922 he appeared in Russia once again — in Moscow, as a member of the British Trade Mission. Under this cover he proceeded to work for the benefit of the British crown. In 1920-ies and 30-ies he worked in European countries, during World War 2 he served in Canada and then in Spain as a liaison officer for the British and the Spanish intelligence services. According to the authors of the movie, senior officers of the British intelligence also had their hands in the murder, Captains John Scale and Stephen Alley. They were the ones, who planned the murder, and Lieutenant Oswald Rayner simply fulfilled their plan with the help of his Russian friend Prince Yusupov. It turns out that gay and transvestite Felix Yusupov was very "close" with these three officers of the British intelligence. After so many years it is hard to be sure how much "close" he was with them. Yet, it is known that Rayner studied with Yusupov in the Oxford University, and they became friends there. Captain Alley was born in the Yusupov Palace in Moscow in 1876, as his father was a close friend of Felix's father. He was one of the British engineers, who constructed the first Russian railway between Petersburg and Moscow, and a part-time spy. As for Captain Scale, he was staying in Russia since 1912 and also was a friend of the Yusupovs', and a resident of the British special service. Later, in the emigration, the daughter of John Scale met Prince Felix. Thus, young Prince Yusupov was friends with three British intelligence officers at once. They only needed to plant the necessary idea into his pretty head...

Oswald Rayner, the British agent and the murderer of Rasputin

How did the gallant British learn the truth about the old operation of their own intelligence? By mere chance.

Andrew Cook was collecting materials about another knight of the British Queen, Sidney Reilly (and we are going to talk about him later), and interviewed the 91-year-old daughter of John Scale, residing in Scotland. She showed him many other documents verifying that her father hadn't just been aware of Rasputin's murder, but also had taken part in it. Among those papers there was a list of agents in Petrograd with Rayner's name in it. The British historian was interested and found the nephew of Oswald Rayner. The latter told him that on his deathbed his uncle told him that he had been in Yusupov's palace on the night of murder. He also had a ring made of a bullet that, according to him, was shot at Rasputin. And this was yet another proof that Rayner took his part in the plot. Scale's daughter and Rayner's nephew lived in different parts of Great Britain and didn't even know about each other. However, their stories matched in every detail. Then Richard Cullen and Andrew Cook knew they managed to unravel the longstanding secret of the British special service.

Early in 2004, they spent several weeks in Petersburg studying all the circumstances of Rasputin's murder in-situ. Being a forensics, Cullen focused on official medical documents about Rasputin's death and post-mortem photos of the body and the crime scene. He was assisted by a well-known St. Petersburg coroner Vladimir Zharov, who had conducted his own investigation of this crime 10 years earlier, but had no chance to announce it.

As they studied the photos of Rasputin's dead body and the ballistics report, they learnt that three bullet wounds of different size were made with three different bullets fired from *three different firearms*. The bullet wound in the forehead that is clearly visible on the post-mortem photos was made from a very short distance. And that was why they concluded there had been a third murderer, and it had been no other than Oswald Rayner, who had been in the palace and controlled the operation on elimination of Rasputin.

Thus, they understood how exactly the murder went on. Yusupov had tried to poison him and had seen that the poison was of no effect, and shot the monk. Rasputin fell down and lost conscience, but agitated Felix Yusupov considered him dead. The prince explained how Rasputin "came back to life" in his memoirs. Suddenly, he felt some odd alarm and went down to the basement, where killed Rasputin lied. "*I don't know why,* but I grabbed the body with my both hands and gave it a shake," Felix Yusupov wrote. His odd wish has a rather rational explanation. All the weirdness and mysteriousness of Rasputin's murder is simply covering up the facts that need to be withheld. Through the backdoor Yusupov let the British agent in for him to make a photo report about the dead monk. They put Rasputin up and rolled him up and down. The police found these photos later.[1] When the photo session was over, the British agent left through the same door, and Felix Yusupov was the only plotter who had seen him.

But after all this shaking Rasputin came back to his senses. He understood that he had to flee, it was his only chance. Yusupov returns, and the monk suddenly "comes back to life." He pushes aside the prince petrified with astonishment and shoots off. The door through which Oswald Rayner has left *isn't locked.* And through this door Rasputin ran outside. "I knew the door was locked and stopped at the stair landing. Imagine how surprised and horrified I was when the door opened, and when Rasputin disappeared in the darkness!" And Purishkevich described this moment, too, "…I heard steps down, at the very staircase, and then I heard that the door of the dining room, where Rasputin was, opened."[2]

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[1] Shishkin O. Rasputin. The History of Crime. M.: Eksmo Yauza, 2004. P. 297.

[2] Purishkevich V. The Story of Rasputin's Death / The Legend of the Fornicary Monk Grishka Rasputin. M., 1990; http://www.hrono.ru/dokum/191_dok/smert_rasput.html

Then Purishkevich hears Yusupov's cry and rushes after Rasputin running away. He shoots the monk in the back. Rasputin falls and tries to crawl away from his murderers. At that moment the British agent, who hasn't gone far away, swishes off to the monk on the ground and makes an insurance shot on his forehead. In the photos made by the investigators in 1916, a long bloody line is seen that crosses the yard and ends with a bloody spot where the car was parked. This was where Oswald Rayner killed Rasputin.

Then Rasputin's body was put into the car, taken away and thrown into the ice-hole. A wide bloody line remained in the yard. A police department was right opposite the Yusupov palace, and the *gorodovoy* (Translator's note: The policeman) that heard the shots hurried to ask the prince what had happened. To explain all the blood and shooting, Yusupov killed his own dog and told the policeman that it had attacked his guests, and he had to kill it. Hence the shooting. Later when he was asked if he felt any remorse after taking part in the murder, Felix replied, "No, I've just killed a dog," and smile mysteriously. People were astounded as they believed Felix called Rasputin, whom he loathed, a dog. But in fact, it was just some grim humor of Yusupov — he said the truth, he had only killed a poor creature, and Rasputin was killed by the British spy...

George Buchanan, the British ambassador, acted representatively. During the New Year Ball he approached the Russian Emperor, "As I've heard that Your Majesty suspects a young British man, a school friend of Felix Yusupov, in abetting the murder of Rasputin, I've seized the opportunity to assure you that these suspicions are absolutely groundless." [1]

Just think about it, the official British representative heard the rumors and attempted to reassure Nicholas that Rasputin hadn't been killed with a British bullet! Doing so, Buchanan simply gave himself away. He wasn't just a regular British man, he was a representative of the British monarch. No matter what rumors are spoken in the Russian capital — the ambassador has no right to react to them. However, Buchanan's announcement provides a lot of information to us:

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[1] Buchanan D. My Mission to Russia. M.: Tsentrpolygraph, 2006. P. 238.

- if the ambassador came to assure the Tsar that the British man had no fault in the murder, he definitely knew ***who*** the rumors were about;
- if the ambassador came to assure the Tsar that the said British man hadn't killed Rasputin, then he definitely knew ***who*** killed Grigori.

And the conclusion is rather straightforward here — if the British Ambassador was so well informed, the British must have been very interested in this case. In Rasputin's death and in concealing their trace in it…

Nicholas II listened carefully to the ambassador's speech. He wanted to punish the murderers severely. Alas, he didn't have enough time. The investigation wasn't finished — the Tsar abdicated, and the new power deeply rooted in the plot of the Entente's intelligence services hurried up to cover up all the traces. Instead of investigating the wanton murder of Rasputin, an absolutely different investigation was initiated. As soon as the Tsar abdicated, the notorious Committee of Inquiry of the Provisional Government started its proceedings. The dead Rasputin wasn't able to object any of the smearing rumors and once again appeared to be the best person for further discredit of the Imperial family. However, the rumors of many millions of rubles that the monk was supposed to earn while being close to the Imperial family, have never been verified, remaining a waste of air. And the rumors about harlotry of the Romanovs' favorite also haven't been confirmed — the Committee of the Provisional Government published a notice in the newspaper asking all the women he had seduced to report him. And no one came.

We don't really need to know if Rasputin was a devil in rags or a true angel. What we care about is that in some period of the Russian history he appeared in the way of the "allies," bringing Russia to its end. And was killed because of that. The British friends of Felix Yusupov attracted him with all the talk that Rasputin's death would prevent the separate peace and the revolution that would follow. It would crush the monarchy. It would crush everyone. Kill Rasputin — save the country. This was what the British said, this was what the plotters believed. This is true, this is what is going to happen, just like the British agent Oswald Rayner told the instable Yusupov. *He didn't tell him the main thing, though — killing Rasputin wouldn't prevent the revolution, it would put a start to it.*

The time has come to overthrow the monarch and to move further to the planned ruining of the Russian Empire. Alexander Kerensky has been sitting too long idle on his hard seat in the Duma. Vladimir Lenin is wandering down narrow streets in Zurich. All of them wanted to act and burst to go into action. And Nicholas Romanov should have opened way for them and abdicate. And to make the Tsar abdicate they needed to kill Grigori Rasputin.

Were Yusupov or other plotters British agents? I don't think so, but the lives of Rasputin's murderers were so many times crossed by the British line. We've already mentioned the numerous friends and lovers of Felix Yusupov. But there is also the British trace in the life of Grand Prince Dmitry Pavlovich. He allowed to open a *British-Russian* hospital with 200 beds in his palace, in the very center of Petersburg, at the corner of Fontanka and Nevsky (today it is the palace of Belosselsky Belozersky). Dozens of thousands of Russian soldiers were dying in the war, and now they were offered to heal their wounds *on 200 beds* paid by the British. This was the contribution of the "allies" to the common victory. The opening ceremony was attended by dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna, as well as the wife of Nicholas II and his daughters.

This hospital became the primary meeting place for Felix Yusupov and Dmitry Pavlovich. It was so convenient and couldn't seem suspicious. The grand prince lived in the first floor, and there was the British hospital upstairs. Any British could come and visit his fellow doctors not arousing any suspicions. And their fellows weren't some ordinary citizens — the Head of the hospital Sybil Gray was the sister to the chief of the British MFA, and the daughter of the British Ambassador Buchanan also worked there.

When we come to assessing the future destinies of Grigori's murderers, we'll see an interesting trend —

***Great Britain along with the Provisional Government, and later even Bolsheviks (!) really favored the ones related to Rasputin's death.***

And contrariwise, whoever tried to prevent the Russian disaster, came to a sticky end. Let's just follow the destinies of main personalities associated with Rasputin's affairs, and this odd fact will become absolutely obvious. Let's start with the might-have-been murderer of Rasputin Khioniya Guseva, who stabbed the monk with a knife, thus preventing him from preventing World War 1. After the assassination attempt she, naturally, was arrested. But Nicholas II wasn't able to control his country anymore. Power was slipping from his hands, and it is so obvious, if we consider Guseva's case. There is no wonder that the Tsar forgot about her existence right after World War 1 started and didn't follow the investigation. But surprisingly, the mad peasant wasn't abandoned by those interested in destruction of Russia. The ones that put a knife in Guseva's hand and a gun in the hand of Gavrilo Princip.

*On July 3 (16), 1915, Khioniya Guseva was announced insane and indemnified against criminal liability.* Already at that time calling someone "nuts" was the best way to let him legally avoid punishment. Guseva only had to wait, to outstay the troubled period, some two years until the despised monarchy fell. Naturally, she couldn't have been set free while Nicholas II remained at power. But she wasn't too bad in the nut hospital. She lived in good conditions and received parcels with food and fruit. She freely corresponded with all her fans, who considered her a hero.. Instantly after Nicholas Romanov's abdication, early in March 1917, she was relieved from the hospital *on the personal order of Kerensky.* And she wasn't just let out — Guseva was amnestied, and having provided "special merits to her fatherland," she was declared not guilty. Additionally let us see the miraculous healing. Two years before Khioniya Guseva was announced insane, but as this "prisoner of conscience" was medically examined before dismissal, they announced *she was absolutely sane.* Let us not be surprised — the odd healing of Guseva isn't the greatest miracle the British intelligence accomplished in times of the Russian Revolution...

The investigation of Rasputin's murder went on for about 3 months and was hastily stopped on March 4 (17), 1917, on the order of Minister of Justice of the Provisional Government Kerensky. Let's see what was going on.

There is an odd scenery there — the Provisional Government has absolutely nothing to do. There are no problems or challenges. Not to mention chaos and mess that were the partners of the Provisional Government during all the period of its feverish activities. World War 1 must have finished. Why shall we say so? Let's consider the decrees that the government issued in its first days. Let's remember the chronicles of events:

- On March 2, 1917, Nicholas II abdicated;
- On March 3 his brother Michael Romanov abdicated, too.

*Thus, March 4 was the first full-term working day of the Provisional Government.* The dust has settled, the declarations have been printed, the meetings have faded away. The time has come to deal with the state affairs — in particular, for the new Minister of Justice Alexander Kerensky. Theoretically, he should have had a whole lot of things to do — in a couple of days the February killed 1,433 persons, crushed shops and government agencies, police departments and prisons. Hundreds of crimes were committed — robberies, murders, rapes. Many criminals ran free during troubled days of the February Revolution.

***And what does Kerensky do in his first full-term working day as the minister of justice?***

He issues two orders —

1. *To stop the criminal investigation of Rasputin's murder.*
2. *To find the grave and to get the monk's body out of it.*

Beyond all doubt, these were the most important tasks the new government had to deal with. The new democratic Russia can't be built unless Rasputin's case is ceased. Until his body isn't extracted from his grave, the serious political in-crisis can't be overcome. This is why I feel there were no problems in the country, and the Provisional Government had nothing to do, as it dealt with such minor things. But maybe, these things weren't that minor if Alexander Kerensky contributed his precious time to them?

We might think his actions were odd. Yet, if we apprehend that the investigation of Rasputin's murder could have caused falling on the "allied" track and the British spies, Kerensky did logical and correct — the investigation should have been ceased. They needed to find Rasputin's body because his corpse was the most important piece of evidence. It shouldn't have been just found, it should have been destroyed, as on Rasputin's forehead there was a bullet wound. There is no miracle that could explain it, and thus, the "allied" curators of Kerensky gave him advice that the tracks should have been covered up.

This is logical and correct. Ask yourself — ***why else would anyone dig Rasputin's body from the grave?*** This was what happened — Grigori's body was extracted from the grave and then burnt.

In the books you can find several versions, and every is touchingly naive and absolutely inconsistent. They can be conventionally divided into two groups, depending on who looked for Rasputin's body. Theory number one says that some journalists or military men on their own motion figured out where Rasputin was buried, as the Empress visited his grave. But what do you do with a grave once you know its location? We might be embarrassed with the answer. The activists of the new democratic government had one answer — to dig it out. To get the coffin with the corpse. Ask why they needed it. And the experts on Rasputin provide several answers here. The first version was announced by the authorized representative of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma, Philipp Kupchinsky, who commanded the burning of monk Grigori's body.[1] "We need to prevent the next generation worship the ashes of Rasputin," he told the students of the Polytechnic Institute that helped him.

And that was absolute nonsense. On the day of the burial the zinc coffin with the killed monk's body was on the Empress's order taken to a place unknown. The public was told that Rasputin was going to be buried in his home village, but in fact, they buried him in Tsarskoye Selo. The Empress wished to daily visit the grave of her dear monk Grigori. Then the reasonable question arises — how can the "counterrevolutionary forces" worship the remains of Grigori Rasputin, if the burial place is a secret of the Imperial family, and no one knows exactly where he is buried? And on the contrary, after Rasputin's grave was found, there were rumors, and the chapel quickly turned into a site of pilgrimage. What we have here? Let's find the coffin, we can't do it in secret, and people will go worship Rasputin. So... let's go looking for the grave! Some poor babbling, really.

Theory number two is yet more peculiar. It turns out the grave was being looked for on the order of the government. Kerensky was supposed to believe that there was treasure in Rasputin's grave, and that was why the grave was dug out.[2] Naturally, the treasure seekers didn't find anything in the coffin but a small icon... And once again we see some absolutely unconvincing explanation to Kerensky's actions. I'd even put it stronger — it was hard to think of something more ridiculous.

*Has there been a precedent in the Russian history that a person's grave was dug out on the order of the government not for*

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[1] It was Kupchinsky that had a warrant signed by Kerensky, who brought Rasputin's body to the Polytechnic Institute and then tried to burn it in the forest with a group of students. He needed to destroy the body, not to bury it in secret, as many authors put it. What a "burial" can take place in a forest, in the frozen ground, without any special preparation? And why did Kupchinsky take the students with him, was it to dig the grave? To have more witnesses for the secret burial?..

[2] The End of Rasputin // Komsomolskaya Pravda. 2002. December 26.

*court activities, not for exhumation or recognition, but in search for hidden treasure?*

Following this logic, we should dig out every burial place without distinction — what if there are hidden treasures there! Let's start with Lenin's Mausoleum, what if the notorious "Gold of the Communist Party" is concealed there. And having opened the grave and discovered nothing, don't rebury the harassed remains, but take it to the forest and burn there. I mean, the fans of Kerensky that present us with these blether-like versions don't care to explain why Rasputin wasn't reburied after no gold was found in his grave.

Some of the researchers explain that the Provisional Government acted in reply to the letter from Empress Alexandra Feodorovna asking to prevent the desecration of Rasputin's body that was dear to her. Kerensky, a gentle soul, orders to find Rasputin's grave. This myth can be easily dispelled, too. The former Russian Tsarina, indeed, applied to Kerensky, but with a different request. Dreading the possible desecration, she asked to prevent it, which is either to guard the grave or to rebury the body somewhere else in secret. Let the peasant that so many times saved her only son rest there in piece. And that was why she told Kerensky where the body was entombed. Naturally, Alexandra Feodorovna would never have asked to burn the remains of her dear friend. And if any normal country leader was in Kerensky's place, he would have satisfied her request. But Kerensky *personally* ordered to abuse the monk's remains. Why?

It was because the body was the main evidence that could be used against the "allied" intelligence, and thus it had to be immediately destroyed. And as Alexander Kerensky had so much interest in Rasputin's case, we can be sure who shot monk Grigori in the forehead. Or, rather, who didn't.[1] We can easily delist Grand

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[1] Edward Radzinsky in his book about Rasputin calls Grand Prince Dmitry Pavlovich the murderer. And confused stories of Purishkevich and Yusupov he explains with their wish to cover the Grand Prince up. The reputable play writer doesn't consider the actions of Kerensky that definitely

Prince Dmitry Pavlovich. He didn't finish Rasputin off and even didn't shoot at him. Why would democrat Kerensky cover up tracks in a murder committed by a dynasty member?

Rasputin's grave was found in Tsarskoye Selo. Having extracted the coffin from the grave, they nailed it up into a wooden case from a grand piano and hid it in the Imperial stable on Konushennaya Square. Then "the authorized representative of the Provisional Committee of the State Duma Philipp Kupchinsky" came in...

And he wasn't just some ordinary person, either. The name of Kupchinsky was first mentioned in the Russian history during the Siege of Port Arthur by the Japanese. During the Russo-Japanese War the future commissary of the Provisional Government was a military reporter of the Rus Newspaper. General Lieutenant Stessel that commanded the Russian troops left peculiar memoirs of how this valiant reporter had taken every effort to yield himself a prisoner. "Kupchinsky instantly started to tell the Japanese whatever he knew about Port Arthur, although they didn't really ask him about it. And being a prisoner in Japan, Kupchinsky communicated with the imprisoned officers, who weren't yet familiar with him, and thus shared their escape plan with him. The plotters were led by Lieutenant Svyatopolk Mirsky. And Kupchinsky disclosed their plan to the Japanese. All the officers were arrested, and some of them like Svyatopolk Mirsky were even tortured. Kupchinsky was released, as the Japanese were so grateful to him, but before that our officers beat him senseless for his espionage."[1]

Some miraculous coincidences are discovered again. Mr. Kupchinsky acts like a traitor, if we put it mildly. If we face the reality, though, we'll see that he acts very much like a spy.

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prove that this version is inconsistent. Either he isn't aware of them, or the truth is not as nice and spectacular and thus doesn't suit Radzinsky's books.

[1] The Russo-Japanese War: View of the Defeated. M.: AST, 2005. P. 745–746.

This is what the Russian counterintelligence thought as well, and in 1909 they arrested the reporter for the divulgence of state secrets. Yet, having spent a couple of months in prison, he got free. And this questionable person was entrusted with the responsible mission of destroying Rasputin's body. Was the personnel policy not good enough? Oh no, it was perfect — in the HR department of the British intelligence. And that was why Alexander Kerensky entrusted the delicate business to a person, who just like himself was a protégé and a puppet. A spy and a traitor.

Kupchinsky honorably completed the mission — Rasputin's ashes were scattered in the air. Afterwards the trail of our hero was lost in the storms of the Civil War. I've only managed to find his name in agitation posters of the Armed Forces of the Russian South, i.e., the White Army commanded by Denikin. The agitation and propaganda department of the White Army was called OSVAG (Translator's note: This abbreviation is made of two Russian words, the Information Agency). Philipp Kupchinsky, a poet and a publicist, seemed to do honest work for his masters, "selflessly serving" the Whites, and preventing them from winning the Civil war. He fought the Reds until the last White! As we are well aware, such Kupchinskis achieved the goal, and the White lost. There is nothing surprising about it provided General Denikin had propagandists like that.

...After Rasputin's death the events started to rush like mad. *Less than a year* after an insurance shot by the "allies" into the monk's forehead, and Lenin and Trotsky came to session in the Smolny.

Governments kept changing in Russia during revolution, but for the killers of Rasputin, for those, who fairly helped to pull the trigger of the Russian Revolution things went equally well. Just as the other way round, whoever tried to stop them and to save the country were either dead or in much trouble.

***Boris Shturmer,*** the dismissed prime minister, didn't stay free for long. The Provisional Government, managed and directed by the British and the French intelligence, didn't forgive him his German name and his highly hypothetical negotiations of separate peace with Germany. Those who used to criticize Shturmer from the Duma bench finally were able to imprison him in the Peter and Paul Fortress, where the Emergency Investigation Committee of the Provisional Government interrogated him. He didn't leave the fortress alive and never appeared on the court stand, but became one of the first victims of the new "democratic" Russian power. After Shturmer's death, his widow demanded that the Provisional Government should investigate his case and either clear him of all charges or pass a sentence. The answer she got wasn't unexpected, "*The case of Boris Shturmer was ceased as there was no evidence against him.*" In other words, they found no proof that he was a traitor. Meanwhile, historians are still writing about the separate peace negotiations led by Shturmer and Rasputin. It is still favorable to falsify the history and conceal the truth...

***Alexander Protopopov***, the last imperial minister of internal affairs, whom Rasputin nicknamed "Kalinin," also fell victim to his Stockholm "negotiations" with the Germans, and close communication with the holy elder. Together with Kerensky and Lenin he represented the Simbirsk community in the Russian political scene, but his fellow countrymen didn't help him: at first, the Provisional Government imprisoned him in the Peter and Paul Fortress, and then the "Februarists" started to vilify the Imperial minister and to spread the most vile rumors about him. Have you ever heard that Lenin was feeble-minded as his brain was destroyed with syphilis? His fellow landsman Protopopov had the bad luck to be the first victim of such rumors.

The Golos Sibiri Newspaper, September 29 (October 12), 1917:

"As the press has already announced, the Emergency Investigation Committee learnt that ex-Minister Alexander Protopopov before his appointment and while holding the post had a mental disorder, and thus it was decided to subject him to a medical examination. The doctors that examined Mr. Protopopov discovered that he suffered from paralytic dementia caused by syphilis." [1]

The idea was really simple — only a person suffering from a venereal disease with his brain destroyed could have tried to conclude separate peace with Germany and serve Rasputin and the Tsar. After the October, Protopopov was hastily shot during the Red Terror as an unnecessary witness.

They say everything is comparative. Please compare it with the destiny of ***Nikolay Maklakov,*** a fervent monarchist, a former minister of internal affairs (1912 to 1915), and ***Vladimir Purishkevich,*** a monarchist as fervent and a Black Hundreder.

In the same December 1916, when Rasputin was killed, Maklakov sent a letter to Nicholas II calling him to take strong measures against internal Russian enemies that were violating all bounds. He was a strong-willed person and early in 1917 the Rights even considered him as a possible dictator in case of revolution, During the February, Maklakov was arrested and heavily wounded on the head delivered to the Peter and Paul Fortress. He spent the time of democratic changes in torture chambers of the new Russia and met the October there, too. Bolsheviks were more human than "Provisionalists"— in December 1917, Maklakov was transferred to hospital for health reasons.

After the murder of Rasputin Purishkevich took the advantage of the break in the Duma sessions and left for the active army on a medical train. Then the February thundered, followed by the October. The fervent monarchist, the anti-Semite and one of the founders of the Black Hundred went into hiding under the name of Evreinov (Translator's note: This name is associated with the Russian word "Evrei," which is "Jew") (!), but was arrested. And here their destinies followed different scenarios:

- Monarchist Maklakov, who offered to take strong measures, tried to save the country and the monarchy, and interfered into the plans of the British, eventually was taken to Moscow under guard. On the first day of the Red Terror he was executed.

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[1] Krasnoyarsky Rabochi, December 19, 2003; http://www.krasrab.com/archive/ 2003/ 12/19/32/view_article

◆ Monarchist Purishkevich participated in murdering Rasputin and helped the British, and he was set free.

Vladimir Purishkevich was interrogated by Dzerzhinsky personally, and the Soviet government passed a ridiculous charge on him — some four years of compulsory labor. And yet, he had participated in a real anti-Bolshevik plot right after the October revolt. I'd love to draw a line here, but I can't, which is a pity. Miracles kept happening in destinies of people, who willfully or unknowingly helped the British intelligence ruin the Russian Empire. Purishkevich hadn't even stayed imprisoned for his term, he was set free four months later *"Due to his son's illness"*![1]

Who says Bolsheviks went wanton? Here is a sample of their true humanity. How could they have executed a fervent monarchist if his son was ill? Shame on you! Under such circumstances a person can't be held captive, and Purishkevich was set free not in 4 years, but in 4 months. Later, he died from typhus in Novorossiysk.

***Grand Prince Dmitry Pavlovich*** got away with nothing more than fright. At first, the Empress ordered to arrest him in his quarters. In December 1917, the grand prince was sent to exile to the squadron of General Baratov that acted in Persia together with the British Corps. Once again the destiny of young Romanov crossed the British line. *After the October Grand Prince Romanov (unprecedented for a dynasty member) officially joined the British Army!* Then he stayed in London and in Paris, and in 1926 Dmitry Pavlovich married an American heiress Audrey Emery. After that he and his sister Maria Pavlovna moved to the USA, where the grand prince traded wine, and the grand princess was a consultant in the fashion house of Bergdorf and Goodman.

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[1] St. Petersburg Encyclopedia; http://www.encspb.ru/ru/article.php?kod=2804023840

***Felix Yusupov*** was exiled to his family estate until the investigation was over. After the February he became a hero. Things went much worse during the October, and having taken from his house some drawings by Rembrandt and family jewels, he hastily left for his manor. Till 1919, Felix stayed in the Crimea with his family, and in April 1919, together with the remaining members of the dynasty he went abroad *on a British combat ship.*

Thus, all the murderers of Rasputin weren't harmed by the new Bolsheviks government. *For mere chance,* naturally...

Yet, we've been carried away. This is not a book about the murder of Rasputin — it is about the February and the October, the two steps that let the Russian Empire ascend its Calvary.

However, for this to happen, a Judah was needed, just like in the Bible times.

And he appeared. Judah of the early 20 century was Alexander Kerensky, just like Judah of the late 20 century was Mikhail Gorbachev...

# CHAPTER 7

# Alexander Kerensky's Giveaway Game with Vladimir Lenin

> Connivance towards Bolsheviks is the darkest page in the history of the Provisional Government.
>
> *Denikin A.*
> *Sketches of the Russian Time of Troubles*

> You can't claim to treat the cases of the plot and the revolution with a demand like — give us the protocols, give us membership cards...
>
> *Vyshinsky A.*

As you dive into the period between the February and the October Revolutions, you live through several stages. At first, you get dizzy with the plenty of information. Then you start wondering how your personal view of those events is far from reality. Then you get slightly terrified when you realize that whatever you've heard, read or been told about our revolutions is nowhere near true, but on the contrary, blurs over the actual events of those days. After you've experienced this gamma of feelings, you start to quietly "admire" the beauty and grandiosity of the plan for ruining Russia. It is so magnificent and grand, indeed. Comparing the multiple coincidences and oddities over and over again, you can no longer doubt that it really existed. Soon they are so many that the last of distrust disappears. Details match one another perfectly — in time, in their essence, and in consequences, eventually you feel like unbonneting in front of the invisible stage director, who managed to make the multilingual chorus of politicians, generals, and revolutionaries sing in unison.

Yet, the main part in this chorus belonged to the Provisional Government. This new government made some mistakes. Or, to be more specific, not just *some* mistakes, but a whole load of mistakes. And not the mistakes, actually, but some odd actions that were as good as insane and criminal. If we've assumed before that the Provisional Government was all patriots and saints, now let's look at the bunch of them with a cool head, and see who they really were. We can call them a bunch of traitors, the puppets of the "allies" and thorough hypocrites that were perfectly aware of what they were doing, and who were deliberately pushing the country to the edge of the abyss.

No matter how many variants were there, misters "Provisionalists" always chose the worst for Russia. The simple explanation like "They were fools" just doesn't work. Naturally, the fool's logic can't be comprehended, as it is unpredictable — a negative action can be easily followed by something positive. And if the Provisional Government had been made only of short-witted people, then after taking a decision harmful for the country they would have done something to reinforce it. These guys could have just sat shooting in the dark, making a good guess after a bad one. They are fools, what can be demanded from them. But it was very different with the Provisional Government — its every action was aimed to destroy the country. Only at the first sight they acted chaotically and odd. We just need to understand the logic of the conducts of the Provisional Government, to comprehend their goal, and you will be surprised to see that the puppets of the "allies" were consistent and accurate in their action.

***The objective of the Provisional Government was to pass the power to Lenin and Trotsky, who were to finish off the Russian Empire that had cracked.*** The February should have smoothly given way to the October. That was why no one opposed Vladimir Ilyich seriously, no one interfered into his business. On the contrary, Kerensky actively played along with him.

There is a type of checkers called "Giveaway." Whatever the player does in it seems absurd. You should take every effort to expose your checkers to the opponent, and make the latter put them away. The sooner the opponent puts away all your checkers, the better. When you have no checkers left, you win. Players even try to make their checkers "kings" to get rid of them faster. This was the game of giveaway checkers played in the Russian political arena ...

So, the goal of the Provisional Government is clear. And the means for reaching it is power alone. The thing is that it shouldn't be used like that. The "typical" government reinforces the army, the economy, the regime, and whoever plays the giveaway game weakens it all. Just consider every step of Kerensky — not all the nice talk, but *his real actions*, and you will have to assume that he is either a complete idiot or a great giveaway player.

We've already mentioned the absurd decrees of the Provisional Government, so let's not repeat. Vladimir Lenin came to make revolution and to cardinally change the life in his country. Normally such convulsions are welcomed by only a minor part of the society. But if the ruling government looks like it is insane, then extremist Lenin can seem a rather reasonable politician if compared to them. Since Lenin and then Trotsky came to Russia, the government was taking every effort to destroy the Russian state and to delegate the power to the extremists. Of course, they couldn't have done it overtly. And the great game of checkers helped them out here...

Now let's move again to April 1917. As we know, Lenin safely arrived in Russia. No one prevented him from it, and he even easily obtained the necessary documents. Even when he arrived at the Finlandsky Station in Petersburg, he still wasn't sure of his safety. They said that he even whispered in his wife's ear, "Nadenka, it seems they are going to arrest me here." However, the red-carpet welcome dispelled all of his doubts. The British had said the truth. The government wasn't going to stand in his way, and on the contrary, was going to support in every possible way.

Just think of it — in the center of the Russian capital during a terrible World War a group of armed people welcomed the man that had passed through the enemy's lands. Right in the railway station Lenin made a speech and called people to overthrow the existing government. And he wasn't arrested, and his party wasn't prohibited. ***Could Bolsheviks have bought the counter-intelligence, the police, the army, and even the Provisional Government with the German money?***

Such odd behavior of the government can't be explained even with complacency. Imagine how long Osama bin Laden would have stayed at the White House in Washington calling for the Holy War with the USA, and for overthrowing the American government? A minute or two? Or thirty seconds? It would have been the matter of how soon they would get him, but his arrest would be a solved matter. And it wouldn't matter how many millions or billions of dollars he had in his secret accounts. What's the matter if Ilyich came home in a "sealed" train with loads of "German" money? He needed a way to spend them, to publish subversive newspapers, to legally deliver them to military units, to hold anti-governmental meetings in the open. Unless the government supported him, Lenin wouldn't have managed any of it. For some reason, no one rushed to arrest Lenin — he calmly proceeded with his propaganda and accomplished his task...

Thus, while considering Kerensky's actions, we need to know that his goal was to assist Lenin eventually handing over the power to him. This is important, *but while assessing Lenin's actions, it is even more critical to remember that he was aware Kerensky was going to play Giveaway with him!* That was why Lenin's ideas seemed so bold, why his insights were so "ingenious." He was always two steps ahead of his comrades, because he knew more than they did. This "knowledge" plus money from the "allies" made him close with Trotsky.

What a pity it was that Lev Trotsky stayed in the British camp! Yet, Lenin without any pause swung into action. His writings were always quick and witty, and he enjoyed it more than ever: there was no censorship, and the "German" financial support let him do it grand style. When Kerensky was advised that Lenin, zealously calling to make a socialistic revolution, should have been cooled off, the former replied directly and honestly, "I want Lenin to speak out in Russia as freely as in Switzerland." Wasn't such position odd for the head of the government? Mind, it was the government that Lenin was going to overthrow. And yet, it was rather consistent for a puppet, whom the "allied" wire-pullers ordered not to prevent the Bolshevik propaganda.

*If you delay gangrene treatment for a couple of weeks, you'll lose your limb. If you delay further, you'll die.* These are the ABC of medicine. In Russia, "gangrene" was more active than doctors at that time. The Provisional Government didn't interfere in the process of destruction, though in case of "gangrene" it is necessary to take action as soon as the decease starts.

Lenin shared his new ideas for the first time in his "April Theses" that was published on April 7 (20) in the Pravda Newspaper. Further, the Soviet mythology represented Lenin's idea of the further development of the revolution as reasonable and coming out from Marxism. In 1917, "The April Theses" astounded the audience and were taken in a very different way. "Lenin's theses were published on his personal behalf," Trotsky wrote later in his "History of the Russian Revolution." The central agencies of the party were critical about them, their hostility only softened with their bewilderment. *No one, not an agency or group, or a person wanted to sign it.*"[1]

Having arrived in Petrograd, Lenin was alone in developing ideas. He knew that he had to extend the revolution and move towards the proletarian dictatorship, but other revolutionaries were puzzled with his ideas. Lenin offered them curves that were too sharp. The country hadn't yet recovered after one revolution, but Lenin was already pushing the other one. All the revolutionary democratic public had just stopped wondering about the unexpected overthrow of the tsarism. Remember, only a month had gone by. Practically everyone believed that establishing the Provisional Government was a major achievement, but Lenin called to stop cooperation and to overthrow it. It was really hard to comprehend. Instead of putting the new life right, preparing the elections, parliamentarians discussions, and fulfillment of all programs of the Social Democrats, the Bolshevik leader called to struggle further. Instead of uniting all the democratic forces, Vladimir Lenin offered counterblast dissociation and further split.

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-F.html

In the meeting of the Petrograd Committee of Bolsheviks Lenin was almost in full isolation with his point. "The deputies exchanged glances. They said that Ilyich had stayed abroad for too long and hadn't yet felt the situation out,"[1] Trotsky said. "The April Theses" were actively discussed and then rejected: 13 cons, 2 pros, and 1 abstained.[2]

The next day Ilyich spoke in the Tauride Palace before all the Social Democrats, all the members of the Petrograd Soviet. The audience made of the revolutionaries of all kinds reacted even tougher. Lev Trotsky is slightly ironical when describing Ilyich's speech,

"In an hour Lenin had to repeat his speech in a previously scheduled meeting of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the majority of visitors thought his ideas were either derision or rubbish. Those more forgiving shrugged their shoulders. This man must have come out of the Arc — barely having taken down the stairs of the Finlandsky Station after a decade of having been abroad, he preached that proletariat should seize power."[3]

The prospect of direct transition to the proletariat dictatorship was unexpected and objected the tradition, and, at last, simply blew everybody's mind. "His program was met with sneering rather than resentment, as everybody thought it was extravagant and fanciful," SR Zenzinov recalled later.[1]

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-F.html

[2] Kara-Murza S. The Soviet Civilization. V. 1; http://www.kara-murza.ru/books/sc_a/sc_a26.htm

[3] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-F.html

Yet, leave alone Mensheviks and SRs, the curious fact is that the comrades of the leader, Bolsheviks, assessed his revelations as hard! Bolshevik Bogdanov interrupted Lenin's speech with a shout, "It's nonsense, madman's ravings! Aren't you ashamed to applaud this ribble-rabble! Marxists you are!"[2] He was supported by Bolshevik Goldenberg and one of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, Steklov (Nakhamkes). The opposition was so strong that Lenin had to leave the room. It didn't actually matter, though. Lenin had German money to move towards his goal as a ram, sweeping away every slow-witted and opinionated comrades — he would simply find new comrades, who would simply take his word and not think of trivial matters.

He kept following his own way no matter what — because Lenin knew what was going to happen, whereas Bolsheviks Bogdanov and Goldenberg didn't. Ilyich knew that the Government would play along, he knew all the behind-the-stage agreements. Lenin knew that the destiny was giving him a chance, the one and only. Ruining the country and withdrawal from the war were minor payments for the carte blanche facilitating him in fulfilling his lifelong ambition, the socialistic revolution. Moreover, he knew that the "allies" were aware of his agreements with the Germans and weren't going to stop him, either. He could steadily follow his course. Further events were the best proof that he was right. Nobody, in fact, interfered into his business. Against common sense, against their own promises published in the Parisian newspapers. Plekhanov and Chkheidze opposed Lenin and argued with him, unlike the Provisional Government which simply did nothing.

We can understand Lenin's problems. He had to assure his comrades, who were in doubt, but he couldn't reveal his cards, his knowledge of the terrible betrayal of the "allies." Firstly, no one would believe him, secondly, revealing such secrets is normally followed by death penalty. He didn't know what would have taken more effort — making the revolution itself or persuading his less informed comrades. The latter got in his way much more than Kerensky and his government. Those stubborn Social Democrats, always in doubt. Why didn't they see it was the wrong time to discuss things, it was time to take action, and to do it urgently!

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-F.html

[2] Political Parties of Russia: Past and Present. The Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 2005. P. 144.

In his "April Theses" Lenin noted that it was necessary to reinforce the fraternization propaganda. Do you know what it is? It is when soldiers of the opposing parties leave the trenches and instead of shooting their opponents offer them some *baccy*. What was wrong about it? They say, everything is relative. Imagine Soviet soldiers near Moscow fraternizing the Germans in the midground in Autumn 1941. What would they be called? Traitors, naturally. They would all have been shot from a machine gun. Their families would have been exiled to Siberia. Whoever called in the press to fraternize the enemy won't be spared. All the staff of the publishing house, including typists and cleaners, would be executed. That was why the Soviet soldiers didn't fraternize the enemy — because Mr. Stalin didn't actually care for "the freedom of speech" or "political rules" for his militants, but considered the ways of stopping the Germans approaching Moscow.

Yet, that would be in 1941, and in 1917, Bolsheviks had different objectives, and our soldiers were leaving their units and fleeing to their home villages, whereas the German soldiers remained in their positions. Great democrats of the Provisional Government that were playing the giveaway game didn't do anything to prevent fraternization. Despite the fact that Bolsheviks wrote about it openly. In April 1917, Lenin announced his resolution on the war during the Petrograd City Conference of Bolsheviks, in which he asserted that fraternization was one of the best means to draw closer the end of the war.[1] Let us add that this end of the war should have happened not of the own wills of the war opponents, but due to complete decay of the Russian Army, and its inability to further fight both outside and inside the country. There still was discipline in the German trenches, and the fraternization mainly wreaked havoc on the Russian Army, but, in fact, that was the initial intent…

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[1] Political Parties of Russia: Past and Present. The Publishing House of St. Petersburg State University, 2005. P. 138.

On April 28 (May 11), the Pravda Newspaper published Lenin's article "The Meaning of Fraternization." It emphasized that the fraternization "started to ruin the damned discipline… of soldiers obeying their officers and generals, their capitalists (as officers and generals mainly belonged to the capitalistic class or protected its interests)." Thus, it became obvious that the fraternization was "one of the steps on the path towards the socialistic proletarian revolution."[1]

It was rather frank — the "damned discipline" needed to be broken, then it would become possible to ruin the "damned" country, the government of which couldn't even prohibit delivering the evildoing newspapers calling its soldiers in trenches to fraternize with the enemy. It would be so undemocratic. Reports from the front that the articles most "interesting" and "useful" for the Russian Army were delivered to our trenches from the German side (just like thousands of copies of Order Number One) didn't confuse Kerensky at all.

The country needed to be immediately brought to order. This simple thought was quickly comprehended by the most hardcore "democrats." Even by those who "fought for freedom" for throughout their lives. Take "the Granny" of the Russian Revolution, SR Breshko-Breshkovskaya. She was triumphantly brought back from the exile, and Kerensky met her with a bunch of roses. Why wouldn't she live and enjoy all the unexpected respect and laurels? Lenin and Bolsheviks were like brothers to her, they used to fight despotism together. But Breshko-Breshkovskaya saw that ongoing events were pushing Russia to a disaster. And Sasha Kerensky who showed her so much respect was in the lead.

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[1] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949. V. 24. P. 285.

"I told Kerensky so many times he should arrest Lenin," she recalled later. "But he wouldn't. Wanted to do it all under the law... Why wouldn't he put them all to hopper barges and just drop them down on the open sea... It sounds terrible, but it was necessary and impending."[1]

Russia was rushing towards it end, and Kerensky kept talking and doing nothing. "Our every effort was aimed to set democracy in Russia on the basis of global social reforms, and the federal governmental structure,"[2] he said later. And if we judge him by his deeds, as the proverb tells us, we'll see that his trail in the history is our Civil War, World War 1 lost, and the country completely ruined.

Yet, none of it has happened yet. There is just a party, whose leader is speaking out his evildoing and incredible ideas. Thus corrupting the front and the rear units with his newspapers and agitators. And what about the power? Kerensky informed Lenin that he wished to meet him in person, as if with the objective to provide a glimpse of reality to Ilyich, but Lenin declined the invitation. Lenin didn't need that — he knew that he was allowed to do the most extreme things. Why then tarnish himself talking to the person who was to lose the game and give both the country and the power to Lenin in the end? On the contrary, Kerensky's circle was puzzled that he wanted to meet Vladimir Lenin instead of arresting him. He even had to clarify that Lenin "lives in an absolutely isolated atmosphere, knows nothing and looks through the spectacles of his fanaticism, he has no allies that could help him understand what is going on."[3]

You see, Lenin was so radical because he didn't understand the situation, and if someone had a heart to heart talk with him, he would appear to be all kind and humane. And who could talk to him but Kerensky. They knew each other so well, they were born in the same town of Simbirsk, and even had their birthdays on the same day of April 22, though, they were born in different years, Lenin in 1870, and Kerensky in 1881. They even studied in the same gymnasia.

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[1] http://nauka.relis.ru/10/9709/10709036.htm

[2] http://hronos.km.ru/biograf/kerensky.html

[3] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 1; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/1-F.html

And that's not all — the Kerenskys and the Ulyanovs were friends in Simbirsk. Kerensky's father, Feodor Mikhailovitch helped Lenin's family after Lenin's father Ilya Nikolayevich died. In 1887, after Alexander Ulyanov was arrested and executed, Feodor Kerensky gave a positive recommendation to Vladimir Ulyanov, a brother of the political criminal, for the former to enter the Kazan University. He also helped the future leader of the global proletariat to get the gold medal to make his admission to the university easier, though, in one subject Lenin had not an excellent, but a good mark (and it was logic). In short, Lenin and Kerensky had some history of relations...

Peculiar enough. At first, Volodya Ulyanov was assisted by Kerensky-father, and later Kerensky-son continued this good family tradition. Instead of striking the defeatist Bolsheviks, decaying the army, he stroke ... the army itself. Remember how Kerensky refused to have anything to do with Order Number One? How much he wanted to keep out of it? It was in March, and in April, after the government reshuffle, Minister of War Guchkov retired, and Kerensky took his place. Having done so, he instantly issued a document called "The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights." I think you already know what was written therein. It was Order Number One all over again but even worse, as it had been published by the minister of war himself. Kerensky had distanced himself from it before, but this time he simply signed *not just the document of some Soviet, but a governmental decree* that introduced the absolutely unbelievable freedoms in the army. In fact, he simply formalized the chaos that reigned in the Russian barracks since February 1917.

This Declaration of Soldiers' Rights "finally ruined the foundation of the old army," General Denikin wrote in his memoirs. "It brought limitless politicking and social struggle elements into the unstable and armed mass that had already felt its brutal physical force. It both justified and allowed the unforbidden extensive propagation, both orally and in writing, of antigovernmental, antimoral, and antisocial doctrines, including those that actually denied the government and thus — the very existence of the army. Finally, it passed the power from the military command to the elective collegiate agencies, thus triumphantly reproaching the command, humiliating and insulting it."[1]

Kerensky was simply unable to speak short, and thus the document he wrote included 18 clauses. Some of them were rather reasonable, but the point was that several insane clauses overscored the rest of them, and gave a specific tint to the entire document. The military command expected order and discipline established in the army, stopping of the Bolshevik propaganda that was decaying it, but instead they got a document that didn't prohibit it but restricted interfering with it. The new Minister of War Kerensky issued a declaration that spoke only of rights. The soldiers weren't any longer obliged to die for their Motherland. Here is this "masterpiece," its key issues.

1. All the military men can use all the civil rights. Thereat, every military man must strictly coordinate his behavior with requirements of the military service and discipline.

2. Every military man is entitled to participate in any political, national, religious, economical or professional organization, community or association.

3. Every military man is entitled to freely and openly express his political, religious, social and other views orally, in writing or in printing, in his free time.

6. All printed publications, both periodical and non-periodical, are to be passed to the addressees without delay, without exception.

12. Obligatory military courtesy to single persons or groups is cancelled.

14. None of the military men can be punished or penalized out of court. However, under battle conditions the commander is

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[1] Denikin A. Sketches of the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. P. 286–287.

entitled against his personal responsibility take every measure including the use of armed powers with respect to his subordinates in case they disobey his orders. Such measures aren't considered disciplinary actions.

15. Any punishments humiliating the honor and dignity of a military man, as well as painful and obviously injurious to health, are prohibited.

18. Only the commanders are entitled to assign people to their posts and in cases, stipulated by the law, to suspend the commanders of any kind from their posts. They are also entitled to give orders in regard to combat actions and combat training of the unit, its coaching, special operation, inspection and economy. The right of internal self-administration, punishment, and control in specific cases (Orders for the military department No. 213 of April 16 of this year and No. 274 of May 8 of this year), is vested in the elected military agencies.[1]

"Let the world's freest army and navy prove that the freedom brings force, not the weakness, let them forge the new iron discipline of duty and increase the combat might of the country."[2]

All the nice words. You can write anything in the document, but if the right of punishment is vested in the soldiers' committee, not the officer, this is the final and true end of the discipline. The military men entrusted with every political right were allowed to join any political party, including the Bolshevik one. They were allowed to *acknowledge* and, what is more important, *to propagate* any political opinions up to anarchism. Any printed media could be delivered to the front and the rear, even the antigovernmental ones, no exclusions. Obligatory military courtesy was cancelled. And finally, *all disciplinary actions were eliminated.* Including the death penalty for deserters and traitors. The Provisional Government didn't bother to explain how could a soldier be made to submit to the remains of discipline without any penalties. Wasn't it obvious that in such cases it was necessary to address their revolutionary consciousness? The officers no longer had any other means to control the troops.

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[1] http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai2/1_22.html

[2] Denikin A. Sketches of the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. P. 288.

The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights by Kerensky plus Lenin's fraternization propaganda were to ruin the Russian Army quickly and finally. Yet, the historians still doubt if these two were consciously and intentionally dumping the country...

Imagine somebody issuing an order eliminating all local power agencies when the Germans were attacking Moscow...

Imagine the police eliminated and replaced with some militia (which in English actually means "people's volunteer corps")...

All the political prisoners are set free along with all the criminals...

70 commanders of infantry and cavalry divisions are dismissed...

Soldiers are allowed not to obey their commanders, not to salute them and to choose the commanders they liked...

And even those commanders are prohibited to penalize the guilty and non-obeying subordinates...

Imagine the minister of war allowing to deliver any newspapers including the anarchistic ones to the military units...

Would Moscow keep standing after that?

...Kerensky had a lot of things to do in the government. His career was on the rise. As the country was sliding down into the abyss, Kerensky was getting more and more power to steer Russia. We've already seen how he did the steering, and we'll see more of it. Remember Kerensky was a member of the Petrograd Soviet? His career was on the rise there, too. Since June 3 to 24 (June 16 to July 7), in 1917 the 1st All-Russian Congress of Soviets took place in Petrograd. There Kerensky was elected a member of the All-Russian Executive Committee. Kerensky made his speech right after Lenin there, and his success was even greater, he elicited even more applause from the audience.

That Congress of Soviets was a triumph of democracy and absurd. The leaders and the future gravediggers of the country were at the stand — the Socialist Ministers of the Provisional Government Tsereteli, Chernov, Skobelev, and Kerensky himself.

They were followed by the Bolsheviks, Lenin and Kamenev. The "Interdistricter" (member of the Inter-District Committee of the United Social Democrats) Trotsky also made a speech. The underboss of the October Revolution isn't even a member of the Bolshevik Party four months (!) before it. The time hasn't yet come, the command for unification will come from the abroad a bit later...

The party doesn't even conceal its intent to take over the power. Yet, they have not enough forces for that. 777 of 1,090 delegates announced their party status — 285 SRs, 248 Mensheviks, 32 Menshevik Internationalists, 10 United Mensheviks (United Social Democrats-Internationalists), and 24 people from other factions and groups.[1] The Bolsheviks were only 105, and yet their leader Vladimir Lenin was absolutely sure of their victory.

Irakli Tsereteli, who told such a good wheeze in France later, during the Congress announced from the stand that there was no party in Russia ready to take the power in its hands. "And my word is there is such a party!," Lenin shouted from his place, and then added during his speech from the stand, "There is no party that would refuse it, and thus, our party won't refuse it, either. It is ready to take all the power."[2]

Yet, the time hasn't come yet, Lenin was taking curves too sharp — SRs and Mensheviks that were in majority in the Congress declined both projects of Bolsheviks and accepted the draft resolution proposed by Menshevik Dun who called to support the Provisional Government. The former members of the Provisional Government tried to appeal the acting government to reason with no effect. No result, but that should have been expected. Kerensky was the minister of war at the Provisional Government, and he also was a member of the key executive agency of the Soviets. Two weeks later he became the prime minister of the Provisional Government. What diarchy can we talk about? The only question is if Kerensky, the member of the Petrograd Soviet, joined the Provisional Government, or if Kerensky, the member of the government, participated in the sessions of the Soviet. If we compare the dates, we'll see the following thing:

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[1] http://www.booksite.ru/fulltext/1/001/008/087/949.htm

[2] Civil War in the USSR: The History. M.: OGIZ, 1936. P. 443.

- *at night of February 27, 1917,* Kerensky was elected the deputy chairman of the Petrograd Soviet;
- *on March 2, 1917,* he became the minister of justice in the Provisional Government.

So, at first, Kerensky joined the Soviet, and then the Soviet blessed him to join the Government.

That's why the further events of the Russian Revolution, so brightly described in the Soviet historiography, were actually rather prosaic. In fact, there was almost no overthrow in October, there was a performance played by Kerensky, who pretended to be saving his Motherland. Yet, he actually brought it to the necessary condition and was getting ready to pass it to Lenin, just like the "allies" had planned, for Russia to be finally destroyed. Lenin and Kerensky acted in unison. They were members of one organization and spoke in the same congress. They were playing the same game, one was moving his checkers, the other was putting them away — Giveaway is giveaway.

There was a little-known episode in June 1917 that outlined the state of the government, and its "attempts" for fighting the upcoming time of troubles. It happened when the Congress of Soviets took place in the Vasilievsky Island in the building of the Cadet Corps...

The most exotic revolutionary movements started to develop in Russia, where the national identity was rapidly ruining. For instance, there came anarchism. Before the revolution there were few adherents of Kropotkin's theory. Then the Russian State led by the Provisional Government started to collapse like a house of cards, and the supporters of the idea of complete negation of the power came to multiply as fast as cockroaches. "In particular, the anarchists started to make things humming in Petersburg. They had their office in the Vyborgskaya side, in the far and humble dacha of the well-known Tsar Minister Durnovo," Sukhanov

(Gimmer), the member of the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee wrote in his memoirs. "They've occupied this dacha long ago and were holding it tight."[1]

It would be a different matter if they stayed quiet in that dacha. In that case the government would have pretended not to notice them. But on 5 (18) June, 1917, the wanton anarchists occupied the editorial office of the Russkaya Volya Newspaper and announced it expropriated. The anarchists told the employees and the clerks that they came "to free them from the capital exploitation oppression."[2] The employees of the publishing house weren't happy, as in fact, they had just turned unemployed. Yet, the anarchists didn't care, they simply proceeded printing their leaflets in the occupied publishing house.

"A large agitated crowd gathered around the building. Two squadrons were sent that sealed off the adjoining street and didn't know what to do next,"[3] Sukhanov wrote. The government had the opportunity to use its powers and kick the occupants away from the publishing house. But at the same time the Congress of Soviets started to solve this problem. A delegation was sent to negotiate with the anarchists. The latter demanded that a special conciliatory committee should be established to solve the matter. The negotiation was fruitless — the anarchists weren't going to leave the occupied premises. Only having made sure that the military authorities were rather determined and were ready for the armed assault of the publishing house, the anarchists agreed to leave. Yet, they made a condition — they wanted to be protected from the furious workers. The Soviet provided them such guarantee. So, the anarchists weren't arrested by the judicial authorities (as they should have been), but were taken directly to the Congress of Soviets. When the representatives of the judicial authority came for them, they were simply not allowed in. Later, the anarchists were released "on the order of the Executive Committee" and weren't even asked of their identities. The next day the Rabochaya Gazeta Newspaper that wasn't run by Bolsheviks gladly welcomed "the interference of the organized democracy."[1]

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[1] Sukhanov N. Notes on the Revolution; http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/history/xx/suhanov/suhan004.htm

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 180–181.

[3] http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/history/xx/suhanov/suhan004.htm

Alas, the nature of brigands is so that if you don't punish them and just let them go, they get even bolder. This was what happened this time, too. When the government took faint efforts to banish the anarchists from Durnovo's dacha and thus simply eliminate the center of this infection, they received many resolutions and decrees. The plants of the Vyborgskaya side even started to strike against the "counter-revolutionary" demands of the government. Fifty sailors arrived from Kronstadt to support their "brethren." Bolsheviks supported anarchists, too. Then the government seized its attempts and tried to take no further notice of the wanton followers of Mr. Kropotkin. Yet, on June 18, during the crowded meetings the anarchists attacked the prison and set free several dozens of their imprisoned comrades taking them to their shelter at Durnovo's dacha.[2]

That was when the government decided to use some force. The corpse of the only anarchist killed during the building's seizure was taken outside and put in the center of the yard. Having arrived, the investigator tried to take the body to the Military Medical Academy for autopsy, but the workers of the surrounding plants demanded that he made autopsy in-situ, in front of them. As Zheleznyakov and some other "popular" sailors were arrested, the Kronstadt command sent an ultimatum to the Ministry of Justice demanding that whoever had been arrested should have been released, otherwise they promised to move towards Petrograd with deadly force. Soon all the arrested people were released...[3]

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 187.

[2] Ib. P. 193.

[3] Ib. P. 187.

That was how the government failed to deal with a group of criminal trouble-makers. They could have done it, but it would have involved spilling some blood. Later, the "democratic mood" of the government would cause rivers of blood flooding out. The sailors from Kronstadt that set their ultimatums to the ministers would have a key part in the October events. The Soviet historians even fondly called them "the beauty and the pride of the revolution." They were the main crushing power of the Bolshevik Revolution, and not only in Petrograd. After a quick and easy victory in Petrograd the sailors were on special trains sent to Moscow, and on their arrival the balance immediately weighted down to Leninists. If things had been put right in Kronstadt, the October Revolution could have been prevented. Why didn't they put the things right? Naturally, to promote the October...

Kronstadt quickly became the disobedience cluster. Right after the February Revolution, the officers were slaughtered there. In the local Soviet Bolsheviks prevailed, instantly. On May 17 (30), affected by Trotsky and Lunacharsky, the Kronstadt Soviet announced that it wasn't going to obey the Provisional Government any longer. Neither the October nor the July revolts of Bolsheviks had yet taken place, and even the anarchists were quiet in their dacha, but the place where the main abscess was maturating was known. How would any government of any country react, if one of its towns announced its disobedience? It would sent troops along with the police and eliminate the center of separatism. Any government in any country would do it, but not the Russian Provisional Government.

Having gained their footing in Kronstadt, Bolsheviks sent their agitators all over the country with mandates of their Soviet. They arrived in the front and disrupted discipline, they came to the rear, to villages and caused smashing of manors there. Sometimes local agencies arrested them, but they were always quickly released. Thus, the Provisional Government gradually handed over the control over the country to the new government, whose leaders had only one month ago come from the abroad. All sorts of Soviets and Congresses only sped up this process.

Two weeks after the Congress of Soviets had ended, Lenin attempted an antigovernment coup. We know the following historic facts — on July 3-4 (16-17), the antigovernment armed demonstrations led by Bolsheviks took place in Petrograd. Ilyich spoke in front of the armed crowds from the balcony of Kshesinskaya's house. Kronstadt joined the demonstrations and sent an armed 10 thousand squadron to the capital. Massacres started, people began to build barricades. However, there was no accurate plan for the coup, that's why it was no success. It lacked the synchrony and accuracy that Bolsheviks would have in October. The soldiers marched forth on July 3 (16), and the storm troops from Kronstadt arrived only on July 4 (17). The coup was suppressed, and 56 people died during it. Sukhanov found the most precise words to describe the July action of Bolsheviks, "Lenin's group didn't aim to take the power, though, they would gladly take it, if the conditions were more favorable, and they were working to improve those conditions."[1]

KD Nabokov wrote about the demonstration that ended with the coup attempt, "The same mad, brutish, and monstrous faces that we all remember from the February days."[2] His words show that some people were already sobering up from the February intoxication. Many were considering what Russia led by Kerensky and Co was heading to. And suddenly something unforeseen happened. Giveaway suddenly turned into a regular checkers game.

Follow me. The Russian mass media published the documents that accused Lenin of his relations with the German government. They were published on the permission of Pereverzev, the minister of justice. The story of financial relationship between Bolsheviks and the Germans was announced. Maybe, not all of it, but it was enough to reveal a part of the terrible plan of the "allies," covered in mud and blood. Kerensky couldn't have afforded it.

He had been desperately fighting before — not with Bolsheviks decaying the army, but with every attempt of divulging the materials that could discredit them. Rumors of Lenin's cooperation with the Germans had started even before he arrived in Russia. The way he arrived added some oil on the flames of rumors and gossips. When Milyukov brought up this issue during one of the sessions of the Provisional Government, Kerensky decisively objected such "scandalous" lie about the "glorious Russian Revolution" and immediately submitted for resignation. However, he recalled it the next day. It is peculiar what Mr. Kerensky said about this episode, "I might have had some rough confrontation with Milyukov early in March, but I can't really recall any of it now."[1]

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[1] http://www.magister.msk.ru/library/history/xx/suhanov/suhan004.htm

[2] http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/2–1.html

Indeed, whenever it comes to some tricky moment like authorship of Order Number One or the episode described above, Kerensky's memory fails him...

Since March to June, the Russian counterintelligence knocked on the government doors in vain — its materials were completely ignored and kept classified. During the July coup Pereverzev, the minister of justice, decided that the time came to disclose these materials.

Things went on in a rather peculiar manner. How should the Provisional Government act after receiving such data? We would at least expect them to investigate the case and to arrest the people suspected of cooperating with the German intelligence service. They couldn't further pretend not to notice Lenin — the honest patriots published the things that the Government had been giving a go-by for some time. Pereverzev was a Laborist (a member of the Labor Party, the Left Party). Until quite recently the Head of the government Kerensky had also been a member of that party, but later he moved to the SRs. The minister of justice had not once called the government to deal with Bolsheviks that were preparing to overthrow it, but everything was in vain. Then he decided to make an extravagant move and to communicate with the head of his government through the press. After the documents had been published Kerensky wasn't able to ignore them, and he acted up.

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[1] http://lib.ru/HISTORY/FELSHTINSKY/f17.txt

But before he did anything, the heads of the Petrograd Soviet, who were also members of the Provisional Government, had shared their opinions. "These documents signed by two Socialists, Alexin and Pankratov, were sent to be printed," Denikin writes in his memoirs. "This was discovered preterm and was fervently protested by Chkheidze and Tsereteli, and caused terrible fury of Ministers Nekrasov and Tereshenko. *The Government prohibited printing of the data discrediting the good name of Mr. Lenin and retaliated... the officials of the judicial branch.*"[1]

Chkheidze and Tsereteli called the newspapers and offered them not to publish the startling revelations as they were "unverified," and to wait until a special committee investigated the case. All newspapers obeyed but the small Obshchaya Newspaper (Translator's note: The name of the newspaper is different in the next paragraph, however, it looks that the author means the same newspaper here), but as soon as it published the information, the others followed. The informational blockade was broken, and Kerensky reacted.

"On the same day when the materials were published, on July 5, Pereverzev, whom the government had been considering getting rid of, had to resign," Trotsky wrote in his History of the Russian Revolution. "Mensheviks gave hint that it was their victory. Later Kerensky insisted that *the minister had been dismissed because of undue haste that had hindered the course of investigation*."[2]

Once again we see the miraculous thing, instead of hitting the enemy, trying to overthrow him, Kerensky targeted those, who tried to save the government. Pereverzev resigned, and the Obshcheye Delo Newspaper was closed.

However, the plans of the "allies" were hit badly. On the same day, on July 5 (18), Lenin talked to Trotsky and asked him, "Won't they shoot us away?,"[3] and the next day he hid in Razliv and spent a couple of weeks in a hut (a shelter of straw) together with Zinoviev. At the same time the press started to publish materials, and the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet started to make public speeches, trying to repudiate this information, miraculously disclosed. Tsereteli, the minister of internal affairs and a Menshevik, announced, "I have no doubt that the Bolshevik leaders accused of the coup on July 3-5 have nothing to do with the German Headquarters."[1] Another leader of Mensheviks, Liber, supported him, "For one, I am sure that the accusation of Lenin and Zinoviev is groundless."[2]

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[1] Denikin A. Sketches of the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. P. 237.

[2] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/2–1.html

[3] http://www.trotsky.ru/ld-works/histrev2–1.html

And yet, before his resignation Minister of Justice Pereverzev gave a command, and the publication was followed by arrests. Ganetsky, the financial genius of Bolsheviks, was arrested along with Kozlovsky and his cousin Mrs. Sumenson, their names mentioned in the published documents. Trotsky, Raskolnikov, Kamenev and Kollontai were also imprisoned. All of it occurred on July 5. By the night of the next day it became obvious that despite its minister's resignation, the governmental machine, once clearly commanded to fight extremists, was operating at full steam. The Manor of Kshesinskaya, where the Bolshevik Headquarters were located, the dacha of Durnovo, and the Peter and Paul Fortress were occupied by troops loyal to their government. The actual staff of the Central Committee of the Baltic Navy was disembodied, and the government demanded that the Kronstadt command should immediately arrest the troublemakers.

It was likely to happen — the troublemakers would have been arrested, and Kronstadt would have finally been brought to its senses, if… if Kerensky didn't arrive in Petrograd on July 6 (19). Mind, that when Bolsheviks had tried to cease power, he was away from Petrograd. In July he reasoned the contact troops to attack, and in October he fled from the Winter Palace, following the "loyal squadrons."

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/2–4.html

[2] Ib.

Kerensky started to act. His speeches were as correct and compelling as ever, "The Russian Revolutionary democracy and I, Minister of War, authorized by it and put in charge of the army, as well as the Provisional Government, won't allow any attacks in regard of the Russian Revolution."

This should have been followed by some stern measures against Bolsheviks. And this would have happened, if it hadn't been a giveaway game. The inertia caused by the ex-minister of justice was enough to do one more thing — newspapers Pravda, Okopnaya Pravda, and Soldatskaya Pravda were prohibited from being delivered to the army. Right after that, at night on July 7 (20), Kerensky did something odd — *he withdrew the arrests* of Trotsky and Steklov (Nakhamkes). The Headquarters of the Petrograd district protested, but Steklov was released anyway. Yet, Trotsky remained behind the bars.[1]

These events were followed by other acts of Kerensky, as miraculous as the previous ones. At first, the newspaper that had published evidence against Lenin was closed, and on July 10 (23), Kerensky deprived the military men of the right to arrest Bolsheviks. The justice agencies also ceased arresting them. ***Kerensky officially ordered General Polovtsev, the regional commander, to stop disarming Bolsheviks.***[2]

Leninists stored arms in many factories. After they had failed with the coup, they hastily started to take the arms home. The military command tried to prevent it and started to disarm them, but as soon as the Sestroretsk plant had been successfully "disarmed," Kerensky ordered to stop the disarmament. Instead, they published an appeal to the citizens about voluntary (!) turning in of the arms. The military men protested and refused to publish this document. Then Kerensky wrote the appeal himself (!). On his order, this incredible document was pasted up all over the city, and special posts were established where the volunteers were expected. The result is rather predictable. According to the bystander, the appeal "affected only the elderly and trustworthy bourgeois — they turned in several pistols and sabers that had seen the Russo-Turkish war."[1] Bolsheviks successfully moved their armories and hid them — till the October.

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[1] Kerensky was persistent in releasing his future grave-diggers. At night on July 7, he withdrew the orders for arresting Trotsky and Steklov. The Headquarters of the Petrograd district protested but didn't succeed. Steklov fled to Mustamäki (Translator's note: The village of Gorkovskoye in the Leningrad Region), where Lenin used to live, and was arrested by the military men there. When Steklov was delivered to Petrograd, Kerensky issued a special order, according to which Steklov was taken away from them and released in a couple of hours. Why the haste? Because Kerensky was afraid that sensitive Steklov-Nakhamkes would crack up at the military men (Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 223).

[2] Ib. P. 224.

However, it wasn't enough for Kerensky only to save the arms Lenin and his comrades had. In August, during the Kornilov Putsch, the Red Guard troops were handed out arms from the governmental warehouses on the direct order of Alexander Kerensky. Eventually Bolsheviks had enough arms and could have been passed the power.

The Soviet historians really liked to repeat one episode from the revolutionary biography of the world proletarian leader. They told how Ilyich was hiding in Razliv, living in a hut there, how he was pondering upon things, writing his papers, and getting ready. The researchers of today actively object that — they say Lenin has never stayed in a hut, but was hiding in the Bolshevik citadel, in Kronstadt. To be honest, there isn't much difference where Lenin was hiding from the Provisional Government, because he didn't. If you want the evidence, simply read the memorial boards in the streets of St. Petersburg. For instance, take the board at Bolshoi Sampsonievsky Prospect, building 37. It reads, "Here the 4th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party held its first sessions since July 26 till August 8, 1917, which directed the party for the armed coup and the socialistic revolution.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 224.

VI съезд РСДРП
В И ЛЕНИНА

The Memorial Board on Building 37 at Bolshoi Sampsonievsky Prospect in St. Petersburg, where the first eight sessions of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks took place.

The Congress was led by Vladimir Lenin, who at that time worked underground, being persecuted by the Provisional Government."

Can you imagine anything more absurd? *The Bolshevik leader, being on the wanted list, led the Congress of his party, legally held 5 km away from the residence of the Provisional Government!* Of course, they weren't able to find him. Who could have imagined that Lenin would go to visit his comrades? How could they have guessed to infiltrate at least one of their agents into the openly held Congress, who would have informed them that Vladimir Ilyich was there? Never mind, if the memorial board tells us that this Congress "directed the party for the armed coup and the socialistic revolution." Let them meet, and we'll keep looking for Lenin anywhere but at our doorstep.

If you still can't believe the case of the giveaway game, consider for how long Boris Berezovsky can participate in the meeting of *any* party in Moscow before they arrest him...

Clouds were gathering over the government, as the influence of Bolsheviks in the Soviets reinforced. On August 31 (September 13), the Petrograd Soviet adopted the Bolshevik resolution "On Assuming Power." It demanded retirement of the Provisional Government and establishment of "the truly revolutionary government during the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets." On September 5 (18), the Moscow Soviet adopted a similar resolution. However, instead of any action preventing the coup preparation, the government kept playing along with their "grave diggers." Those few Bolsheviks who had been arrested in July were released. Kollontai, Kamenev, Lunacharsky, and many common Bolsheviks got free.[1]

On September 2 (15), Lev Trotsky was also released. "Kerensky's government arrested me, and two months after I returned from emigration, I once again happened to be in Kresty (Translator's note: The detention unit in St. Petersburg), so well-known to me...," he wrote in his memoirs. "After leaving the prison of the "revolutionary democracy," we found a small apartment in a large bourgeois house leased by a widow of a liberal journalist. *The preparation for the October overthrow was going on at full speed. I was appointed the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet."*[1]

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 489.

Even when we read these several lines, we see that when Lev Trotsky was released, he felt no remorse whatsoever. On the contrary, the Bolshevik plotters were at full speed getting ready to overthrow the Provisional Government. Right at that moment Trotsky was released from prison on bail! I mean, for money! This is as odd as if the actual Russian government released some leader of Chechen terrorists, or as if the Nuremberg trial let Goring or Ribbentrop go. Why was Lev Trotsky released?

Because he and Lenin had to make the revolution. By the way, "Interdistricter" Trotsky left the prison as a true Bolshevik. He was admitted to the party... *in absentia* (the curators must have commanded it), during the 4th Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party of Bolsheviks that was held from late July till early August.[2] All 275 of his adherers, most of whom followed their leader from America, were also admitted to the party.[3] Money of the "allies" finally united two locomotives of the October revolution. The "sealed" train and the "sealed" vessel became one, all mutual offences and theoretical arguments abandoned. Now they are together officially, they have one task — they need to get the power. This task was set by those who had organized their return home.

Steadily they moved to complete their mission. On September 17 (30), Bolshevik Nogin was appointed the chairman of the Moscow Soviet, and on September 25 (October 8), Trotsky took the post of the chairman at the Petrograd Soviet. At the end of September the 2nd Congress of the Deputies of the Baltic Navy resolved that the navy should stop obeying the government.

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[1] Trotsky L. My Life. http://intervud.ru/all/memoirs/a/3844.113.html

[2] http://www.hrono.info/biograf/trotski.html

[3] M. Uritsky, V. Volodarsky (Goldstein), Y. Larin (Lurie), G. Melnichansky, G. Zalkind, I. Ioffe, G. Chudnovsky, S. Gomberg, E. Yarchuk, V. Borovsky, A. Minkin-Menson, S. Voskov, and many other future "heroes" of the October Revolution and the Civil War returned from America. How did all these guys fed, when they lived abroad? Who alimented our revolutionaries?

After suppression of the Kornilov Putsch, Kerensky actually became the dictator of Russia. He had all the powers to eliminate the threat on the part of the Left extremists. Moreover, he arrested the military "plotters" and suppressed the attempt for his overthrowing from the Rights. Thus, he had some will to fight. No one had any doubt about intentions of Bolsheviks anymore. And Kerensky himself understood their intent clearly, too, "On October 12, Bolsheviks established the Military Revolutionary Committee at the Petrograd Soviet that was officially called to protect "the capital of revolution" from the German intrusion, but in fact became the headquarters, where the armed coup against the government was planned."[1] What did the head of the Russian government do when he saw the approaching threat?

He did nothing. Kerensky completely ignored all the preparations made by Bolsheviks. When he met the supreme military command early in October, he mentioned that everything was rather quiet in the capital. *At the same time, Minister of Justice Maliantovich kept releasing the Bolshevik chieftains from prison on Kerensky's orders*![2]

This was two weeks before the October coup. The Giveaway party was reaching its logical end. Kerensky was not just putting his checkers on the line, he was even adding new pieces on his opponent's board. He released Kozlovsky, Raskolnikov, and the foregoers of the machine gun battalion that had been the first to oppose the Provisional Government in July. Minister of Justice Maliantovich found a reason for his odd actions that would melt you with its childlike directness — in his opinion, Bolsheviks

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt24.htm

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 640.

"can't be persecuted under article 108 (Favoring the opponents) just like Lev Tolstoy couldn't have been persecuted."[1]

This is what Milyukov noted, "One of the minister's comrades wrongly considered that such actions of Bolsheviks like disobeying the military command, taking away the rifles from those who wanted to join the army, explosions in the defense plants or holding trains with ammo can't be considered as "favoring the opponents."[2]

No one would care for such trivial matters like a special appeal from the Russian counter-intelligence that indicated that the German agents strived to disrupt the economical and political power of Russia "through aggravation of the political struggle and carrying it to the verge of massacre and anarchy."[3] Kerensky didn't hear his own Minister of Trade and Industry, *Progressist* Konovalov. This was the minister, who had resigned in May, as the government had no will to solve the actual problems. In May, right before his resignation, he had fairly stated that "*Russia is being brought to a disaster with the anti-state tendency veiling its true face with soapbox slogans.*" Yet, in July he returned to the government. Again he tried to appeal to reason and insisted that Kerensky took some measures to prevent the Bolshevik coup. He asked Kerensky, which security units were going to support the Provisional Government? Was there the defense plan?

And so what?

"Kerensky replied equivocally: the measures have been taken, there is nothing to be afraid of, our military forces are sufficient and they will protect us, if necessary,"[4] the KD head goes on. And yet Konovalov won't stop — on October 14 (27), he insisted that they listened to the Head of the Petrograd District Headquarters

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 640.

[2] The Russkoye Slovo Newspaper. 1917. October 14.

[3] The Russkiye Vedomosti Newspaper. 1917. October 15.

[4] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 642.

General Bagratuni. He wasn't just some ordinary general, he was married to Kerensky's sister. Thus, any attempts to get ready for the coup bypassing Alexander Kerensky were impossible. From the report of General Bagratuni, Kerensky's brother-in-law, it was obvious that no preparation was going on. That was why sleepless Konovalov rushed to access Kerensky and to inform him of the near-term hazard. Even a person incapable of clairvoyance can predict Kerensky's reaction — he won't do anything and had nothing to tell. "Displeased with Konovalov's insistence, Kerensky simply started to avoid talking to him and giving any direct answers to his direct questions,"[1] Milyukov writes.

Time went on, the precious time, when the upcoming catastrophe could have been prevented. Kerensky didn't take any action that could stop his compatriot Ulyanov, but did several things that really helped Bolsheviks. Remember the first document of the Provisional Government, its Declaration? It guaranteed that the troops of the Petrograd garrison won't be sent to the front. Semi-decayed military units stayed in the city just as promised. Suddenly *in the middle of October* Commander-in-Chief Kerensky issued an order for *urgent* withdrawal of these units from the city and their sending to the trenches. Having been comfortable in Petrograd and disaccustomed from military service, the soldiers weren't eager to go to the front. After the order was published, the entire garrison came over to Bolsheviks, who continuously discussed the end of the war. That was why the Winter Palace was guarded by junkers and female volunteers. Enthusiasts as they were.

On October 23 (November 5), Antonov-Ovseyenko was making a report on the first two days of the work of the Military Revolutionary Committee during the crowded meeting of the Petrograd Soviet. He told that almost all units of the garrison had acknowledged the power of the Committee and its commissaries.[2]

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 642.

[2] Ib. P. 649.

Lev Trotsky assessed the course of events correctly, "...The outcome of the coup on October 25 was ¾ predefined, not to say more, as soon as we objected the Petrograd garrison leaving the city, established the Military Revolutionary Committee (October 16), appointed our commissaries to every military unit and agency, thus completely paralyzing not only the Headquarters of the Petrograd military district, but the government, as well."[1]

And even at that moment, when everything was absolutely clear and any urchin could have predicted further events, Kerensky kept playing the giveaway game with Leninists. Till the very last minute. The same day, on October 23 (November 5), the Provisional Government considered the matter of immediate arrest of the members of the self-proclaimed Military Revolutionary Committee, but... *decided to wait and see how the events would progress.*[2] Instead, Kerensky offered Minister of Justice Maliantovich ... *to take legal proceedings against the committee members.* This was when the government had almost lost the power and when only quick and decisive actions could have changed the situation!

There is a fact that shows the level of work of the Provisional Government, or, to be more specific, that shows how much Kerensky assisted Bolsheviks. Here is the message published in the Novaya Zhizn Newspaper dated October 20, 1917. "Minister of Justice Maliantovich directed the Prosecutor of the Judicial Department to immediately order to arrest Lenin."[3] Five days (!) before the October Revolution Minister of Justice Menshevik Maliantovich only "directed... to immediately order to arrest Lenin." And the minister only made this timid direction after it was approved by Kerensky. While Kerensky waited until the last moment, and he only issued the order for Lenin's arrest, when it was almost impossible to do it.

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[1] Civil War in the USSR: The History. M.: OGIZ, 1936. P. 454.

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 650.

[3] http://smallmaster.ru/note/history/a/3459.60.html

Moreover, having made this order, the Menshevik minister instantly warned Lenin about the potential hazard of arrest.[1] When they discussed the matter of arresting the members of the Military Revolutionary Committee, Maliantovich insisted that this order was canceled, as, according to him, it was necessary to investigate things and to find out, who issued the appeal, and to arrest the troublemakers only after that![2]

Grateful, after the coup Lenin gave his "savior" a safe conduct that covered Maliantovich from every trouble and helped him not only to survive during the Red Terror, but also to avoid the expropriation and resettlement in his grand seven-room apartment.[3] Being careful, Menshevik Maliantovich didn't leave his autographs for the history, having only signed a single telegram. Instead of him the order on Lenin's arrest was signed by his Deputy, Andrei Vyshinsky. The same Vyshinsky who became the senior state prosecutor in Stalin's times. This is the sample of the iron logics of "the Father of the Nations" — the "odd" Minister of Justice Maliantovich with Lenin's safe conduct went to the execution basement, and Vyshinsky, who tried to arrest Ilyich, honestly fulfilling his duty, was promoted. Their beliefs didn't matter, decency and honesty did. Alas, these were the qualities that the members of the Provisional Government lacked drastically.

Only on the eve of the coup, on October 24 (November 6), Minister Kerensky, the chairman of the Pre-parliament (The Provisional Soviet of the Russian Republic), "suddenly" saw that the coup was on the way and demanded some specific authority.[4] Having got it, he quickly moved out of town, leaving his government blocked in the Winter Palace. He did whatever he had to, and Lenin could have easily taken power. Mind, Lenin assessed Kerensky's assistance and returned the compliment —

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[1] http://prokuratura-krasnodar.ru/history/hpages/revolution

[2] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 659.

[3] http://www.flb.ru/info/2324.html

[4] Ib. P. 664.

after the Provisional Government had been overthrown, everyone looked for its ex-leader, but they have never found him. Just like they hadn't found Lenin earlier. However, if there had been a wish, both of them could have been found. Until June 1918, which is *for eight months (!)* Alexander Kerensky illegally stayed in Russia, but Bolsheviks didn't arrest him. Could they have been unable to find him? No, they simply weren't looking. In fact, he traveled a lot and thus could have been easily exposed. In the last third of November 1917, he arrived in Novocherkassk, where Hetman Kaledin refused to cooperate with him. Then, when the Constitutional Assembly started its operations, Kerensky came to Petrograd. After it was dismissed, he moved to Finland, but in late January 1918 returned to Petrograd again, and early in May moved to Moscow. Kerensky didn't stay so long in Russia because of some underground struggle with the usurpatory Bolsheviks — the fact was that the country he used to lead had been in such chaos that he only managed to leave it safely eight months later. Too many Russian citizens would like to take the precious gift of life from the ex-layer, the Duma member, the minister of justice and the prime minister of the Provisional Government. But finally he left Russia on board of the British cruiser General Ob.

Indeed, there were several vessels in the port of Murmansk guarding the military cargoes that the British had delivered to the Tsar. But a special vessel was sent for Kerensky to take out the agent of the "allies," who had brilliantly accomplished his task of ruining his Homeland. Kerensky's documents were fine, and he even had *a British visa,* which he got in Moscow in the British Consulate. Mind, it was when he was on the All-Union "wanted" list. His passport was stamped by a British representative, Deputy Ambassador Bruce Lockhart, who had the closest relations with the leaders of the Soviet Russia,[1] namely Lenin and Trotsky.

Please, pay attention to Kerensky's trail, as it explains a lot — at first, he went to Britain, then he lived in France, and since

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[1] http://history.nason.ru/dipkorpus3/

1940 he stayed in the USA. What I mean to say is that millions of people left Russia after the revolution, but Paris wasn't the main center of emigration. Odd it may seem, but people mainly moved to Berlin. In this foreign city the largest Russian expat community formed. However, Kerensky went to his "allied" masters, to Paris and then to New York. Until his death in America they got him reasonable life standards, and for the people's orator not to get bored, they even established the People's Freedom League for him personally. Thus, for the rest of his life he kept fighting for this people's freedom in the USA. Having ruined Russia once, he didn't stop till the last of his days. In fact, he hadn't managed to destroy that country completely. Incredibly, the Soviet Union appeared in the place of the Russian Empire. And the "great democrat" wasn't comfortable, while Russia remained on the world map under any name. From 1922 till 1932 he was the editor in the Dni Newspaper, where he published harsh anti-Soviet lectures, but that is something we can understand. However, in 1941 Kerensky in public saluted the fascist Germany that attacked the USSR, and in 1951, when the relations between the USSR and USA exacerbated, he predicted another world war, in which, he hoped, America would win.

Alexander Kerensky was writing memoirs, trying to explain how all of it happened. His explanations of that incredible behavior at the wheel of the Russian governmental machine astound the readers with childlike directness and stupidity, "*We were so naive... We really lacked some resolution...*"

Kerensky's family also had no problem with leaving Russia. So many innocent people died during the Red Terror. So many imposing names brought death to their owners, who had been taken hostage by Bolsheviks. And yet, it had nothing to do with the name of Kerensky — during the first years of the Soviet rule it was the perfect safe conduct. Kerensky and his wife Olga had two sons. Alexander Kerensky was in such a hurry to flee from the country that he had left his family for the mercy of fate. Yet, his "compatriot" Ulyanov didn't let them perish in the chaos organized by their husband and dad. To make it safe, the family was transported to some remote province. Kerensky's younger son Gleb later recalled, "When Bolsheviks came to power, our mother and us had to move to Kotlas from Petersburg. We stayed in Kotlas till 1921, when our mother finally *managed to get an emigration permission from Cheka* (Translator's note: The Emergency Committee), and we moved to Estonia. From there we decided to travel further, to Britain. We took a train to Sweden, and then crossed the sea on a ferry and arrived in Ipswich or Harwich, I can't recall the precise name, and our father met us. *He had many friends in Britain, and they took care of us and even helped to find a place to live.*"[1]

"The British friends" took care of Kerensky and got him out of Russia, and they took care of his family, when Alexander himself wasn't really eager to do it. He got a new family, and his relations with his kids were bad enough for his son not to attend his father's funeral.

If you've ever heard of Cheka, you can easily imagine how a woman under the common Russian name of Kerensky would come to this agency and ask for an emigration permit. And, mind, she was allowed to emigrate. Isn't it remarkable? It isn't, if you remember that this woman was married to a man, who gambled Russia away in a Giveaway game!

Distinguished Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev wrote, "Never in the revolutionary environment, in case the one created by war, can people of moderate, liberal and humane principles triumph. In the age of revolution the winners are always of extreme views, people apt to and capable of dictatorship." Let us add, that such people became winners even easier and faster, if they get enough help. The Provisional Government offered so much help to Lenin that he reached the summit of power in only **SEVEN MONTHS!** This is an absolute record in history. However, Lenin's achievement just can't be compared with results of other freedom and equality fighters, as none of them has ever had such grand support.

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[1] http://www.simbirsk.yabloko.ru/PUB/kerensky.htm

***The Blockade of Leningrad lasted 900 days, and the Provisional Government was in command for only 242 days. In 900 days the enemy didn't manage to occupy a single city, yet in 242 days Kerensky and Co managed to completely ruin the great state and to destroy the country many generations of their ancestors had created.***

The Provisional Government did some titanic job, indeed. The "Februarists" had some challenges and problems, but they lacked one thing, they never really wanted to solve any of those.

Many books have been written about that period of the Russian history. Time passes by, events are assessed differently, and Alexander Kerensky, who used to be a half-comical person in the Soviet history, has become almost a heroic democrat. Here and there people smile sadly — oh what if the revolutionary proceedings in Russia stopped after the February!

Let me share a scene that springs to my mind here. Imagine SS Standartenfuhrer Otto Von Stierlitz (the Russian intelligence officer Maxim Isayev) moving abroad after disintegration of the Third Reich in 1945. And in some 20 years he is making a speech before the descendants of the runaway Nazi, somewhere in Argentina or Bolivia. The youngsters are really interested and ask him questions,

"How come you failed to create the nuclear bomb in Germany? How come the peace negotiations with the western "allies" failed? How come you lost the Russian radio operator you had to protect?" And Stierlitz smiles at the stand. He has his explanation long prepared —

***"We were so naive... We really lacked some resolution..."***

# CHAPTER 8

# Why Alexander Kerensky Betrayed and Deceived General Kornilov

> When they repeat here and there that Bolsheviks caused the destruction of Russia, I object. Russia was ruined by somebody else, and Bolsheviks were just foul worms that nested in its abscesses.
>
> *Denikin A.*

> Just like the army decay directly followed Kerensky's sabotage, famine and havoc followed the sabotage of ministers dealing with industry, transport, and procurement.
>
> *Verkhovsky A., Minister of War of the last composition of the Provisional Government*

This happened on August 30 (September 12), 1917. The Commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps General A. Krymov entered Alexander Kerensky's study. This is what Denikin tells about the following events in his memoirs, "Krymov was deceived. Having left Kerensky, he fatally wounded himself in the chest from his revolver. Taken to the Nikolayevsky Military Hospital, Krymov several times recovered his senses to hear the obscene language and mockery of the revolutionary democrats — the hospital medical attendants and nurses — that were tearing off his bandages, and in several hours he died."[1]

What happened in the blight August of 1917, an unfortunate year for Russia, and why did General Krymov dispatch his troops to Petrograd? Let's start from the very end, from the answers.

**Location of the army was the most important condition for the country destruction.** It was in August 1917 that Alexander Kerensky, a puppet of the "allies," removed the last barrier on Vladimir Lenin's way to power. This barrier was the Russian Army. Betrayed, spat at and deceived, it was still serving as a shield for its homeland. As long as Russia had its army, it couldn't die. Thus, they needed to destroy it…

As we know, the military command, the army elite was enthusiastic about the February coup. They consoled themselves with illusions and hopes that soon started to vanish like puddles of July rain under the bright summer sun. Alexander Krymov, the commander of the Ussuriisk Cossack Division, was among those who thought that changes in the upper echelons of the Russian power were to lead to a victorious end of the war. In his memoirs, Rodzianko described a meeting, attended by "many members" of the State Duma and General Krymov, that was held at his place in January 1917. The battlefield general said then, "News about a revolution will be welcome among the army men."[2] This was about dethroning Nicholas II and replacing him with his heir Alexei under the regency of Michael, the Tsar's brother. This was what the military supreme command and the most modest plotters like Rodzianko wanted. (They were also the least informed ones!)

Yet, then the revolution happened, and everything came much beyond what the Russian generals had planned. Thus, the first thing the military patriots wanted to do was to open the eyes of the Provisional Government to the mess going on. To explain to the smart and well-educated ministers the necessary truths evident to any schoolboy:

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[1] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 2. P. 21.

[2] Multatuli P. Emperor Nicholas II in the Lead of the Acting Army and the Plot of Generals; http://monarhiya.narod.ru/multat.htm

- *that the army is the most important part of the state mechanism in wartime;*
- *that after a variety of "orders" the country might lose its army;*
- *that the disruption of the army will be followed with the entire Russia decaying.*

The military men couldn't even have imagined that all these odd and stupid things weren't accidental, that they all had been planned and intended. Krymov started to insistently knock on the military department's doors and soon after sent Baron Wrangel to the capital. Wrangel had a conversation with Milyukov, but it didn't bring any results.[1] The government still did nothing to save the army from the "revolutionary democracy" that was ruining it quickly. Finally, on March 14 (27), Minister of War and Navy **Alexander Guchkov** had the grace to call General Krymov up to the capital.

This wasn't how Krymov imagined the upcoming changes in the country that had been announced in the distant January by the democratic deputies, Guchkov among them. That was why he offered the Provisional Government to clear Petrograd in two days with his single division. If only the Provisional Government had accepted his offer, the entire history of Russia could have been different, and a week after that (!) Lenin would have been met at the railway station not by the guards of honor, but the Police and the Ussuriisk Cossacks with their whips. Yet, the "allied" puppet masters knew who they had put in command, and they placidly provided guarantees to the Germans. The horror-struck Guchkov refused the "undemocratic" help offered by Krymov; the general returned to the front, and the army decay went on dynamically. Just as it had been planned…

Just starting a war and making Russians unpleased with its course wasn't enough to ruin Russia. It wasn't enough to corrupt people's minds with the propaganda and disorient them with loud democratic slogans. They needed to completely prevent the sound forces from putting things right and saving the dying empire. The strife-torn Russia could have wanted to bring back a steady hand to the tiller, and at that time such a hand was only associated with the monarchy or military dictatorship. Russia had no monarch anymore, but there were plenty of vigorous and eager generals. And the military patriots with their firm grip could have ceased the ruination and decay of the country. That was why Alexander Kerensky took active action to prevent such possibility.

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[1] Wrangel P. Notes; http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vrangel1/01.html

To get ready for destruction of Russia they worked in three directions at once:

- *caused chaos and mess;*
- *brought extremists of all kinds to the country;*
- *instated ultimate intriguers and dreamers to rule.*

The ones who would prefer extremist socialists to a battlefield general, who would loathe the traditional calmness and order more than cataclysms to-be. To prevent restoration — not of the old regime, but of any discipline — more and more antistate elements were brought to the government after every new crisis. More and more representatives of socialist parties took the ministers' bench in the Provisional Government. It resembled a leap frog game, as not many stayed there longer than three months.

The time has come for us to look closer at the ministers of the Provisional Government. We have always been told of capitalist ministers, but the fact is that during the October Revolution Antonov-Ovseyenko came to arrest an absolutely different company. Today the schoolbooks tell so little of that, and once again we'll have to see into all of it on our own.

### The first Provisional Government[1]

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister Chairman | Prince G. Lvov (KD) |
| Minister of Internal Affairs | The same |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs | P. Milyukov (KD) |

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[1] Personal composition of "provisional governments"; http://www.megabook.ru/Article.asp?AID=622035

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister of War and Navy | A. Guchkov (Octobrist) |
| Minister of Justice | A. Kerensky (Laborist) |
| Minister of Trade and Industry | A. Konovalov (Progressist) |
| Minister of Transport Routes | N. Nekrasov (KD) |
| Minister of Agriculture | A. Shingarev (KD) |
| Minister of Finance | M. Terestchenko (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Education | A. Manuilov (KD) |
| State Supervisor | I. Godnev (Octobrist) |
| Attorney General of the Holy Synod (Minister of Confession) | V. Lvov (KD) |

So, let's start. The Provisional Government established right after the Tsar's abdication had members of the following parties in it: six KDs, two Octobrists, whereas Progressists and the ones politically uncommitted had one portfolio each.

*Laborist Kerensky was the only left-wing minister in this government.*

After the first April crisis the picture changed.

### The first Coalition Government

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister Chairman | Prince G. Lvov (KD) |
| Minister of Internal Affairs | The same |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs | M. Terestchenko (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of War | A. Kerensky (SR) |
| Provisional Manager of the Ministry of Navy | V. Lebedev (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Justice | P. Pereverzev (Laborist) |
| Minister of Trade and Industry | A. Konovalov (Progressist) |
| Minister of Transport Routes | N. Nekrasov (KD) |
| Minister of Agriculture | V. Chernov (SR) |
| Minister of Finance | A. Shingarev (KD) |
| Minister of Education | A. Manuilov (KD) |
| Minister of Labor | M. Skobelev (Menshevik) |
| Minister of Provisions | A. Peshekhonov (People's Socialist) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister of State Charity | Prince D. Shakhovskoy (KD) |
| Minister of Post and Telegraph | I. Tsereteli (Menshevik) |
| State Supervisor | I. Godnev (Octobrist) |
| Attorney General of the Holy Synod (Minister of Confession) | V. Lvov (KD) |

Once again, we see six KDs, one Laborist, and one Progressist. Octobrists were one fewer (1). But the most important thing was that the main "Februarists" were removed from the government — the KD leader Milyukov and the Octobrist leader Guchkov. Kerensky quickly changed to SR, and together with Chernov represented this party in the government. These two representatives of the Left party were joined by two Mensheviks and one freedom fighter from the party of "People's Socialists," sounding rather exotic to us.

The balance was as follows — eight representatives of the bourgeois parties versus six members of socialist parties plus two politically uncommitted ministers.

This composition of the government remained till the Bolshevik coup in July. The unsuccessful revolt actually resulted in several things. Ilyich together with Zinoviev went to Razliv to let mosquitoes feast on their blood. Trotsky, Kamenev, and Kollontai were committed to prison for a short term, and the Provisional Government resigned once again — just to clear its ranks of moderate politicians and engage more left-wing extremists.

### The second Coalition Government of Alexander Kerensky

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister Chairman | A. Kerensky (SR) |
| Minister of Internal Affairs | N. Avksentiev (SR) |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs | M. Terestchenko (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of War and Navy | A. Kerensky (SR) |
| Minister of Justice | A. Zarudniy (People's Socialist) |
| Minister of Trade and Industry | S. Prokopovitch (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Transport Routes | P. Yurenev (KD) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister of Agriculture | V. Chernov (SR) |
| Minister of Finance | N. Nekrasov (KD) |
| Minister of Education | S. Oldenberg (KD) |
| Minister of Labor | M. Skobelev (Menshevik) |
| Minister of Provisions | A. Peshekhonov (People's Socialist) |
| Minister of State Charity | I. Efremov (Radical Democrat) |
| Minister of Post and Telegraph | A. Nikitin (Menshevik) |
| State Supervisor | F. Kokoshkin (KD) |
| Attorney General of the Holy Synod (Minister of Confession) | A. Kartashev (KD) |

This government was formed by Alexander Kerensky personally. This time the power was consolidated in his hands and in the hands of the prime minister and the minister of war. In fact, it was dictatorship. It is possible to put things right in the country if you are entitled to command the army and have no need to coordinate your orders with anybody. This is challenging but possible — if you really want to save your country from a disaster. In case your objective is the opposite, the result will be the opposite, too.

The second coalition cabinet had fewer KDs (5), though two politically uncommitted ministers retained their positions. However, Octobrists, Laborists, and Progressists were excluded. Mensheviks had two portfolios, just as People's Socialists. And there were as much as 4 SRs. A member of the Radical Democratic Party took the post of Minister of State Charity, as if to extend the assortment of the parties in the government (you know, radicalism and democratism were exactly what the ministry dealing with widows, orphans, and the disabled needed).

The ministry led by Prime Minister Kerensky had five bourgeois ministers versus nine socialists and two politically uncommitted.

However, the wind of changes that had blown away almost half of those who had initiated all the changes didn't quiet down. After the Kornilov Putsch, Kerensky once again reorganized the government, this time following the pattern of the Great French Revolution. They even borrowed the name of the new governing agency from the French, the Directory.

### The Directory (Council of Five)

| | |
|---|---|
| A. Kerensky | SR |
| A. Nikitin | Menshevik |
| M. Terestchenko | politically uncommitted |
| A. Verkhovsky | politically uncommitted |
| D. Verderevsky | politically uncommitted |

The balance in the government keeps moving towards the left — none of the ministers is "bourgeois," but there are two socialists and three politically uncommitted.

The Directory ruled for only three weeks, and then the government yet again restructured itself.

### The third Coalition Government of Alexander Kerensky

| | |
|---|---|
| Minister Chairman | A. Kerensky (SR) |
| Minister of Internal Affairs | A. Nikitin (Menshevik) |
| Minister of Foreign Affairs | M. Terestchenko (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of War | A. Verkhovsky (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Navy | D. Verderevsky (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Justice | P. Maliantovich (Menshevik) |
| Minister of Trade and Industry | A. Konovalov (Progressist) |
| Minister of Transport Routes | A. Liverovsky (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of Agriculture | S. Maslov (SR) |
| Minister of Finance | M. Bernatsky (Radical Democrat) |
| Minister of Education | S. Salazkin (KD) |
| Minister of Labor | K. Gvozdev (Menshevik) |
| Minister of Provisions | S. Prokopovitch (politically uncommitted) |
| Minister of State Charity | N. Kishkin (KD) |
| Minister of Post and Telegraph | A. Nikitin (Menshevik) |
| State Supervisor | S. Smirnov (KD) |

| | |
|---|---|
| Attorney General of the Holy Synod (Minister of Confession) | A. Kartashov (KD) |
| Chairman of the Economy Council | S. Tretyakov (Progressist) |

This is the third coalition government, and its staff will replenish the dungeons of the Peter and Paul Fortress. This last Provisional Government once again had an assortment of KDs (4), Progressists (2), SRs (2), and Mensheviks (4). After the Radical Democrats had trained on the disabled and the orphans, Kerensky let them deal with the finances (and they would have managed it, if the Bolshevik revolt hadn't interrupted the rapid ascent of this party, which is totally unknown today). Strictly speaking, it didn't matter who this government was made of, as it only had to govern for about a month.

This is interesting. The last Provisional Government has 7 representatives of the left-wing parties, six — of the right-wing, and five politically uncommitted ones. Prime Minister Kerensky is Left (SR), Minister of Internal Affairs Nikitin is Left (Menshevik), Minister of Finance is Left, too (Radical Democrat). And mind that the "politically uncommitted" Terestchenko and Verderevsky, the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Navy, had recently been members of the Directory made of just five people. The Directory formed by the left-winged Kerensky with people "close" to him (from the left-wing, as we classify them). The tricky question is what you call a government where the key portfolios are allocated to members of the Left parties? The answer is rather obvious.

*The Provisional Government overthrown by Bolsheviks was left-wing both in terms of its composition and its spirit.* A few more retirements — and some of the positions in the government could have been filled by Bolsheviks and then even by anarchists. That was how the government was getting more and more Left, hence cutting off its retreat from Bolsheviks. And thus moving towards the end of the Russian Army and the state itself.

Let's follow Alexander Kerensky in him destroying the army. To do so, we ought to go back to the first crisis of the Provisional

Government. To ruin the army for sure, Kerensky needed to become the minister of war. Alas, this post was occupied by Guchkov. And this is when the first governmental crisis started — when the Februarists shed their old tight skin like a snake for the first time. On April 18 (May 1), 1917, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Pavel Milyukov sent a note to the "allies." In it he once again emphasized that Russia was ready to carry on the war till its victorious end. "Constantinople is victory, and victory is Constantinople,"[1] Milyukov said. Did the minister say something new or inappropriate? The Turkish straits were the grand prize for our victims and asperities. It was Nicholas II whom the "allies" had promised the Dardanelles. Now Russia had to concentrate and make it till the victorious end of the Great War to justify the millions of soldier deaths.

Yet, everything turned out to be a complete disgrace. Milyukov was nicknamed "Milyukov Dardanellish," and the government had to deal with anti-war demonstrations held under the slogans "Done with the war," and deterioration of the interior political situation. In fact, Milyukov acted the part of a stupid provocateur and instigator, though he only emphasized the results of the future victory, which were significant to Russia.[2] Who could have wised him to stand up so untimely? He had many friends, and Jacob Schiff, who with one of his hands was crediting the Germans for them to organize a revolution in Mexico, and with the other — financially supported the Provisional Government, wasn't the least of them.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 79.

[2] Despite all the heavy activity by Kerensky and Co, the British weren't sure that they would manage to ruin Russia. Thus, they launched a slogan for ending the war disguised as the anti-war propaganda pounding this message into the masses. It wasn't just about the end of the war, it was about its termination "without annexation or contribution". This means that having lost millions of soldiers, Russia was to abandon the idea of getting the Turkish straits on the eve of victory. You must remember that there was a plan to crush Germany and its satellites in 1917. It would be rather problematic for Britain not to pass the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the Russians after the victory. However, if the Russians refused to take them, it would be a very different matter. That's why the British glorifier Kerensky said, "Today the Russian democracy is the master of the Russian land. We decided once and for all to abandon any attempts with regard

Having framed Milyukov, the "allied" friends started to console him — never mind, government crises happen all the time in democratic countries. You just have to resign, if the people demand it. And the government resigned — *en masse*. And when Prince Lvov reestablished it, its composition significantly changed. All the changes were initiated by Alexander Kerensky, a fervent democracy campaigner. He stated that he was going to leave the cabinet unless Milyukov was outplaced to the post of the minister of education. At the same time, Kerensky demanded that the representatives of the socialistic parties should be brought into the Government and threatened that otherwise he would leave the government himself. Why was his conduct so insolent?

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to imperialism and capture in our country..." (Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 80).

Yet, even the Tsar's Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov believed that "annexation and contribution-free" peace would be treachery of Russia's interests — and remember that Sazonov was one of the main instigators of war on the Russian side. "...The sinister formula of "annexation and contribution free" was suggested to the masses from the abroad, when both people and their self-proclaimed leaders were so much affected by the moral degradation due to overtiredness with war and the revolutionary propaganda, both of it eclipsing their patriotic mind. Having caught on it, the revolutionary government started to abandon the policy bequeathed to Russia by the past centuries and reviled itself with an act of historical apostasy that hardly can be found in the chronicles of humanity (Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 273).

However, Sazonov doesn't consider why the Entente was in such warm relations with the Provisional Government, which was betraying Russia's interests. This means Sazonov failed to comprehend that the British and the French "friends" had used him and other Russian "hawks" blindly. Russia was fighting to get the straits but failed to get them and scattered to pieces.

Although formally this government was chaired by the noble KD Prince Lvov, the show was run by the modest Minister of Justice SR Kerensky. In his memoirs, Milyukov wrote, "The only voice of power at the meetings belonged to Kerensky, in front of whom the chairman would get completely embarrassed."[1] They couldn't refuse him. But why? Because he had the "allies" at his back, who were directing the ministers from the backstage. And since he couldn't be refused, they had to sacrifice some significant political figures. Why was all this reshuffling started?

*All the governmental crises pursued a single objective — to give more power to Alexander Kerensky.* This is very peculiar, and it is undeservingly little addressed. The most immoral and unprincipled ones were brought to power through creating political complications.

Let's recall:

- after the first crisis caused by Milyukov's note Kerensky became the minister of war;
- after the second crisis caused by the July uprising of Bolsheviks, Kerensky became the head of the government;
- after the third crisis caused by the Kornilov Putsch, Kerensky obtained dictatorial powers.

Whenever the situation aggravated, Kerensky always came off it with more power. After every "re-zeroing" of the Provisional Government his power increased. And this wasn't by chance — the governmental crises were artfully organized and orchestrated. At the same time, people that could find a common language with those who wanted to save Russia from the upcoming disaster were leaving the bodies of the government. All the moderate February plotters, who only wanted to restore the monarchy a little but didn't want to drag it through the mud, had to leave. Thus, one by one the most reasonable people were sneakily removed from power, and those controllable and most vile remained.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 79.

Milyukov was removed from the government, and the same happened to Minister of War Guchkov.

*If we take a closer look at what Alexander Kerensky is doing, we'll see at once the main trend in the destruction of Russia now.* In the first government, he was the minister of justice. That's right, to start destruction of the country it was necessary to bring all the kinds of contagion to its bleeding wounds — bring it from the abroad, release it out of prisons and bring it back from the exile. To do so, it was necessary to claim amnesty, and *it was Minister of Justice Kerensky* who realized it. In the second government, he was the head of the military department. Only complete ruination of the army could guarantee that the plan of the "allies" would work. One Order Number One wasn't enough, there was a whole lot of work for *Minister of War Kerensky*!

As we've already mentioned, Milyukov's note caused multiple demonstrations in the capital. However, he personally believed that the unrest, which had resulted in his resignation, had been organized by the German intelligence, "The task of removing both ministers (Milyukov and Guchkov) was directly assigned by Germany."[1] Bolsheviks paid workers 15 rubles a day for taking part in demonstrations.

It is amazing how short-sighted all the February leaders were. The horrible World War is roaring in the country: two supreme powers are fighting in the battlefields, in the air, on the sea, and under the sea. The struggle on the invisible front of intelligence and special services is as hardcore. However, Milyukov, Kerensky, Guchkov, and all the others still see only Berlin's hand in every Russian disaster. Milyukov writes about the February demonstrations, clearly emphasizing that they originated mysteriously and definitely had to do with some back-stage work. However, when he speaks about the meetings in April of the same year, he doesn't hesitate to state that they had been organized by the Germans.

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 94.

It will be reasonable to mention how Lev Trotsky commented this statement, "This liberal historian had a golden German key to unravel every riddle he was unable to solve as a politician."[1] If put in different words, he meant that Milyukov's narrow vision prevented him from understanding things correctly, and thus, he by force of his habit blamed everything on the German special service. Yet, not every event in Russia happened on the order of the German special service. And to be more accurate, *none* of the events happened on their bidding but for the strikes at the defense plants. The Germans had no reason to displace Milyukov and Guchkov. The Provisional Government was the brainchild of the "allied" special services. It always did what it masters wished. The Germans wouldn't profit from changes in its composition. They had no reason to pay the workers 15 rubles a day.

The Germans had no reason, but Kerensky and the "allies" behind him did. Because the first governmental crisis and the resignations that followed resulted in Mr. Kerensky's appointment to the post of the minister of war. If we remember that one of his first moves was signing the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights, the situation will become much clearer. The strikes were required to issue this document.

"The final nail in the coffin of our armed forces..."[2] — this was what General Alexeyev called the Declaration. A spicy detail — prepared in the interior of the Ministry of War, this paper was totally objected by Minister of War Guchkov. He simply rejected to sign it. And here comes the governmental crisis. Wasn't that on time?! They deposed both Guchkov, who tended to dispute much, and Milyukov. Kerensky came to replace them and with a steady hand instantly hit "the final nail in the coffin of our armed forces." Why Minister of War Kerensky signed this garbage is a rhetorical question, and we've already provided an answer to it. He was instructed by his "allied" curators, and he couldn't disobey them.

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[1] Trotsky L. History of the Russian Revolution. V. 2; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/HRR/2–4.html

[2] Kersnovsky A. History of the Russian Army. http://militera.lib.ru/h/kersnovsky1/18.html

The ineligible political destinies of Guchkov and Milyukov served as a lesson for every "independent" Russian politician. The principle of self-protection for all other figures was rather simple. To remain at the helm they had to obey and fulfil "the requests" of their French and British friends without hesitation. Any requests, even the most ridiculous ones, and they should never contemplate the interests of their own country. By no means, they should prevent the military men from putting things right in their dying country...

Unwittingly, General Lavr Kornilov became a symbol of the healthy part of the society, which hopefully turned to the army. Just like Krymov and many others, he honestly served Russia and at first gladly supported the Provisional Government. In spring 1917, at an officers' meeting he announced, "Old times are over. Our people are building new freedom, and the task of the people's army is to fully support the new government in their hard task of creation."[1] We are not getting into every political detail, but the Russian military men pursued one cherished goal — they wanted their country to be among the future war victors. And they decisively rejected whatever could prevent it.

Early in his "revolutionary" career, Lavr Kornilov used to fight chaos as the commander of the Petrograd garrison. He took his first steps there during the demonstrations that caused the composition of the Provisional Government to change. The scenario was traditional, just like in February. At first, it was "Done with the war!" and "Give us bread!," and then it came to "Done with the government!" Some shooting happened not far from the Kazan Cathedral. Bolsheviks didn't try to seize power at that moment, but they definitely considered this opportunity. It was too early since General Kornilov was at the lead of the Petrograd garrison. He brought reliable troops into the streets and stopped all the unrest with hardly any bloodshed.

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[1] http://tmn.fio.ru/works/64x/310/kornilov.htm

They bore it in mind and made their conclusions. It became obvious that the military men can appear on Lenin's way to power. The army wasn't ruined to a sufficient extent yet. Thus, to successfully destroy Russia it was necessary to proceed with destruction of the army, and General Kornilov had to be removed. And the Provisional Government rushed to fulfil these two tasks. That's why Kerensky blackmailed his colleagues with his retirement, that's why he took every effort to replace yet sane Milyukov in his post of the minister of war.

See how nicely all of it goes. Milyukov's speech causes unrest, which results in a change of the government and replacement of the stubborn ministers. The manageable Kerensky doesn't pause to think and drops his signature on the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights, thus signing the death-warrant to the Russian Army. After that, Bolsheviks try to seize power in July, and Kerensky takes the prime minister's chair. He keeps playing along with Lenin, but now he has the ultimate authority to do so. Bolsheviks don't get arrested and don't get disarmed, and even if they end up behind the bars like Trotsky, they are released. Lenin will manage to get power only when the ruination of the Russian Army is well under way, and when Kerensky neutralizes its only co-belligerent and the main Bolshevik's enemy — the healthy armed forces.

Meanwhile, the Russian Army, led by Minister of War Kerensky, was going to attack. It was getting ready to start the offensive, which was scheduled for May 1917 *for the same time* as the offensive of the "allies." The one that dishonorably failed and many years on became the "Nivelle massacre" in many historic books. As the "allies" "suddenly" started their offensive a month before the scheduled date, all the strategic concept of this attack proved to be flawed. In fact, the situation was as follows:

- the common strategic plan of the Entente ceased to exist;
- the "allies" were battle-bled by the wise General Nivelle and hunkered down;

- the state of the Russian Army made the success of the offensive almost impossible;
- after repelling the attack at the Western Front, the Germans transferred their troops to the eastern line;
- the reinforced German troops didn't attack but were waiting for something.

Why would the Russian Army attack in such a losing situation when it hardly can defend itself? If you look through different books, you won't find any reasonable explanation for that longing. There will be only one reason: our offensive retracted the German forces from the Western Front. And this is true, but it's hard to grasp why Russia, standing at death's door, would draw even more counter forces away from the front, where the British and the French were doing much better. This reason seems rather odd if we believe that Kerensky and his masters from London and Paris really wanted a common victory for the Entente. However, all the pieces click into place as soon as we know the final objective of the "allied" contrivers, which is to ruin Russia. They additionally burden the seriously ill patient and don't give him any medication to make sure it dies in the shortest time. In the same way, the Provisional Government, directed by the "allies," tried to draw in as many German troops as possible to ensure that the defeat of the Russian Army would cause an interior crisis, a revolution, and chaos and to finally destroy the geopolitical opponent of the Anglo-Saxon states.

If you look into the biography of the British Ambassador to Russia George Buchanan, you will see that the decision about our army's offensive was made under his dictation. The "allies" demanded that the army should proceed, as it would weaken the country rushing toward the abyss even further. Their protégés were unable to resist. Who did the British ambassador push against? Prince Lvov, the head of the government, and the minister of war, whose post Kerensky had just *accidentally* taken. He also became the main ideologist and the senior lobbyist of the idea of proceeding with the offensive. With a safe conscience, he attends the military units and calls in the new revolutionary army to attack, to start an offensive that would result in failure, general rancor, and Lenin's ratings upgrade.[1]

The wish for a quicker destruction of the Russian Army is, as usual, veiled with soapbox slogans. They say that the new revolutionary army would fight so good that the war would be won in a jiffy. Both the politicians and the military men understood how ludicrous such ideas were. "It is inadmissible to fulfil the active operations scheduled for spring,"[2] resumed General A. Lukomsky, the executive officer, at the meeting in the headquarters. One of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet, Sukhanov (Gimmer), calls the planned offensive "an apparently risky business doomed to failure."[3]

Leave alone the rest — even Bolsheviks were against the offensive! "On June 4, at the session of the Soviets, the Bolshevik faction presented the declaration I had drafted in regard to the attack on the front being prepared by Kerensky," Lev Trotsky writes. "We indicated that *the offensive was a risky affair that threatened the very existence of the army*."[4] A few lines lower he concludes, "The confidence of people in the Provisional Government was irreparably shattered."[5]

That was why Kerensky called for action, it was his next move in the giveaway game. It is classics — the bad cop is for the offensive, and the good cop is against it. Kerensky plays the part of the bad cop here — he makes every effort and brings all his oratory skills to perform. Whoever is against the offensive is against the revolution — this is the central idea in his speeches at that time. All the memoirs telling of that period simply cry about it, "Kerensky's agitation proved (almost) a complete triumph for him. They would bear him in their hands and shower him with flowers."[1] This is what Sukhanov said. However, he was a civilian, creative and compulsive. Let's see what General Denikin says. Oh, he revoices Sukhanov, "There definitely was a short but really bright period in Kerensky's life when he was the minister of war (it was approximately in June), when not only the wide public but even Russian officers fell under the charm of his excited oratory, his hysterical pathos. The Russian officers, who had been chosen as sacrificial lambs, excused him and agonizingly expected him to save the army."[2]

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[1] On the verge of the offensive, the British representatives promised to support him with battle action in the Western Front. As you might have already guessed, the support was behind the schedule. They also supplied some military equipment and arms, but all of them appeared to be "really low quality". However, a whole (!) British motor squadron took part in our offensive (Warth R. D. The Entente and the Russian Revolution. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2006. P. 128.)

[2] Golovin N. Russia in World War 1. M.: Veche, 2006. P. 451.

[3] Sukhanov N. In June 1917; http://www.ruthenia.ru/sovlit/j/230.html

[4] Trotsky L. Memoirs. V. 3, p. 1. M.; L., 1924. P. 196.

[5] Ib.

The "allies" were absolutely thrilled about Alexander Kerensky, too. He was a great finding! He so skillfully managed to fool the entire country. The "allied" newspapers were full of flattering references about his skills. The articles about him were absolutely positive — he is the youngest minister of war in the world! Russia and the army believed Kerensky, and the silver-mouthed minister deceived them all once again. The soldiers and officers were getting ready for an unnecessary and unprepared offensive. It was to finally put the Russian Army to rest. Later Trotsky wrote, "Kerensky organized the offensive of June 18 at the obvious bidding of the Entente, which was interested in the German troops repelled to the Eastern Front. Preparing this offensive, Kerensky and the military command knew that the army had neither technical nor moral resources to succeed. And in the end, the offensive turned against its orchestrators, as the new criminally provoked defeat caused strong revolutionization among the soldiers and thus created the breeding ground for Bolsheviks' agitation for peace."[3]

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[1] http://gkaf.narod.ru/kirillov/oral/09kerensky.html

[2] Ib.

[3] Trotsky L. Memoirs. M.; L., 1924. V. 3, p. 1. P. 223.

A truer word has never been spoken.

Despite our significant overmatch in manpower and equipment, our offensive stalled and quickly stopped, and then even turned into disgraceful withdrawal accompanied by robbing and foray. Bitter tears were falling from the eyes of the Russian officers. "Here and there the infantry refused to follow the battle orders and take up positions to replace other regiments," General Krasnov writes. "Sometimes our infantry prohibited the artillery branch from shooting at the opponent's trenches on the grounds that such shooting caused the opponent to fire back."[1]

The best military units were already decaying as a result of the Bolshevik propaganda. The 1st Guards Corps refused to attack. Meetings were taking place in military units, where the soldiers decided whether they should attack or have some rest by voting. While the army was in the trenches, it still existed. As soon as it was sent to attack, it merely scattered. This was what Kerensky took pains for, hence all the pathos of his speeches and the good-looking posture.

"The 'democratized army' unwilling to spill its blood to 'save the revolutionary achievements' fled like a herd of sheep. The military command, divested of its authority, was unable to stop this bunch,"[2] Baron Wrangel recalled in his memoirs. The outcomes of the battles were dreadful — the Russians incurred heavy casualties and monstrous losses of equipment and resources.

The German Army occupies the town of Ternopil "with its multi-billion" reserves. It is because the German Army did not just counter the Russian strike but started its own offensive. But let me ask where did the Germans find the reserves for the counter strike? Wasn't the German Army exhausted? There is no secret here, the answer is given black and white in every history schoolbook, "The German command hastily transferred its troops from the French and other fronts to the breach site."[1] In the shortest terms, eleven divisions appeared in Russia. And don't feel strange about the wording "and other fronts," as in all "other" trenches the German soldiers had the same opponents from the Entente. And the British and the French remained inactive and let the Germans gather the reinforcements freely.

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[1] Krasnov P. At the Domestic Front / White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 369.

[2] Wrangel P. Memoirs; http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/vrangel1/01.html

"In the French and the Italian theatres the summer operations were performed not only in regard to the Russian Front but also irrespective of each other. Whereas in the Russian theatre there were the offensive and the retreat we've just described, the British, the French, and the Italians didn't take any action," writes a notable military strategist M. Zaichonkovsky. "However, when the Russian Front stopped, and the Germans became free, the British made their attack at Ypres on July 31. When the British made a one-month break in the offensive (from August 16 till September 20), the French started their attacks on Verdun (August 20-26), and the Italians started their 11th attack on Isonzo (August 19 — September 1). Thus, the operations went on, but were absolutely uncoordinated in time."[2]

The agreements reached by intelligence officers of the two blocks were strictly observed. The Germans freely transferred their troops to the Eastern Front, and the "allies" didn't fulfil any serious offensive operations in the west, just as they had promised.

Whatever took place there looked like minor pinpricks, "During this period the western states made their attacks without any significant targets," Zaichonkovsky proceeds. "They would confine with tactic tasks everywhere, which was improving their status through the occupation of better positions."[3]

The "allies" didn't have to worry about their positions, either: in April the Germans didn't move to Paris, when the riot embraced the French armies. Note that *the German commanders*

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[1] Strokov A. The History of Art of War. St. Pb., Omega-Poligon. P. 535.

[2] Zaichonkovsky A. World War I. St. Pb.: Polygon, 2002. P. 529.

[3] Ib. P. 530.

*acted "the right way" only when it had to do with Russia.* Seeing that their opponent is weak, they didn't just defend themselves but started to attack. However, in the same situation at Paris the German troops stood stock-still!

Already during the investigation of the Provisional Government General Kornilov attested, "I accepted the army that was almost completely ruined. Thanks to the military committees, the top military command had no influence on their troops. Under the pressure of the committees, a lot of generals and most of the regiment commanders were removed from their posts. Except for a few units, there was a massive fraternization going on. There were fraternization cases when German choirs were located between our and German wire obstacles. Within two months, I had to visit military units almost every day to explain to the soldiers why discipline was necessary..."[1]

These lines confirm that the army into decay and disarray. Russian soldiers were fraternizing with Germans, and German military bands played music in the midground. The demoralized and degenerated Russian Army was offered a disabling burden, which was to finally ruin it . And yet, even in this subconscious state, it managed to attract 144 infantry and 21 cavalry regiments of the enemy in 1917. This was more than ever during this war. The "allies" could be calm in their trenches — all the power of Teutonic rage came down on the weakened Russia. However, our "friends" from London and Paris didn't just strive to give their troops a pause paid for with the blood of Russian soldiers. Their target was much more global: they wanted to ruin the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, as long as there was an army in Russia that had General Kornilov, it prevented the "allies" from fulfilling their intention. And Kerensky was there to deal with this problem.

Lavr Kornilov really had much authority in the army. During the Russo-Japanese War, he earned distinction at the battle of Mukden, where he covered the retreat. When World War 1 started, Kornilov was a division commander. Under his command, it quickly gained an honorable name of the "steel" division. We know that once a small group of volunteers of the 148th Ismail Regiment, a unit of this division, made a fierce "Suvorov-like" attack under Kornilov's command and knocked down two Austrian regiments, capturing 1,200 soldiers and one general. When the Austrian learnt how small the Russian squad had been, in a fit of anger he cried, "This Kornilov is not a man, he is a squall!" During the forced withdrawal of the Russian Army, Kornilov had to cover up the division's retreat and was seriously wounded and captured. The Austrians who took him prisoner knew who they were dealing with and thus they imprisoned him in a fortress with numerous guards. And still, barely having recovered from his wounds, he managed to escape from the prison hospital. During his flight, he pretended to be a Hungarian soldier, who knew little German. He moved at night and chew down whatever he could find and finally reached the Russian troops. After the newspapers shared his story with the public, the authority of General Kornilov was enormously enhanced. He was the hero Russia had been waiting for.

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[1] http://tmn.fio.ru/works/64x/310/kornilov.htm

After Kornilov successfully and almost without shooting suppressed the April coup of Bolsheviks in Petrograd, multiple protests of the City Council made the general abandon his post of the garrison commander and join the field forces. Right before the offensive, which couldn't have ended in anything but fail. Yet, he didn't miss or disappear in action, and his 8th regiment showed the best results.

Seeing the dreadful consequences of their attack, on July 11 (24) General Kornilov sends a telegram to Kerensky, "The army of berserk ignorant people, whom the government fails to protect from systematic deprivation and decay, who have lost their self-respect, is fleeing… This disaster can be ceased, and this shame should be put an end to by the revolutionary government, or, in case it turns out to be incapable of doing that, the march of history will inevitably put forward some better people. I, General Kornilov, have selflessly been serving my Motherland since my very first day of existence till now , and I am claiming that my land is dying. Haven't been asked, I still demand that the offensive on every front should be stopped to keep and save the army for further reorganization in accordance with the strictest discipline principles and in order not to risk the lives of few heroes, who have the right to see better days..."[1]

Eight days after this telegram, on July 19 (August 1), Kornilov was appointed the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army. Kerensky chose to promote him to the most important post — but it wasn't because he appreciated the general's noble qualities. No, for Bolsheviks' revolt to succeed, they needed to destroy the army. Soldiers could be corrupted using propaganda, but generals and officers wouldn't be threatened with orders and committees into abandoning their duty to the country. It was possible to rout them out, to remove them from the army, the soldiers passing all bounds could have been set against them, but there was a *reason* needed! It was necessary to make the army act against the destruction of the country and thereafter announce it rebellious and crush its top tier. To make the military men rail against the Provisional Government, they needed a leader. And that was why Kerensky designated Kornilov.

Lenin's impatience and permanent calls to proceed with the revolution and extend it didn't meet the required response — at first. After the throttled offence, he was given much more ear, but Ilyich still lacked one thing essential to finally win the minds and hearts of Russian soldiers and public — *an exterior threat to the revolution!*

There was no risk for all the gains of the revolution to be lost at once. There was no interior enemy for everyone to rally against — under Bolsheviks' command, naturally. The Provisional Government didn't count, as it wasn't the enemy (like a famous Soviet bard Vladimir Vysotsky sang, "Not a friend, not a foe, just so!") And until there was such an enemy, no one in the party and the country understood why all those shocks in the country should go on, where the government, becoming more and more "left," was introducing all the reforms on its own.

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[1] http://tmn.fio.ru/works/64x/310/kornilov.htm

They needed to create an enemy. Lenin couldn't do it, but Kerensky could. And he arranged the situation they needed — he appointed General Kornilov the commander-in-chief, and now they only had to wait. What would the battle general do after he had come to power? Of course, he would put the things right. In the only way he knew — roughly, military-style. And his every step could have been foreseen — having introduced the death penalty at the front, he would inevitably turn to bringing the rear units to their senses. This eagerness to maintain elementary discipline during the dreadful war could be called a counter-revolutionary riot. Consequently, all the "healthy" forces of the society should rally at the revolutionary leaders and resist the attempts to restore the old order (or, to be more accurate, simple order!). As soon as this "dreadful threat" was averted, the gate to power for Bolsheviks would finally open. The army would be demoralized, decapitated and unwilling to interfere with political matters.

Who could save the country? Sane Russian forces hoped that rough-tempered, direct, and honest Lavr Kornilov would be this person. His short-term duty as the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army was an attempt to stop Russia from collapsing into the abyss. About a month passed from his appointment to the post before his arrest, but even during such a short period he managed to do a lot. The battle general failed to understand one thing — he was a pawn in the game of forces bringing the country to chaos. In fact, his attempt to avert the disaster draw it much nearer. It was the Kornilov Putsch that revealed all the vile and treachery essence of the Provisional Government and its leader Alexander Kerensky. That's why we can call General Kornilov "the mirror of the Russian Revolution." The general faced incredible hideosity and deceit he simply couldn't have conceived of. And we can understand him, as the person who derived him wasn't some regular citizen, it was the head of the Russian state!

The Kornilov Putsch is 100% merit of Alexander Kerensky, he was the scriptwriter and the dramatist there. Actually, there was no putsch — a group of patriotic generals tried to save their country, because ... Kerensky had asked them to, but later belied and betrayed them. The behind-the-stage puppet masters must have applauded their fosterling. Yet, this play was the last in Kerensky's life, as he only remained in power for two months after it...

Let's have a break and forget the evil-smelling story of the Kornilov Putsch. Let's consider the situation in Russia when Lavr Kornilov took up his new post. It wasn't just about the failed offensive and the military defeat. No, incredible things were happening all over the country. Chaos and uncontrollability, which the Provisional Government had abundantly sown in March and April, plentifully grew above the ground in July.

"No one wanted to work. As if charmed, everything remained just like it had been at the moment of the "bloodless" revolution, creating a dreadful and grave impression," said Cossack Colonel Polyakov, giving an account of those months. "Roads remained unrepaired, workers left without permission, numerous technical personnel organized nominal committees, but in fact, everyone did what they wanted and only took care of themselves in the best possible way."[1]

"The outrage, unrest, anarchy, illegal seizures, violence, lawlessness, and disobedience were going on in the country,"[2] Sukhanov (Gimmer) echoed him. That's what every newspaper of that period was full of. The headlines were self-explanatory, "Anarchy. Unrest. Massacres. Lynch." Politically uncommitted Mr. Prokopovitch, the minister of trade and industry, notified the government that "both the cities and the army had come face to face with the grim specter of starvation, because all the distance between the places where bread is procured and the front is anarchy-stricken and it can't be overcome." The minister of internal affairs could have added that there were robbery and brigandage going on all over the country, and the new people's militia wasn't able to deal with them. Actually, the old police would also be unable to cope with the situation. All and sundry were plundered on every railway and waterway. For instance, of the caravans, which were to deliver 200 thousand poods of bread to Petrograd, 100 thousand poods were stolen by peasants on its way. Statistics of the Ministry of War for one week, which only covered the most important events and happenings in the rear, listed 24 massacres, 24 "self-constituted speeches," and 16 "repressions by armed forces."

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[1] Polyakov I. Don Cossacks Fighting Bolsheviks; http://www.ruslib.com/MEMUARY/POLYAKOWIA/kazaki.txt_Piece40.1

[2] Sukhanov N. In June 1917; http://www.ruthenia.ru/sovlit/j/230.html

However, besides the political aspect, the crisis had some economic consequences. The trade in the country was dying, for no goods could be transferred from point A to point B without the risk of losses. Consequently, mass closing of industrial enterprises started, which in turn significantly worsened the living standards of the population. The industrial production reduced by about 35%. At the same time, the economy was becoming more natural, and the monetary relations were giving way to barter. Yet, none of it happened on its own accord. The Provisional Government had an active part in all the economic trouble. It was the ministers of the new free Russia, not the Tsar's satraps, who turned the printing machine to full power. Nicholas II couldn't afford that, as he really cared for his people. And the "Provisionalists"... well, they were provisional!

In less than 8 months the government of the free Russia printed over 9.5 billion rubles worth of banknotes. Moreover, the Treasury was allowed to issue "primitive" money using low-quality paper with poor counterfeit protection and without signatures or dates. People used to call the notes of 20 and 40 rubles "*kerenki*." This finally ruined the monetary system. The inflation rate was high, and the ruble value decreased by 15 times. The Russian national debt increased by 14 billion, and by fall 1917 it was 49 billion gold rubles.[1]

Yet, the front was the first to suffer from the chaos and the worsening economic conditions. It became just impossible to ensure regular delivery of supplies to the army. The commander of the Caucasian Native Division said the following about the Podolsk province, where his troops were located, “We are incapable to struggle with the people, shameless and bold. Military units passing by crush everything, they destroy the crops, the cattle, the poultry, they break into the state warehouses for spirits, they get drunk and set fire to both manor places and peasant houses…”[1] Life in the new and free Russia was getting frightful. The inactive government discouraged the population that used to respect the state; its weakness and lack of will were a great nutrient for rough and resolute extremists of Lenin’s kind.

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[1] http://sarist.narod.ru/tema55.htm

So, this was the grim background for Kornilov to take up his duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. One of the first things he did was bringing back the death penalty. In the rear. Without any prior arrangements, he introduced the death penalty and the court martial to his army, and only after that he made the government legally register these regulations. The Provisional Government reintroduced it for the front a week before his appointment, right after Bolsheviks’ revolt in June. Even before that, Kornilov started to form new discipline units, shock battalions. He prohibited meetings and revolutionary agitation in military units. His “shock fighters” put the things right both at the front lines and in the rear as early as during the offensive that ended with a shameful flight — they were catching deserters and shooting down marauders. Kornilov ordered to demonstrate the bodies of the latter in the squares and hang them on street lamps with signs saying, “For plunder and spoliation.”

It was rough, indeed. But these arrangements had a really miraculous effect. If you don’t believe me, read the Cursed Days by Ivan Bunin, “The villagers had passed all the bounds last summer. Living in the Vasiliyevskoye got really creepy! And then there was this rumor — Kornilov introduced the death penalty, and in July the Vasiliyevskoye was as quiet as the grave. Whereas people were simply scared to walk down its streets in May and June…”[2]

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[1] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 1. P. 128.

[2] Bunin I. The Cursed Days; http://az.lib.ru/b/bunin_i_a/text_2262.shtml

Bunin experienced all the niceties of that time of troubles — in summer he lived in the village, and once he barely escaped death, when they accused him of arson just for his bourgeois looks. But as soon as the death penalty returned, everything got rather quiet. And it all happened in a simple village, where people hadn't done anything criminal or terrible yet. However, the very fact that the capital punishment was possible now quickly put things right. In the same book Bunin makes a shrewd remark about the very atmosphere in Russia in 1917, "However, the Russian post came to an end long ago, in summer 1917, after we, like in Europe, got a "minister of post and telegraphs." At the same time, we got our first "minister of labor" — and the whole of Russia instantly stopped working. Indeed, Russia felt the devil of Cain's anger, thirst for blood, and the most barbarous vigilantism in the days when fraternity, equality, and freedom were announced. Instantly there came rage and acute derangement."[1]

In the atmosphere where everyone seemed to have gone mad, Kornilov introduced the death penalty. The left newspapers couldn't stop boiling over with indignation at Kornilov's methods. A year later, having already come to power, Bolsheviks found a great way to deal with anarchy, speculation, thievery, and all the social problems. They chose an absolutely Kornilov-style method — summary execution on the spot. No trial, no record. It was tough, but it was the only way for the Red government to quickly put things right in the country.

On July 30 (August 12), during the meeting with the ministers of railway transport and provisions, Kornilov presented his program for overcoming the crisis, "To end the war with peace worth the great and free Russia, we need three armies — an army in the trenches to fight, an army in the rear — in workshops and plants to manufacture whatever the army in the front needs, and a railway army to bring all the supplies to the front."[2]

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[1] Bunin I. The Cursed Days; http://az.lib.ru/b/bunin_i_a/text_2262.shtml

[2] Shturman D. At the Edge of the Abyss. The Kornilov Putsch Through Eyes of Historians and Contemporaries; http://magazines.russ.ru/novyi_mi/1993/7/shturm.html

An army needs discipline, and according to Kornilov, the same cast-iron discipline should be established in the rear and on the railway. Absolutely consistent, by the way. This was how honest Russian patriots saw the general's actions... just like the orchestrators of the upcoming provocation. General Kornilov offered a rather rough program, but no one objected to his proposals — Kerensky, in particular. Barely having taken in the situation, on August 3 (16), Kornilov arrived in Petrograd to report to the Provisional Government. He stated all of his proposals in a memorandum and handed it over to Kerensky. Having looked through the memorandum, the head of the government said that in principle he agreed with the proposed program and asked Kornilov not to present his memorandum to the government officially until the Ministry of War finished its parallel project for their provisions to be compared in the end. During this memorable meeting, there happened an incident that deeply impressed Kornilov. I believe you will be impressed, too...

This is what happened. The government session is underway, the ministers are giving their speeches. Finally, it comes to the military matters. Kornilov is reporting on the arrangements necessary to fight chaos and anarchy. However, as soon as he touches upon the questions of the planned offensive in the South-Western Front, Kerensky suddenly stops him. The general was puzzled, but then he received a note, in which Boris Savinkov, a notorious SR terrorist and now Kerensky's assistant for military affairs, said was worried that "the state and allied secrets announced by the commander-in-chief run a risk of being disclosed to the enemy as a gesture of comradery."[1]

Colonel Ignatiev, the head of the Russian intelligence in Paris, whom we've already mentioned, had notified the government about it long ago, "As soon as I share any information, it is not a secret anymore, as some members of the Provisional Government pass it on to their parties... Kerensky refused to announce certain details on the military matters in the presence of Chernov, who was an German agent, barely taking the trouble to conceal it."[1]

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[1] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 2. P. 53.

Do you see where it goes?

***There was a German spy in the government, and everybody knew, but they didn't do anything about it!***[2]

Can you imagine that? To what extent should the government be putrid for it to be possible? Still, in Russia led by the Provisional Government, everything is possible. That's why Minister of Agriculture Victor Chernov (Liberman) safely attended the Cabinet sessions. Everybody was polite with him, they smoked together and exchanged anecdotes. However, they avoided discussing military and secret subjects in his presence. Some political correctness reduced to an absurdity, you know. Mr. Chernov must have taken offence at his comrades from the government being so mistrustful, but he didn't cease his cooperation with the German intelligence. He didn't leave the SR Party, either, and let me remind you that Kerensky was a member of that party, too, just like Savinkov, the author of the notice.

Can you believe that? I can only think of one reasonable explanation for it — working with the foreign intelligence or defending the interests of a foreign state was so common for the government members that no one in the halls of power was surprised. The only difference was that Chernov worked for *the German intelligence,* whereas the others worked for the special services of the "allies." Our dear minister of agriculture was of different suit, but still from the same deck!

And his colleagues from the Cabinet respected his individuality, they didn't blame Victor Chernov — everyone has to make a living, we're all humans. The ministers just tried to avoid discussing state secrets in his presence. Now a simple conclusion is forced upon us: many represented the interests of Britain, France, and the USA in the ruling cabinet of free Russia. The German interests were taken care of by the member of the SR Party Victor Chernov. *And no one in the Provisional Government advocated the interests of Russia.*

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[1] Ignatiev P. My Mission in Paris. M.: Gaia Iterum, 1999. P. 159.

[2] There is no doubt that the slaughterous SR Party cooperated with the British special services (see: Starikov N. From Decembrists to Mujahideen. Who Fed Our Revolutionaries? St. Pb.: Piter, 2007). During the war, SRs and Chernov were allowed to cooperate with the Germans — but only with the consent of their principal patrons from the British intelligence.

Kornilov was shocked with the events of the sinistrous session. Everything that had happened couldn't settle in the general's mind. After the meeting, he returned to the General Headquarters delusioned. The country needed to be saved quickly. Kornilov had thought the Soviets were the source of infection, and primarily — the most malicious Petrograd Soviet, but now he saw that the Provisional Government was as rotten. Finally, Kornilov decided to take some radical action to put things right in the country. His mistake was that he sincerely wished good to his country and wanted to rely on those who in fact obeyed the true and principal destroyers of Russia, those who followed the will of the "allies."

To start some resolute action the military-minded general needed an order of his immediate commander and the head of the power vertical, Mr. Kerensky. Kornilov didn't idealize him, but if the prime minister had issued the necessary order, Kornilov's actions would have been absolutely legal. It was necessary to isolate Kerensky from the "rotten" Petrograd environment, ensure his safety and take several drastic measures to save the country from ruination.

Meanwhile, the events in Russia were becoming more severe: on August 14 (27), there was a series of massive explosions at gunpowder plants and storage magazines in Kazan.[1] About one million of missiles and 12 thousand machine guns were destroyed. Later in August a global railway strike was expected that might have finally paralyzed the entire transport system of the country, thus inevitably causing famine on the front line. On August 20 (September 2) our troops abandoned Riga to the enemy. They had been successfully defending it for the previous two years, and this surrender came as a complete shock to Kornilov. After that, the Germans started to get ready for a grand landing operation that endangered Tallinn (Revel) and Petrograd. And finally, the military counterintelligence brought a report on Kornilov's table, which said that Bolsheviks intended to seize power in late August or in early September. There was no more time to wait.

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[1] "By no means, caused intentionally," Denikin A. Writes about it.

The general was going to save Russia. Whoever wanted to see it ruined were going to provoke his advance, as they believed his army would destroy all the powers on the way of Bolsheviks in one stroke. Kornilov expected Kerensky to support him. He had a reason to think so, as at first the chairman of the government agreed to establish a committee that was to draft a project on military revolutionary courts and the death penalty in the rear. Later Kerensky even approved of declaring a state of emergency for Petrograd and its suburbs. He even gave a go-ahead for liquidation of the anarchism and bolshevism center in Kronshtadt. Kornilov believed it would go on like this: Kerensky would come to the General Headquarters in Mogilev and proceed with managing the country from there. At the same time the 3rd cavalry corps, led by General Krymov, would be sent to Petrograd to eliminate the center of outrage — they had to disarm the Petrograd garrison and drive out the local Soviet. After the capital would be brought to its senses, order in the rest of Russia would also be restored. The Soviets would be dissolved, the martial law would be imposed all over the country, followed by militarization of defense plants and railways plus prohibition of strikes, etc.

*Kornilov moved troops to Petrograd with the consent of Kerensky to help the latter put things right in the capital and then in the entire country.*[1]

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[1] The scenario of the Kornilov Putsch strangely reminds the August Putsch in 1993. The released putschists, in particular, General Varennikov, appear on TV and explain that they have acted with the consent of Gorbachev and on his orders. This is how Kornilov believed everything should have happened, as he believed that he had agreed everything with Kerensky.

To make the general believe that he had multilateral support, the “allies” joined the disinformation campaign. For Kornilov to advance, they demonstrated him their benevolence. This is what Denikin wrote about it, “The foreign military representatives expressed even more definite and rather friendly attitude to the commander-in-chief. Many of them introduced themselves to Kornilov in these days, assuring him of their respect and wishing him good luck; the British delegate made it especially touching.”[1]

Those were just words, though, no real support at all. A peculiar thing here — in the same month, in August 1917, the “allied” American government sent its delegates to Russia. The official purpose of their visit was noble and honest — the Red Cross humanitarian mission. Yet, the real reason was absolutely different — they needed to control the ruination of the country that was reaching its logical end, when the power would be handed over to Bolsheviks. According to some reports, this “humanitarian mission” right on the verge of the Kornilov Putsch handed Lenin about a million dollars for him to organize the last stage of the October Revolution.[2] However, no one gave any money to Kornilov — he only had the words of support from the “allied” ambassadors, some agreements with Kerensky, and two divisions of tried-and-true troops.

And still, he resolved to act.

At that moment, Alexander Kerensky had a very simple choice — Kornilov or Lenin. Kornilov meant discipline established by a steady hand, deserters hung on lamp-posts and a perspective victory in the war. Lenin meant discipline enforced with methods even tougher, the Civil War, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, demise, loss of territories and agonizing attempts to seize them

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The scenario was the same in 1917 and in 1993 — at first, the army was asked to put things right, and then they were called traitors. And in the end some new forces come to power to ruin the country.

[1] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 2. P. 18.

[2] Sutton A. Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution; http://www.rus-sky.com/history/library/sutton/sutton1.htm

back. Kornilov stood for saving the Russia that used to amaze the world with its development, Lenin stood for an unprecedented experiment, creating something new at the cost of millions of lives, dead children, shooting ditches and typhus barracks.

It was Kerensky who chose the future for Russia. With a steady hand, he chose his fellow landsman Ulyanov. Giveaway is giveaway…

On August 26 (September 8), 1917, General Krymov was ordered to move to Petrograd. Kornilov believed that his actions fully corresponded with his arrangements with Kerensky and that everything should go smoothly. But the general didn't know who he was dealing with. Then there started a political circus, or, to put it more precisely, Kornilov was simply betrayed. In the evening of August 26 (September 8), in a meeting of the Provisional Government Kerensky instantly qualified Kornilov's actions as a riot and demanded emergency powers. As we remember, whatever Alexander Kerensky asked for, no matter what the composition of the cabinet was, there were no limits. And this time he was given all the powers, and the ministers habitually resigned. Next day, on August 27 (September 9), the whole of Russia was shocked at a manifest of the Provisional Government outlawing General Kornilov. The manifest was published in a great haste and in secret from the other members of the Provisional Government. Kerensky didn't need the crisis to end up peacefully — he needed fierce confrontation. He needed a reason for final defamation and finishing off the army, a reason to give arms to the Red Guards and release Bolsheviks from prisons.

While Boris Savinkov and others communicated with Kornilov by telegraph trying to find out the details and take in the situation, Kerensky didn't wait for the results and ordered to publish the manifest. In it, Kerensky called Kornilov, the hero of the Carpathians, a traitor and ordered the military command not to obey his orders. The railway personnel was ordered to dismantle the road and prevent the cavalry corps from coming to Petrograd. On the same day, Kerensky issued an order to bring Kornilov and his allies to justice.

A few arrested Bolsheviks were released from prisons.

The commander-in-chief was most astonished at such an outcome. He replied with his own manifest, which was not a program or a plan, but more of a heart-cry:

"Russian people! Our great Motherland is dying. Its death hour is near. They've made me speak straightforwardly, and I, General Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, under the constraint of most of the Soviets, acts in full compliance with the plans of the German General Staff, and along with the oncoming enemy's landing on Riga shores it is killing our army and destroying our country from the inside. Grimly acknowledging our country's imminent death, in these fearsome minutes I call to all the Russians to save our dying Motherland. If you have a Russian heart beating in your chest, if you believe in God, go to church and pray that the Lord would work the greatest miracle of saving our native land. I, General Kornilov, a son to a Cossack peasant, assure everybody that I need nothing but to save the Great Russia, and I swear, I will conquer the enemy and thus lead the Russian people to the Constitutional Assembly, where they will be able to choose their destiny and the new tenor of the state life. I can't betray Russia into the hands of its primordial enemy, the German progeny, and make the Russian people German slaves. I'd rather die in the field of honor and battle than see the Russian land in shame and disgrace. Russians, the life of your Motherland is in your hands!"[1]

Having been notified of Kerensky's unexpected conduct, General Krymov was confused. At that moment, he was visited by the government representatives who offered him to see Kerensky for negotiations. Krymov knew that Kornilov acted with the prime minister's approval and couldn't understand why the general had been announced a traitor. He personally went to Kerensky to talk and resolve the confusion. Many authors say that if Krymov hadn't stopped his corps' movement to Petrograd and hadn't gone to see the prime minister, the city would have been conquered and our history would be short of so many of its dark pages. However, he went there — and forfeited his life for that. After their conversation, Krymov shot himself, or he might have even been killed. This story is as dark as the entire story of Kerensky's ascent to power. Don't forget that at first the "great democrat" Kerensky prohibited the widow of the deceased general to arrange a public funeral. Only after she insisted and solicited, and after General Alexeyev interfered, it was allowed, as Denikin says, "to bury the deceased in accordance with the Christian tradition, not later than 6 a.m., in the presence of nine people at most, priests included."[1] Such was the tragic end of one of the best Russian cavalry generals, who was so enthusiastic about the February Revolution…

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[1] http://www.specnaz.ru/istoriya/274/

Krymov's troops were stopped. General Kornilov was arrested by Kerensky's order in his General Headquarters. He wasn't the only high-rank military member to be arrested, there also were generals Denikin, Erdeli, Lukomsky, and many others. Imagine the effect this action had — at war time, the supreme military commander was called a traitor. In fact, it was a charge against all officers, not a certain person. As a consequence, Russia saw a wave of murders of commanders. For instance, in these days General Oranovsky, the commander of the 42nd Army Corps, was killed in Vyborg along with General Vasiliev, the commandant of the Sveaborg Fortress, and a number of other officers. In total, 80 officers were killed in this quiet and peaceful town. How many victims there were all over the country remains unknown…

"All of it was announced in newspapers, and the Cossacks read how soldiers threw their battered officers into the sea, and if the latter tried to get out, they were beaten to death with gun butts right on the spot," one of Cossack officers wrote. "The most important thing is that all of this went punished."[2] Thus, it wasn't in the times of Bolsheviks that Russian soldiers start to kill their officers, all of it started during the rule of the Provisional Government. Lenin and his comrades simply acted on a different scale, so they alone were accused of all those barbarities ...

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[1] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 2. P. 238.

[2] Yeliseyev F. With Kornilov's Cavalry. M.: AST, 2003. P. 105.

In August 1917, Kerensky didn't simply destroy Kornilov and Denikin — he ruined all remnants of discipline in the Russian Army. He ruined the Russian Army in general. Later he wrote in his memoirs, "But for the Kornilov Putsch, there would be no Lenin."[1]

Instead of using the army to put things in the country right and give it a chance to pull out of the spin, Kerensky did the opposite. And it wasn't by chance. Let's not forget that Alexander Kerensky was going to hand the power over to his fellow landsman Ulyanov, not some tough and rigorous general. Now it was easier to do as planned — Kerensky had obtained the extreme powers. A Directorate of five members had been established. In fact, Kerensky became a dictator for Russia and could now finish off the remains of the Russian statehood without any hindrance. After the Kornilov Putsch, he took some steps that finally facilitated Bolsheviks' rise to power. Kerensky's service to the October Revolution was immense, but the grateful Soviet government didn't erect a single monument or at least a modest bust sculpture to him.

Why?

Because no one loves traitors…

On September 1, 1917, the Russian Republic was proclaimed.[2] In the country that was so weary and hopeless no one noticed that when Russia was declared a republic, Kerensky arrogated to himself the powers of the Constitutional Assembly. It was the only structure that could determine the destiny of the state. And Kerensky made this decision at his sole discretion, without asking the people.

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[1] http://encyklopedia.narod.ru/bios/gov/lenin/lenin.html

[2] This is a really peculiar moment. It is often claimed that Russia was proclaimed a republic right after the February Revolution, but that is not so. Right until Kerensky made this individual decision, the political regime in Russia wasn't determined. That's why none of the monarchists had tried to overthrow the Republic — it simply didn't exist.

Such attitude to the Constitutional Assembly made its convening a purely theatrical act. The population was becoming more and more apathetic about everything going on in the country. This was what Kerensky was after: when Lenin would come to seize power, no one should wish to stand up for the annoying Provisional Government.

The army was exhausted because of the unnecessary offensive and demoralized by the charges against Kornilov. Moreover, right after the general was arrested, Kerensky suspended execution of death sentences in the army at the request of the Soviet. In fact, he abolished the death penalty that had just been reintroduced and somehow had stopped the anarchy. By doing so he completely destroyed the discipline in the Russian Army. Later, Mr. Kerensky would speak of "developing a special program" to improve the discipline. But there was no need for developing it. This program was ready. General Kornilov had written it for Kerensky long ago — with coal on the plates decorating the chests of hung marauders and deserters. However, it didn't suit Kerensky, as it could have sobered both the army and the country at once!

There was only one last step left — Kerensky appointed himself "the Commander-in-Chief of Land and Marine Forces" of the Russian Democratic Republic. And this "commander" instantly turned to reformation of the armed forces. At first, the top commanders were banished from the army "for counter-revolution." The reforms went on at an accelerated tempo, and that's why no one came to defend the Provisional Government. The bastards that were licking Kerensky's boots didn't wish to risk their lives...

It was a mere month before Lenin appeared at the top of Russian politics. Preparations to handing the power over were coming to an logical end. A month is thirty days. Is it a lot or not? Even at the last moment before the disaster, some reasonable people tried to save the Provisional Government and Russia from Bolsheviks coming to power. General Krasnov, who was in August appointed the commander of the 3rd cavalry corps instead of the deceased General Krymov, was one of them.

There was an interesting episode about his appointment. The mess in the country and the army was terrible, and thus, two persons were appointed to this post at once, General Krasnov and General Wrangel. They both arrived at their new place of service to find out that there had been a mistake. It was instantly explained to Wrangel that Krasnov had to take the post because "in accordance with the political moment" Minister of War Verkhovsky didn't see a way to appoint him the commander of the corps located close to the capital.

The corps that Kornilov had sent to Petrograd didn't reach the city and stayed in its suburbs. Its headquarters were in Tsarskoye Selo, and its units were located in the towns near the capital. In fact, after Kornilov had been arrested, the corps was the only force preventing Bolsheviks from attacking.

*The matter was as follows: if the 3rd cavalry corps left Petrograd, the October Revolution would happen; if it stayed, Russia would have a tiny chance to survive.*

The threat to the "allied" plan of Russia's destruction had to be eliminated immediately. At first, the corps needed a compliant and obedient commander. However, having relieved Wrangel, known for his patriotic zeal, of command, Kerensky didn't achieve much, as General Krasnov turned out to be an honest person as well. In early September 1917, he reported the establishment of a formidable cavalry group from the loyal cavalry and Cossack units, with powerful artillery and armored cars.[1] A part of the group was to remain in the capital, and the other part — to stay nearby, combat-ready. This definitely wasn't about withdrawing the troops from the capital. The commander of troops of the Petrograd military district accepted Krasnov's project and submitted it to Kerensky. Actually, this project was the last hope of the Provisional Government and Kerensky as the leader of the country.

You must have already guessed what Commander-in-Chief Kerensky did. If not, let me give you a clue. He shared the details of this project with Bolsheviks. And the next day after the report had been submitted, its text appeared in the newspapers, and Trotsky as the representative of the Petrograd Soviet imperatively demanded that the cavalry corps should have been removed rather far off the capital.[1] Naturally, Kerensky fulfilled the requirement of Bolsheviks, and the cavalry corps be moved to Pskov suburbs under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front General Cheremisov, who supported Bolsheviks.[2] He rapidly dissipated the power and strength of the corps by fragmenting it into small groups of cavalrymen, which he sent further away from the city. So don't be surprised that the October happened so easily and that there were so few victims. Kerensky had done everything he could for the Bolshevik Revolution to succeed!

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 407.

And the "allies" kept their promise: the valuable agent that had fulfilled his task had to stay alive and unhurt. This is a very important moment — if they had sacrificed him as some used material at that moment, the others wouldn't have agreed to cooperate later. Saving the overthrown prime minister was a rather important thing, a key to the future. The other ministers stayed in the Winter Palace, and Alexander Kerensky left, or, to be more precise, departed to the political inexistence — in the car provided by the "allies."

"I don't know how, but the news of my departure reached the allied embassies. As I was leaving, I was visited by representatives of the British and, to the best of my recollection, the American Embassies and said that the allied states wanted me to use an American-flagged car, which was waiting downstairs.."[3]

Isn't Kerensky's memory weak? As soon as we find a questionable moment in his biography, he has a memory lapse. The

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 408.

[2] Ib.

[3] Kerensky A. Gatchina. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.gatchina.tk/kerenski_a_f/kerenski_gatchina2.htm

"allied" embassies somehow learnt that comrade Kerensky had to leave, or rather, to flee. And they gave the Russian prime minister a car — with an American flag on the bonnet, as the car belonged to the US Consul.

In the most critical moment, Kerensky simply fled from the Winter Palace, abandoning his ministers. He just deceived them — to be more convincing, he said that he was going to meet the troops supposedly moving to Petrograd to support the Provisional Government. And here the ministers should have understood that if their prime minister left the capital to personally (!) meet a battalion of soldiers in Luga and "waylay them before they entered Petrograd," it meant things weren't just going bad, the situation was hopeless! An army should be attended by the minister of war, a battalion should be attended by its mayor or colonel, if necessary. If the head of the government and the commander-in-chief meets every squadron or troop personally, this country has no future. In fact, this is what happened — the Russian Democratic Republic was living through its last hours. Painfully, the future Soviet Union was spawning in its womb, whose leaders, unlike Sasha Kerensky, fulfilled their primary duties — led the country...

Kerensky used the car, courteously and "inadvertently" provided by the "allies," to get to Pskov. To the very General Krasnov, whose project on saving the government he had submitted to the left newspapers, thus making its implementation impossible.

"Where's your corps, General? Is it approaching? Is it already here?" these were the first questions the commander-in-chief Alexander Kerensky asked.[1]

"The Father of the Russian Democracy" must have overworked and had not enough sleep, and might have forgotten that the parts of the corps that could have radically change the situation now *were scattered all over the north-western Russia by his own order.* Alas, he didn't manage to recover his memory. That is the only explanation why *Kerensky was still amnesic* in his collection of articles "Izdaleka" (From Afar), published in *1922 in Paris. He described in detail that* "the 3rd cavalry corps was the very corps which General Kornilov had sent against the Provisional Government on August 25 and which was led by the "barbarous division" under General Krymov's command."[1] And then there is a most unexpected continuance, "After it (the Kornilov Putsch — *N. S.*) had failed, the demoralized parts of this corps were scattered all over the Northern Front."[2]

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 418.

Kerensky uses the word "scattered," as if two cavalry divisions that might have saved Russia had disappeared off the face of the earth. They would have stayed intact, if it wasn't for the actions of Alexander Kerensky, respected and even worshipped by many our contemporaries. It was he who held the post of the commander-in-chief and the head of the country. It was by his order that the 3rd cavalry corps was divided into parts and sent off to different parts of the enormous polygon of 450 km wide and deep.

However, every normal government would have tried to move the only loyal military units closer to its residence. In fact, the Cossack regiments were the main force that had suppressed Bolsheviks' attempt to seize power in July. And neither the Provisional Government, nor Kerensky forgot about it. The last parts of the corps were moved two days before the October Revolution! And of course, further from the capital…

By the way, the 3rd cavalry corps wasn't the only unit to be removed from Petrograd for it not to interfere in Lenin's business. The same thing happened to the 5th Caucasian Cossacks Division.

"Unwilling to have Cossack units near Petrograd,"[3] as the future Commander of Kornilov's cavalry regiment Yeliseyev F. writes, Kerensky sent the units of the division to different places:

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[1] Kerensky A. Gatchina. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.gatchina.tk/kerenski_a_f/kerenski_gatchina2.htm

[2] Ib.

[3] Yeliseyev F. With Kornilov's Cavalry. M.: AST, 2003. P. 122.

- two regiments of the division with its squadron and headquarters to the town of Villmanstrand (Lappeenranta in Finnish);
- another regiment with its squadron to Vyborg (Viipuri);
- and the fourth regiment to Helsingfors (Helsinki).[1]

It is about 50 km from Vyborg to Lappeenranta and about 300 km from Vyborg to Helsinki. Try to command a military unit that is so much scattered. How much time will it take to bring it together, to send orders and to make it capable of action? Now multiply your result by two, as the discipline is extremely low. Do you still fail to understand why the Cossack divisions didn't appear at the Winter and the Smolny Palaces at the critical moment in October 1917?

But Kerensky stubbornly pretends to know and understand nothing. We should do justice to Cossack General Krasnov's self-possession. He coolly reported to Kerensky that at the moment there was no corps and not even a division. They needed to be summoned, and it would take really much time. Proceeding towards the capital in small groups would be insane. Moreover, there was no infantry in the corps that was badly needed in order to occupy Petrograd. And Kerensky promised to send it — but the infantry would never show up.

The country still can be saved, there is a chance. Some resolution is needed in this critical moment. After all, Kerensky isn't just a politician and a demagogue, he is the commander-in-chief. His orders must be obeyed. But Kerensky has driven the honest generals that loved Russia out the army. And he has appointed General Cheremisov the Commander of the Northern Front to "shuffle" the 3rd cavalry division all over the outskirts of the capital. When Krasnov asks how come his order about sending the troops to Petrograd has been cancelled, Kerensky proceeds with the giveaway game and replies that General Cheremisov commands at the Northern Front, and he is in charge.

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[1] Yeliseyev F. With Kornilov's Cavalry. M.: AST, 2003. P. 122.

However, General Cheremisov won't talk with Kerensky after his overthrow, he is no longer interested in him. "The general didn't pretend to be interested in committing his future to the destiny of the "doomed" government,"[1] the prime minister wrote in his book "Gatchina."

On the other hand, General Cheremisov speaks rather frankly with Krasnov, who has come for help. The Cossack hetman delivers their conversation almost word by word in his book:

"The Provisional Government doesn't exist anymore," he (Cheremisov. — *N. S.*) said wearily. "I'm ordering you to detruck your echelons and remain in Ostrov. You've done enough. You can't do anything."

"Give me a written order," Krasnov demanded.

Cheremisov looked at him pitifully, shrugged his shoulders and said, "I truly advise you to stay in Ostrov and do nothing. This is for your own good."[2]

Shame on Krasnov, he didn't understand the hint. Wasn't he directly told that everything had been decided and he needed to keep cool? And that clown Kerensky wasn't worth Krasnov's time and life. But General Krasnov believed he served Russia, and the pathetic and tricky Alexander Kerensky in the fatal October 1917 was the head and leader of this country. General Cheremisov knew something else — he was aware that the matter of passing the power to Bolsheviks had already been settled. It was inevitable, and in the shadow of this destructive process, there were the powers that shouldn't be opposed for reasons of personal safety. That's why Cheremisov's look was so weary. He definitely knew more than he could say. The more knowledge, the more grief!

General Cheremisov's "odd" position becomes a little bit clearer if one knows that this glorious warrior was on trial for espionage in 1915, when he was a colonel. Some mysterious patrons saved and helped him off the hook.[1] Two years later he had to work out his debt: in the fall of 1917, Cheremisov secretly financed Bolsheviks' newspaper Okopnaya Pravda (Trench Truth).[2] Then he scattered the key 3rd cavalry corps and other Cossack divisions all over the north-western territories. Now he had to prevent any attempts at sending loyal troops to Petrograd. We can only guess who had helped General Cheremisov out in court. And a more interesting question is *why Kerensky chose that particular general to command the district so close to the capital.* We already know how the historians explain it — *by chance...*

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[1] Kerensky A. Gatchina. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.gatchina.tk/kerenski_a_f/kerenski_gatchina2.htm

[2] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front / White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 416.

In those October days everything hung by a thread: the destiny of the country, lives of millions that would burn in the fire of the Civil War, the fate of the future global political map. The newborn Soviet government was extremely weak. If the troops had attacked instantly, without any delay, they would have had great chances to succeed. But this could only work if you wanted to win and save the country from the imminent peril. If your objectives were different, you would play for time as long as possible.

Even here, on the verge of his political career, Kerensky continued to play along with his fellow landsman Ulyanov. For two solid days Krasnov waited for infantry enforcements promised by Kerensky, and the precious time was running out. They wouldn't come. Having understood that, Krasnov decided to act on his own. And he led his army towards Petrograd, "Six sotnias from the 9th regiment and four sotnias from the 10th regiment. They were weak sotnias consisting of 70 people each. There were only 700 horsemen — it was less than a regular regiment."[1]

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[1] Some cavalry captain that served in the headquarters of the 5th army used to invite his fellows to play cards at his place. "Both the officers arriving from the front and heading to the front took part in the game. Despite the prohibition law, there was enough wine and vodka at supper. When an officer fell unconscious, his luggage and pockets were searched; his papers and documents were thoroughly studied and sometimes even copied." They would try to recruit everyone who lost much money. One of the played out officers reported it to the counterintelligence. The captain appeared to be a German intelligence resident, and his spouse turned out to be a German spy. Cheremisov, who at that time was a colonel and served in the same headquarters, always took part in their debauchery. When this shop was closed, Cheremisov "wasn't interdicted for the period of the investigation and wasn't made to resign after it, but... was appointed the brigade commander in one of the infantry divisions" (Bonch-Bruevich M. All Power to the Soviets! M.: Voenizdat, 1958. P. 228).

[2] Denikin A. The Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. Paris, 1921. V. 2. P. 267.

It is time to summarize the outcomes of Alexander Kerensky's actions — the minister of justice, the chairman, the commander-in-chief.

*His balanced decisions, smart personnel politics, bold political maneuvering, uncompromising struggle against extremists and thorough support of his own army — all of it resulted in just 700 Cossacks rushing to suppress Bolsheviks' revolt.*

No one else wanted to fight for this "hero of the revolution," but this is what Kerensky worked for. He impersonated the power and the state. No one wanted to protect such a state, and that was why Bolsheviks seized power so easily — no one resisted. The people, tired of cataclysms, the army, ruined by the government, — none of them noticed that the old Russia became history along with the Provisional Government. The very Russia "we have lost" — through the efforts of Alexander Kerensky.

And yet, General Krasnov wasn't aware of it and headed for Petrograd with his "deadly" army of seven hundred soldiers. Just like General Ivanov attacked the city with a battalion of St. George Cross holders in February 1917. The revolution once again was in terrible danger. This was what the leaflets and the front pages of the left newspapers yelled about. No one could have imagined that Kerensky could have been so "good," that's why the number of Krasnov's soldiers was exaggerated to dozens of thousands there.

"Historical" books and schoolbooks of today say that the Cossack troops tried to stop Bolsheviks. And the authors, just as usual, will fail to indicate how much Cossacks there were in Krasnov's unit...

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 411.

The very first battles that took place on the approaches to the city indicated that soldiers of both sides weren't eager to shoot at each other. It was really unusual for the Russian soldiers to shoot at the Russian Cossacks, but Krasnov had ridiculously little forces. Even having learnt about the revolt of the junkers in Petrograd, Krasnov was unable to proceed further than Tsarskoye Selo. He simply didn't have enough soldiers to guard the prisoners, so they just released everyone. Krasnov didn't even think of shooting them down.[1] He was old-fashioned and wasn't aware that this would become the new way of dealing with things...

Instead of the promised enforcement, the "allies" once again appeared on the stage in this critical moment for Russia. Krasnov wrote, "In the evening the French General Nissel arrived in Gatchina from the General Headquarters. He had a long conversation with Kerensky and then invited me. I told Nissel that I believed the situation was hopeless. If they had given us at least one foreign battalion, we could have used it to make the garrisons of Tsarskoye Selo and Petrograd obey the government by force. But Nissel heard me out, said nothing and hastily left."[2]

And why not leave — the "allies" had fulfilled all their plans in regard to Russia's destruction. There is only one question left — why did the French general come to Kerensky, who was staying in Tsarskoye Selo with several hundreds of Cossacks? He could have asked how Kerensky was doing on the phone, and it wasn't worth risking his life while passing the combat formations of the Red Army and the revolutionary sailors. It was hard to be sure that some excessively hot "brethren" wouldn't shoot down the "allied" general. Could the French military attache have come to offer help? It would have been really welcome: a single battalion, and the entire Russian history could be different. In a couple of days, Bolsheviks would offer the Germans to make peace. This was a non-reversible disaster, and France couldn't have let it happen. Losing an ally meant reinforcing the enemy. Could the brave Parisian general have discussed this matter with Kerensky, could he have been contemplating how to help the Provisional Government and himself?

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 424.

[2] Ib. P. 423.

Alas, no. Nissel simply left, saying nothing to Krasnov, but Kerensky grinned and made a helpless gesture, "There you go... I have hoped Nissel would help us, but he declared that *France didn't want to interfere with the Russian internal affairs*."[1]

Can you imagine that? They didn't want to interfere! They all were fatalists in Paris: whether we have Russian "allies" that have saved France twice in this war with their bones or we don't is a matter of luck. The Lord has given us allies, and Lenin has taken them away, so it goes. It's hardly possible that General Nissel risked his life only to share this political revelation with Kerensky that had lost his power. And of course, it was the bad news that drastically improved Kerensky's spirits.

Naturally, behind the closed doors, the French general discussed with Kerensky the details of his transportation to a safer place. Nissel once again confirmed the security guarantees previously announced by the "allies" and reassured the miserable Russian leader that he had a serene future ahead. That's why Kerensky was shining like a polished samovar, though it really was the time to cry. All the talk about help was nothing more than a performance played for Krasnov and the others.

General Nissel left, and Kerensky followed him, having appointed Krasnov the commander of the non-existent army right before the curtain fell. He disappeared but left a notice. Hastily the head of the Russian Democratic Republic wrote, "Hereby I lay down my title of the chairman and pass all my rights and liabilities associated with this post to the Provisional Government.

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[1] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 424.

A. Kerensky. 1.XI.-17."[1] Considering that all the members of the government were imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, we'll see that in fact *Kerensky officially abdicated in favor of the new head of the Bolshevik government, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.*

Of course, the act of his abdication was of non-official kind, but a fact is a fact. Instead of calling the forces loyal to the government to fight the usurpers, he simply fled in an unknown direction and didn't leave any official banner for the anti-Bolshevik forces. Both Bolsheviks and their antagonists were equally illegal from that moment. The Constitutional Assembly would have been the only legal power authority, but it was to convene only in January 1918. That's why the real struggle against Bolsheviks started only after they had dissolved the "Constituent Assembly," but until that moment everyone temporized. Even with his flight Kerensky for the last time helped his compatriot Ulyanov to hold on and stay on through the most difficult weeks right after Bolsheviks had seized power.

Krasnov's memoirs are full of desperation and complete despair, "At night alarming telegrams arrived from Moscow and Smolensk. There were slaughterous fights going on there, and not a single soldier stood up for the Provisional Government. We were alone and betrayed by everyone..."[2]

In less than a year, on April 13, 1918, General Kornilov heroically died during the siege of Yekaterinodar by units of the Volunteer Army. After the Whites withdrew, the Reds unearthed Kornilov's body from the grave. His corpse would be identified and taken to Yekaterinodar (Krasnodar), undressed in the presence of many people and hung up on a tree. Then the drunken commissars chopped Lavr Kornilov's body with their sabers, trampled over it, covered it with straw and burnt it. May the memory of him live forever!

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[1] Kerensky A. Gatchina. M.: Panorama, 1992; http://www.gatchina.tk/kerenski_a_f/kerenski_gatchina2.htm

[2] Krasnov P. In the Domestic Front // White Movement. M.: Vagrius, 2006. P. 441.

Some time later General Krasnov would experience the solidness and price of the British word first-hand. It would be much later — after World War 2, Britain extradited him to the USSR, and on January 17, 1947, he was hung up in Moscow, in the yard of Lefortovo prison.

A couple of weeks later, the former Emperor and now a regular citizen Nicholas Romanov wrote in his diary, "November 17. Friday. The weather remains as unpleasant, the wind is strong. It is sickening to read in the newspapers what happened two weeks ago in Petrograd and Moscow! It is much worse and disgraceful than the events of the new time of troubles."[1]

Only eight months had passed since his abdication. The new time of troubles had started in Russia already eight months ago, and now the country was on the verge of the Civil War...

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[1] Diaries and documents from the personal archives of Nicholas II. Minsk: Kharvest, 2003. P. 77.

# CHAPTER 9

# Why Lenin Was in Such a Rush to Seize Power

> If there was neither Lenin nor me in Petersburg, there wouldn't have been any October Revolution, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party would have prevented it...
>
> *L. Trotsky*

> The state must be saved by whatever means it can. The only means that is unconstitutional is that which leads to the ruin of the state.
>
> *M. Robespierre*

This is how Ilyich finished the speech he made at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets right after he seized power, "In Russia now, we have to begin the construction of the proletarian socialist state. Long live the World Socialist Revolution!"

But just two weeks before that Lenin had written something completely different. Then his nerves were highly strung. At that time, he managed everything — creating new slogans and making impressive speeches in the meetings, as well as convincing the ones in doubt and literally dragging them into the bright future by the scruffs of their necks. He was in a rush, in a terrible rush. We can read it in Lenin's letter with a clear and explicit title, "Bolsheviks Have to Seize Power."

The letter is addressed to the Central Committee, as well as the Petrograd and Moscow Committees of RSDRP(b)[1].

"Why do Bolsheviks have to seize power right now? Because the upcoming surrender of Petrograd will make our chances a hundred times less. And we can't prevent the surrender of Petrograd with the army headed by Kerensky and Co. So, we can't "wait" for the Constituent Assembly because in view of the surrender of Petrograd by Kerensky and Co it can be disrupted at any moment. Only after we seize the power, our party can guarantee the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and after seizing power we will accuse the other parties of delay and substantiate this charge."[2]

The nervousness of Lenin's writing is obvious. The main question is, *"Why do Bolsheviks have to seize power right now?"* Lenin is in a hurry, he knows that power has to be seized *immediately*. But this unnecessary rush should be concealed. The wider public will not understand it; they fail to understand it already, as they haven't managed to understand many other things before. He's fed up! He can't reveal all the truth to them, and therefore he has to invent some outrageous excuses for his comrades.

Everything is at stake — the revolution, the country and, perhaps, the destiny of the whole world. But he is the only one who understands it. He and maybe Trotsky, nobody else. Some take his word, they follow their leader, but he still sees misunderstanding deep in their eyes. Why now? Why are we in such a rush?

On October 10 (23), at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party, Ilyich sensed some "indifference towards the issue of the uprisal."[3] Lenin's nerves are not made of steel, he's getting emotional. And his anxiety and nervousness trenching upon despair are spilled on paper like invisible ink.

**"Letter to the Members of the Central Committee of the RSDRP (b)"**

"Comrades, I am writing these lines on the eve of the 24th day, the situation is utterly critical. It is more than clear now that postponing the uprisal is really self-defeating. I am doing my best to convince my comrades that *everything is hanging on a thread now*, that we need to consider the issues that can't be resolved in meetings and congresses (even if these are the Congresses of Soviets) — they can only be resolved by people, crowds, and by the struggle of the armed crowds only... We can't wait!!! We can lose everything!!! The history will not forgive any delay to the revolutionaries who can win (and will surely win) today, risking losing a lot tomorrow, risking losing everything. *The seizure of power is a matter of the uprisal; its political goal will be revealed after the seizure.* Waiting for the vote of the ones in doubt on October 25 is a self-defeating formality; the people have the right and can resolve such issues not by voting but by force. The government hesitates. It is necessary to finish it off by whatever means we have! *Any delay of the action is self-defeating!*"[1]

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[1] The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (of Bolsheviks).

[2] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949. V. 26. P. 1–2.

[3] Ib.

If Ilyich was insincere before, if he invented different unrealistic stories, now he openly says, and not just says — he shouts that the power must be seized! Everything is hanging on a thread! We can lose everything! And then he calls his comrades not to ask unnecessary questions, not to doubt, and not to waste precious time at the meetings and congresses. Lenin says quite openly that "the political objective" of seizing the power "will be revealed after it." First, we will come to power, and then our objective will become clear. Our objective isn't yet clear to you, comrade Zinoviev, is it? But it's not a problem, old man. Let's seize power first, and then I'll tell you why we did it.

We'll leave Vladimir Ilyich alone with his doubts and concerns and ask ourselves just one question. The answer to it is more than interesting. The answer to it is frightening, as it discloses the secret of whence the bane of the revolution fell upon our country. *Where is Vladimir Ilyich hurrying to?*

Let's think about it. If a political force is desperately pushing forward to fulfil its political plans, it means that another force can disrupt their implementation. Lenin is in a rush to seize power, so there must be a risk that Lenin's plan would be disrupted. Who can prevent him from leading Russia to October 1917?

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[1] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949. V. 26. P. 204.

We have listed all his hypothetical enemies below.

- the "bourgeois" Provisional Government;
- the military overthrow;
- the monarchist plot;
- the German offensive and occupation of Russia;
- interference of the "allies."

Let's analyze how real each of all these threats was.

1. *The power of the Provisional Government* rapidly degraded; it was literally falling apart by the minute. Russia was governed by Kerensky, who was doing his best to help Bolsheviks. More and more socialists and extremists of all kinds made their way to the government. Lenin could see it perfectly well. He could simply wait till the power, retained so unskillfully, would fall to Bolsheviks' feet like a ripe fruit. After all, the government either stood still or assisted and played along to its annihilators until its very last minute.

2. The only real threat to Lenin, *the military overthrow*, was no longer so frightening due to Kerensky's efforts. General Kornilov was defamed and arrested with the support of the head of the Provisional Government. Kornilov's closest associates were either arrested, or shot themselves dead. The army was combed-out. All unreliable generals were fired or actually sent away. The military overthrow was completely ruled out. There were no leaders, no organization, and no motivation, too.

(It may seem funny, but after the October Revolution Bolsheviks will sort Kerensky along with Lavr Kornilov. That is what they will write in their proclamations, "Soldiers, render active resistance to Kornilovist Kerensky!" It sounds as funny as "Trotskist Stalin!" But who will bother checking?..)

3. There was no trace of *monarchist plots* in 1917. Even the most meticulous historians found a slightest hint of such an opportunity. We'll also brush it aside.

4. *The Germans* also can't be considered a threat to the seizure of power by Bolsheviks. After all, it was they who have

brought Lenin to Russia, and all his actions are aimed to weaken Russia.

Hence Germans just benefited from it. And the German officers, who arrived in the "sealed" train, helped to organize the rebellion. "The upcoming surrender of Petrograd" to the Germans, which Ilyich mentions in the letters to his comrades, should not surprise us. Neither Kerensky nor Kornilov had such plans, there were no such plans at all. The surrender of the city was simply tweaked, it existed only in Lenin's imagination and served as an excuse for his incomprehensible rush. And the Germans were not at all going to capture the Russian capital. Lenin knew it perfectly well, he simply invented a good excuse to ginger up his feckless comrades-in-arms, and later this fact started to migrate from one book to the other. At first, he tried to scare the proletariat and revolutionary democrats using Kornilov, and then he began to intimidate them with the German skewer. All of this was getting even more convenient since Lenin was more familiar with German plans than anyone else. The July Bolshevik uprisal was remarkably in line with our offensive at the front and the subsequent counter-attack of the Germans. Bolsheviks weakened the country and the army by their actions, hindering them would be very strange on the part of the Germans.

5. *Our valiant "allies"* were not able to disturb Lenin for the same reason as the Germans. They also benefited from his actions. Besides, there were neither free divisions nor plans to attack. This threat was not real at all. And that is why Lenin never mentions it.

An interesting picture we see here — Leninists have no real enemies inside the country, as the ruling class is split and dysfunctional. Everything is going perfectly well with the external world, the Germans love them dearly, and the "allies" do not interfere with anything. There is no threat, and as weeks go by, Bolsheviks are getting stronger. Bolsheviks are gaining power slowly but steadily, and the further they push the less obstacles remain on their path. It seems reasonable to grow patient and wait for some time but the ingenious Lenin is still in a rush, and he continuously urges his comrades, he hurries and hastens, and "any delay of the action is self-defeating!" But why so?

We need to ask the leader of the world proletariat himself.

*"We've defeated Kerensky's gangs and seized the power so easily, we've implemented the decree on the socialization of the land and the rule of the workers, and we've only managed to it just because some specially established conditions protected us from the international imperialism for a short time."*[1]

This is what Vladimir Ilyich will write later. Everything happened as if in a fairy tale; "specially established conditions" helped Lenin to seize power. The international "allied" imperialism was looking at it calmly, as it had established these convenient "special conditions" for Bolsheviks. But the "allies" asked for something in return...

Nothing happens in this world for no reason. To get the opportunity to seize power in order to obtain the money and loyalty of the Provisional Government, Lenin had to undertake certain commitments. And these are worth mentioning.

*Everything is clear with the "German" obligations — Lenin has promised to take Russia out of the war.* All the contemporary publications mention Bolsheviks' "debts" to the Germans, completely forgetting about their obligations to the "allies." You become convinced that they existed while analyzing how Paris, London, and Washington reacted to the escalating Russian Civil War. We have to once again look at the sinister plan to ruin Russia, developed by our "allies" form the Entente. A part of their plot, as we have already seen, was brilliantly implemented by Kerensky. The final stage has begun. To implement this part, they prepared Lenin. They wanted to use him, and he, in turn, was getting ready to take the advantage of a unique moment and carry out the revolution, which would be absolutely impossible in any other situation.

**Lenin undertook only one commitment towards the "allies." HE WAS TO DISRUPT THE LEGITIMACY OF THE RUSSIAN POWER!**

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[1] Stalin I. Problems of Leninism. M.: OGIZ, 1939. P. 37

It is a very interesting and completely unexplored issue. It is the key to understanding Lenin's rush. It is the answer many historians are looking for. In October 1917, the only legitimate power in Russia was the Provisional Government.

Its only mission was to convene the Constituent Assembly, which after the abdication of Nicholas and Michael had to determine the further order in the country. The Provisional Government was just a leading force which had to push the country to the elections. Instead, it pushed the country over the edge, but that is another book.

*To finally destroy Russia, the "allies" prepared a small legal mishap, the total absence of legitimate power!* After all, no matter how bad the Provisional Government was, only Lenin openly opposed it! Kornilov lost just because he was not going to overthrow the "Provisionalists," he just wanted to purge the government of spies and traitors. All the other revolutionaries and separatists of different kinds in the vast Russian Empire-Republic only dared to speak about autonomy and national military formations. It is both morally and legally difficult to call directly for the legitimate government overthrow. By doing so you automatically become a rebel and a criminal. But when there is no government at all, it is a very different story. Well, of course, it is there, *but it's not legitimate, and it is not necessary to obey it!*

That's the situation that was prepared for our country. After the overthrow of the Kerensky's government by Bolsheviks, the Constituent Assembly remained the only legitimate governmental authority. Bolsheviks had to stay "on the throne" until its convocation and then successfully disperse the people's representatives. After they eliminated the Constituent Assembly, there would be the total legal vacuum, as there would no longer be any legal government in the country. Can you imagine Russia, so vast and boundless, and no government at all? The Tsar has abdicated the throne, just as his brother, Kerensky has receded. The Provisional Government has been dispersed, its members have been imprisoned; the deputies of the Constitutive Assembly have been dismissed. From Vladivostok to Helsinki and from Murmansk to Central Asia there is no government structure respected and recognized. But you can't live without a government or a state, you can't allow any vacuum in the life of the society. So, formation of the new government structures has to begin in all these vast territories, and it has to begin spontaneously and at once. What does it mean? It guarantees the inevitable clash of the new structures, confrontation and struggle between them. It means chaos, anarchy, and civil war. It is about death, hunger, and ordeals. Everything taken together means the end of the country. Here we have the logical end of the plan of "allies" — ruination of Russia.

To disrupt the power legitimacy the overthrow should have been carried out not "when it is possible" but at the exact time. *Lenin hurried to seize power before voting for the Constituent Assembly began. On the other hand, he had to make it before the opening of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets.*

Lenin had to seize power before the voting papers were put down the ballot boxes for one more reason — he had no other pretext to seize it! The whole country was waiting for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The only thing that the masses could understand at that moment was that they needed some government to hold the elections and ensure the future convocation of the main state authority. It meant voting "in favor," not "against!" Being an ingenious politician, Lenin was to seize power under the banner of supporting the Constituent Assembly in order to dismiss it later! That is why in his letters to his comrades Lenin calls to seize power to provide for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Actually, Ilyich calls Bolsheviks to play the role of the Provisional Government, which means to carry out the election process. But in fact, Lenin did not need the elections, he needed the revolution.

To finally dispel our doubts, we will check the dates:

- voting to the Constituent Assembly — November 12 (25)
- the Great October Socialist Revolution — October 25 (November 7), 1917

Here, Lenin managed to get ahead of the elections and buy almost two weeks of free time. But he was almost late for the second date, the opening of the Second Congress of Soviets. Do you remember the First Congress of Soviets in June, where Ulyanov and Kerensky spoke amicably, one after another? Before its closing, October 25 (November 7) was chosen as the opening date of the next Congress.

It is an "amazing" coincidence that the Bolshevik Revolution took place on this exact day! However, historical "miracles" don't happen on their own! The history of our revolutions is not an exception. Lenin had to seize power not in general, but before an exact date. He had to do it quickly and accurately, not wasting any time for explanations and persuasions. Otherwise, the whole contribution of his actions into the plan of the "allies" would be lost. That is why the "delay is self-defeating." If he had seized power a week later, the "allied" friends would have said he hadn't fulfilled his obligations. But if you make it in the specified time, everything will come without a hitch. First, both the Germans and the "allies" will help you, or at least will stay out of your way. Second, almost nobody will oppose you inside the country (at least, at the beginning). In other words, there will be time to look around and gain a footing. "Specially established conditions" should be used to the fullest extent. Lenin needs this revolution not to flee abroad after grabbing some gold and not to ruin the Russian Empire, he needs it to make his unrealizable fancy of building the new socialist state come true.

You can't seize power after the elections. It's better to do it before, in good time. The coup is a complicated thing, and you can't be late with it. At first, in July nobody was ready. Then, the August Kornilov Putch interfered with their plans. Finally, in October they were thoroughly prepared but they had to be confident of success. The stakes were too high. If the action fails, both the "allies" and the Germans may turn their backs on Bolsheviks. They will start looking for other executors to fulfil their plans. Then miracles may stop, and Lenin's "brilliant" foresight might fail...

No, they couldn't take such risks. They arranged a repetition in Tashkent. And there, everything almost failed because of the resistance offered by a single Cossack regiment. It resisted so energetically that Ilyich' comrades panicked again. Then he had to assure them repeatedly that everything would be fine and they would be able to win. And again he was right, the Cossacks got a telegram from Kerensky, who demanded that they made peace. During the war with Germany, you can't spill fraternal blood, and so on. Having obeyed Kerensky, the Cossacks left Tashkent and withdrew to the fortress; Bolsheviks surrounded it with heavy artillery overnight, and in the morning they began bombarding it. The Cossacks could do nothing but go out without their horses and surrender. They were caught and brutally murdered, the officers' eyes were poked out...

And Bolsheviks made their own conclusions for the future. In Petrograd, there will be a treaty with the Cossacks, and they remain neutral, so the seizure of power will go within reasonable limits.

However, thorough preparation took time. And Lenin had very little of it. Minutes were slipping through his fingers like sand trickling in a sand glass. Lenin hurried, and yet he couldn't manage it until he got some help again... And the help came from Kerensky. Now it is not mentioned too often but initially the voting for the Constituent Assembly was scheduled for *September 17 (30), 1917.* This date was announced only in mid-June. However, in August the terms were changed. "With regard to the worsening situation in the country," the Provisional Government postponed the election of the Constituent Assembly till November 12 (25). The date of its convocation changed, respectively, from September 30 (October 13) to November 28 (December 11), 1917.[1] Later, the convocation was postponed again, till January 5 (18), 1918. This was the time gain which allowed Lenin to make the revolution...

An indicative example of the true reasons of Lenin's rush to carry out his armed uprisal is a well-known story of Kamenev's and Zinoviev's "betrayal," when they "revealed" the party's plans to the enemy. Ilyich had everything ready to seize the power. Everything… except for the Bolshevik party. To be exact, except its intelligent part. The gnawing suspicion tortured everyone who could think on his own. Why organize an uprisal on the verge of the elections?

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[1] Milyukov P. History of the Second Russian Revolution. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 290–291.

And it was not a secret to anyone including local gamins that there will be an uprisal. Frankly speaking, no Bolshevik made a secret of it, including Vladimir Ilyich himself.

At the end of September, Lenin writes a work titled "Will Bolsheviks Retain State Power."[1] It is quite clear from the title that the seizure of power is a foregone conclusion and Lenin refers to the success or failure of this affair. The final decision was made on October 10 (23), at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Party. Everybody except Kamenev and Zinoviev voted in favor of the seizure. And after the decision was made, the participants of the meeting assigned the Military and Revolutionary Committee, which quietly seized power and jailed the ministers of the Provisional Government in the Peter and Paul Fortress two weeks later.

This is what Trotsky spoke about the level of secrecy maintained by Bolsheviks on the second anniversary of the October Revolution in 1919, "I am trying to recall another rebellion that was openly and preemptively slated for a specific date and then successfully carried out in due time."[2] Actually, in Trotsky's memoirs, "My Life," the "dark secret" is mentioned many times, "People talked about the rebellion, they discussed it everywhere, in the street, in canteens, and during the meetings on the stairs of Smolny."[3]

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[1] This work contains an interesting extract which fully contradicts another popular Lenin's citation saying that every cook can govern the state, "We are not Utopists. We know that any worker and any cook can't start governing the state at once" (Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949. V. 26. P. 89).

[2] Trotsky L. The Recollections About the October Coup; http://www. i-u/ru/biblio/archibe/trockiy_1/02.aspx

[3] Trotsky L. My Life; http://www.1917.com/Marxism/Trotsky/My_life/My_life-00-02-06.html

So, everyone is already waiting for the armed Bolshevik uprisal, everyone knows about it. At the same time, on October 18 (31), an interview with Kamenev was published in The Novaya Zhizn Newspaper; in this interview he spoke about his (and Zinoviev's) opposition to the decision of the Central Committee of the party concerning the armed uprisal. The idea of those who disagreed with Lenin's course was simple — why take a risk if the power can be obtained through the elections?

"Our party has more than good chances at the elections to the Constituent Assembly," Kamenev wrote. "We consider the rumors that the authority of Bolshevism is fading absolutely groundless. These statements of our political opponents are nothing more than political posturing in an effort to provoke Bolsheviks' action under the conditions favorable for our enemies. The influence of Bolshevism is growing. Huge groups of workers get captured by it. With the right tactics, we will be able to get a third of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, or even more."[1]

On the same day, speaking in the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky said, "Everybody says that we are preparing to seize power. We make little secret of this matter..."[2]

Lenin's reaction to the speeches of his closest associates concerning the uprisal is amazing and inexplicable. *He pays no attention to Trotsky's direct utterances from the stand of the Petrograd Soviet, but he hails all his rage upon Kamenev and Zinoviev!* On October 20 (November 2), Lenin writes a letter to the Central Committee concerning the "treacherous behavior" of his comrades-in-arms. The Central Committee condemns Kamenev and Zinoviev and henceforth forbids them to make any statements opposing the decisions made by the party. Then Ilyich answers Zinoviev and Kamenev in writing. "The Letter to the Comrades," an extensive work of 20 pages, is being published for three (!) days in the three issues of the Rabochy Put Newspaper, "I openly say that I no longer consider these two my comrades and I will fight for their exclusion from the Party by all means,"[1] writes the proletarian leader.

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[1] Protocols of the Central Committee of RSDRP(b), August 1917 — February 1918. P. 92.

[2] Denikin A. Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/denikin 02/chapt12.htm

There are quite many condemning epithets, "Unexpected hesitation that can have a destructive impact on the Party…

These two comrades have completely lost their principles."[2] It often happens to Lenin that in the heat of polemics he doesn't mince his words, cursing those who have given away Bolsheviks' plans. But does he refute it later? Not at all.

*Having relieved his feelings in the printed battle, Lenin himself gives an open and complete justification for the necessity of an immediate armed uprisal, the "secret" of which has been "given away" by his comrades!*[3]

And after the October (which is in just one week!), Kamenev, one of those who "lost the principles" will head the VTsIK (Translator's note: The All-Union Executive Committee), called to supervise the work of the Soviet government — the Council of the People's Commissars, headed by Lenin. Some more time will pass, and Kamenev will become the chairman of the Moscow Council of Deputies. At the same time, Zinoviev will become the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and the Comintern Executive Committee.

Only one week passed, and there is no trace of the "terrible" contradictions and the "horrible betrayal." Bolshevik leaders are together again. Why is fanatically stubborn Lenin so inconsistent in his struggle against the traitors and renegades? Why did he so quickly forgive the *"traitors," "strikebreakers," "scoundrels," "swindlers," "liars," "fugitives," and "criminals,"* who "gave away the decision of their party to organize an armed uprisal to Rodzianko and Kerensky?" Why five years later, on December 24, 1922, in his "Letter to the Congress, " being in fact his political will, Lenin wrote, "The October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was certainly not an accident, but they should be as little blamed for it as Trotsky's is blamed for his non-Bolshevism"?

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[1] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949, V. 26. P. 168–184.

[2] Ib.

[3] In the end of the article Lenin addresses his slow-witted comrades with a sardonical request, "Sing us a song against the military plot!" (the italics is Lenin's).

Lenin writes it as he knows perfectly well that the harmful (for the uprisal) conduct of Kamenev and Zinoviev is caused not by their scoundrelism and betrayal but by their desire to carry out the revolution in the best way possible.

Kamenev and Zinoviev need to come to power in the simplest and most bloodless way possible. As for *Lenin, he should not just seize power — he needs to disrupt its legitimacy!*

He has clear deadlines and specific obligations to the "allies." How can he explain to his over-principled comrades that the "specially established conditions" for the revolution are only valid for now and that Kerensky will behave so oddly and play "giveaway" only while he is instructed to do so? If his masters change their position, Bolsheviks will be swatted in no time. It can't be explained. Therefore, Zinoviev, who had stayed with Ilyich in his tent in Razliv, just like Kamenev fails to understand the underlying causes of Lenin's actions. Not realizing the true motives of their leader, they sincerely believe that Lenin is making a mistake.

That is why Kamenev and Zinoviev are trying to warn Lenin against the fatal delusion, and writing in the newspaper that "in view of the given co-relation of forces and just a few days before the Congress of Soviets, seizing power would be disastrous for the proletariat." They do not understand that it is the only possible way to seize power. But it doesn't reduce their dedication to the cause of the Party.

There was no treachery, that's why Lenin appoints both "traitors" to the key positions only a week after their "betrayal." He worries so much because he can't afford to reveal his weakness and the weakness of his party to the external parties. How, dear Lenin, will you make a revolution and fulfil your obligations if you can't deal with the Central Committee of your own party?

That's the question that the "allied" emissaries will ask Lenin, that the German officers who have arrived in the "sealed" car to help with the uprisal will repeat. That's why Ilyich came across Zinoviev and Kamenev.

Lenin did it also because his nerves would not bear further strain. At last, the final and the most important days have come for him. If the October uprisal fails, there can be no other chance to do it. It is very important that we understood HIS terrible tension on these October days. He had to convince his hesitating associates, prepare the uprisal, and establish the Military and Revolutionary Committee. And when everything seemed to be ready, the restless Kamenev and Zinoviev opened a discussion in the press!

The date of the action changed several times. The uprisal was first planned for October 20, and Petrograd was filled with rumors and speculations. Many locals left the city on that day. Others didn't dare to leave their houses, the streets were half empty. But there was no Bolshevik action, something went wrong, and the last sand grain almost trickled down in the hourglass of history.

Later people on the streets said that the uprisal was planned for October 21. But then Verkhovsky, the minister of defense, makes an unexpected statement at the meeting of the Provisional Government: he openly says that the army can't fight any longer and it is necessary to save the country, which requires making separate peace with Germany.[1] It is a disaster for Lenin; if the government makes peace or at least declares its desire to begin negotiations, Ilyich will lose his last trump card. He can't afford this. Therefore, Kerensky is playing "giveaway" again and makes Verkhovsky resign. There will be no negotiations. However, even banal rumors about them are highly undesirable. When the Obschee Delo Newspaper had found out about the suggestion of the defense minister and labeled him a traitor and a renegade, it was... *immediately closed by the Provisional Government to the surprise of its publishers!*[2]

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[1] Verkhovsky A. At the Hard Passage. M.: Voenizdat, 1959. P. 394.

[2] Ib.

The rumors continue to travel persistently all around Petrograd, people say the Bolshevik uprisal will take place on Sunday, October 22 (November 4). But October 22 is the Kazan Holy Lady memorial day, and the Cossack regiments arranged a prayer for the salvation of the Motherland and a mass procession around the city on that day. Cossacks can't be messed up with, and Bolsheviks have to postpone the uprisal once again. So, the date was changed several times until at last the Great October Revolution took place on October 25 (November 7).

Only Ilyich's iron will could unite the Bolshevik Party and force it to follow the path of the victorious uprisal from the beginning to the end. At the very last moment, Lenin managed to accomplish what the "allies" expected him to do. And he entered the conference hall of the Second Congress of Soviets as a triumphant. A few hours before the opening of the Congress, on the evening of October 25, Bolsheviks had overthrown the Provisional Government. Thus, the Congress of Soviets was confronted with an accomplished fact. And it made a number of decisions that were extremely helpful for Vladimir Ilyich in his attempts to retain power and disguise his true intentions.

*"The Decree on the establishment of the workers' and peasants' government, October 26, 1917.*

*The All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of the Workers,' Soldiers,' and Peasants' Deputies enacts to establish the temporary workers' and peasants' government, which will rule the country, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly that will be referred to as the Soviet of the People's Commissars... Soviet Chairman, Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin)..."*[1]

The decree was adopted. The ruling power changed, but just like its predecessor it demonstrated its "provisionality" in every possible way. People patiently waited for the Constituent Assembly and the voting, they just did not want to go into any political details concerning the successive governments.

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[1] Decrees of the Soviet Government. M.: State political press, 1957. V. 1.

Another passionate fighter for the people's happiness, Comrade Trotsky, got the position of the foreign minister in Lenin's "Provisional Government." Now he could communicate with his "allied" curators officially. And they should be satisfied, as the process of ruining Russia was going with the unexpectedly high speed.

*"The Decree of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, October 26, 1917.*

*To all provincial and local Soviets of Workers,' Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All power from now belongs to the Soviets.*

*The commissars of the Provisional Government are suspended. The chairmen of the Soviets shall communicate directly with the revolutionary government. The Decree of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets also enacts to release all the arrested members of the land committees. The commissars who arrested them are subject to arrest."*[1]

*"The Decree of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, October 26, 1917.*

*The All-Russian Congress of Soviets enacts to terminate the death penalty on active service restored by Kerensky. Absolute freedom of agitation is restored up the line. All soldiers and revolutionary officers who are under arrest for so-called "political crimes" must be immediately released."*[2]

Can you imagine the strength of the Russian soldiers who continued to defend Russia despite Order Number One and the Declaration of the Soldier's Rights that made Bolsheviks return to this issue once again? That little what Kornilov managed to do was leveled to the ground. Kerensky suspended the death penalty, and Lenin abolished it completely. At the front there was absolute "freedom of agitation" instead of protection of Motherland!

The correct tactics, chosen by Ilyich, led to the almost bloodless uprisal. It was yet unclear in what respects Bolsheviks were better than the "Provisionalists," and in what respects they were worse. But they shouted at every street corner that "the aim of the October Revolution was to ensure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly"; so far it was the cadets who prevented it from being convened. One revolutionary government was replaced by another, the goals didn't change, and the Constituent Assembly should be convened. So, why and what for should one oppose Bolsheviks?

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[1] Decrees of the Soviet Government. M.: State political press, 1957. V. 1.

[2] Ib.

An article in the Rabochy i Soldat Newspaper, dated October 26 (November 8), is an eloquent testimony of the attitude prevailing among the military.

"Yesterday, at a meeting of the regimental committees of the 1st, 4th, and 14th Don Cossack regiments a statement was made concerning the situation that had arisen in connection with the fall of the Provisional Government. For the sake of the state, the Cossacks were urged to calmly await the establishment of the new state authority. In response, the chairman on behalf of the audience stated that, 1) the Cossacks will not execute the orders of the Provisional Government, 2) they will not oppose the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Petrograd Soviet under any circumstances, and 3) they are ready to protect the state property and provide personal security services, as they did under the former government."[1]

Wait and do nothing. This was the decision of the Cossacks Krasnov had relied on coming to Petrograd with his "army" of 700 people. It happened at a very important moment, crucial for the Russian history. Then all the enemies and the ill-wishers of Russia should have stood up and given Kerensky a round of applause. It's his doing. That was he who helped Bolsheviks to win the neutrality of the Cossacks with his treachery in Tashkent and all his frenzied actions. The Cossacks in Petrograd stayed neutral. For the short time of his reign, Kerensky pestered the citizens of the country so much that no one came to defend him later. On the day of the uprisal the Provisional Government was sending desperate telegrams asking for help — but all in vain. The people and the army remained indifferent.

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[1] Starilov N. Chronicles of the Revolution; http://lib.irismedia.org/sait/lib_ru/lib.ru/newproza/starilow/revolution.txt.htm

The terrible apathy and indifference that overtook the entire population of the country, and the smart tactics invented by Ilyich helped Bolsheviks to hold on for the most difficult first days and weeks. Nobody believed they would succeed and they really lucked out with that. One of the Bolshevik leaders, Anatoly Lunacharsky, wrote to his wife two days after the uprisal, on October 27 (November 9), “Dear Anuta! Of course, you know all the details of the uprisal from the newspapers. *But for me, it was a surprise.* Of course, I knew that the struggle for the rule of the Soviets would take place *but I believe, nobody knew that power would be seized on the eve of the Congress.* Maybe, the Military and Revolutionary Committee decided to launch the offensive so suddenly, fearing that the defensive position would kill them and ruin the whole cause. The uprisal was also a surprise for me in terms of how easily it was carried out. Even our enemies say, “That’s a hot shot!”[1]

Bunin in his “Cursed Days” writes, “Lunacharsky had his eyes wide-open for about two weeks after the uprisal, just think, we wanted to arrange a small demonstration but succeeded so unexpectedly!”[2]

Nobody was going to interfere with Bolsheviks, everyone was waiting for them to collapse on their own. Open some memoirs from that period, and you’ll see that people unanimously believed that the Bolshevik rule would last for two weeks maximum, and collapse afterwards. Such ideas may seem naive and ridiculous to us, as we know that Communism had stood in Russia for almost 75 years. One of the White movement leaders, Anton Denikin, agrees with such estimation, “These “two weeks” are nothing more but the fruit of intellectual romanticism…”[3] Albeit his

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[1] From Lunacharsky’s letters to his wife; http://his95.narod.ru/doc02/541.htm

[2] Bunin I. The Cursed Days; http://az.lib.ru/b/bunin_i_a/text_2262.shtml

[3] Denikin A. Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles. P. 322.

"Sketches on the Russian Time of Troubles" were written much later, in emigration in Belgium and Hungary, in 1922. In October 1917, "two weeks" of existence seemed quite enough for the new regime. At least, the majority thought so. For most people, these "two weeks" of the Bolshevik rule were an excellent alternative to struggling against the usurpers of power and a chance to put an end to their scruples. And then Bolsheviks should have collapsed. We are aware that they didn't, and Lenin as a leader and a politician deserves some credit for that.

What can express any moment in history better that newspapers? Let's read the periodicals of those days. The newspaper Izvestia SRSD (Translator's note: Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies) wrote right after the uprisal, "This gamble is insane. It's not the transfer of power to the Soviets but the seizure of power by Bolsheviks. They will not be able to manage the state."

The Novaya Zhizn Newspaper is no less critical in its assessments, "The Bolshevik government can't rule Russia, it cranks out decrees but all of them remain on paper; these decrees are nothing more than newspaper headlines; Bolshevik leaders have demonstrated startling ignorance in governing the country." The Rabochaya Gazeta says the same, "It's necessary to make Bolsheviks capitulate peacefully, to isolate them and thereby secure a bloodless victory over them."[1] A similar point of view can be read between the lines of the Delo Naroda Newspaper, "After the rip-roaring October revolution the winners start to flee from the Bolshevik state ship. Can you imagine the total exodus that will begin in two weeks? ... The dictatorship of Lenin and Trotsky must be defeated not by weapons, but by boycotting them and turning away from them."[2]

The leitmotif is the same everywhere: we have to wait, and everything will be fine. This position looks harmless but it helped to unfold the most disastrous scenario. Russians were eager to wait for the new government, i. e., till the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. It will convene and solve all the problems at once. Carl Mannerheim writes about these odd anticipation in his memoirs, "After spending a week in Helsinki, I returned to Petrograd. There wasn't a shade of resistance. On the contrary, I noticed that the Soviet power was growing stronger..."[1]

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[1] Solzhenitzin A. The Red Wheel; http://koleso.by.ru/4/4_VIII.htm

[2] Ib.

Some were passively waiting; some just did nothing by "vigorously protesting." Bolsheviks launched their freshly issued decrees on peace, land and labor control on people. They were fulfilling their obligations, giving peace to Germany, and the urgently published "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" — to the "allies," who longed to break Russia apart; the declaration provided an opportunity of free self-determination and further secession to everyone. Then there came the decrees on the abolition of all courts, laws, and trial attorneys, on the nationalization of banks, and the compulsory labor service introduction.

Trotsky, the new minister of foreign affairs, ordered to dismiss all the Russian ambassadors in the key countries, without any retirement pension or the right to continue public service after they had refused to confirm their obedience to the new government by telegram. Dzerzhinsky arrested the officials of other departments, who refused to go to work, without warrants and delays (we are not bureaucrats!). The downpour of all these unprecedented innovations overwhelmed the country. The main aim of Bolsheviks was to gain time and grow stronger. Bolsheviks needed to prepare for the Constituent Assembly, or for its dismissal, to be exact. The dispersal will disrupt the legitimacy of the Russian government and enable Lenin to launch an unprecedented socialist experiment. This step of Bolsheviks will lead to fratricidal slaughter and start the final stage of the destruction of the Russian Empire...

All that was happening in a patriarchal society. Russian people had not yet learned to spill Russian blood. Therefore, immediately after seizing power, the Bolshevik Military and Revolutionary Committee decided to "immediately release 130 women of the women's shock battalion, imprisoned in the Grenadier

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[1] Mannerheim C. Memoirs. M.: Vagrius, 1999. P. 81.

Regiment premises."[1] Most of the junkers, captured in the Winter Palace, were released, too. But the peaceful Bolshevik uprisal wasn't enough for the Anglo-French at all. The West needed a destructive war in Russia, the war that would level our country to the ground. According to their plan, the breakdown of the country would be finalized by the scammers and rascals, namely, Bolsheviks, who would come to power. The more insane the ideas of the new government are, the better, as they will facilitate the breakdown of the country. On the one hand, the pretext for separation from Russia is perfect: some madmen came to power in the capital, and to save our native Azerbaijan (Ukraine, the Crimea, etc.) we are creating our own state. And on the other hand, the new government openly declared that the suburbs were allowed to secede from Russia.

Thus, a hundred-year-old connection between Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the outskirts of the empire was broken. The result was disastrous.

During the first weeks of the Bolshevik reign, Finland and Ukraine announced their sovereignty; Estonia, the Crimea, Bessarabia, and the South Caucasus declared their autonomy. Even the primordially Russian Cossack regions and Siberia established not only their local governments, but virtually local mini-states. Thousand-year-old Russia ceased to exist in a matter of days.

Lenin did not care about it. His main aim was to grow stronger and gain time. All that will be lost now can be gained later. But in order to survive he had to fulfil his obligations to the "allies" and the Germans. During the entire initial period of the Soviet government establishment Lenin brilliantly maneuvered between these two forces.

Getting ready to disperse the Constituent Assembly, Bolsheviks also arranged the preparation for the elections "as promised." Under the Provisional Government, this process was controlled by a special committee. Without a moment's thought, Bolsheviks put Solomon Uritsky, the future leader of the Petersburg Cheka, at the head of it. When the members of the committee protested and refused to work, they were all arrested and replaced by the Commissariat for the Constituent Assembly.

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[1] Starilov N. Chronicles of the Revolution; http://lib.irismedia.org/sait/lib_ru/lib.ru/newproza/starilow/revolution.txt.htm

Then Solomon Uritsky was appointed the commandant of the Tauride Palace and managed to organize the dispersal of the assembled parliament in a clear and prompt manner. After all, for those who knew Lenin, who at least once read his writings, it was clear that the future of Russian parliamentarism was very sad. For example, in the work "The State and the Revolution" he writes, "The true bourgeois parliamentarism not only in parliamentary-constitutional monarchies but in the most democratic republics is about deciding once in several years which member of the ruling class will suppress and crush people in the parliament."[1]

He puts it bluntly. Ilyich did not like the parliaments but the elections still had to be held. It was impossible to avoid elections, as the whole country was waiting for them.

Besides that, voting, which would take more than one day, and the vote counting gave Bolsheviks the gain in time, increasing the period during which they were left alone. The real struggle was to begin after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly.

Let's mention in passing that Bolsheviks already had the experience of the dispersal of the deputies. It is little known that on the eve of the October Revolution they dispersed the Preliminary Parliament (the name speaks for itself). At that forum the deputies from different parties practiced their oratory, they didn't actually decide anything, but on October 25 (November 7), the Mariinsky Palace in Petrograd was surrounded by soldiers. After that, the hapless parliamentarians bustled off.

And at last, the long awaited day has come; on January 5 (18), 1918, Bolshevik Sverdlov opened the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. Then the election of the chairman began. SR Viktor

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[1] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949. V. 25. P. 134.

Chernov won the majority of 244 votes. He was the minister of the Provisional Government, in whose presence his colleagues tried not to discuss any military issues, because they were absolutely sure that he cooperated with the German intelligence. So, most of the deputies wanted to see this "decent" man, the leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries, at the head of the Constituent Assembly. There were no more worthy picks in the coffers of the Russian democracy.

Dispersal of the parliament looked absurd in the eyes of the Russian public. Therefore, Bolsheviks needed some clear explanation. Ilyich tried to give it in his "Theses Concerning the Constituent Assembly." It looked not very convincing, at the very least, "... the elections to the CA took place when the vast majority of people could not yet understand the whole scope and significance of the October... Revolution."[1] In the "Draft Decree on the Dispersal of the Constituent Assembly," his demagogy grows bigger and goes deeper, "At that time people, giving their votes to the candidates from the Socialist Revolutionary Party, could not make the choice between the right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, supporters of the bourgeoisie, and the leftists, the supporters of socialism."[2]

There is nothing to say, the reason is solid. It looks as if the division of the Socialist Revolutionaries by their political views can give additional votes to Bolsheviks! Lenin will represent this to the workers and revolutionary sailors, as though the voters just got lost in factions and parties, various types of SRs and Social Democrats, and it was necessary to disperse the entire parliament. The same rubbish was written in the Soviet history books.

"In fact, the parties of the right-wing SRs and Mensheviks are struggling hard against the Soviet power,"[3] Lenin adds. But Ilyich is cheating: the reasons for the dispersal of the only legitimate body of the Russian government are completely different.

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[1] Lenin V. Works. M.: GIPL, 1949.V. 25. P. 341.

[2] Ib.

[3] Ib. P. 395.

The Constituent Assembly had been foredoomed long before it was convened and the election began. The decision to dismiss, or more precisely, to disperse it was made by our "allies" along with the decision to convene it, and was an integral part of the plan on Russia's ruination. Fulfillment of this hard-hitting job was entrusted to Lenin. On the verge of its opening, in the morning of January 5 (18), 1918, Bolsheviks sprayed with bullets the peaceful demonstration marching with the slogan "All power to the Constituent Assembly." Then they eliminated the source of parliamentarism by taking the deputies away calmly and without shooting. If you believe history books and memoirs, it turns out that one German spy for some reason dispersed an assembly of people who considered another German spy, Chernov, the most worthy deputy. German intelligence is strange, you know. One left hand doesn't know what the extreme left one is doing.

The witnesses described the mood of the proletarian leader in their memoirs perfectly well. Bonch-Bruevich points out that at the time of the opening of the Constituent Assembly Lenin "was worried and looked unusually pale… then he looked around the hall with his glowing eyes wide-open."[1] Later Ilyich put himself together, recovered his temper and was "just reclining on the steps either with a bored expression, or laughing cheerfully now and again."[2]

The time to fulfil the last part of the agreement between Lenin and the Anglo-Saxons, to disrupt the last legitimate Russian authority, has come. Vladimir Ilyich knows that if he fulfils his obligations, the western intelligence agents and curators will continue to work with him. If he fails to accomplish his promise, the "specially established conditions" will develop in such a way that Bolsheviks and their revolution will be wiped out. Ilyich is worried; his nerves can't bear any further strain. That is why at night when the deputies of the "Assembly" were dispersed, not at night of the October uprisal, he had a nervous break-down. Why?

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[1] Chernov V. Before the Storm. Minsk: Kharvest, P. 360.

[2] Ib.

Because then, at night when the Constituent Assembly was being dispersed, the future of the revolution was being determined! Only Lenin understands the significance of the moment. For everyone else everything that's happening is just the elimination of a handful of blabbers.

Alexander Kerensky, who rendered invaluable assistance to his landsman Ulyanov, explained Lenin's haste in his own way.

"It was extremely important to wrest power from the grasp of the Provisional Government before the coalition of Austria, Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria broke down, in other words, before the Provisional Government got a chance to make honorable peace with the 'allies'."[1]

Kerensky can't tell the truth, but he loves writing his memoirs, so he makes Freudian slips and mixes these with obvious nonsense. Read his statement again. What is Kerensky trying to say? Lenin, the German spy, has to seize power before Germany, Turkey, Austria, and Bulgaria lose the war. This necessity is understandable and quite obvious, as after the defeat the seizure of power in Russia by the German agents will be like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic for the Germans. It is clear to any reasonable person. But we need to take a closer look at the second part of Kerensky's statement, *"It was extremely important to wrest power from the grasp of the Provisional Government... before the Provisional Government got a chance to make honorable peace with the 'allies'."*

Unexpectedly, Kerensky blabs out the truth. But he speaks not of Lenin's but of his own goal and the goal of the "allies"!

Not winning World War 1 while the legitimate Provisional Government is in power in Russia. This was the goal of the "allied" generals and politicians of that period. Unfortunately, it was achieved. Russia, which fought on the side of the victors of World War 1 (the Entente) is considered defeated judging by the results of the war along with its opponents, the Germans, the Austrians, and the Turks.

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[1] Kerensky A. Russia at Historic Turn; http://stepanov01.narod.ru/library/kerensk/chapt24.htm

Enabling the extremist Lenin to "wrest" power from the grasp of the Provisional Government before the end of the World War — this is the task of Kerensky and his assistants! Hence comes Kerensky's love for playing the Giveaway game.

Vladimir Lenin has his own objectives:

- to "overthrow" Kerensky before the elections and the Congress of the Soviets;
- to retain power until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly;
- to promptly disperse the latter.

Only after fulfilling all the obligations undertaken Lenin could start a new game...

715 deputies were elected to the Constituent Assembly. Among them were about 370 SRs, 175 Bolsheviks, 40 Left Social Revolutionaries, 16 Mensheviks, 17 KDs, 86 representatives of the national parties and agencies. These figures are known, but we must understand that Lenin would have dispersed the "Assembly" in any case, even if he had the overwhelming majority of Bolshevik deputies there. He had a task, and only upon its fulfillment Lenin and Co could disappear from the arena of the world's history safely. It was how our "allies" planned it. Lenin disrupts the legitimacy of the government. In response to this, Russia loses not only its outskirts, but also the primordially Russian regions. The Civil War, which is the struggle of all against all, begins. Of course, in the end, some government will take power but it will happen in a completely different country, immensely weakened and downsized.

Bolsheviks had to disappear the same way they came, to go back to Europe and America, to get under the wing of the "allied" intelligence. And they were going to do so. There is much evidence that almost every Bolshevik leader had some "Argentinean" passport with a fake name in his pocket. Besides, there were lots of gold, currency, and jewelry in Sverdlov's sister apartment. For the road, you know. Therefore, none of the "allies" attacked Bolsheviks, they had to quickly disappear on their own immediately after the dispersal of the Assembly. But then a thing happened that resolutely changed the course of the world history.

***Lenin realized that he and his comrades, who knew such dark secrets as "German money" and "the betrayal of the allies," would not survive for long.*** They will be either given away to the new government of Russia that will simply hang the fighters for the people's happiness on the first branch they find, or (which is more likely) they will quickly perish in accidents and all sorts of other incidents that are so frequent in clandestine practice of the revolutionaries. The "allies" will simply eliminate them while covering up the traces of their monstrous betrayal. The conclusion was obvious — Lenin had to stay in Russia. Such a decision was dictated by elementary self-protection and Lenin's keen desire to complete his lifework, the cause of revolution. To bring this cause to an end was now a matter of life and death, the Bolshevik leaders after the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly risked either to be sentenced to death for the betrayal of their Motherland, or for the attempted coup. Two crimes punishable by death are a bit too much for any sane person...

Bolsheviks needed to stay and build a new state. They had to restore the defeated army, to develop economy and fight against the enemies empowered by their policies. The decisive stage in the life of the Bolshevik Party began. From that moment on, they start the struggle to preserve their power, their lives, and their revolution. In the history of our country, this period is called the Civil War. Having leveled the old Russia "to the ground," Bolsheviks try to restore it again.

They will retain power with the help of desperate maneuvering between the Entente and Germany during the most difficult first six months of their rule.

But one look at the steps of the emerging Bolshevik government is enough to see the state which interests it prioritized.

...Soon after his appointment to the position of the foreign minister, Lev Trotsky established a special information bureau headed by Karl Radek. One department of this bureau was responsible for the international revolutionary propaganda in other countries. Where should Bolsheviks destabilize regime, if they were the German spies, especially after such a triumphant defeat of Russia? Of course, they had to target their enemies, other countries of the Entente, Britain and France, in particular.

*In fact, the first and the most important project of the bureau is the German propaganda newspaper, Die Fakel.*

There were also smaller newspapers for Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia.[1] So, we observe the mass production of subversive literature for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Two American writers[2] work at the bureau under the guidance of Radek and Trotsky: Rice Williams and John Reid. The latter is very famous in our country. It is surprising that it is not their compatriots that they enlighten about the new idea. No *Fakel* is published either in English or in French.

Why do Bolsheviks foment the world revolution only in the countries that compete with the Entente and stay away from Britain, France, and the United States? After all, if the revolution is expected to get global, it is necessary to prepare it everywhere. The answer is simple: the foreign "friends" brought Lenin here to ruin Russia, and they are not going to let the sparks of the ignited blaze set their own countries on fire. Rewording a well-known joke, he who pays the revolutionaries calls the revolution...

The issues of the Die Fakel were brought to the demarcation line separating the Russian and German troops. The newspaper was quickly distributed among the soldiers' committees along the entire front line, and from there it was secretly transferred to the German soldiers and delivered to the territory where the German troops were disposed. All this was going on during the peace negotiations in Brest. And all this was done by the "German spies," Bolsheviks.

We can ask a traditional question concerning a revolutionary newspaper: where is it printed and which funds are used to pay for it? For instance, at the time of Lenin's return, the circulation of the Pravda Newspaper did not exceed 40 thousand copies a day, and the circulation of the Menshevik newspaper Luch made 15 to 16 thousand copies. At the best of times, the circulation of the Social-Democratic press did not even reach 100 thousand copies.

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[1] Warth R. D. The Entente and the Russian Revolution of 1917–1918. M.: Tsentrpoligraph, 2006. P. 226.

[2] They might be not too much of the writers or not the writers at all.

**The circulation of the Die Fakel rapidly reached half a million copies a day.**[1]

Who pays for the publication of this bestseller? "Edgar Sisson, who stayed in Russia... contributed some of his funds for the printing presses used by Radek's bureau and allocated a considerable amount for the Soviet government to use in their propaganda activities."[2]

For your reference, Edgar Sisson came to Petrograd as a representative of the American propaganda department, the Public Information Committee. He was also a nonofficial representative of the American President Wilson in Russia. In other words, he was an intelligence officer working under the guise of a journalist. Let's note the time of Sisson's arrival to Petrograd — it's November, 1917. He came as soon as Bolsheviks seized power. But had the Americans remained completely indifferent to what was going on in Russia before that?

Mathematics is an exact science. Two times two always equals four. The reverse is also true, divide four by two, and you'll get two. In February, 1917, someone allocated money for publishing the Izvestia Newspaper, which released Order Number One, thus ruining the Russian Army. We do not know who it was. Less than a year passes, and intelligence agents of the Entente countries allocate funds for the publication of the Die Fakel, which is corrupting the German Army. The pattern is the same, and the money comes from the same source...

The "German spies," i. e. Bolsheviks, act oddly. For some reason, they obviously play against their German "masters." And it's not about Lenin or Trotsky lacking their principles, as they do not take money from the Germans to publish a newspaper in English! And they do everything to corrupt the German Army and thereby put the victory at the feet of the Entente.

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[1] Warth R. D. The Entente and the Russian Revolution of 1917–1918. M.: Tsentrpoligraph, 2006. P. 227.

[2] Ib.

But what about the Brest Peace Treaty? Isn't it a direct evidence of the cooperation between the Bolsheviks and the Germans?[1]

Unfortunately all stories don't fit into one book. Discussing how Bolsheviks managed to retain power in 1918 inexorably brings about new questions and riddles:

- The murder of the royal family;
- The drowning of the Russian fleet;
- The terrible Civil War;
- The causes of the defeat of Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel, and Kolchak.[2]

Let's come back to it later in another book.

In the meantime, the author would appreciate your comments:

www.nstarikov.runstarikov.livejournal.com
nstarikov@bk.ru
nstarikovru@gmail.com

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[1] When people ask me about it, I always return the question. Do you know what was the first requirement of Bolsheviks at the peace negotiations with the Germans? "NO TRANSFER OF TROOPS TO THE WESTERN FRONT." The historians don't like to explain why Lenin and Trotsky needed the German troops to remain in the vicinity of the revolutionary Petrograd. Otherwise, it will become clear that at the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk Bolsheviks were fulfilling the task of their British and French "friends"... For details of the Brest negotiations, please, check: Starikov N. The Liquidation of Russia. Who Helped the Red to Win the Civil War. St. Pb.: Piter, 2010.

[2] Ib.

# ANNEX 1

# Who Orchestrated the World War?

> The problem was that Germany was sure it could rely on the British neutrality.
>
> *Sazonov S.,*
> *the minister of foreign affairs of Russia*

> That was how the old pirate British state managed to cause massacre in Europe...
>
> *Alfred von Tirpitz,*
> *the German grand admiral*

It is not by chance that we've put the history of the World War 1 instigation mechanism not at the beginning of the book, but at its end, even outside its chapters, in the annex — this way it will be most obvious who orchestrated this tragedy and who was responsible for it. Particularly this way, when you know everything that happened to Russia in 1917, it is easier to comprehend and identify those who orchestrated the dreadful turmoil in our country, trying to eliminate the Russian Empire from the list of the world's political players...

Let's say a few words about the background of the conflict.

On June 28 (June 15 Old Style), 1914, the heir to the Austrian throne Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia.[1] This was an ordinary and absolutely unremarkable visit of the emperor-to-be to one of his central cities. And we wouldn't be interested in it unless the whole sequence of shady accidents and odd coincidences, which led to the death of the heir to the Austrian throne, resulted in World War 1.

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[1] Despite the title of the heir, Franz Ferdinand was 56 years old. His age was so respectable as Emperor Franz Joseph was 84. He died at the end of 1916.

The circumstances of the assassination, which triggered World War 1, really seem suspicious. It was really necessary for the archduke to die.

- The secret police agents, who had arrived with the successor of the 84-year-old Emperor Franz Josef I, **for some reason** stayed at the railway station.
- Despite the fact that the 18-year-old Nedeljko Chabrinovich threw a bomb at the motorcade (it wounded twenty people from the crowd and two officers from the heir's escort), the program of the visit *wasn't changed.*
- No additional security arrangements were made, and the motorcade went back the same way.
- The driver of the front car lost his way and **accidentally** took a wrong turn, where he drove up the sidewalk and stopped. All the participants of the motorcade stopped behind him and then tried to slowly reverse out of the traffic jam.
- Moving in that manner, the archduke's car stopped at the Shiller's Delicatessen food store. **Accidentally,** it was there that the second 19-year-old terrorist stayed — the one that was to leave his mark in history, Gavrilo Princip.
- The Austrian heir's car didn't just stop close to the assassin. **Accidentally,** it was turned to the terrorist with its right side, the side where there was no guard at the door.

Princip whipped out his pistol and shot at the immobile car twice. The first bullet hit Duchess Sophie, having pierced the vehicle body and the duchess's hard corset. The second bullet hit the heir to the Austrian throne. Both were killed, and the assassin was immediately arrested. They kicked and punched him, and even stroke him with their swords a couple of times, and that was why he had his hand ablated in prison.

But the oddities continued to pile up.

As Nedeljko Chabrinovich and Gavrilo Princip saw that it was impossible to flee the crime scene, they took poison. And **accidentally,** neither of the terrorists was affected. Both had capsules with poison, which turned out to be an absolute dummy.

What does that mean? That means that whoever orchestrated the murder wanted the terrorists to be captured alive.

***If two young men with no documents had died there, on the Sarajevo pavement, the global conflict might not have started.*** At least, at that moment.

*All the investigation and its conclusions were based on the evidence provided by the captured terrorists, and thus, all the upcoming dreadful consequences of the archduke's death, as well.* The investigation was unusually fast. The arrested Gavrilo Princip confessed that he had shot the archduke as he believed him to be "the worst enemy and oppressor of the Serbian people."[1] Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by Serbs, by students of the University of Belgrade, members of the Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) group, who were brought from Serbia for this specific purpose. And this terroristic group was secretly supported by the guild of Serbian nationalists, the Black Hand, headed by Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevich, also known as Apis.[2] Consequently, whoever orchestrated the assassination didn't need the Austrian heir to die — they needed the investigators to draw the necessary conclusions. And they needed Austria-Hungary to advance claims to Serbia and even declare a war on it.

The crime orchestrators were incredibly sagacious: if they hadn't given the terrorists the dummy poison capsules, the latter could have shot themselves. As there was a crowd around, and the guards of the archduke were nearby, the assassins didn't have a second chance for self-liquidation, and the Austrian courts of justice got them alive. Who could have given the assassins of Franz Ferdinand this "safe" poison? Someone who was interested in the Austrians quickly finding the culprits and hailing their rage on Serbia. Serbians didn't need the terrorists to be captured alive — it would only harm the Serbian state's reputation, and attract the rage of the Austrians. This means that the assassination was prepared by the people who didn't have the Serbian interests at heart.

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[1] Trotsky L. Bosniak the Volunteer. Essays. M.; L., 1927. T. 9. P. 320.

[2] MacDonogh G. The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous. M.: AST, 2004. P. 540.

Only a few people knew the truth about the assassination of the Austrian heir. In every good play, any actor has his small part — he knows when he comes onto the stage, he knows his lines and how he should act. As soon as he is done, he takes his bow and withdraws to the backstage. Just in the same manner, the main witnesses and participants of Franz Ferdinand's murder were passing into nonexistence. His murderers, Nedeljko Chabrinovich and Gavrilo Princip quietly died in prison. They had played their part twice, first, when killing the archduke and then when giving the Austrians the "right" trail. The military and political orchestrators of the assassination also played their parts. The Head of the Secret Guild of the Serbian Nationalists, the Black Hand," Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevich (also known as Apis), who had armed and directed the assassins, fairly fought at the front for four years. After that, he was unexpectedly arrested on the order of his own state. This important backstage orchestrator also became an unnecessary witness, and the military field court without delay sentenced the head of the Serbian intelligence to execution by a firing squad.[1]

The political orchestrator of the assassination in Sarajevo, Vladimir Gachinovich, also passed away under puzzling circumstances. He was at once a member of three groups suspected of the crime — the Young Bosnia (Mlada Bosna), the National Defense (Narodnaya Odbrana), and the Black Hand (Crna Ruka). Moreover, he was the most authoritative member and the main ideologist of Mlada Bosna, which had performed the terrorist attack. He was the one who linked all these groups with the external environment: with other revolutionaries and secret services. He was friends with SR Natanson, with Social Democrats Martov,

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[1] http://liberea.gerodot.ru/neoglot/princip.htm

Lunacharsky, Radek, and Trotsky. The latter even was going to honor his memory with an obituary. You know, in August 1917, a healthy and sprightly Vladimir Gachinovich **instantly** fell sick. His sickness was so strange and mysterious that the Swiss doctors that operated on him twice (!) didn't find anything. Still, Gachinovich died in the same month…

The claims that Austria-Hungary had in regard to Serbia quickly evolved into a war — but not between these two countries. The main objective was to make Germany and Russia fight, as they were the main geopolitical opponents of Great Britain. And this objective was reached, even though the task was extremely challenging. Early in the 20 century, Russia and Germany didn't have any contradictions that could have become a reason for a conflict. These countries were managed by Nicholas and Wilhelm, who were cousins and had a rather good relationship. Why would they start to fight? For us, who were born in the end of the 20 century, Germany is a bold aggressor that brought Russia to the brink of collapse twice over the century. However, the historic memory of the Russians before World War 1 was very different. For them, Germany was a country with a traditionally friendly regime, and Russia had last conflicted with Germany in Napoleon's times, which was a hundred years before. There was a solid reason needed, a set of circumstances which could make both countries forget their longstanding friendship. Thus, provoking the Russo-German conflict became the main trend in the British politics. France, which had no foreign policy of its own for a long time, aimed for the same result. Alsace-Lorraine, which had been lost due to their military defeat, could only be returned through a war, but France was unable to defeat Germany alone. They needed some Russian cannon fodder…

Later, politicians from different countries were asked how the most murderous war in the history of mankind managed to break out all at once. Most of them would shrug their shoulders, some of them accused their countries' opponents.

However, there was one person on the political Olympus of Europe who modestly remained silent. He didn't participate in discussions and didn't write any memoirs. His name was Viscount Edward Grey of Fallodon. Between 1905 and 1916 this worthful man was the foreign secretary of Great Britain. It wasn't he who planned World War 1, but it was by virtue of his efforts that the terrible plans sprang to life...

However, let's get back to the blight July 1914. The Austro-Hungarians started the investigation and instantly found a definite answer to the perennial question "who is to blame?" The archduke's assassins had not only received weapons and instructions in Serbia — they were brought to the Bosnian lands right before the assassination. This was a long-awaited motive for the Austrians to strike a blow at Belgrade, which they loathed.[1] The Serbian extremists passed all bounds and killed the heir to the throne. Their actions definitely threatened the very fundamentals of the multinational Habsburg monarchy.

This was how things looked from the window of the Viennese Cabinet. Quite recently, in May 1903, there had been a government overthrow in Serbia. It resulted in killing the Serbian King Alexander Obrinovich and his wife, Queen Draga. There was a gossip that the plotters broke into the palace and pushed their king out of the window. However, the king managed to grab hold of the window sill, and one of the murderers chopped off his fingers, and the king fell down on the pavement and plunged to his death.[2] A few years passed, and the Serbians had another crown-bearing person on their list — this time it was Franz Ferdinand. Now, when the Austrian government was going to seek the fullest satisfaction from Serbia, the German Emperor Wilhelm II shared their intent. "In reply to the personal appeal of the Austrian

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[1] The reason for antagonism between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was the wish of the Serbs to create a Greater Serbia through annexing the Slavic lands owned by the dual monarchy. On the other hand, the Austrians were gradually consuming more and more Slavic lands. The final straw was the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908.

[2] MacDonogh G. The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous. M.: AST, 2004. P. 547.

Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm, propelled by some sort of chivalry, promised to support him in fighting the Serbian assassins. The Kaiser made an announcement to my deputy early on July 6, in the park of Potsdam New Palace — he believed that Russia was unlikely to interfere to support Serbia, as in his opinion, the Russian Tsar would never support kingslayers."[1]

The scenario for the World War instigation was very complicated in its organization but very simple in its essence. Supported by Germany, Austria-Hungary asserts its claims on Serbia. Belgrade is unwilling to cooperate as they have secured some guarantees from Russia. At the same time, Austrians and Germans, which believe that the force solution is the best in the Serbian case, must be sure that Petersburg won't support the Serbs and will confine itself to diplomatic denouncement. This is the only way to set the Bickford fuse of the war on fire. If only Austria and Germany had known that their action against Belgrade would result in a fight with Russia, they would never have chosen that way, because under the terms of the Franco-Russian agreement this meant war with France, and in the long term — with Britain, too.

As this scenario was too obvious, it was the main guarantee against the instigation of an armed conflict. World War 1 could have easily been averted. Great Britain just had to assure Germany that it would by no means remain neutral in case of a European war and would support its allies from the Entente. This was how Great Britain had acted several years before, preventing the Franco-German war during the Moroccan crisis. And still, the British acted absolutely differently in 1914...

The fate of the entire humanity depended on the position of the British government in that hot summer 1914. This position was explained to the entire humanity by the honorable Sir Grey. After Franz Ferdinand was killed, on June 29 (16), 1914, the head of the British diplomacy publicly expressed his deepest condolences to Vienna in the Parliament and then... kept silent for about a week.[1] On July 6 (June 23), 1914, after the German Kaiser communicated with the Austrians, the German Ambassador in London Prince Lichnowsky came to Grey to sound out the position of Great Britain in the current situation. Before that, the British had been showing their peacefulness to the Germans, as if ostentatiously. Besides diplomatic equivoques, the British demonstrated their good mood towards the Germans materially. The main root of the German-British rivalry was the navy, the grand shipbuilding campaign started by the Reich. In London, they were explicitly hostile towards the German fleet. And instantly, their position changed. This is what Admiral Tirpitz wrote about it, "During the Kiel week[2] in 1914 Prince Lichnowsky, our ambassador in London, reported that Britain managed to reconcile itself with the building of our fleet; a war because of this fleet or our trade was absolutely out of question; our relations with Britain became satisfactory, and we were getting closer... During the Kiel week, our relations with Britain improved so much that for the first time over the past 19 years we were visited by a fleet of British battleships... Relations of our two countries looked so good that for the first time in many years a British squadron arrived in Germany to take part in the Kiel week. It left after the murder in Sarajevo, though."[3]

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[1] Tirpitz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 261.

This was the first thing the German ambassador said to start a conversation with Sir Grey. Lichnowsky told him about the deep satisfaction that Emperor Wilhelm felt about the British squadron visiting Germany. After that, he turned to carefully sounding out the British position on the oncoming international aggravation. He said that the Austrians were going to attack Serbia. After that he honestly shared the German position — Berlin couldn't refuse help to its main ally, but if they helped, the relations with Petersburg could get complicated.

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 21.

[2] Franz Ferdinand was assassinated during a yacht race in the German town of Kiel, which was called the Kiel week.

[3] Tirpitz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 257.

The Germans knew perfectly well that these two monarchies were connected not only by ethnic sympathy but by kinship — the mother of the Serbian heir was the sister of Grand Prince Nikolay Nikolayevich Romanov, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in the upcoming war. The Russian monarch was the uncle to the Serbian heir Alexander. Just a few months ago Nicholas II personally promised Serbia "every possible military support" and even "whatever support they may need."[1]

And the German ambassador threw out the feeler asking the main question to hear the answer that he actually came to get in the first place. The Germans knew that Britain and Russia were negotiating some marine convention, which could have encouraged Russia to oppose Austria. After a rough announcement made by the London diplomat, the Germans would have to reverse at once. A conflict with Russia, in which the British were ready to support it, was unacceptable for the Germans. It was a great opportunity to show the storied British toughness to the German ambassador, but instead Sir Grey said that Britain "couldn't let France be destroyed."[2] Diplomats always speak a special language that isn't always clear to lesser mortals. But one diplomat will always understand another, as to a certain extent their job is decoding the hints and omissions of the others and the skill of telling things without saying anything. If translated to the normal language, this phrase about Britain that "couldn't let France be destroyed" meant the following:

- *Petersburg is holding or has held some negotiations with London.*
- *Britain hasn't provided any safety warranties to Russia.*
- *In case of a military clash between Germany and Russia, the British would stay out of the conflict.*
- *The only thing that the British worried about and what they were ready to countervail was the military destruction of France.*

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[1] http://horthy.narod.ru/wwwI.html

[2] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 22.

You see how much information can be put in a short phrase. Thus, Sir Grey didn't answer to the German sounding but made a hint that Great Britain wouldn't care if Russia was destroyed.

The strength of those who wished to instigate the war was that they were playing on both sides of the barricades, on both teams at once. This is a British innovation — before the war, they were friends with the Germans and "allies" of the Russians. When the revolution is boiling up in Russia, the same British gentlemen will embrace Nicholas II and at the same time allocate funds for his overthrow. Later they will send welcoming telegrams to Kerensky and promise support to General Kornilov. Then Bolsheviks will come to power, and the "allies" will counsel with them and their opponents once again. During the Civil War, the British will support the Whites and at the same time keep a wary eye on them to ensure they do not win. This is not some special British cunning and wiles, this is just following their own interests and plans. Playing both as black and as white in a game of chess, you can checkmate the ones you don't need any longer.

This is what was going to happen, but for the British plan of the war instigation to come true, after meeting the British ambassador Sir Grey hospitably hosted the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff. And there he said something very different. On July 8 (June 25), the head of the British Foreign Ministry outlined all the gravity of the situation for Russia. He was sure that Austria would attack and even shared his opinion that Russia had to protect Serbia. Moreover, the lord in many ways emphasized the German hostility towards Russia. He gave a hint that as far as he was aware, in case of a conflict the Germans were ready to switch the gravity center of their military operations from the west to the east.

Sir Edward Grey was a great actor: he played an optimist in front of the German ambassador, and a pessimist in front of the Russian one. Having sown the seed of doubt in the Russian government, on July 9 (June 26), the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain Sir Grey met the German Ambassador Lichnowsky. Quite recently, only three days before, Grey had already given him the hint that Britain wasn't going to interfere in the continental proceedings as long as they didn't threaten France with destruction. To check if they got the British position right, the Germans had to make sure that they "had deciphered" the hints of the British minister the correct way. The British position still could prevent the European continent from collapsing into the abyss. What did the highly respected head of the British diplomacy say? Was it a word about the importance of peacekeeping and the need to solve conflicts in a peaceful manner?

Nothing like that. At first, Sir Grey spoke a lot about the peaceful Russian attitude. The cautious German ambassador in accordance with his instructions asked if Britain would agree to pacify Petersburg in case of a Austro-Serbian conflict. The lord assured Lichnowsky that they would "do everything possible to prevent war between the great states."

"I said, — Sir Grey writes in his memoirs, — that in case Austria acted towards Serbia to a certain extent, it would be comparably easier to persuade Petersburg to be tolerant."[1] And as the German ambassador wrote, at this "Sir Grey was emanating optimism."[2] Thus, radiant and beaming, Sir Grey said the main thing that Germans wanted to know. Let's give the floor to the German ambassador. This is what he writes in his telegram to Berlin dated July 9 (June 26), 1914:

"He (Sir Grey) said that he had nothing to add to what he had said on July 6, and he could only repeat that no secret agreements had been made between Great Britain, as of the one part, and France and Russia, as of the other part, that could immobilize Great Britain in case of a war in Europe."[3]

Then Grey said, "Britain wanted to keep its hands totally free."[4]

***Translated from the diplomatic to the normal language, this means Britain wanted to remain neutral in the potential war!***

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[1] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy", XV century B. C. — 1940 A. D.; www.diphis.ru

[2] Ib.

[3] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914–1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 51.

[4] Ib.

So much for the Entente! So much for the "allies" and the "entente cordiale."[1] This was a permission to start a war with Petersburg and even to crush Paris! But how could Sir Grey state that Britain had no agreements that could immobilize it in case of a war? Hadn't Russia, Britain and France formed the Entente?!

The most peculiar thing is that what Sir Grey said was absolutely true. Historians never write about it and try to avoid this odd issue. The point is that until ***the very beginning of the World War there was no special agreement about the Entente.***

In fact, there were three absolutely independent documents. The first one was the Anglo-French Agreement, which is believed to be about the foundation of the Entente. It doesn't say a word about any military obligations in case of war.[2] The second one was the convention of 1907 between Russia and Britain. Let's read the agreement that Russia signed to join the Entente:

- "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of order throughout that country..."
- "Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions..."
- "Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself and not to support, in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Concessions..."
- "It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs... In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or payment of interest of the Persian loans ..."[3]

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[1] The Entente block got its name from the French expression meaning "Heart consent" (Entente cordiale).

[2] The agreement of April 8, 1904 was made in London as the convention of Newfoundland, Western Africa, and Siam plus Egypt. The Entente is considered to have been established on that day.

[3] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 36–37.

Hold on. We've always been said that having signed that document, the tsarist Russia joined the Entente and cast in its lot with Britain and France, but the text is all about some customs and concessions. I've got it! We just need to read further, the main thing must be there. Oh, but it's something even more unlike an agreement between two states:

- "The British government declares that it had no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan..."[1]

Isn't that nice? But what does it have to do with the Entente? Five more clauses on this godforsaken country. Then there comes Thibet:

- "The Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet... engage to respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and to abstain from all interference in the internal administration..."[2]

And there goes a half of the page about this "most important" place on the political world map. Reading through this most interesting document, you quickly lose patience, and your amazement grows bigger at the same rate. What is this agreement about? How is it related to a war with "third states" and mutual support?

To get the answers we simply need to check the name — we've forgotten that this document is called "The Agreement Relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet."

That was why it only spoke of the division of influence spheres in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and nothing else, not a single word about military obligations!

What a surprise! I wonder if the Tsar's diplomats read it at all before they signed it. Why would anyone think that Britain and Russia were bound by some contractual allied obligations? The only thing London undertook to do was to respect "the territorial integrity of Thibet" and "independence of Persia"...[1]

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 38.

[2] Ib. P. 39.

The third agreement at the bottom of the Entente was the Franco-Russian one, and it was signed by no other than Alexander III. It was the only true document. According to its terms, France and Russia were to immediately declare war on Germany if it attacked Russia or France. But this was valid only for... Paris and Petersburg.

***Here we have an unprecedented diplomatic case — the Entente only existed in minds of our diplomats.*** The Entente kind of existed and didn't exist at the same time. This was a great formation — whenever Russians had to die for France and Britain, it existed. Whenever British were to support Russia, "Britain wanted to keep its hands totally free." We can only guess how the Tsar's diplomats and the Tsar himself managed to overlook that. In fact, the Entente countries entered into a real allied agreement after World War 1 had started. What's the difference? There's a great difference. In the absence of a normal agreement the British were able to announce their neutrality to provoke Germany to start a war and to promise its help to Russia at once. If the Entente had been documented properly, the Germans would have acted very differently, and the ambiguous position of London was, in fact, the bail that the German diplomats swallowed.

The French Ambassador to Russia Maurice Paleologue directly told his British colleague, Sir George Buchanan, "I insist that

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[1] This is a good old British tradition — never give firm guarantees or undertake direct duties that require specific actions. Even now, so anxious about the integrity of Georgia and the destiny of democratic institutions of Ukraine, the USA, and Great Britain give no security guarantees to these countries. It can be done in a regular agreement that can be signed in one to two months. But instead of that they offer a long-term (up to 10 years) procedure for joining NATO. The point is that during all these ten years the West isn't OBLIGED to do anything for either Georgia or Ukraine. I mean, if the West can profit from it, they will protect them or sell them just like they have sold Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Poland to Hitler.

Britain should play a decisive role in dampening the belligerent fervor of Germany, and let me refer to the opinion Emperor Nicholas shared with me four days ago — Germany will never dare to attack Russia, France, and Britain united unless it is out of its mind."[1]

Of course, Germany wouldn't attack three great states. And that was why the British tried to assure Berlin ***that there were no three states that opposed Germany!***

And the Germans believed that. The ice of mistrust to the traditionally hostile policy of Britain melted under the rays of Sir Grey's charm. Admiral Tirpitz indicated, "On July 9, the Foreign Office reasonably believed that if against all expectations the European peace didn't remain, Britain would instantly join our friends without waiting for the results of the military action. However, the peaceful position of the Foreign Office in the subsequent weeks kept deceiving the circles close to Bethmann. It looked like the General Headquarters also believed the peaceful intentions of the Entente."[2]

If Britain wished peace, only two words were needed to be said for the Germans to understand how thin the thread was that the destiny of their country was hanging on. But Sir Grey had been given a different task, and he acted masterfully, preparing the coffin for millions of people that were still carelessly sunbathing under the July sun. Like any other country of the world, Britain had both official and nonofficial diplomacy. However, this time stakes were so high that even it remained silent.

"This time Britain even refrained from warning us in private,"[3] Alfred von Tirpitz complained.

Instead, the British "independent" newspapers started to publish articles that could hardly be called anything but provocation. The Standard and the Daily Chronicle directly named the villains guilty of the Austrian heir's death, "There is no doubt that the plot was totally prepared in Serbia, and Russia has its share of responsibility, if not all of it"; "the murder was based on the Russian method of removing every unfavorable opponent at the Balkans."[1] It's rather peculiar that the Russian revolutionaries also added some fuel to the fire. Lev Trotsky in his book "Europe at War" indicated, "The murder... definitely was inspired by the Serbian government. On the other hand, Russia indirectly participated in this assassination planning, too."[2]

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[1] Paleologue M. La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre. M.: International Relations. 1991. P. 41.

[2] Tirpitz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 281.

[3] Ib. P. 271.

Comforted with the British peacefulness, the German Kaiser left for his traditional sea trip over the Norwegian fiords. The Austrians, having approved their next moves with him, turned to preparing the ultimatum to Serbia. Thanks to the efforts of Lord Grey, Vienna and Berlin saw a very rosy picture: in case Austria attacked Serbia, Russia might not have interfered into the conflict, and if this happened, Britain definitely wouldn't support it. France was likely to interfere, but it would be even good in that case, because it was Paris that desired to get back Alsace-Lorraine and thus was a real opponent of Germany.

***Veiled hints of Sir Grey did much more for the cause of war instigation than the shots of Gavrilo Princip.***

The culmination was drawing nearer. On July 20 (7), the French President Raymond Poincare, who had the nickname of "La Guerre" (the war),[3] came to Russia.

For Nicholas II not to be afraid to help his Slavic brethren, Poincare assured him that in case of a war with Germany France would fulfil its allied obligations. At the same time, they once again discussed the military plans of the parties. According to its obligations, on the 15 day of mobilization Russia had to make its army fully ready to attack Germany. It was planned to attack Austria-Hungary on the 19 day of mobilization. While the Russian monarch and the French president were counseling, the events seemed to cease.[1] However, after Poincare left they rushed at a murderous speed. Russia had one week of peaceful life left.

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[1] http://www.rusk.ru/st.php?idar=318924

[2] Trotsky L. Essays. M.; L., 1927. V. 9. P. 326.

[3] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 21.

On July 23 (10), the "allied" president went home, and just before that Lord Grey successfully torpedoed the last opportunity for a peaceful solution of the conflict. On the Tsar's initiative, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov suggested that Russia, Britain, and France together influence the Vienna government and make it politically settle all of its claims on Serbia — and Grey rejected this proposal.[2] It could have ruined everything because he was waiting for the Austrian ultimatum. This document was to become the Bickford fuse of World War 1 — it took mere days since it was handed over till the first battle action.

And his expectations came true. On July 23 (10), the Austrians handed an ultimatum to the Serbian ambassador. It wasn't by coincidence that the Vienna diplomats passed it over to the Serbs right after Poincare had left — now Paris and Petersburg had no one to consult with. It was convenient for both Germans and Austrians. But another thing was important for our "allies": having left, the French president could no longer answer certain questions asked by Nicholas II in person, though he still could "answer in telegrams." What if the Russian Tsar once again offered to make a mutual announcement? For example, an offer to delegate resolution of the Austro-Serbian conflict to some international committee and thus prevent the long-awaited war? Now instead of an actual discussion of the situation, the French could make away with general phrases. And the ultimatum was to expire in just 48 hours. Time rushed so quickly that the war couldn't be stopped, and the main task for Grey now was to make the events irreversible.

On the day when the ultimatum was handed over, the British minister met the Austrian ambassador for the first time. The

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[1] And at this moment for no obvious reason, the strikes started to roar in Petersburg...

[2] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy", 15 century B.C. — 1940; http://www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110#91917.

British knew the content of the note perfectly well, as the Times had rather accurately told about it a day before. Anyone who is familiar with politics can see that it was a reason for an armed conflict. And when the Russian Minister Sazonov received a telegram telling about the ultimatism, he instantly cried, "This is a European war!"[1] Lord Grey pretended not to understand that. Instead of warning the Austrians on the brink of war he only expressed regret for the note handed over to Serbia being limited in time and refused to discuss it before he saw it with his own eyes.[2] Then he told the Austro-Hungarian ambassador that the war among *four great states* could have a negative effect on trade.[3] The Vienna Ambassador Mensdorff knew his numbers well, the four states were Russia, Austria, France, and Germany, but Grey didn't say a word of the fifth state, Britain. This wasn't a hint anymore, this was a direct evidence of the perspective neutrality of Britain. The Austrian ambassador finished his report on their conversation with the following words, "He was cool-headed and objective as usual, and he was in a friendly mood and even showed some sympathy to us."[4] After this conversation with Grey, Austria-Hungary was finally assured that it could strike Serbia.

Now let's turn to the facts once again. Having received the Austrian note of 10 clauses, Belgrade was panic-stricken. There was a scent of trouble in the air, and Serbia was face-to-face with the enraged Austria. "We can't defend. That's why we beg Your Majesty to render us assistance as soon as possible,"[5] the Serbian Prince Regent Alexander wrote to Nicholas II. In reply, the Serbs received an offer to accept the Austrian terms, not to resist but to announce that they would yield to force and entrust its fate to the great states.

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 31.

[2] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy"; www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110#9

[3] Ib.

[4] Khvostov V. History of Diplomacy. M., 1945; http://infoart.iip.net/politic/yugoslav/history/war1/war1a012.htm

[5] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 54.

The ultimatum was to expire in 48 hours. And since that moment, like in a ticking bomb, the countdown started. A half of the period given by the Austrians had passed when the Austrian ambassador in London brought a copy of the ultimatum to Grey. And this was when the great actor Lord Edward Grey rolled his eyes up. He told a discouraged Ambassador Mensdorff that "it was the most formidable document" of its type ever generated by diplomacy.[1]

The last minutes of peace were elapsing right along like sand through an hourglass when the head of the British diplomacy called the German Ambassador Lichnowsky. Now, when Europe had only 24 hours to enjoy a peaceful life, were the British going to deliver their weighty say and save millions of lives? Not a bit of it!

"If Austria enters the Serbian land, — Grey said, — the risk of European war will be really close... All the consequences of **such a war among four states** can't be predicted at all."[2]

The British diplomat speaks about the damage that can be made to the world trade, about the possible revolutionary outburst, about imminent global impoverishment, but nothing of it actually matters, these are just words. But the main thing is that he once again brings to attention, his time — of the German ambassador, that the war was possible only between FOUR great states, and once again he indicates that Britain is going to remain neutral. It was not by chance that Grey emphasized this once again — he didn't want the Austrians just to deliver their ultimatum, he needed a battle action to start after its expiration. Only being absolutely sure that Britain was going to remain neutral, the German and the Austrian could take the plunge into the war with Russia and France.

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[1] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy"; www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110#9

[2] Khvostov V. History of Diplomacy. M., 1945; http://infoart.iip.net/politic/yugoslav/history/war1/war1a015.htm1917.

On July 25 (12), the Serbian Prime Minister Pashich delivered the answer of the Serbian government. Serbia agreed to all the terms but for one thing — they refused to let the Austrian representatives investigate the plot against the archduke. And though Belgrade accepted nine of the ten terms of the ultimatum, the Austrian ambassador wasn't satisfied and announced breaking off the diplomatic relations. Thanks to the British hints, one of the parties was ready to start a war. What about the other party?

Russian diplomats were trying to preserve piece. When Austria cut off its relations with Serbia, Sazonov instantly addressed Sir Grey asking to "clearly and resolutely" criticize the policy of Austria-Hungary.[1] No criticizing followed, though, as it could have stopped the Austrian troops being pulled to the Serbian border.

Edward Grey had a complicated task: at the same time he had to demonstrate his neutrality to the Germans and show the Russians that their "neutrality" was in favor of Russians. At the same time, the Russian ambassador in London Benckendorff reported his impressions about the British "neutrality," which were just the opposite, "Though I can't provide any formal assurance regarding the military cooperation of Britain, I haven't noticed any symptom on the part of Grey or the King or any authoritative person indicating that Britain is really considering remaining neutral. In fact, my impressions is that the opposite is true."[2]

In Berlin, the alarmed Kaiser is discussing the current situation with his confidants. This day the brother to Wilhelm II, Prince Henry, arrived in Potsdam and delivered a message from the British King George V. The campaign aimed to misinform Germany had been joined by the crowned persons. The British monarch told Prince Henry the following, "We are going to take every effort not to be drawn into the war and are going to remain neutral."[3]

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[1] Telegram from Sazonov R. to the Russian Ambassador in London A. Benckendorff, 12/25 July 1914.

[2] http://www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110

[3] Ib.

"When I expressed my hesitation, the Kaiser objected, 'I have the king's word, and that's enough for me,'"[1] Grand Admiral Tirpitz wrote in his memoirs. The time compressed rushing like hell. On July 28 (15), the Austrian cannons started to bombard the Serbian lands. Petersburg insisted that Britain finally announce its position. The answers from London were rather vague. The French Ambassador to Russia Maurice Paleologue could only write in his memoirs that his British colleague "Buchanan promised to support the policy of resisting the German claims in front of Sir Edward Grey ."[2]

Under the pressure of the military command and Minister Sazonov, the Russian Tsar decided to announce partial mobilization. He hesitated to make this really fatal decision. On the same day, having received a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm, who promised to act as a mediator between Russia and Austria and asked not to speed up the military preparations, Nicholas II decided to cancel general mobilization and fulfil only partial mobilization in four military districts. The order on partial mobilization in the Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Moscow districts (only against Austria) was announced by telegraph early on July 29 (16). It was immediately reported to Germany that "none of them were directed against Germany."[3]

However, being sure of the British neutrality, Berlin acted roughly. On July 29 (16), the German Ambassador Pourtales read to Sazonov a telegram from the German Chancellor Bethmann. The latter demanded that Russia should cease any military preparations, otherwise Germany would also announce mobilization, which could easily lead to a war.

At that moment London finally heard Petersburg's request about its position, and on July 29 (16), our "allies" showed a few of their cards and demonstrated that they were really committed to their promises. A shame that Nicholas II never learnt about it. On July 29 (16), the British foreign secretary had two meetings with the German ambassador. During the first meeting Grey didn't say anything important. He was waiting for the news on the Russian mobilization. But having received the necessary information, Sir Grey notified Lichnowsky that he wanted to meet with him one more time.

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[1] Tirpitz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 291.

[2] Paleologue M. La Russie des Tsars Pendant la Grande Guerre. M.: International Relations. 1991. P. 42.

[3] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 208.

Nothing seemed to hold any surprises in store when Sir Grey all of a sudden announced that... Well, let's give the stand to the German Ambassador Lichnowsky, "Grey announced that the British government wished to maintain our previous relations and was going to remain uninvolved, as only Austria and Russia were involved in the conflict. If we drew France into the war, the situation would change immediately, and the British government might be forced to make some instant decisions."[1]

"But how?..." the German ambassador barely uttered, and the Kaiser wrote a perfectly correct conclusion on his telegram, "So, they will attack us."[2] They didn't know in Berlin that two days before that, the nice and kind Edward Grey in the session of the Cabinet furiously demanded that Britain take part in the war and threatened his resignation if it didn't.

Now, when the events were becoming irreversible, the Germans understood that in case they had a conflict with Paris, the Reich would have to fight with Britain, too, and this was a game changer. Fighting the British Empire, which had large colonies and almost inexhaustible human and primary resources, and prospectively — the United States, meant fighting with the whole world. Germany had no chance in such a fight.

Grey's announcement came as something of a shock to Berlin. Even the Kaiser gave vent to his feelings, "Britain is revealing its cards now when they believe we're in a dead-end and our position is hopeless. This rascal huckstering bastard tried to deceive us with his dinner-parties and speeches. The words of King Henry delivered to me, this 'We will remain neutral and try to keep back as long as possible,' were nothing more than a fragrant deceit."[1]

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 75.

[2] Ib.

Alas, the German monarch recovered his sight too late. The world is on the edge of the abyss. However, let's leave Ambassador Lichnowsky in his bewilderment and Wilhelm II in his holy anger. We need to pay attention to another fact. Sir Grey gave an absolutely new input to the German diplomats.

***In fact, Great Britain delivers Germany an ultimatum: if you want to avoid fighting Britain (which is the entire world), fight Russia alone!***

Don't touch France! This is the main thing. The British weren't trying to organize a world war, they were trying to make the war start among Austria, Germany, and Russia only. They wanted to stay out of the war themselves, to keep their hands totally free, as Sir Grey had put it. Everything is consistent. Let's remember why Great Britain needed this war in the first place — it wanted to destroy Russia and Germany. Thus, let them annihilate each other, and the Anglo-Saxon would join the fight at the last moment. We can even proclaim a war and fix our status-quo, but there is definitely no need for an honest fight. This is what the "allies" did in 1939, when the bleeding Poland didn't see any help from them.

Shock caused in Berlin by the words of the British minister passed. The situation was dramatically changing. They had to think how they would leave the current situation, and they had to make their decision really quickly. At the same time, they learnt that Italy was unlikely to support its allies, Germany and Austria. The prospects were getting rather dark. The situation instantly changed: now Berlin was close to panic. Grey's warnings were passed to Vienna, and Berlin tried to persuade the Austrians to only occupy Belgrade as a security and to leave this case for consideration of the international mediators.

In Petersburg, the military command tried to pressure the Tsar into announcing general mobilization. On July 29 (16), (between

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[1] Kremlev R. Russia and Germany: Fight! From Versailles of Wilhelm to Versailles of Wilson. New Take on the Old War. M.: AST, 2003; http://militera.lib.ru/research/kremlev/05.html1917.

6 and 7 p.m.), Nicholas II agreed to order general mobilization,[1] when all of a sudden a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm arrived, who asked to stop partial mobilization of the Russian Army and let Germany act as a mediator.[2] Which in fact meant — to avoid the war!

The message from the head of Germany had a great effect. Nicholas II ordered to cancel general mobilization. Why did he announce and cancel such serious arrangements as mobilization so easily? We need to understand that this telegram was the FIRST ONE that the head of Russia received from the head of Germany during the current crisis. The fact is that Wilhelm arrived in Berlin from his traditional sea trip along the Norwegian fiords only on July 28 (15). And Nicholas instantly wrote to him asking to stop the war and impact the Austrians. And Wilhelm answered that he was ready to do it. Nicholas cancelled the mobilization he had announced, seeing the mobilization of the Austrian troops and getting no reply from Berlin.

It seemed like the war wasn't going to flame up now, that the heads of the countries would find a way out of the deadlock. Nicholas II didn't want war, either, and dynamically exchanged messages with the German Kaiser. Could they have come to an agreement?

Having seen the British guile, the Germans were ready to back-pedal. It means that here the orchestrators of the war had to ginger the things up, this time — on the Russian side, as in Berlin they were ready to avoid the war.

For the war to start it was necessary for both opponents, Germany and Russia, to mobilize their armies. If they did it, it would be impossible to prevent the war. But for the moment Russia has only announced partial mobilization, and in Germany mobilization hasn't yet started. However, the Germans will have to start it if Russia announces general mobilization — just because you can't sit and watch your neighbors mobilizing their troops.

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[1] Sukhomlinov V. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2005. P. 492.

[2] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 69.

How could they make Nicholas II take this fatal step if he resisted it? It was necessary to show him that Germany was already in mobilization when there was not even a trace of it. This means it was necessary to deceive the Russian Tsar and make the Russian actions look like a response to the nonexistent German actions…

The historians don't like to write about it. Not because they don't know about it but because they can't explain it. It is easy to find this information, but under the concept of Germany the Aggressor, which all of a sudden started a war, this is hard to explain consistently.

***To make Nicholas II announce the general mobilization someone in Germany initiated publishing a newspaper that contained a fake announcement of the German mobilization!***

Let's give the stand to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, this is what he wrote in his memoirs,

"About noon on June 30, an extra issue of the Lokal Anzeiger appeared in Germany that told of mobilization of the German Army and navy. Sverbeyev's telegram about it was sent to Petrograd plaintext in a few minutes after the newspaper had been issued, and I received it two hours later. Soon after sending his telegram, Sverbeyev was called on the phone by Von Jagow, who told him that the message on the German mobilization was fake. Without any delay, he telegraphed me about it, but this time his telegram arrived in my hands much later. ***The story of the news on the German mobilization published is still isn't clear.***"[1]

In the German capital, a newspaper was issued (an extra issue, as Sazonov calls it) that contained a message on mobilization. A FAKE ONE! It aimed to provoke Russia for it to announce mobilization, The Germans instantly reacted to this fraud and called the ambassador to refute it. However, for reasons unclear, the second telegram Sverbeyev sent to Petersburg was delayed, or, strictly speaking, was delayed on purpose. The message in that newspaper made Nicholas II agree to announce general mobilization!

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[1] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 220.

"Nobody was surprised that Russia attended to this message and that the decree on the army mobilization was trusted more than the one on its refuting… these weren't just some rumors, this was a certain message in an extra issue of the semiofficial newspaper," Sazonov writes.[1]

This was how a provocation was used to trigger World War 1. It was after this fake German mobilization that the events instantly became irreversible. It was two days before the war…

"This story has a different side that hasn't been covered as much. This is a matter of delaying the second Sberbeyev's telegram, in which he refuted the first one, having been called by Von Jagow. The most obvious explanation of this fact that suggests itself is that the second telegram was delayed on purpose. However, there is no evidence to that, and there can't be any…"[2]

Who organized this provocation? Was it Germany that wanted to make Russia look as an aggressor, to make it announce mobilization first? No, this isn't a good version, if this had been the case, the Germans wouldn't have declared the war on Russia just a day later.

So, who did it?[3]

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[1] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 220–221.

[2] Ib.

[3] First telegram No. 142 was sent at 1:10 p.m., and the one refuting it — at 1:15 p.m. (Sukhomlinov V. Memoirs. P. 494). However, Sazonov insists that he received it two hours later, at 3:15 p.m. It is unclear when the second telegram arrived, actually. But we know that Minister of War Sukhomlinov learnt that it was decided to announce general mobilization at about 2:00 p.m. (Op. cit. P. 295). Saznonov writes that Nicholas accepted him at 3:10 p.m. and his report ended at 4:00 p.m. Then they had a conversation, where the decision was made (Sazonov S. Memoirs. P. 224). What do we have here, then? According to the source provided above, Minister Sazonov reported to the Emperor and didn't have any telegrams from Berlin, but still reported to him about the German mobilization and the necessity of immediate counter-measures. How did Sazonov know it? From the message of Markov, the correspondent of the Petersburg telegraph agency in Berlin (Op. cit. P. 495). If it is true, we have a plot at hand. The plot of the Tsar's circle purposed to draw Russia into the war.

Having been misinformed, on July 30 (17) Nicholas II wrote an order on general mobilization, It was to start on July 31 (18.07) 1914. And the chain reaction started. From Berlin, it seemed that despite the peaceful assurance of its Tsar, Russia announced not partial (only against Austria-Hungary), but general mobilization, which meant it was directed against Germany as well. This couldn't remain without an answer. Germany imposed the "Kriegsgefahr" (military threat) law. The Berlin command was really much surprised with the behavior of the Russian Tsar. On the day when Nicholas decided to announce general mobilization, the Germans started to act in accordance with the mediating liabilities they had accepted. "On July 30, I met with the German ambassador once again, and he asked me if we could do with the Austro-Hungarian promise not encroach on the Serbian territorial integrity, and asked to indicate under which terms we would agree to postpone our military preparations," Sazonov wrote in his memoirs (being either a villain or an idiot).[1]

Thanks to Lord Grey, the situation was rather grave for Berlin: Austria was already at war with Serbia. Russia was at mobilization, and thus, Berlin was also getting ready to start mobilization, but the German preparations were followed by the French

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Could Sazonov have been an idiot? Why would he try to embroil his own country into the war? There are two answers possible here — he could have been a traitor or a fool used blindly. And if we recall that it was he who kept up wearisome correspondence with the "allies" about handing the straits to Russia after the war, we will instantly understand who used him. The British and the French. What did they promise him? They promised to hand the straits over, but to do it there was a war needed, and the Tsar didn't want the war. Thus, we need a small deceit for a great purpose. But Sazonov didn't print the announcement on his own, did he? And whoever did it had even agreed about the publishing time with him in advance. They had been persuading Nicholas until the refutation from the Russian ambassador arrived. And when it arrived, there was no way back, the Tsar couldn't cancel mobilization twice over two days and not lose his face. The telegram about the general mobilization was sent to the military districts at 6 p.m. on July 30 (17) 1914.

[1] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 218.

mobilization. The Germans had no choice — if they had temporized and taken no action, Russia could have stricken Austria. Germany would have to support its ally, and France would have to support its ally. Then Great Britain would join the war. This was a dead-end that left almost no chance for victory. The second variant was offered to Germans by Sir Grey directly: they could fight Russia alone if they took the initiative. He even offered them a reason — Russian mobilization directly threatened the security of the Reich. Thus, the British were pushing both Germany and Russia into a war. The bonfire was set aflame on both sides.

Having understood the British hint right, Berlin in the last moment tried to leave the dead-end that Wilhelm II had put himself in. His last chance was to make Russia, or to ask it (keeping the dignity, though) not to interfere into the Austro-Serbian conflict. But the Russians had to cease mobilization. "... The Russian mobilization made the war inevitable. Only a miracle could have averted the war at that moment," wrote the head of the German fleet.[1]

And Germany tried to make this miracle happen. On July 31 (18), at midnight, the German Ambassador Pourtales delivered an ultimatum to Russia and demanded that mobilization should be cancelled in the nearest 12 hours and "precise explanation provided in regard to that matter."[2] If Russia didn't cancel mobilization till 12 p.m. of August 1 (July 19), Germany was going to announce general mobilization, too.

Along with his diplomats acting, the German Kaiser sent a telegram personally to Nicholas II, desperately trying to be assured by the latter about a peaceful attitude of Russia. After having been deceived by the British, and having this odd Russian mobilization going on, the Kaiser wanted to receive not just words, but warranties of Russia's *peaceful attitude verified by deeds.* The dilemma was simple and tragic — either "cousin Nicky" would have a second thought and the war would be averted, or Germany would have to declare war on him and thus be at conflict with Russia alone. Just like Sir Grey promised the Germans. The Kaiser was almost desperate — he understood that the Russian Tsar was much calmer as he had the "allies" at his back. I mean, he still failed to understand all the circumstances.

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[1] Tirpitz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 291–292.

[2] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 116.

***Before midnight of July 31, 1914, the British government still had a chance to avert the global disaster if only it had announced that it definitely was going to join the war. The British didn't do it because they needed that war.***

These were the last peaceful hours. Telegrams were sent on either side.

Nicholas II to Wilhelm II, August 1 (19.07), 1914:

"I have received your telegram. I understand that you have to mobilize your troops, but I wish to get the same warranties from you that I've given to you (in the previous telegram Nicholas promised that "his troops won't take any provoking action," — *N. S.*), i.e., that these actions don't mean war and that we're going to proceed with negotiations for the good of our states and global peace we all care about. With God's help, our long tested friendship will prevent bloodshed. Weary and hopefully expecting your answer, Nicky."[1]

Wilhelm II to Nicholas II, August 1 (19.07), 1914:

"Thank you for your telegram. Yesterday I indicated to your government the only way to avoid war (to cancel mobilization). Despite I demanded your answer today by noon, my ambassador still hasn't brought me a telegram with your government's reply. For this reason, I had to mobilize my army. The immediate positive, clear and unambiguous answer from your government is the only way to prevent numerous miseries. Unfortunately, until I receive this answer I can't discuss the subject of your telegram. Anyway, I have to ask you to immediately command your troops to withhold even minor trespassing of our borders. Willy."[2]

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 81.

[2] Ib. P. 81–82.

The situation was more horrible as they had no chance of coming to an agreement, no matter how hard they tried — the events were turning irreversible. When Russia was at mobilization and wasn't going to cease this process, the only reasonable thing for Germany to do was to follow Sir Grey's advice and to declare war on Russia. At least, to do it formally and then to try to solve this problem informally, at the negotiation table. All in all, they could have proclaimed the war and immediately started their negotiation without any fighting.

Early on August 1 (19), Nicholas II welcomed the German ambassador. He heartily assured him that Russian mobilization wasn't a threat to Germany and didn't indicate any hostile intentions toward it, but it couldn't be stopped because the Russian territories were so extensive. Pourtales immediately reported about this conversation to Berlin, but the Germans didn't believe anyone on the say-so anymore,[1] *and de facto mobilization in Russia went on.* It was the second day of mobilization. According to the pre-war plans, perfectly well known in Berlin, on the 15th day the Russian Army was to be ready for the offensive.[2]

Late on August 1, the cornered Kaiser made a fatal thing. The German Ambassador to Russia Count Pourtales came to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov. "From the very start, Count Pourtales asked me if the Russian government was ready to positively answer the ultimatum delivered the day before. I answered negatively and said that while total mobilization couldn't be canceled, Russia still was eager to proceed with negotiations and a peaceful resolution of the disagreement.

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[1] If the Germans hadn't believed the words of the British, they wouldn't have ended in the trap arranged for them. Then the German government got wiser and didn't believe anyone. Unfortunately, it's too late.

[2] Under the pressure of the French, the Russian military command promised to attack on the 15th day of mobilization. This was nothing less than a crime. "This promise, carelessly given by the representatives of the Russian General Headquarters, put our troops, especially the ones in the North-Western Front, into a very difficult position. The latter was in the state of mobilization readiness on the 28th day only..." (Denikin A. The Path of the Russian Officer. M.: Sovremennik, 1991. P. 247).

Count Pourtales was very anxious. He repeated his question and emphasized the grave consequences of our refusal to consider the German demand for mobilization cancellation. I repeated the answer I had just given him. Taking a folded sheet of paper out of his pocket, he repeated his question in a faltering voice for the third time. I told him I couldn't give any other answer. With evident effort and deeply uneasy, he told me, "In that case, my government has entrusted me to deliver this note to you." With a shaky hand, Pourtales handed me a note that declared a war on us. It had two opportunities that were put in one text by a mistake of the German Embassy."[1]

In the books telling about World War 1 they rarely give the words of the note delivered by Pourtales and declaring the war. Meanwhile, the lines of that document are indicative of the fatal part of the false announcement regarding the German mobilization."

"His Majesty the German Emperor in accordance with Britain took pains to fulfil the mediator's part, ... when Russia without waiting for the results started general mobilization of its ground and naval forces."[2]

Thus, Germany proclaimed the war on Russia. And after that, all the miracles started again. Late on August 1, having received the German note declaring the war, the Russian Tsar sent a very long telegram to the British king. Fatigued, he visited the Empress at 2 a.m., had a cup of tea, then took a bath and was on his way to his bedroom when his personal attendant caught up with him, holding a telegram from Wilhelm II in his hand.

The Kaiser took the last desperate attempt to save them both. Such things had definitely never been seen in the history of diplomacy.

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[1] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 237.

[2] The Orange Book: Collection of Diplomatic Documents. St. Pb., 1914. P. 60.

***Seven hours after the war had been declared the Kaiser, who had instigated it, called for peace, asked to cease the battle actions that hadn't even started yet and to start peace talks!***[1]

Nicholas didn't answer, as his soul was full of indignation because of this unexpected war declaration...

And at this moment the Head of the British Diplomacy Sir Grey once again butted into the course of events to definitely set the Germans on Russia. To make sure that a local German-Russian war, where Britain would remain a passive onlooker, had started. At least, for the first time, while the opponents would be delivering series of depleting strikes at each other. This would be when Great Britain and the USA were to come onto the stage. Then they would easily dictate to debilitated Russians and Germans the terms of the new world order.

What about France, the ally of Russia? It also wasn't supposed to join the war, letting the Germans and the Russians annihilate each other to the top of their bent. We will talk later about how the alibi for Paris was "forged," but now let us return to the tumultuous Berlin. Two messages from London arrived in the German capital at a brief interval. The first told about the British warranties towards Belgium. The second was from the German Ambassador Lichnowsky. We need to mention it specifically. The German ambassador reported, "In case we don't attack France, Britain is going to remain neutral and guarantees that France will remain neutral, too."[2]

This message from London caused a thrill of joy in Berlin. It seemed that they had managed to avoid a disastrous war on two fronts, or even the war in general, as Russia became much more concessive when it remained alone. Still, the reality quickly abated Kaiser's high spirits.

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[1] Pourtales handed over the note of war at 7:10 p. m. on August 1, and at 2 a. m. on August 2 the telegram from Kaiser arrived proposing peace.

[2] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 126.

*In fact, the German Ambassador Lichnowsky didn't get the foreign secretary of Great Britain right!*

This is not a joke or an anecdote. This is a clumsy attempt to disguise the British part in the World War instigation. In fact, there are all the documents, telegrams, and diplomatic correspondence, and they show in black and white what the head of the British ministry of foreign affairs told the German ambassador. This was what he reported to Berlin. And now, the war is over, Germany is defeated, the Russian Empire is destroyed, all the objectives of this war are achieved. Now it is time to shift all the responsibility to the Germans and disguise the provocative part of Britain and the treacherous part of France. This is why they wrote the books with explanations that in a couple of decades became the official points of view.

The thing is that the truth can't be totally hidden even in such books. A typical example of a book written to hide the truth is "The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914" by Barbara Tuchman. Reading her explanations of incomprehensible things and circumlocutions is an unalloyed pleasure. Well, you can't get the Pulitzer Prize for nothing.

This is what Tuchman writes about this event, unprecedented in the history of diplomacy:

"Actually, Grey had not said quite that. What, in his elliptical way, he offered was a promise to keep France neutral if Germany would promise to stay neutral as against France *and* Russia, in other words, not go to war against either, pending the result of efforts to settle the Serbian affair. After eight years as Foreign Secretary in a period of chronic "Bosnias," as Bülow called them, Grey had perfected a manner of speaking designed to convey as little meaning as possible; his avoidance of the point-blank, said a colleague, almost amounted to method. Over the telephone, Lichnowsky, himself dazed by the coming tragedy, would have had no difficulty misunderstanding him."[1]

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 126–127.

Differently speaking, the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the most powerful state of the world of that time and the ambassador of another superstate simply were idiots. One spoke senseless speeches, and the other failed to understand him but didn't ask again. And the war already was at their threshold, one false move or unclearly expressed idea could come at a price of millions of lives…

Further actions of the German military command perfectly well demonstrated why Sir Grey had been so word-bound and why he had been asking Germany to fight with Russia alone. It is very simple. The essence of this matter was shortly and accurately defined by one of the leaders of the German Army, General Erich Ludendorff, "An offensive against Russia and defense in the west under the actual conditions would in advance mean, as multiple military games have shown, a long war, and thus they were discarded by General Count von Schlieffen."[1]

The hasty declaration of the war on Russia caused great surprise among the commanders of the German armed forces. According to all thoroughly drafted plans, they needed to fight with France first. Grand Admiral Tirpitz, the commander of the German fleet, failed to understand the actions of his command, either, "*Thus, I don't know the answer to the enigma of us announcing the war first.* We must have done it due to our formal and legal conscientiousness. The Russians started the war without announcing it, whereas we didn't think it possible to defend before declaring a war… In my opinion, we had to use our advantage, our defensive position at the Russian Front to have Russia declare war on us first."[2]

***The Germans couldn't attack Russia during the early stage of the war, they didn't want it and weren't ready for it.*** To understand it, you just need to look through the German plan of military actions. It was called "The Schlieffen Plan," after the head of the German General Staff, who had discarded the idea of the attack on the Russians. He didn't do it because of much love to our country, he had been planning a possible war under the condition of the Franco-Russian alliance in cold blood and in terms of the iron Prussian logic. Having such a plan doesn't give evidence to extreme aggressiveness of the "German imperialism" — even today every country has a military plan. Every member of the conflict in 1914 also had a plan, and they used these plans to mobilize their troops.

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914–1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 141.

[2] Tirptiz A. Memoirs. M.: Voenizdat, 1957. P. 292–293.

The plan of Alfred von Schlieffen, the head of the German General Staff, said:

1. The war with France is inevitable.
2. Under the actual political conditions, it can only be a war on two fronts.
3. The only chance to win is to crush the opponents separately.
4. A quick victory over the Russian Army is impossible because of the Russian conditions and its terrain.
5. Thus, it is necessary to attack in the west and to defeat in the east.
6. It was necessary to crush the French Army before the Russian Army sprang up completely. This could be done during the encircling operation.
7. The French line of fortresses can't be breached quickly and thus, should be passed over.
8. Such passage over is possible only along territories of the neutral Belgium and Switzerland. The terrain in the latter made this scenario unacceptable.[1]

This graceful German military logic made it necessary to deliver a blow on France — and not simply to attack it, but to infract the Belgian neutrality. This was the right thing to do because the real enemy of the Germans was France, which desired to get back the debatable Alsace and Lorraine. That was why the German General Staff planned to defeat it in the first place. Russia was in the second place of interest to the Germans: if the war with it started at the Eastern Front, it would be better to hunker down. This is what we got — if loose reign was given to the case, the German Army would start smashing the French first, not the Russians. Just because they have been getting ready for it over twenty years and couldn't simply change it in one day.

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 131.

Intelligence services have been there all the time, and the conclusions made by von Schlieffen weren't a secret to anybody. It was absolutely clear that the Germans would have to infract the neutrality of Belgium. This was why even prior to any military action London sent its warranties of the Belgium neutrality. It was just one more remainder of the *correct way* for Germany to act. To defeat France they needed to go through Belgium, but in that case Britain would join the war. If Berlin wanted the British to remain neutral, they had to strike in the east against the German plans, against any better judgment, against everything!

*They needed to corner the Germany to make it really fight with Russia.* This was what Sir Grey was trying to do. In fact, no one could guarantee that the Russian Army, barely having prepared, would start to attack the Germans on its own. The British couldn't expect such a gift from Nicholas II (although, this would actually happen). They aren't fools there in London, they understand perfectly well that the cleverest thing for the Tsar's government to do is to get ready for the war but not to fight actually, to stay quietly at the border and watch the German and the French at battle. To get ready for the fight formally, but not fight actually. To do the same thing the British themselves were going to do.

Then the French will get weakened, as while the Russians stood at their wait-and-see position, the French will be defeated. The war will go not the way its orchestrators want. Instead of Russia and Germany destroying each other, it is heading to crushing France. After that, Germany was likely to make peace with Russia, as they had no reason to fight further. Instead of destroying their geopolitical rivals the British could make one of them much stronger. Hence, the British are playing a very fine game, and losing it is going to cost a fortune. It is the global power, no less, at stake. And the way to it for Great Britain lies over the hecatombs of the Russian and German soldiers that might (not must, it will take some extra effort) lead to an internal explosion of the opposing empires. However, to make all of this happen, a military conflict had to start between Berlin and Petersburg.

The German military supreme command was really puzzled. The Kaiser didn't explain to his military men what a dirty game the British were playing, how they were almost dragging Germany to the east by the scruff of its neck. And the rationally thinking German generals and admirals were really shocked with such conduct of the government, They knew perfectly well that there is no need in such a hasty declaration of war on Russia, according to the German war plan. It demanded the quickest start of the battle actions against France. Any delay of battle action in the east could bring the Germans only good. Why was it necessary to announce a war and take the disgrace of the attacker if Germany didn't plan to invade Russia? Why would you proclaim a war on a state that you are only going to defend from?

Amusing, but almost every historian writing about World War 1 asks the same question. And they always fail to answer it — because they are looking for the answer in Berlin, whereas it is concealed in the corridors of the British ministry of foreign affairs!

Meanwhile, the German diplomats are getting as puzzled as the military men. As Berlin has proclaimed the war, Italy[1] decides that in this critical moment it is good for it not to support its allies, Germany and Austria, and decides to remain neutral. Later, the Italians even acted on the Entente's side. The fact is that according to the agreement with Germans and Austrians Italy had to act on the side of its allies *only in case of a defensive war.* As it were the Germans that had proclaimed the war, the lovers of pizza and pasta had a legal motive not to help them. Thus, the German diplomats were perplexed — why proclaim the war on Russia with that haste, if it caused losing the Italian ally? Let the Russians have the disgrace, then Italy would have to declare a war on them.

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[1] On the verge of World War 1 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were covenanted with the allied agreement, By the way, Romania was also obliged to protect Germany from France, though it was released from it when the Germans were proclaimed war.

Without knowing the reasons of its own government mysterious conduct, the German military men on the verge of the coming conflict acted in accordance with their long-drafted plans. When Wilhelm, wishing to avoid the war with the Germans and hoping for the French neutrality, ordered to move all the troops to the east, the Head of the General Staff Moltke countered it and refused to fulfil this order. "Your Majesty, — Moltke said to the Kaiser, — it can't be done. We can't improvise relocating millions of soldiers. Your Majesty insists that we send all the troops to the east, but the troops won't be ready to fight. This will be a disorganized armed crowd without any supply system. It has taken a year of the most patient labor to establish this system." [1]

The order to send the troops to the east instead of the west was against *every* plan, and changing the plans in such a short term was impossible. The Germans didn't even have a finished plan for railway transportation and concentration of the troops on the Russo-German border, let alone the plans of military action.

The situation was stalemate. In the military history it has always been like that: first, mobilization, then the war declaration, then the military action. In 1914, it was absolutely another way round with the Germans — at first there was the break of diplomatic relations, then, on August 1, they declared war on Russia and at the same time started to mobilize their troops.[2] No battle action at all. Moreover, after having mobilized the Germans manned the defense. What a nonsense! Why did they declare the war then? They could have acted on the defensive even without announcing the war.

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 129.

[2] At 5 p. m., August 1, 1914.

This was unprecedented — before then, war declaration had been the prerogative of the attacker. It was the aggressor that was to declare war for descending upon the enemy "with a clear conscience." In 1914 everything went wrong for the Germans: Germany needed to crush France, but declared war on Russia. Because of the latter, they needed to transfer their troops to the east, but they were only allowed to send them to the west. Everything the German did looked like absolute idiocy. With one provision, though — if we forget about the "hints" from Sir Grey for a moment. And on the contrary, if we remember about them, we can only agree that the Germans couldn't have acted in any different way.

However, while the Kaiser was swearing with his generals, the old prewar plan of the German mobilization was being fulfilled, and the army was concentrating at the western borders instead of the eastern ones. The Head of the General Staff Moltke was trying to explain an obvious truth to his monarch. If the German Army was transferred to the east, Germany would be absolutely helpless in case France attacks.

After so many twists and turns of the British and so awkward conduct of the Russians, they didn't believe anybody's word. And here Moltke put out his last trump card. According to the Schlieffen plan, the 16th German division *was already advancing* to Luxembourg and was about to cross the border. The Kaiser and his chancellor, panic-struck, demanded to stop the troops, as after all, in case the neutrality of Luxembourg was infracted, the British might join the war. The division was stopped literally a kilometer away from the border, sending the stop order over the phone.[1]

And then yet another telegram arrived from London. This time it was from the British King George. It was the answer to the last Kaiser's message.[1] The British monarch said he didn't have the slightest idea of any British guarantees in regard to the French neutrality.[2]

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[1] MacDonogh G. The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous. M.: AST, 2004. P. 556.

Wilhelm II was desperate. Made to obey Sir Grey and having declared the war on Russia, he surely hoped the conflict to be restricted to that, and now London was being devious again and avoided undertaking the obligations in regard to France not backstabbing the German Army. The mobilization in France was going at full drive, the naval and ground forces were completely assembled to strike. And the Kaiser had only one way out, he had to address the French.

The Germans sent their inquiry asking if Paris was going to remain neutral as early as on July 31 (18). Quite recently, in April, during the parliamentary election in France, Pacifists had *accidentally* won. The new Prime Minister Viviani also was the peace-lover and he would have been happy to avoid the war. It wasn't a big deal that he betrayed his Russian allies that way. Didn't care a curse that President Poincare "La Guerre" promised something different in Petersburg. Never mind that Viviani personally accompanied him during his visit to the Russian monarch.[3] They had democracy in France, and the prime minister's opinion shouldn't necessarily coincide with the president's one. It was very convenient that the left hand wasn't responsible for the right one. In one word, the honorable French leaders played a good cop and a bad cop game. However, they went beyond just talks: not answering the inquiry of the Germans in regard to their conduct in the current situation, on July 31 (18), France moved its troops ten kilometers away from the border "to prove the peacefulness of France and to avoid occasional incidents and provocations."[1]

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[1] Trying to get off the hook, the Kaiser attempted to make arrangements with France for it to remain neutral and not to interfere into the developing conflict. Here is the telegram he sent to the British king, "On technical grounds mobilization, which had already been proclaimed this afternoon, must proceed at two fronts — east and west — as prepared. This can't be countermanded, and I am sorry the telegram from your cabinet came so late. But if France offers me neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the British fleet and army, I shall, of course, refrain from attacking France and employ my troops elsewhere. I hope that France will not become nervous. The troops on my borders are in the act of being stopped by telegraph and telephone from crossing into France."

[2] MacDonogh G. The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous. M.: AST, 2004. P. 557.

[3] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 21.

*The Germans were given a hint: don't be afraid and don't hesitate to declare war on Russians.*

Seeing the French drawing their troops away, the German command really believed that Britain and France weren't going to interfere into the conflict and declared a war on Russia, unexpected by anybody. On the next day ***after the Germans had proclaimed a war on Russia,*** France proceeded with its vile game. The French had a task that was similar to the one of the British — they had to keep the Germans sure that they weren't going to interfere, not giving any documented proof to that, which the Russians could have learnt about, thus ruining the entire game.[2] That's why in reply to the German inquiry the answer was rather equivocal, "France is going to act as it may be good for it." Understand it as you wish. Mind that BEFORE the Germans declared a war on Russia they were given an answer as equivocal, and it was done for the only purpose — to make the Kaiser believe that he would have to fight Russia alone. Not saying yes or no, the French provided excessive evidence of their "peacefulness" to the Germans.

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 136.

[2] There are many examples in history when those who just were enemies became friends and fought against their former allies. The most demonstrative example are the Napoleon wars, where the fellows-in-arms changed several times. At the same time, a demonstrative case "with documents" took place. During the Hundred Days, Napoleon captured some documents in Paris that contained evidence of the obvious betrayal of the Russian interests by Austria and Britain. He instantly redirected them to the Russian tsar, but at that time Alexander I didn't change his policy. Now let's recall the year of 1914. Imagine, the French MFA would officially reply to the Germans that France was going to break the Russo-French agreement and wasn't going to march against Germany. The next day this document would be on the table of Nicholas II. And there wouldn't have been any German-Russian war.

*The French signed the mobilization order on July 31 (18) and put the date of August 1 in it.* "At the same time, the decision for 10-kilometer withdrawal of the troops was verified. On the order of the President of the Republic, not a single unit, patrol, detachment or soldier was allowed to get to the east from the indicated line. Whoever broke this order was subject to the court martial."[1]

Ask yourself a question: why would France do it? According to the Russo-French agreement, France was obliged to do the opposite — "if Russia is attacked by Germany or by Austria supported by Germany, France shall use all of its powers to attack Germany." As soon as Germany or Austria announced mobilization, "France and Russia, considering no other agreements need to be made in that regard, shall instantly and at once mobilize all their armed forces and transfer them as close to their borders as possible... These forces should as soon as possible start the battle action for Germany to have to fight in the west and in the east at once."[2]

How could Paris have avoided fulfilling the clauses of the Franco-Russian agreement, which CLEARLY stipulated that in case Germany attacked Russia France was to proclaim a war on it? How could France save its face and not fulfil the agreement?

There is a nuance here. The thing is that the Franco-Russian agreement was a confidential document. For the first time, it was published by Bolsheviks right after they came to power — along with other classified diplomatic documents. Early in August 1914, the Franco-Russian agreement hadn't been published yet, though it was signed and ratified by the Russian and French governments. Under the law of the French Republic, to declare a war the Parliament, which was said to be unaware of this agreement, had to give its consent. If the Parliament didn't agree, the war on Germany couldn't be proclaimed. You can read about it in the book by Barbara Tuchman, "The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914":

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. M.: AST; St. Pb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999. P. 141.

[2] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. 1999. P. 140.

"These terms appeared unequivocal but, as Isvolsky[1] had anxiously queried Poincare in 1912, would the French Parliament recognize the obligation? In Russia, the Tsar's power was absolute, so that France "may be sure of us," but "in France, the Government is impotent without Parliament. Parliament does not know the text of 1892... What guarantee we have that your Parliament would follow your Government's lead?"[2]

Thus, the French Parliament could help find a nice way out of the situation and leave the war to Russia and Germany alone. The same Barbara Tuchman openly writes that the German command was given transparent hints that such conduct of Paris was possible.

Let me remind you that the author won a top award. It might be because all along she blames the Germans for aggression and fixes the entire responsibility for instigation of World War 1 on them. I mean, she can hardly be suspected of following the conspiracy theory or the antipathy towards France of Great Britain. This makes her evidence, which has never been contradicted, even more valuable.

"A colleague of Bethmann's[3] came to beg him to do anything he could to save Germany from a two-front war and suggested a means. For years a possible solution for Alsace had been discussed in terms of autonomy as a Federal State within the German Empire. If offered and accepted by the Alsatians, this solution would have deprived France of any reason to liberate the lost provinces. As recently as July 16, the French Socialist Congress had gone on record in favor of it. But the German military had always insisted that the provinces must remain garrisoned and their political rights subordinated to "military necessity." Until 1911 no constitution had ever been granted and autonomy never. Bethmann's colleague now urged him to make an immediate public, and official offer for a conference on autonomy for Alsace. This could be allowed to drag on without result, while its moral effect would force France to refrain from attack while at least considering the offer. Time would be gained for Germany to turn her forces against Russia while remaining stationary in the west, thus keeping England out."[1]

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[1] The Russian Ambassador in France.

[2] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. 1999. P. 140.

[3] The German chancellor when World War 1 started.

Everything is so plain and cynical. Germany was offered a FORM in which France was able to stay out of the war, thus keeping its face. And Great Britain would be able to remain neutral, too. Germany was to fight Russia only.

Who was this mysterious "colleague" who made such a proposal to the Germans? The winner of the Pulitzer Prize writes, "The author of this proposal remains anonymous, and it may be apocryphal." All the fog once again, once again it is consider as you wish. However, those aware of the consequent "miracles" of the Russian Revolution can easily guess which country's intelligence sent a person to the German chancellor...

The most surprising thing is that the author accuses the Germans, who rejected this proposal, of... aggression.[2] As if the war with Russia wasn't a war at all, just so. It was okay, whereas fighting with Anglo-Saxons and the French would have been a real crime...

Later on, the French demanded that Nicholas Romanov should attack, even though his army wasn't ready yet. Throughout the entire war, they would demand, not ask — give us some Russian soldiers, give us support, give us concessions, etc. And the Tsar would agree. But why? Because he was absolutely sure that France fulfilled its duty as an ally. Now Russia had to fulfil its duty.

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. 1999. P. 124–125.

[2] "The opportunity was there, and the chancellor could have thought of it by himself... Instead of offering France and inducement to stay neutral, the German government sent her an ultimatum at the same time as the ultimatum to Russia." (Ib. P. 125).

Was it tragic blindness? No, he wasn't aware of everything that is known to us now. He didn't have the document that researchers possess today. Nicholas II can't be blamed. You know, in almost every book about World War 1 you will read about our French allies, who supported Russia in the hour of need. These historians read the same documents and memoirs as your obedient servant, but failed to understand a thing, though being in possession of all the information…

Still, let's get back to our "true allies." Instead of directly declaring war on Berlin on August 2 (July 20), as their duty of an ally (and the agreement!) required, the French put up a real fuss. Motives of our Entente allies remind of childish babble. On August 1 (July 19), the Russian Ambassador in Paris Isvolsky reported, "For political reasons… it was very important for France for its mobilization not to precede the German one, but to be a reply to it," that "it would be better if the war was proclaimed not by France, but by Germany."[1] The French Marshal Joffre as early as on August 2 (July 20) wrote to his commanders that "for national motives of moral type and for pressing reasons of diplomatic origin it is necessary to place on the Germans as much responsibility as possible for starting the hostile activities."[2] In fact, it was an easy thing — our true "allies" still hoped to set Germany on Russia alone. This is why they produced all this diplomatic trash.

***This is a breach of the "allied" agreement, a betrayal on the first day of the war, an anticipation for the Germans to***

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[1] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy"; www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110#9

[2] Ib.

***start fighting Russia alone against their own war plans and common sense.***

It could have gone that way, and the French might remain on the pages of history books as traitors, but the Germans managed to save their face. They proclaimed a war on France and thus ruined the plan of a local Russo-German war, which was to mutually weaken the two opponents of Great Britain.

Why did Germany do it? Would you believe the French neutrality after all this lousiness? Would you believe that it wasn't going to strike you in the rear after you got weakened in the senseless war with Russia? By the way, why fight Russia if you need to ruin France and remove from the agenda the matter of its revenge?..

On August 2 (July 20), 1914, the German government delivered an ultimatum to Belgium, demanding to let the German troops pass through the Belgian lands towards the French borders, as the Schlieffen Plan required it. On August 3 (July 21), Belgium rejected the demand from the Germans and turned to Britain for help. That day Germany understood that there was no more time for any delay and declared war on France, making the whole world see it as a blatant aggressor. Only after that, the British delivered an ultimatum to Germany, demanding not to impinge Belgium's sovereignty. And as we see, the Germans couldn't have observed that demand. On August 4 (July 22), Great Britain joined the war in its "white" clothes of the Belgian freedom protector...

The backstage activities of Sir Grey had finally brought the long-awaited results. In mere days the German-Russian and Austro-Serbian conflicts got the necessary global scale. It was the beginning of the most severe war the humanity had seen by the start of the 20 century. It had been virtuously prepared by the British government. The traces of this preparation are still being thoroughly concealed. However, if you read the books about World War 1 attentively, you will see the gold nugget of truth in the enormous dumps of lies. The British Royal Fleet met the global slaughter at full combat readiness, fully mobilized, this is what the books tell us. And the order for mobilization of the British sailors was given on July 10 (June 27) 1014, which was long before the similar actions of the other members of the conflict.[1] *This was a mere coincidence* — the historians tell us. However, Winston Churchill, who was the British secretary of the navy early in the war, later said something different, "Never in the recent three years have we been better prepared."[2] And he was right: the excellent, perfect military preparation is never accidental. It is the result of many years of systematic work. It is the result of titanic efforts of the military command, the political highest ranks of the country, its diplomats, and spies. That was why, having held the military training the fleet was said to have been mobilized for, the British didn't let anyone go home.[3] That was how the full-strength "peaceful" British fleet entered the war to protect the Belgians from the "aggressive" Germany, which had only started its mobilization...

Here are some more facts that hardly can be explained by the historians writing about the Germans and Austrians, who instigated World War 1 as they were going to ruin Russia and France. Austria-Hungary didn't haste to declare war on Russia. It did it only on August 6 (July 25), in six (!) days after Germany.

There was an interesting situation. Russia was mobilizing under the threat of ***possible*** Austrian attack. At least, this is the version provided in every Russian document of that time. However, it was Berlin that declared war on us, and Vienna only did it in a week. Just like the Germans, the Austrians didn't undertake any offensive action on the Russian Front. Carl Mannerheim, whose unit was opposite to the Austrian one, writes about the first days of the war, "We were looking forward to attacking the Austrians, but days passed on, and Russia and Austria-Hungary *wouldn't start the war."*[1]

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[1] Tuchman B. The First Blitzkrieg. August 1914. 1999. P. 147.

[2] Virtual book "The History of Diplomacy"; www.diphis.ru/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=110

[3] Sazonov S. Memoirs. Minsk: Kharvest, 2002. P. 205.

The story of this odd delay in the battle action and the surprisingly peaceful aggressors is rarely told by the historians. It is easy to get lost in the kaleidoscope of events that followed the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Some sources give dates according to the New Style, and some — according to the Old Style. This is done with only one purpose — to tangle up the chronology and to prevent anyone from knowing inside out who is to blame for the instigation of the dreadful war. Those who have ever studied history remember perfectly well the date when World War 1 started — August 1, 1914. And if such a person reads that, say, Cossack General Krasnov accepted his first battle in that war on August 4, they will never see how they are being misinformed.[2] Everything looks okay: the battles normally start right after the formal declaration of the war. *But in fact, the battle actions on the Russo-Austrian Front started only on August 12 (July 30). And it was even later on the Russo-German Front, on August 13 (July 31).* It is hard to deny this fact, but it can be concealed — manipulating dates and intentionally mixing up the Old and the New Styles. In fact, not three, but sixteen days had passed since the beginning of the conflict. It doesn't seem to be deception, but the essence of the events is really much distorted. And they need to be distorted, because otherwise, it will be hard to understand why it was the "defending" Russia and not the "attacking" Germany that started the offense!

Having declared the war, the German Kaiser incredibly surprised everyone in Petersburg. Not only his own military men were perplexed, but the Russian ones, too. Future historians that would have to study the origins of the conflict were going to be in trouble. The Russian Emperor was absolutely astonished. In his telegram dated August 2 (July 20), 1914, to the British King

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[1] Mannerheim C.G. Memoirs. M.: Vagrius, 1999. P. 47.

[2] Smirnov A. Hetman Krasnov. M.: AST, 2003. P. 47.

George V, sent on the next day after the German demarche, Nicholas II gave vent to his feelings, explaining his mobilization, "This sudden war declaration from Germany, *absolutely unexpected by me,* proves that I had a reason to do so..."[1]

Has there been a precedent in history when someone declared a war at the same time with mobilization? Who has ever started a war and the main stage of military preparation at once? Only Germany acted that oddly in 1942.[2]

Now, my dear reader, you must understand why it happened. Now you must be able to UNEQUIVOCALLY answer the question, "Who is the main culprit and the orchestrator of World War 1?"

The winners are never to blame...

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[1] Shatsillo V. World War 1 1914-1918. M: Olma-Press, 2003. P. 89.

[2] The aggressor is always ready for the war because he is the one to start it.

# ANNEX 2

# History of World War 1 Instigation

**(New Style)**

**June 28, 1914** — Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the Slavophile and opponent of war with Russia, was assassinated in Sarajevo.

**July 6** — The British Foreign Secretary Sir Grey made it clear to the German Ambassador Prince Lichnowsky that Britain didn't give Russia any security guarantees in case the latter enters a war with Germany and that Britain wasn't going to interfere unless the course of events posed a threat of "destruction to France."

**July 8** — Sir Grey told the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff that he had no doubt Austria-Hungary was going to attack Serbia and that Russia had to support Serbia, its ally.

**July 9** — Sir Grey confirmed to the German ambassador that "Britain had not entered into any secret binding agreements with France and Russia concerning war in Europe," and also that "Britain wanted to keep its hands totally free."

**July 10** — Under the guise of military training Britain starts mobilization of the Royal Navy.

**July 10** — Misled by the friendly assurances from the British, the German government believed that Great Britain would remain neutral in case of a military conflict.

**July 20** — The French President Raymond Poincare came to Russia to dovetail Russia's and France's military plans.

**July 22** — Sir Grey rejected the Russian Tsar's proposal that Russia, Britain, and Germany should step in and press Austria-Hungary to find a diplomatic solution to the Serbian problem.

**July 23** — The French President Poincare departed for France.

**July 23** — Austria-Hungary sent a 48-hour ultimatum to Serbia.

**July 23** — (after the ultimatum had been delivered) Sir Grey told the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Mensdorff that a war among the FOUR great states could do harm to the world trade...

**July 23** — After the peaceful statements of the British foreign secretary, the Austro-Hungarian government made sure that Great Britain was going to remain neutral. It was finally decided to declare war on Serbia.

**July 24** — Sir Grey, as if seeing the text of the Austrian ultimatum for the first time, told the discouraged Ambassador Mensdorff that "it was the most formidable document" of its type ever generated by diplomacy.

**July 24** — Sir Grey pointed out to the German Ambassador Lichnowsky that "in case Austria enters the Serbian land" four European states are likely to engage in a war.

**July 25** — The Serbians gave their answer to the ultimatum, having rejected only one of the multiple Austrian demands.

**July 25** — Austria-Hungary wasn't satisfied with the Serbian answer and broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia.

**July 25** — Sir Grey left unanswered the request of Sazonov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, who asked to "clearly and resolutely" criticize the policy of Austria-Hungary that was pulling the troops to the Serbian border.

**July 25** — The Russian ambassador to Britain reported that despite the absence of official guarantees he was sure Britain wouldn't remain neutral.

**July 26** — The British King George V privately told the Kaiser's brother that Britain wasn't going to join the war.

**July 26** — Sir Grey suggested that Britain, Germany, France, and Italy should serve as mediators to conciliate between Serbia and Austria. Germany rejected this offer after receiving multiple messages about the likely British neutrality. However, Sir Grey revoke his proposal for mediation even before the Germans had time to dismiss it. (The future alibi for Great Britain was being prepared, they were getting their peacemakers' suits ready.)

**July 26** — The British Navy "with no reference" to the accruing crisis organized a test mobilization and maneuver training. The British didn't dismiss the reservists , and the fleet remained in full commission.

**July 28** — Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian Army was ordered general mobilization.

**July 28** — Petersburg insisted that Britain should finally clarify its position.

**July 28** — The German Emperor Wilhelm returned to Berlin from his traditional sea trip to the Norwegian fiords.

**July 28** — The council of ministers led by Nicholas II due to the mobilization in Austria decided to start an immediate mobilization of four military districts, comprising 13 army corps, to be directed at Austria-Hungary. This was partial mobilization.

**July 28 (in the evening)** — Russia informed Germany about its mobilization arrangements "none of which were directed against Germany."

**July 29 (in the morning)** — An order for partial mobilization was issued in Russia.

**July 29 (in the morning)** — Petersburg didn't know if the Austrians had already crossed the Serbian border, but it was aware that certain mobilization arrangements were taking place at the Russo-Austrian border.

**July 29 (in the morning)** — Sir Grey had a meeting with the German Ambassador Lichnowsky but didn't share any essential information.

**July 29** — Germany demands that Russia should cease military preparations, otherwise Germany would have to announce mobilization, too, which could easily detonate a war.

**July 29 (between 6 and 7 p.m.)** — Nicholas II gave his consent for general mobilization.

**July 29** — Having been informed that general mobilization had started in Russia, Sir Grey told the German ambassador that the British government "would remain neutral as long as France and Germany stayed outside the conflict."

**July 29 (in the evening)** — The Berlin Government was shocked. The prospect of a dreadful war was hovering in front of Germany. Or it might be a war with Russia alone. ***In fact, Great Britain delivered an ultimatum to Germany: if you wish to avoid fighting Britain (which actually was the entire world), fight against Russia alone.***

**July 29 (in the evening)** — Trying to resolve the unexpected deadlock, Germany persuaded the Austrians to be content with the occupation of Belgrade as a security and to leave this case for consideration of the international mediators.

**July 29 (9:40 p.m.)** — Nicholas II received a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm, who asked to stop partial mobilization of the Russian Army and thus let Germany act as a mediator. As a result, the Tsar changed his decision: several minutes before sending the telegram he ordered to cancel general mobilization in Russia. Partial mobilization that had been announced before went on, though.

**Night of July 29/30** — Nicholas II phoned Minister of War Sukhomlinov and asked him if they could stop partial mobilization.

**July 30 (about 12:00 p.m.)** — A COUNTERFEIT issue of the German official newspaper Lokal Anzeiger announced mobilization of the German Army and fleet! The German government refuted this information through informing the Russian ambassador.

**July 30 (1:10 p.m.)** — The Russian Ambassador to Germany Sverbeyev sent two telegrams within five minutes. In the first one he reported about the German mobilization, in the second one he contradicts this information.

**July 30 (3:10 p.m.)** — The telegram from Ambassador Sverbeyev about the purport mobilization in Germany arrived in Petersburg. The second telegram that was sent only five minutes later, though, was delayed for no obvious reason.

**July 30 (15:10–16:00)** — Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov reported to the Tsar; the main subject of his report was general mobilization in view of the supposed mobilization going on in Germany.

**July 30 (after Sazonov's report)** — Nicholas II signed an order for general mobilization in response to the fake German mobilization.

**July 31 (about 2 p.m.)** — Having learnt about the Russian mobilization, Germany announced a state of "Kriegsgefahr" (military threat).

**July 31** — Germany sent an inquiry to France asking if France would remain neutral in case of the Russo-German war.

**July 31** — The French didn't answer the German inquiry, but the French troops were ordered to pull 10 km back from the German border.

**July 31 (midnight)** — The German ambassador delivered an ultimatum, in which Germany demanded that Russia should cease all military preparations in a 12-hour period, otherwise Germany threatened to start its own mobilization.

**July 31 — August 1** — Kaiser Wilhelm and Nicholas exchanged telegrams. The head of Germany indicated "the only way to avoid the war (cancelation of mobilization!)." The Tsar assured the Kaiser that mobilization didn't mean war.

**July 31 (in the evening)** — The French generals tried in vain to persuade the French government to announce mobilization in France.

**August 1 (8 a.m.)** — Commander-in-Chief of the French Army General Joffre threatened to step down if the French government did not order to start mobilization.

**August 1 (in the morning)** — Nicholas met with the German ambassador and assured him that the Russian mobilization was not a threat to Germany.

**August 1** — Great Britain provided security guarantees to Belgium.

**August 1 (11 a.m.)** — Paris replied to the German inquiry on its neutrality: France was going to act "in accordance with its interests."

**August 1 (about 12 p.m.)** — After giving the equivocal reply to the Germans it was decided to announce mobilization in

France, which was to start on August 2. And yet, publishing of this document was purposely delayed for several hours.

**August 1** — The German Ambassador Lichnowsky sent a message from London to Berlin, "If we don't attack France, Britain will remain neutral and guarantees French neutrality."

**August 1 (5 p.m.)** — Germany declared war on Russia — and at the same time announced mobilization.

**August 1 (in the evening)** — The Kaiser had a meeting with the German Army commanders; they were really surprised to hear the reasons for the hasty declaration of war on Russia coincident with mobilization. Wilhelm tried to persuade the General Staff to transfer the army to the east, not the west, contrary to all the plans. General Moltke flatly refused to do it. A phone call to the 16th division stopped it at the Luxembourg border.

**August 1 (in the evening)** — The Kaiser sent a telegram to the British King assuring him that the German Army would refrain from attacking France and would be employed elsewhere.

**August 1 (in the evening)** — The British King answered the Kaiser that he didn't have the slightest idea of any British guarantees in regard to the French neutrality.

**August 1 (2 a.m. on August 2)** — The Kaiser sent a telegram to the Russian Tsar asking to start peace negotiations.

**August 2** — France, obliged to proclaim war on Germany under the Franco-Russian agreement, didn't do so for a number of plausible reasons.

**August 2 (supposedly)** — Some person came to the German Chancellor Bethmann and offered to hold a German-French conference on the status of Alsace, as it could prevent France's joining the war. The Germans refused to approve of this shady undertaking.

**August 2** — The Kaiser decided to act in accordance with the Schlieffen Plan and attack France from Belgium and Luxembourg. Thus, the British plan for instigation of the German-Russian war alone was ruined, and the war became global.

**August 2** — Germany occupied Luxembourg.

**August 2** — Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium demanding free passage for the German Army on the way to the French border.

**August 3** — Belgium rejected the German ultimatum.

**August 3** — Great Britain demanded that Germany observes Belgium's neutrality.

**August 3** — Germany declared war on both France and Belgium.

**August 4 (in the morning)** — The German troops entered the Belgian territory.

**August 4** — Britain declared war on Germany on the pretext of protecting Belgium.

**August 6** — Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.

**August 12** — First battles at the Russo-Austrian Front.

**August 13, 1914** — First battles at the Russo-German Front, but it was not Germany, which had declared the war, that started the first offensive, it was Russia (much like if Hitler had declared war on us on June 22, 1941, but didn't attack, and thus the Red Army would start the assault).

And the bloody hell broke loose.

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*Nikolay Starikov*

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